


UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO DUPL



3 1761 00316163 5



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2009 with funding from
University of Toronto

YUSUF KHAN



KHAN SAHIB'S PALLIVASAL.
(Tomb of Yusuf Khan at Sammattipuram.)

YUSUF KHAN

THE REBEL COMMANDANT

"The bravest and ablest of all the native soldiers that ever served the English in India."—SIR JOHN MALCOLM.

BY

S. C. HILL

INDIAN EDUCATIONAL SERVICE (RETIRED)

FORMERLY OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THE RECORDS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

AUTHOR OF "THE LIFE OF CLAUD MARTIN," "THREE FRENCHMEN
IN BENGAL," AND "BENGAL IN 1756-1757"

WITH PLANS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

169269.

13. 2. 22

LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO.

39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON

FOURTH AVENUE & 30TH STREET, NEW YORK

BOMBAY, CALCUTTA, AND MADRAS

1914

TO
MY DEAR WIFE

CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	ix
I. EARLY CAREER OF YUSUF KHAN	1
II. ENTRY INTO THE ENGLISH SERVICE	7
III. THE RISE OF YUSUF KHAN	13
IV. MADURA	23
V. COLONEL HERON'S EXPEDITION TO MADURA AND TINNEVELLY .	33
VI. CAILLAUD AND YUSUF KHAN	47
VII. THE SIEGE OF MADRAS BY LALLY	72
VIII. YUSUF KHAN AS GOVERNOR	95
IX. THE CHANCES OF REBELLION	118
X. PREPARATIONS.	133
XI. FIRST SIEGE OF MADURA	145
XII. SECOND SIEGE OF MADURA	162
XIII. ATTEMPT TO STORM MADURA	199
XIV. BLOCKADE AND FALL OF MADURA	210
XV. CONCLUSION	226

APPENDIX I

Yusuf Khan's account of his services to the English	242
---	-----

APPENDIX II

M. de Maudave's defence of his conduct in assisting Yusuf Khan, p. 246. Note by M. Henneberg, p. 249. Extracts from M. de Maudave's <i>Relation</i>	250
---	-----

APPENDIX III

(a) The Surrender of Madura, p. 252. (b) Extracts from Marchand's <i>Precis Historique</i> , p. 258. <i>Note Historique</i> attached to Marchand's <i>Plan des Attaques de la Ville de Maduré</i>	266
---	-----

APPENDIX IV

Extracts illustrative of the character of the Nawab Muhammad Ali Khan	268
--	-----

APPENDIX V

	PAGE
References to Yusuf Khan, by Stringer Lawrence, p. 270; Robert Orme, p. 270; George Pigot, p. 272; John Caillaud, p. 273; Henry Vansittart, p. 275; Eyre Coote, p. 275; the Nawab, p. 275; the <i>Life of the Walajah</i> , p. 282; the Madras Council and the Court of Directors, p. 282; Thomas Pelling, p. 285; Sunku Rama, p. 285; Matthew Horne, p. 285; an Officer at Palamcottah, p. 286; George Nixon, p. 290; Joseph Smith, p. 290; Peixoto, p. 291; Sir John Lindsay and J. Macpherson, p. 292; George Rous, p. 294; Louis Bruno, p. 295; William Fullarton, p. 298; Anquetil du Perron, p. 299; John Sullivan, p. 299; Edward Cotsford, p. 300; Philip Dormer Stanhope, p. 301; <i>General Sketch of the History of the Southern Divisions of the Peninsula</i> , p. 301; Stephen Rumbold Lushington, p. 303; James Mill, p. 304; Sir John Malcolm, p. 305; James George Smith Neill, p. 307; Rev. G. R. Gleig, p. 307; H. Beveridge, p. 308; J. H. Nelson, p. 309; H. M. Vibart	312
AUTHORITIES REFERRED TO IN THE TEXT AND NOTES	313
INDEX	317-320

PLANS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

1. KHAN SAHIB'S PALLIVASAL (TOMB OF YUSUF KHAN AT SAMMATTI-PURAM (Sent me by Mr. Rangasami Naidu Garu)	<i>Frontispiece</i>
2. SKETCH-MAP OF SOUTHERN INDIA	page 8
3. VIEW OF MADURA IN 1794 (From Colonel J. Welsh's <i>Military Reminiscences</i>)	To face page 23
4. SKETCH-MAP OF SOUTHERN COROMANDEL	page 49
5. SKETCH-MAP OF THE COROMANDEL COAST FROM NELLORE TO TRICHINOPOLY	page 73
6. CONJECTURAL PLAN OF THE INVESTMENT OF MADURA	page 173
7. MARCHAND'S <i>PLAN DES ATTAQUES DE LA VILLE DE MADURÉ</i> <i>At end of book</i>	

INTRODUCTION

“ I saw a busy potter by the way,
Kneading with might and main a lump of clay ;
And lo ! the clay cried, ‘ Use me tenderly,
I was a man myself but yesterday ! ’ ”

OMAR KHAYYAM.

ON the evening of the 15th October, 1764, Muhammad Yusuf, Khan Bahadur, Governor of Madura and Tinnevely, was hanged as a rebel in front of the British camp before Madura, by order of Muhammad Ali, Nawab of Arcot.

The historical interest of this tragic event lies in the fact that the man thus executed, Muhammad Yusuf—better known in his time as Yusuf Khan—was by far the ablest of the Indian soldiers who fought in the early wars between the English and French for the possession of Southern India. In the words of Sir John Malcolm,

“ The name of this hero, for such he was, occurs almost as often in the page of the English historian [Robert Orme] as that of Lawrence or Clive.”¹

Orme’s History concludes abruptly in 1761, when Yusuf Khan had been nearly ten years in the service of the English and had arrived at the zenith of his reputation. His services, as we read in Orme, had on two occasions, viz. the campaign of Trichinopoly in 1752–4 and the siege of Madras in 1758–9, been of immense, if not of vital, importance to the English in the Madras Presidency, and during the years 1756–1761 he had, as their Governor, brought back to peace and prosperity the provinces of Madura and Tinnevely, which actually belonged to the Nawab, but had been placed by him under the control of the Madras Council.

Orme therefore has told us of the rise of Yusuf Khan, but the rest of his story—the transfer of Yusuf Khan’s services to

¹ *Quarterly Review*, May, 1818, p. 391. See Appendix V., p. 306.

the Nawab, his rebellion, and his fall—can now be gathered only from the Records of the Madras Government and the collection of Manuscripts which Orme bequeathed to the East India Company, and of which only a small number have hitherto been published. It seemed to me, therefore, well worth while, in the absence of any professedly authoritative account¹ of the life of Yusuf Khan, to attempt a sketch of the career of this extraordinary personage, who, beginning life as a humble peasant, raised himself by his military talent to high rank in the East India Company's service; then by his administrative ability, reduced to order the two most turbulent provinces of Southern India; and finally when compelled, as James Mill says,² to rebel against the Nawab in self-defence, managed to maintain himself against that Prince assisted by the whole available power of the English, for a period of nearly two years, falling at last only by the treachery of his own troops and not by the force of his enemies.

Yusuf Khan was, in fact, of the same type as Haidar Ali—one of those men of genius who naturally come to the front in times of great social or political unrest. Had he been left without outside interference to settle his quarrel with his native suzerain, like Haidar Ali with the Rajas of Mysore, there is absolutely no doubt that he would have succeeded in establishing his independence. As it was, the same Power in whose service he had risen to distinction was fated to be the effective agency of his ruin; still, in spite of his failure, in spite even of his execution as a rebel, it must be remembered that for many years, and those some of the darkest, Yusuf Khan had served the English faithfully; that in his last struggle he fought chivalrously and died gallantly; that amongst the people whom he had governed he left a reputation for ability, firmness, and justice; that, though he could win no pity from his mortal enemy the Nawab, his courage was admired and his fate lamented by the British soldiers who fought against him, whilst

¹ There exists indeed a Tamil poem, *The War of the Khan Sahib*, printed in 1911, which professes to tell the story of Yusuf Khan, but does not appear to be based on any authoritative documents.

² *The History of British India*, Vol. III. p. 388. See below, Appendix V., p. 305.

long after his death his administration of Madura and Tinnevely was spoken of in high terms by the British officials who held charge of those Provinces.

The two chief sources of information regarding the life of Yusuf Khan, viz. the Madras Records and the Orme Collection of Manuscripts in the India Office, have been already mentioned. These have been supplemented by some papers in the French and Dutch Archives and others in the British Museum, the Public Record Office, and the Bibliothèque Nationale, and I have made free use of a large number of printed books,¹ especially of those in which original papers have been published. I have much pleasure in acknowledging here the courtesy of the authorities of the French Foreign and Colonial Offices, and the Dutch Archives, in allowing me to consult papers in their possession. Monsieur A. Martineau, Governor of French India, Mr. A. G. Cardew, Secretary to the Madras Government, Mr. Rangasami Naidu Garu, Sarishtadar of the District Court of Ramnad at Madura, Colonel H. D. Love, Col. D. G. Crawford, Mr. H. Dodwell, and Mr. A. G. Ellis have given me much assistance, for which I am very grateful. Mr. J. V. S. Pope has kindly supplied me with an abstract of the Tamil Ballad, *The War of the Khan Sahib*. I am specially indebted to Mr. W. Foster of the India Office for constant advice and numerous suggestions, and, more particularly, for his kindness in looking through the proofs of this book.

I may perhaps anticipate criticism by acknowledging at once that I have, in various instances, included matter which does not refer directly to Yusuf Khan; my reason for so doing being that such matter, throwing light as it does upon the time and country in which, and the people amongst whom, Yusuf Khan lived, is necessary to place his career in its true perspective. As regards the spelling of names and places, I have, to avoid confusion, followed Bishop Caldwell² in using a single form for each name, even in quotations, indicating the

¹ See List of Authorities referred to in the Text and Notes, p. 313 below.

² See *A Political and General History of the District of Tinnevely*, 1881, by Bishop R. Caldwell. In the spelling of names I have followed as far as possible Beale's *Oriental Biographical Dictionary*, and the latest edition of the *Imperial Gazetteer of India*.

fact, however, by italics. Thus I write only *Yusuf Khan*, though the person so called appears variously in different documents as Esoof, Isoof, or Usoff Cawn, Mahomet Isoof, or Muhammad Yusuf, Cawn Saib or Khan Sahib, the Nellore Subadar, and the Commandant. Documents quoted have generally, apart from the names, been copied *verbatim et liberatim*, but translations in the Madras Records from vernacular letters have sometimes been slightly altered to make them more intelligible, and a few mistakes in translations from the French have been corrected where I have been certain of my ground by the existence of French versions of the same papers. The Sketch-maps, inserted to illustrate military operations, have been adapted—the spelling has been modernized—from Orme's maps, some of the places being added from indications given in his History, Indexes, or Manuscripts. In this connection I may mention that even the best modern maps of India will not serve for the eighteenth century, partly because Indian towns, and still more Indian villages, have a habit of shifting their sites considerably, and partly because, when such towns or villages have disappeared altogether, the frequency with which place-names recur sometimes causes the sites of particular events to be confused with others of the same name but in a quite different locality.

In conclusion, the second title of this book, viz. "The Rebel Commandant," is due to the fact that its country rendering, *Kamandán bághí*, was discovered by a wit in the court of Haidar Ali to form a chronogram, giving the year 1178 A.H. (*i.e.* 1764 A.D.), in which year Yusuf Khan was put to death.

S. CHARLES HILL.

1st May, 1914.

YUSUF KHAN: THE REBEL COMMANDANT

CHAPTER I

EARLY CAREER OF YUSUF KHAN

VERY little is known for certain of the early career of Yusuf Khan; the only sources of information being native tradition¹ or casual references by persons often not very well disposed towards him. Even the date of his birth is nowhere mentioned, and can be fixed only doubtfully and approximately by the fact that he is supposed to have enjoyed, *as a youth*, the protection of Jacques Law, who arrived in India in 1744.

According to tradition, Yusuf Khan was born a Hindu, of the Vellala caste, at Paniyur, in the district of Ramnad, his name being Maruthanayagam Pillai.² He is said to have been wild in his youth and disobedient to his parents. Finally, it is related, he ran away from home, became a Muhammadan, assumed the name of Muhammad Yusuf, and went to Pondicherry; where according to one French account he became a boatman,³ and according to another⁴ a tailor, but native tradition asserts that he entered the service of a European, by whom, after three years and a half, he was dismissed for

¹ The local traditions connected with Yusuf Khan are briefly recorded by Nelson in his *Madura Country*, III. 282-3. See Appendix V., p. 310.

² His Hindu name and many other details were communicated to me by Mr. Rangasami Naidu Garu, Sarishtadar of the District Court of Ramnad at Madura.

³ Marchand, *Précis historique des deux sièges de la ville de Maduré*, p. 7. See Appendix III. (b), p. 258.

⁴ Louis Bruno, *Journal d'un voyage fait aux Indes Orientales en 1764. Archives du Ministère des Colonies, Paris*, C² 98, p. 85 (n.). See Appendix V., p. 295.

2 YUSUF KHAN: THE REBEL COMMANDANT

some great fault. From the Nawab's letters¹ and the Tamil ballad, *The War of the Khan Sahib*, it appears likely that this European was, as I have said above, the Chevalier Jacques Law, and the French accounts concur with the Nawab in asserting that the cause of his dismissal was theft, in punishment for which his ears were cut off, either by the order of M. Law or that of the Court which disposed in the first instance of criminal cases in which natives of the country were concerned. As this shameful accusation was never mentioned until after the death of Yusuf Khan, and then only by those who, if not actually hostile, were certainly biassed against him, it may, I think, be dismissed as groundless. It is, however, very probable that, during his stay at Pondicherry, he made the acquaintance of another servant of M. Law, named Marchand, who also became a soldier and was destined to be the immediate cause of his downfall.

The French account² continues that, not wishing to live in a town where he had suffered such a disgrace, Yusuf Khan left Pondicherry and enlisted as a sepoy, first in the army of the King of Tanjore, and then in that of the Nawab Muhammad Ali, but the native tradition is that after his first dismissal he entered the service of another European, a Mr. Brunton,³ who took great pains with his education and had him instructed in various languages. Who this Mr. Brunton was is unknown, but it is a curious fact that the Laws were originally designated the "Laws of Brunton," until the father of John Law (the Financier and uncle of the Chevalier Jacques Law) styled

¹ Nawab to Council Madras, 30th Jan., 1770. *I.O. Records, Home Misc.*, 103. "His ears were cut off at Pondicherry by Mons. de Law for his roguery." As M. Law arrived in India in 1744 at the age of 20, and Yusuf Khan entered the English service with the rank of Subadar of a company of sepoys early in the year 1752, it seems unlikely that Law acted, if he did act, in this matter as a judge, and more likely that he was a master complaining of the conduct of his servant. The Nawab asserted that, when Yusuf Khan was hanged, it was seen by every one that his ears had been cut off, implying that he had concealed the mutilation from the public by the manner in which he wore his turban. Had this been the case, it is certain that some of the persons present at his execution would have been sufficiently struck by the fact to mention it, but no one did mention it until the Nawab did so in 1770. Marchand mentions it in his *Précis*, published in 1771, and Bruno in his *Journal*, which was written up to 1773.

² M. Bruno's *Journal*.

³ The *Tamil Ballad* confuses Mr. Brunton with Major Preston.

himself "Law of Lauriston." However this may be, this story makes it at least unlikely that there was any justification in the Nawab's assertion ¹ that Yusuf Khan was a mere illiterate person. Moreover, letters ² still exist which show that Yusuf Khan could read, and probably write, both English and French, and the Nawab himself tells us ³ that Yusuf Khan at one time served Muhammad Kamal ⁴ of Nellore as a physician, which certainly implies the possession of some education. As Yusuf Khan married a Portuguese woman and employed Portuguese clerks, it is probable that he knew their language; and the facility with which natives of southern India acquire foreign languages makes it probable that he was acquainted with more than one of the vernaculars in common use in the Carnatic. All this, however, is consistent with the possibility that Yusuf Khan had little or no acquaintance with polite learning. Haidar Ali himself was unable to read or write. Native tradition does not mention Yusuf Khan's service under Muhammad Kamal, but says that after leaving Mr. Brunton he entered the service of the Nawab, and after passing through the various posts of tandalgar, toll-collector, sepoy, naik and havildar, he finally reached that of Subadar or Captain of a company of sepoys. It was with this rank that, as Orme tells us, he entered the English service.

The unanimity of tradition as to the Hindu origin of Yusuf Khan is corroborated by the fact that he was often spoken of by the natives of Madura as "the Pillai," ⁵ a term applicable to both Brahmans and Vellalans, but in the Madura district almost synonymous with Vellalan; ⁶ that he was always

¹ Nawab to Council, March, 1759. *I.O. Records, Home Misc.*, 104. See Appendix V., p. 277.

² Orme MSS., 281.

³ Nawab to Council, 12th Feb., 1763. *Country Correspondence*. See Appendix V., p. 278.

⁴ Muhammad Kamal commanded a body of horse at the siege of Arcot, when it was defended by Clive in 1751 (Orme, *History*, I. 317). On the defeat of Raza Sahib by Clive, he set up for himself and seized the districts of Tirupati and Nellore. He was captured and beheaded by the Nawab in 1753. *Mil. Cons.*, 3rd Oct. 1753. The fact that Yusuf Khan was known at first as the *Nellore Subadar*, supports the statement that he had been in the service of Muhammad Kamal.

⁵ Caldwell, *Tinnevely*, p. 90.

⁶ Nelson, *The Madura Country*, II. 32.

4 YUSUF KHAN: THE REBEL COMMANDANT

on the best of terms with people of the Vellala caste; ¹ and that his tomb, near Madura, is still known by the half Muhammadan, half Hindu name of "the Khan Sahib's pallivasal." ²

Assuming, then, as a settled fact, that Yusuf Khan was born a Hindu and a Vellalan, there is much in this to explain his subsequent career. The Vellalans ³ are supposed to be descendants of foreign immigrants who entered the country of Madura about 900 A.D. A very numerous caste, speaking a pure dialect of Tamil, their proper occupation was that of agriculture, but they engaged in many others, including Government service and the army, though never in such employments as were considered to be personally degrading. Thus they were never artisans, barbers, tanners, tom-tom beaters, fishermen, hunters or jugglers. They belonged to the Saiva sect, and abstained from eating flesh or drinking intoxicating liquors. Polygamy was unknown among them, and the chastity of their women was jealously guarded. From this it is clear that the Vellala caste was highly respectable and self-respecting, that its members were likely to be of a very versatile natural disposition, and finally, as statistics show that amongst all the castes in Madura the Vellalans are in height and chest measurement surpassed only by the Maravans, ⁴ that they, though neither priestly Brahmans nor warlike Kshattriyas, were eminently qualified to distinguish themselves in any capacity, civil or military. Thus, in earlier times some of the most celebrated Tamil writers ⁵ had been Vellalans, and the great soldier, Arya Natha, ⁶ who founded the Poligar system in Madura, belonged to that caste. But though the caste system in India is more elastic than is sometimes imagined, it is in its essence rather protective than

¹ His Wakil or agent at Madras during the siege in 1758-9 was one Moota Pillay (*Orme MSS.*, 278, p. 13). His companion when he visited the Temple of Minakshi at Madura and decided to restore its revenues was Muttarughu Pillai (*Taylor, O. H. MSS., Pandion Chronicle*, p. 41). On the birth of his son he was presented with a golden cradle by Tandava Raya Pillai, Prime Minister of the Ramnad (*Mackenzie MSS.*, XVI. 5-13).

² Francis, *Madura*, p. 67.

³ Nelson, *The Madura Country*, II. 27.

⁴ *Ibid.*, II. 15.

⁵ Dubois, *Hindu Manners, etc.*, p. 274 (n.). Caldwell, *Tinnevely*, pp. 278-9.

⁶ Nelson, *The Madura Country*, II. 33; III. 104. Francis, *Madura* p. 42.

progressive, and places strict limits upon the aspirations of ability. So Arya Natha, we are told, was dissuaded from making himself king by a priest asking if he had ever heard of a Vellalan being raised to that dignity. For Yusuf Khan then to rise to the position to which he attained, it was necessary for him to be freed from whatever trammels might be imposed upon him by his religion. This was effected by his conversion—voluntarily or by force is unknown—to Muhammadanism; though to an orthodox Hindu mind such a change of religion, added to the accident of Vellalan birth, must have made his ultimate disastrous fall appear absolutely inevitable.

To a Muhammadan, on the other hand, the lowly birth of Yusuf Khan, though the Nawab, possibly aware of British prejudices, made this a matter of objection ¹ against him, was no hindrance to his success. As Orme says ² :—

“ There is no country in which the titles of descent are less instrumental to the fortunes of men than they are in Indostan ; none but those of the royal blood are considered as hereditary nobility ; to all others the exclusion is so absolute that a new act from the sovereign is necessary to ennoble even the son of the Grand Vizir of the Empire. The field of fortune is open to every man who has courage enough to make use of his sword, or to whom Nature has given superior talents of mind. Hence it happens that half the grandees of Indostan have arrived at the highest employments in the Empire from conditions not less humble ³ than that of *Anwaruddin Khan*, against whose accession to the Nawabship of the Carnatic the people had taken an aversion from causes independent of his personal character.”

Yusuf Khan's marriage to a Portuguese woman has already been alluded to. It is stated ⁴ that this took place at Arcot, but it is possible that the expression “ Parangi ” by which she was described was a mistake for Pondicherry, and that, as is stated in another account, she was a Pariah woman named

¹ Nawab to Council, 12th Feb., 1763, *Country Correspondence*. See Appendix V., p. 280.

² *History*, I. 53.

³ Orme (*History*, I. 52) says Anwaruddin Khan, who was the father of the Nawab Muhammad Ali, was himself only the son of a petty Khan at the Court of Aurangzeb.

⁴ Nelson, *The Madura Country*, III. 282. See Appendix V., p. 311.

6 YUSUF KHAN: THE REBEL COMMANDANT

Maza ;¹ though even this would not be decisive, for the poorer class of Christians, whether of purely native or of mixed birth, were at this time often confused with the Pariahs, and Maza might have been a Portuguese Christian and yet spoken of as a Pariah woman. On the other hand, if his marriage took place, as the native account seems to imply, at the time of the siege of Madras—a statement which agrees well with the fact that the only son, who is mentioned as having been born to Yusuf Khan, was born about 1762–3—it is as likely that she came from the Pondicherry as from the Arcot district.

¹ Tamil Ballad, *The War of the Khan Sahib*.

CHAPTER II

ENTRY INTO THE ENGLISH SERVICE

ACCORDING to Orme,¹ Yusuf Khan entered the English service by enlisting, with a company of sepoy's which he had raised himself in the Nellore District, under Clive shortly before the battle of Kaveripak.² It is just possible that he is the same man as the Muhammad Yusuf Khan who, with four others, signed an agreement,³ with Admiral Boscawen in 1748, to serve the English for three months against the French—an agreement immediately cancelled—or he may have been the "Moorman" recommended to the good offices of Clive by Richard Prince, Deputy-Governor of Madras, in his letter of the 15th September, 1751; ⁴ but it is more probable, for reasons which will shortly be given, that he was at first in the service of Chanda Sahib; and in fact this must have been the case if he ever actually served as physician to Muhammad Kamal, for the latter was one of Chanda Sahib's adherents.

At this time, though in Europe England and France were at peace, in India they were at war, for the rule of the Carnatic was contested between Muhammad Ali,⁵ whom the English supported as the rightful Nawab, and Chanda Sahib, the candidate put forward by the French. Of all the country between the river Kistna and Cape Comorin to which Muhammad Ali

¹ *History*, I. 346-7.

² See p. 9 below.


³ *Country Correspondence*, 1748, No. 19.

⁴ *Orme MSS.*, 287, p. 103.

⁵ For convenience' sake I shall hereafter refer to this Prince simply as the Nawab. His claim was not acknowledged by the French until the treaty of Paris in 1763. Both the Nawab and Chanda Sahib claimed to have received *farmans* or grants of the Nawabship of Arcot from the Great Mughal; but *farmans* were easily forged, and no importance need be attached to the assertion of either of these Princes. See p. 32 (n.) below.

8 YUSUF KHAN: THE REBEL COMMANDANT

laid claim, he was limited in 1751 practically to the town of Trichinopoly. The country to the north, including Arcot, the capital of the Province, was dominated by Chanda Sahib and the French. To the east, the King of Tanjore was, as a matter of



fact, independent. To the south, the Nawab was separated from the rich province of Tinnevely by Madura, which had fallen into the hands of Alam Khan, a partisan of Chanda Sahib. Trichinopoly was itself threatened by Chanda Sahib in person and a French force under Jacques Law. On the other hand, Pratab Singh, the King of Tanjore, was friendly to the English ;

the services of a Maratha free-lance, named Morari Rao, had been secured by heavy payments of money; and reckless promises, made without the cognizance of the English, had brought a Mysorean army, in which the afterwards so celebrated Haidar Ali held a subordinate command, to the Nawab's assistance; but the security of this Prince really depended upon the English, who had despatched a small force under the brave but incompetent officers Cope and de Gingins to Trichinopoly. These gentlemen supported the suggestion made by the Nawab¹ to the English Governor, Saunders, that the best means of restoring the Nawab's finances, and of relieving the pressure on Trichinopoly, would be a sudden attack from Madras² upon the Arcot districts. Saunders saw that this move would also have the effect of restoring the Nawab's prestige by the recovery of Arcot itself. To command the expedition he chose Robert Clive, who, but a short time previous, had offered to resume his military duties, if he were granted brevet rank as captain but allowed to retain his civil post and pay as Steward or commissariat officer.³

Clive's capture and defence of Arcot against the French and Raza Sahib (son of Chanda Sahib) are too well known to need any description. The raising of the siege was followed by the dispersal of Raza Sahib's army and the transfer of many of his best sepoys to the ranks of his opponents. With difficulty Raza Sahib rallied the remains of his force, and, assisted by the French, again tried the chances of war at Kaveripak on the 28th February, 1752, when fortune once more gave the victory to Clive.

¹ Nawab to Council, letter received 29th July, and Mr. Saunders to Nawab, 6th Oct., 1751. *Country Correspondence*.

² At this time the headquarters of the Madras Presidency were at Fort St. David; hence the French and Chanda Sahib did not expect any sudden attack from Madras.

³ Clive arrived in India in 1744, escaped to Fort St. David after the capture of Madras in 1746, received a commission as Ensign 16th March, 1747, and as lieutenant 28th Feb., 1749, resigned his commission 30th Nov., 1749, and was appointed Steward with charge of the supply of provisions to the army. This office he held until he went to England in 1753, but whilst retaining this post with its salary he received a brevet commission as captain on the 22nd July, 1751. He entered Arcot on the 1st Sept., and repulsed a desperate assault on the 14th November, after which the siege was raised.

10 YUSUF KHAN: THE REBEL COMMANDANT

Meanwhile, in spite of these successes in the north of the province, the incompetence of Cope¹ and de Gingsins and the ineptitude of the Nawab himself, who withheld the necessary supplies, had rendered the prospects of the English party at Trichinopoly very melancholy, and Governor Saunders determined to make the utmost use of Clive's recently acquired reputation, by sending him with a fresh force to relieve Trichinopoly and to assume the command of military operations in that part of the country. It is extremely probable that the supersession of so many officers senior to Clive in the military service by one who was both civilian and soldier and yet neither, would have given rise to much heartburning,² if not to serious trouble; but fortunately at this moment Major Stringer Lawrence arrived from England to resume command of the Company's forces in India, and, very naturally, he superseded Clive as the leader of the relieving army. Clive went with him in his double capacity of Steward and Captain, and with Clive went Yusuf Khan.

Lawrence's operations against the French and Chanda Sahib are described in detail by Orme,³ but Yusuf Khan was not yet in a position to attract the attention of any but his immediate superiors, or for his name to appear in any official report. There are, however, two references to his good conduct in the private papers of Captain John Dalton, a brave and capable though somewhat feather-headed officer, who was the intimate friend of Clive.

In the month of April, 1752, Monsieur d'Auteuil appeared in the neighbourhood of the island of Srirangam,⁴ where Law and Chanda Sahib were now hemmed in by Lawrence, with a

¹ Cope was mortally wounded at Kistnavaram and died 3rd Feb., 1752.

² Caraccioli, in his *Life of Clive*, I. 188, quotes an anonymous petition presented to Lawrence against Clive's promotion, but, if this petition was really presented, Lawrence appears to have taken no notice of it.

³ It is noticeable that Orme, in his account of the behaviour of the French at Trichinopoly, accepts without question Dupleix's remarks in his *Mémoire contre la Compagnie des Indes*, and ignores the explanations given by the French Company in their *Mémoire contre le Sieur Dupleix*, and by Jacques Law in his *Plainte contre le Sieur Dupleix*.

⁴ *Srirangam*, the island formed to the north of Trichinopoly by the rivers Coleroon and Cauvery, contains two very celebrated pagodas or Hindu temples.

convoy for their relief. On the 3rd May,¹ he was defeated at Utatur by Dalton, who wrote the next day to Clive :—

“Your Nellore sepoys are glorious fellows, and their Subadar as good a man as ever breathed. He is my sole dependance.”²

It should be explained that at this time, and for some years after, Yusuf Khan is often referred to as “the Nellore Subadar” or simply “the Nellore.”

On the 29th May, Clive attacked d’Auteuil at Volkonda and forced him to surrender. In describing the action which preceded the attack on the town, Dalton writes³ :—

“Eight hundred of these sepoys were the very same who had made the resolute attempt to storm the breaches at Arcot when Clive commanded there and had since deserted to him.⁴ They were a parcel of resolute fellows, and the continued series of success which for a considerable time had attended our arms made ’em look upon themselves as sure of victory when supported by an English battalion. These people being in the van never waited for the form of drawing up, but each company pressing for the honour of advancing their colours first, they set up a shout and ran at the French in the most daring manner, who had formed themselves in the front of their camp and had begun to fire briskly upon them with their artillery, but they seemed to give very little attention to it, still running on in the same intrepid manner, and the Marathas charging at the same time, they fairly drove the French from their ground.”

It seems likely that Dalton refers on both occasions to the

¹ In his narrative (*Orme MSS.*, III. pp. 539–41), Dalton gives the 10th May as the date of this fight. The dates in the text are taken from his letters to Clive.

² *Orme MSS.*, III. p. 664.

³ *Ibid.*, III. p. 547.

⁴ The French took but little part in the assault (*Orme, History*, I. 195), and this gave much disgust to the sepoys of Raza Sahib. It is probable that the French officer in command was doubtful as to how far he was justified in attacking a fort held by an English officer, or possibly he was withheld by respect for the gallantry of the little garrison. Neither of these motives was allowed to influence either party in the subsequent military operations, but throughout the fighting the Europeans on the victorious side always made it their first duty to secure their European opponents from massacre by the native soldiery. Thus when M. de Kerjean was married in 1753, Dupleix invited to the wedding Capt. Charles Campbell, who had saved de Kerjean’s life in this way at the battle of Bahur. *Mil. Cons.*, 4th Dec., 1753.

same sepoy, and, if this is correct, then Yusuf Khan must have first met the English as an enemy at the ever-memorable attempt to storm Arcot, and, if he was one of the gallant men who were beaten back from the breach, the day was to come when he was to see the English in turn retire from a breach defended by himself.

However this may be, the surrender of d'Auteuil at Volkonda was soon followed by that of Law in Srirangam, and on the same day—the 3rd June, 1752—Chanda Sahib, who had placed himself in the hands of the Tanjorean general Mankoji, was put to death ¹ by that officer as the only possible way of settling the rival claims of the Nawab, the Marathas and the Mysoreans to the possession of his person.

Orme ² thus moralizes on the death of Chanda Sahib :—

“Such was the unfortunate and ignominious end of this man. The many examples of a similar fate which are perpetually produced by the contests of ambition in this unsettled empire have established a proverb that fortune is a throne, and therefore he who falls in such contests is only reckoned unfortunate, without having the odium of rebellion or treachery charged on his memory ; unless he opposes the sovereign of sovereigns, the *Great Mughal*, all the rest is reckoned the common course of politics : for there is scarcely throughout the Empire a *Nawab* who has not an open or latent competitor.”

¹ Indian writers (Miles' Translation of Kirmani's *History of Hydur Naik*, p. 36) say he was put to death in the Dalawai Mandap, in which nearly thirty years before he had falsely sworn on the Koran not to injure or molest Minakshi Rani, Queen of Trichinopoly, thus expiating by a violent death the guilt of perjury.

² *History*, I. 241.

CHAPTER III

THE RISE OF YUSUF KHAN

WITH the capture and death of Chanda Sahib the English fondly hoped that they had foiled the schemes of Dupleix. They had yet to learn that their most troublesome opponent was not Dupleix, but their shifty ally the Nawab. When the latter first asked the aid of the Mysoreans, he promised them the town of Trichinopoly as the price of their assistance. They now demanded payment, and very naturally refused to accept his excuse that, as an officer of the Mughal, he was unable to dispose of the Mughal's possessions. What the Madras Council themselves thought of his behaviour they recorded in their Proceedings ¹ as follows:—

“A knavish and weak action: the former because he knew he had no right to do it; the latter because he must know that, though he procrastinated difficulties, yet he must in the end, as it but too plainly appears, make a powerful enemy instead of a friend.”

Still they did their best to reconcile the Nawab and the Mysoreans, but could not have been much surprised when, to their representation that the Mysoreans, in deserting the Nawab, would commit a breach of faith, the Mysorean general, Nandaraj, replied:—

“The bad scent of the Nawab's faithless behaviour is spread over the world to such a degree that you cannot discern the odour of our faith.” ²

The injustice, which the English committed in supporting the Nawab, was never forgiven by the Mysoreans, and though some sort of compromise was patched up for the moment, their

¹ *Mil. Cons.*, 3rd Jan., 1753.

² *Country Correspondence*, 1753, No. 48.

attitude was such that Lawrence was forced to place an English garrison in Trichinopoly for its protection, whilst his army was still further weakened by the departure of the Tanjoreans and the levies of the Tondaiman,¹ who were tired of the war and demanded permission—which could not be refused—to return to their homes. On the other hand, Duplex, undismayed by the fate of Chanda Sahib and receiving timely reinforcements from home, made use of the dissatisfaction of the Mysoreans and the venality of the Marathas to detach them from the English alliance. This once effected, though he had no officer of sufficient skill and prestige to make head against Lawrence in the field, he thought he could afford to play a waiting game, in the expectation that, sooner or later, the garrison in Trichinopoly and the army of Lawrence must succumb to famine and the want of military stores. Lawrence, in fact, depended for the existence of his army entirely upon the safe arrival of his convoys, and for this he was indebted to Yusuf Khan, thanks to whose skill and courage, according to Orme, not a single convoy miscarried for a period of three months.²

In his own Journal, Lawrence wrote, at this time, concerning Yusuf Khan :—

“ He is an excellent partisan,³ knows the country well, is brave and resolute but cool and sensible in action—in short he is a born soldier, and better of his colour I never saw in the country. He never spares himself, but is out on all parties, and by his good intelligence brought in provisions to keep us in a moderate plenty we wanted much to prolong the time till Mahfuz Khan ⁴ could join us.” ⁵

Earlier in his Journal, Lawrence describes Clive in strikingly similar words :—

“ A man of an undaunted resolution, of a cool temper and a presence of mind which never left him in the greatest danger. Born

¹ The Chief of Pudukottai, always the faithful ally of the English. Trichinopoly depended for its supply of provisions chiefly on his country.

² Orme, *History*, I. 347.

³ The word *partisan* was commonly used at this time for “an officer of irregular troops.”

⁴ Elder brother of the Nawab.

⁵ Orme *MSS.*, 13, p. 78. Lawrence’s meaning is clear though badly expressed.

a soldier, for without a military education of any sort, reading or much conversing with any of the profession, from his judgment and good sense he led an army like an experienced soldier and a brave officer with prudence, and that certainly warranted success.”¹

One can hardly wonder at Yusuf Khan's rapid rise when the first soldier in India thus marked his resemblance to so great a man as Clive. Alike in capacity for both civil and military affairs, alike in courage, in quick and cool decision, in passionate resentment of insult or injustice, alike in the desire for wealth as a means and not an end, they also resembled each other in that both were destined to an unhappy death.

The reputation of Yusuf Khan grew so rapidly that the natives, at least, soon came to the conclusion that if he were removed, the destruction of the English was inevitable. It appears that, in consequence of the favour in which he was held by Lawrence, he had excited the jealousy of a Brahman, named Punniyappan, who filled the post of linguist or interpreter to that officer. Ignorance of the vernaculars placed the English officers very much at the mercy of their interpreters, who, as all the country (*i.e.* Indian) correspondence passed through their hands, occupied the position of confidential clerks, and were not always proof against the temptations to enrich or revenge themselves with which their office supplied them. Some years earlier Governor Morse's *dubash*² had been hanged for treachery, but this example did not deter Punniyappan. He suggested to Lawrence that, if he were allowed to visit the Mysorean general, he might be able to bring about some arrangement. There being no reason to doubt his good faith, permission was given, and Punniyappan paid a visit to Nandaraj, in the course of which he suggested that the English would be forced to accept any terms he might offer if their supplies were cut off by getting rid of Yusuf Khan, which might be effected either by waylaying him when he was out on one of his expeditions connected with the convoys or by inducing the English to suppose him guilty of treachery. For obvious reasons the former method was

¹ Orme MSS., 13, p. 18.

² *Dubash*, *i.e.* interpreter or chief clerk. This occurred in 1747. Orme MSS. I, pp. 139-40.

rejected as impracticable, and it was determined that there should be dropped in the English camp, in such a manner that it must certainly be discovered, a letter addressed to Yusuf Khan and one of his brother officers and implying that, for certain rewards, they had agreed to betray Trichinopoly to the Mysoreans. This was done. The letter was picked up by a Kallan¹ and taken to Major Killpatrick, the officer next in rank to Lawrence, who, having had it translated by Punniyappan, immediately placed Yusuf Khan and the other sepoy officer under arrest, Captain Caillaud being ordered to enquire into the affair.² Cross-examination of the Kallan who had picked up the letter soon showed that it had not come from the Mysorean camp, but had been dropped by a Brahman who was known to have a grudge against Yusuf Khan. Yusuf Khan and his friend were immediately released and the Brahman placed in confinement, with the threat from Caillaud that if he did not quickly reveal the truth he would be put to death. Punniyappan promised to protect him, but the Brahman was so terrified that he disclosed the whole story. Punniyappan was now himself placed on trial and found guilty, and the facts reported to Madras for the orders of the Council, the only plea in favour of mercy being based on Punniyappan's long service under the English. The Council's orders were as follows :—

“ We have attentively perused and considered the examinations you have sent us in relation to Punniyappan's treachery, which appears so plain that there is not even room to doubt his guilt. His having been all his life a Company's servant is so far from lessening that it aggravates his crime, which in our opinion deserves death and that in the most ignominious manner.”³

On receipt of these orders Punniyappan was, on the 1st June, 1754, blown from the mouth of a cannon, which was the usual military punishment for treachery. The fact of his being a Brahman seems to have excited no remark, though, in even

¹ The Kallans were half wild retainers of the petty feudal chiefs: see p. 25 below.

² The record of Caillaud's enquiry is to be found in the *Orme MSS.*, 13, pp. 115-131.

³ Council to Lawrence, 26th May, 1754.

earlier times,¹ the English had remitted the death penalty in the case of Brahmans out of deference to Hindu feeling; in fact, it must have been patent to every one that, in a case of this vital character, the interest of the State overrode all other considerations.² That the plea for mercy on the ground of long service should also be rejected in such cases is evident when one remembers that the longer the service the more defenceless is the employer against his servant's treachery.

It has been suggested³ that his narrow escape must have made Yusuf Khan sensible of the danger of serving foreigners who were so dependent upon their native subordinates, and that accordingly it may have been a remote cause of his subsequent attempt to establish his independence. On the other hand, it is very probable that, if he had been at the time in the service of an Indian prince, he would have been put to death upon the mere evidence of the letter without any further examination. At any rate, if we are to judge at all of Yusuf Khan's feelings at the time, it would appear that his one desire was to prove by his deeds the loyalty of his heart. Immediately after his release he had resumed his duties in connection with the conduct of the convoys. On the 12th May he accompanied a party, despatched to meet one of these, under the command of Captain Caillaud. According to his usual custom of acting as his own scout, Yusuf Khan was riding ahead of the column when, as he approached the place of rendezvous, his horse suddenly began to neigh, and was answered by others. As the latter might belong to the enemy, he advanced cautiously, and, being fired upon by some French troopers, galloped back to warn his commander of the danger. Caillaud, knowing their position, thought it might be possible to surprise the French, and giving the sepoys to Yusuf Khan and taking the Europeans himself, advanced quietly on either side of the road,

¹ *Madras Consultations*, 15th Nov., 1694.

² Similarly the execution of a Brahman for treachery by Khair-ud-din Khan, brother-in-law of the Nawab, is mentioned in the *Madras Consultations* of the 27th Nov., 1752.

³ "The transaction, however, revealed to *Yusuf Khan* the danger of a connection with strangers who were at the mercy of their interpreters; and his confinement made on his mind an impression of disgust which was never afterwards entirely effaced." Wilks, *History of Misoor*, I. 324.

leaving the road itself clear. The French had paid but little attention to the appearance of a single horseman, and, being taken off their guard, were quickly thrown into confusion and compelled to retreat; but when the noise of the fighting had brought up reinforcements on both sides, the English found that they had only 360 Europeans against 700. The situation appeared desperate, and nothing was left but to surrender or fight their way out. This, though harassed on both flanks and in the rear by the French and thousands of sepoys, they managed to do in good order,¹ handling the French so roughly that the latter not only gave up all attempt to intercept them, but did not even retain the position they had taken up to attack the convoy. In the evening the latter came out of the woods in which it had lain hidden during the fight and arrived safely in Trichinopoly. Orme remarks² that the lack of provisions was such that, had this convoy not come through, Lawrence must next day have left the town to its fate and withdrawn to Tanjore. It is quite clear that it was the careful scouting of Yusuf Khan which saved Caillaud's column from falling into the midst of the enemy and from a very probable disaster, which would have made it impossible for the convoy to come any further. Though this is the only instance recorded of Yusuf Khan's exploits at this time, it illustrates very well the nature of the services by which he made his reputation, and justifies the belief of Punniyappan that his removal would have been an irreparable blow to the English army at Trichinopoly.

The war continued for some time without any decisive action taking place, but on the 2nd August M. Godeheu arrived from the French Islands³ to supersede Dupleix, at the very moment when the latter saw success again almost within his grasp. M. Godeheu having received orders to make peace between the French and English Companies, immediately opened negotiations with Mr. Saunders; and, though some desultory fighting went on, during which Yusuf Khan was stationed at Muttarasanallur to guard the channels of the Cauvery, on which the Kingdom of Tanjore depended for its

¹ Caillaud to Palk, 12th May. *Mil. Cons.*, 20th May, 1754.

² *History*, I. 357.

³ The "Île de France," or Mauritius.

water supply, a suspension of arms was proclaimed on the 11th October, 1754, and was followed by a conditional treaty in January, 1755. With the departure of Dupleix and Saunders to Europe, an end was at last put to the anomalous position of war being waged between the French and English Companies in India whilst peace reigned between their respective countries in Europe. Dupleix was succeeded at Pondicherry by M. Duval de Leyrit, a civilian of no great ambition, whilst Saunders, on the 13th January, 1755, made over charge of the governorship of Madras to Mr. George Pigot, who, though a civilian by profession, had a strong *penchant* for the military, and had been under fire on more than one occasion. He was an intimate friend of Clive, and, as we shall see, a loyal patron of Yusuf Khan until the latter took his fatal decision to rebel against the Nawab.

We have now to go back a little to record an incident which, though highly honourable to Yusuf Khan, was grossly misrepresented by persons like Sir John Lindsay and Mr. J. Macpherson,¹ who apparently gathered their information from the Nawab Muhammad Ali. On the 8th March, 1754, Major Lawrence wrote to the Council as follows:—

“I beg leave to recommend another person to you, Gentlemen, for your notice. 'Tis our commander of sepoy, by name *Muhammad Yusuf*. Besides his intelligence and capacity, I cannot too much praise his zeal and alacrity for the service. He always prevents my asking by offering himself for everything; and executes what he goes about as well and as briskly as he attempts it. Some mark of your regard by a letter and some little present would keep up that usefull spirit besides rewarding merit.”²

On the 21st, the Council replied that they “would take notice of *Muhammad Yusuf*, the Commander of Sepoys,” as Lawrence desired. On the 25th they resolved that:—

“Major Lawrence having recommended *Muhammad Yusuf*, a Commander of sepoy, as a very deserving officer and intimated that some mark of favour should be shown him as an encouragement for his behaviour,

¹ See Appendix V., p. 293.

² *Mil. Cons.*, 20th March, 1754.

"Agreed a commission be drawn out for him as Commander of all the Company's sepoys, and that he be presented at the same time with a gold medal."

The same day they wrote to Lawrence :—

"We are always for encouraging merit. To brave men publick marks of honour are much greater rewards than pecuniary gifts. We look on *Muhammad Yusuf* in this light from the commendations you bestow on him, and have agreed to give him a commission as Commander in Chief of all the Company's sepoys. This perhaps may not be a proper title, but something equivalent to it is what we mean, and should be glad you would set us right. At the same time we propose to present him with a gold medal."

On the 23rd April Lawrence wrote to say he would consider the matter.¹ Then followed the affair of Punniyappan, first mentioned in a letter from Mr. Palk to Council, dated 6th May,² which with the illness of Major Lawrence caused some delay. On the 9th September he wrote to the Council :—

"I can assure you that whatever presents I have made the Nellore Subadar, his extraordinary zeal for the service has entitled him to,"³

in reference no doubt to some unauthorized gratuities which all commanding officers used at that time to make on special occasions ; but it was not until the 23rd that he wrote :—

"I have enclosed you a copy of a commission, which if you approve of I should be glad was transmitted to me to be given the Nellore Subadar : I do assure you his behaviour on all occasions and zeal for the Honourable Company's service entitles him to this particular mark of your approbation and favour."⁴

On the 30th the Council ordered "that the commission recommended by Colonel Lawrence to be given to the Nellore Subadar be prepared accordingly," and the next day it was forwarded to Lawrence with a request to deliver it to Yusuf Khan "with assurances that we have a proper sense of his zeal for the service of the Company."⁵ This Commission is not

¹ *Mil. Cons.*, 13th May, 1754.

² *Ibid.*, 14th May, 1754.

³ *Ibid.*, 23rd Sept., 1754.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 30th Sept., 1754.

⁵ *Council to Lawrence*, 1st Oct., 1754.

amongst the Records, but as Yusuf Khan is henceforward known as "the Commandant," it would appear that that was the title which Lawrence thought appropriate for his post. Though the title of Commandant had been used of such officers as Vencatchellum in 1747 and many commissions as Commandant were given to native officers later on, Yusuf Khan appears to have been the first native officer in the English service who held a commission, and the only native officer, at any rate in Madras, who ever held a commission as "commandant of all the sepoy's."

On the 16th November, when advising Colonel Heron, who had recently arrived in India as Major of the Company's force on the Coast, as to the means of procuring provisions, Council concluded their letter:—

"Colonel Lawrence¹ acquaints us that the Nellore Subadar's knowledge and interest in the country has frequently been of service in this particular; it may therefore be useful for you to consult with him on the occasion."

Colonel Heron was now at Woriur near Trichinopoly, and we shall soon see what he thought of this advice. To complete, however, the account of the recognition by the Council of Yusuf Khan's services we must anticipate a little. The Council had promised Lawrence to present Yusuf Khan with a gold medal. Apparently the medal took the local goldsmiths six months to prepare, for it was not actually received by the Council until the 27th March 1755. They then recorded as follows:—

"It having been resolved in consultation to present *Muhammad Yusuf Khan*, Subadar of sepoy's, with a gold medal as a distinguishing mark and reward of his bravery and good service, and a medal being accordingly made is now produced to the Board, weighing three ounces two and a half pennyweight, having the Company's arms with the usual motto² on one side and on the reverse this inscription in the Persian language 'To *Muhammad Yusuf, Khan Bahadur*, Commander of the Honourable Company's Sepoy's, this medal is

¹ On the 12th Sept. Council informed Lawrence that the Warren had brought out for him a brevet Commission as Lieut.-Colonel from the King and a sword from the Company.

² i.e. "*Auspicio Regis et Senatus Angliæ.*"

given by the Honourable Governor and Council of Fort Saint George as a reward to courage, and to preserve to posterity the name of a brave soldier, a skilfull officer and a faithfull servant."

Of the seven members of Council who signed the Proceedings this day, three, namely Lawrence, Pigot and Bouchier, were members of Council when at Lawrence's suggestion it was decided that Yusuf Khan, if captured fighting, should be hanged as a rebel; but these are the actual facts as to how this medal was bestowed upon Yusuf Khan. The seal attached to the letters which were intercepted by Yusuf Khan's besiegers in 1764 bore the inscription in Persian "Muhammad Yusuf, Khan Bahadur, 1168," this date being the year of the Hegira corresponding to A.D. 1754, in which he received his commission as Commandant and was awarded this medal; possibly he considered the latter a charm which would protect him in the last extremity if ever he quarrelled with his present patrons. It was something more than a mere patent of nobility.¹

It is a rather curious fact that, just as Yusuf Khan later on allied himself to the French, we find that Mir Mansur, the first Indian military officer to whom the Madras Council granted a medal² for gallantry, was in the service of the French during the siege of Madras by Lally.³

¹ See account of Yusuf Khan's execution, p. 229 below.

² *Mil. Cons.*, 5th Nov., 1753.

³ Journal of Transactions during the siege of Fort St. George, *Public Sundry Book*, No. 13.



VIEW OF MADURA FROM THE SOUTH IN 1794.

(From Colonel James Welsh's *Military Reminiscences*, I. 21.)

CHAPTER IV

MADURA

THE treaty which had put an end to the conflict between the French and English was really much to the advantage of the latter, for whilst the French had no one able to replace Chanda Sahib, the English retained in Muhammad Ali, the titular and *de facto* Nawab, at once a patron and a puppet, and, under pretext of maintaining his authority over his subjects, they were able to prepare for the renewal of the war with France whenever it should come. It was therefore determined to send Colonel Heron and Yusuf Khan to restore his authority in the southern provinces of Madura and Tinnevely. As, with the single exception of his absence during Lally's siege of Madras, the remainder of Yusuf Khan's life was destined to be spent in these parts, some remarks on their character and previous history appear to be necessary.

The ancient Kingdom of Madura had at one time included, besides Madura itself, the provinces of Trichinopoly, Dindigul, Tondaiman, Tanjore, the two Maravas (Sivagangei and Ramnad), Tinnevely and Travancore. Its political capital, once at Madura, was in quite modern times transferred to Trichinopoly, and in 1750 the only portions which remained under the direct control of the Governor of Madura were Madura, Tinnevely and the two Maravas, but the last-mentioned had long ceased to pay any tribute and their allegiance was of the most fitful character.

Madura and Palamcottah ¹ (near Tinnevely) were the only

¹ Later on Yusuf Khan advised Council to garrison these two towns with their own troops. "I must beg leave to acquaint you that there are two remarkable forts in this country. One is Madura Fort and the other *Palamcottah* fit for the Company to keep. By all means the Company's garrison should be placed in them." Yusuf Khan to Council, 18th July. *Country Correspondence*, 1756, No. 210.

towns which could boast of fortifications of any importance, but in neither case were these of such a character as would be considered formidable by a European enemy, even had they been in good order, which was not the case. Their strength lay rather in their distance from Trichinopoly—Madura being about eighty and Palamcottā¹ about one hundred and eighty miles from that place—in the absence of any made roads, that from Trichinopoly being hardly more than a mere track, leading for miles through almost impenetrable forests, in the fierce character of the people who inhabited the woods and mountains which covered a great part of the country, and in the peculiar climatic conditions, for here there are no regular monsoons, and, though the annual rainfall is only about thirty inches, torrential rains alternate with severe droughts and render military operations often difficult and at times impossible.²

Madura itself is situated on the southern bank of the river Vaigai, and formed at this time an irregular square of about one thousand yards. It was surrounded by a stone wall twenty-two feet high with square towers at about every hundred yards. Outside this was a *faussebraye* thirty feet broad and overgrown with thorny bushes, almost impenetrable; and beyond this a low wall and a deep and wide ditch,³ the depth of water in which, however, depended very much on the state of the weather. There was no citadel, and the safety of the town accordingly depended entirely upon the walls and ditch and the courage of its defenders; but the latter had one advantage, which it took the English a long time to estimate at its proper value, in the facility with which, out of such rude

¹ "The march from Madura to *Palamcottā* is through a country at all times uninteresting, being over a level cotton plain, in which the heat and want of good water are felt at every stage; it is a distance of 92 miles." *Military Reminiscences*, I. 275. Col. James Welsh.

² The heavy rains which fall in the Madura country during the last three months of the year made military operations around the town exceedingly trying to the besiegers, whilst the advance of an army from Madras was rendered extremely difficult during the months of July to September by the swelling of the rivers lying between Madras and Trichinopoly owing to the regular Indian monsoon.

³ Orme says (*History*, II. 210) that the outer wall was only five feet on the inner side, but on the outside descended 11 feet to the bottom of the ditch. But the ditch was probably silted up at this time and much less deep than it was in 1763, when (see p. 158 (n.) below) it was stated to be 28 yards broad.

materials as the trunks of palm trees, they were able to repair any breaches which could be made by even the heaviest artillery that the English could bring up to the attack.

The inhabitants of the country, as in all parts of India, were composed of various castes, but the greater portion of those who made up its native military force were the Kallans,¹ the feudal retainers of the Poligars or petty chiefs who occupied the woody and mountainous parts of the country. The word *Kallan* means a "robber," and the Kallans, to whom alone were known the secret tracks through the jungles, except when terrorized by an unusually strong central government at Madura, occupied their leisure in robbery and murder. Absolutely loyal to their own chiefs, they made but little distinction between allies and enemies. It was men of this caste who, in the camp at Trichinopoly, stole all the horses belonging to Lawrence and Clive,² and it was one of the same fraternity who, many years later, stole from Mr. Samuel Johnston, Paymaster of Madura, the silver casket which contained the heart of the great Montrose.³ Their chief weapons were long pikes of twelve to eighteen feet,⁴ and they showed considerable skill in the rude but effective barriers, which they constructed with mud walls and thorn hedges round their villages or in the passes of the woods and hills. Apparently they were aboriginals⁵ in race, and though passionately attached to the gods whose little brass images filled their temples, they had no great love for the Brahmans. This, no doubt, explains the readiness with which they listened to the teaching of the Roman Catholic

¹ Orme calls them "Colleries." Much interesting information about these people is given in Orme's *History*, I. p. 381, Pennant's *Hindoostan*, II. 11, 12, and Col. Welsh's *Military Reminiscences*, Vol. I. Their ideas regarding the payment of taxes are thus summed up in an unpublished MS. Memoir in the *India Office Map Department*, B. 27, f. 2: "The Heaven supplies the earth with rain, cattle plough for us, and we labour to improve and cultivate the land. Whilst such is the case we alone ought to enjoy the fruit thereof. What reason is there to be obedient and pay a tribute to a person like ourselves?" Their manly and dangerous national game called "jallikat" is described by Nelson, *Madura Country*, II. 21, and Francis, *Madura*, p. 83.

² Orme, *History*, I. 381.

³ Francis, *Madura*, p. 263.

⁴ See Orme, *History*, II. 568; and Colonel James Welsh, *Military Reminiscences*, I. 66.

⁵ Nelson, *Madura Country*, II. 49.

missionaries, and it appears quite possible that, had it not been for the devastating wars between the Muhammadans and Hindus and between the partisans of the French and English, this wild people might have been Christianized and its members reduced to a civil and orderly life by the efforts of those devoted men.¹ We shall see how, later on, Yusuf Khan subdued and attached them to himself, though by methods very different from those employed by the Roman Catholic fathers.

In 1736 the last great Hindu dynasty in Madura came to an end with the treacherous capture of the Queen Minakshi by Chanda Sahib. In 1741 he was compelled to surrender Madura to the Marathas, and these in turn were driven out in 1744 by the Nizam² of the Deccan, who ultimately made over the province to Anwaruddin Khan as Nawab of Arcot or the Carnatic. The latter entrusted it to the care of his sons Muhammad Ali and Mahfuz Khan, but on his death and the accession of Muhammad Ali³ in 1749 Madura was placed under another son, Abdul Rahim. In the year 1750, whilst Abdul Rahim was absent in Tinnevely, the fort of Madura was seized by one Alam Khan, a partisan of Chanda Sahib,⁴ thus cutting off the Nawab from the province of Tinnevely and depriving him of half his revenue.⁵

When he received news of this disaster, the Nawab applied to the English for assistance, and Captain James Cope, who was in command at Trichinopoly, was placed at his disposal with a force for the recovery of Madura.⁶ For some unexplained reason the Nawab immediately began to make objections to the expedition, and asserted that it was unnecessary to take heavy guns, as the walls of Madura were reported to be in such a ruinous condition that the Kallans went in and out by night,

¹ Dubois, *Hindu Manners, Customs and Ceremonies*, II. ch. xi. pp. 300, 301.

² Nizam-ul-mulk, the first Subah of the Deccan, from whom his successors at Haidarabad took the title of Nizam.

³ Muhammad Ali was younger than Mahfuz Khan, but it is said that the latter, being the son of a woman of low origin, was passed over—an explanation contrary, I believe, to Muhammadan law. It is, however, true that he never objected to his supersession, though he was often in rebellion against his brother.

⁴ See p. 8 above.

⁵ Orme, *History*, I. 169.

⁶ See *Pub. Cons.*, 17th December, 1750; and Orme, *History*, I. 169.

stealing whole herds of cattle. Cope, however, knowing the facility with which the breaches could be repaired, insisted and obtained the guns. Then the Nawab delayed the supply of carriages, which Cope had to hire for himself, and, in short, it was not until February, 1751, that he could make a start. He had with him 150 Europeans and Coffrees,¹ and 400 sepoys, but only one gun. His march lay, as he tells us,² "through woods, poligars, rogues, etc.," delayed at one time by a request from the Nawab to capture some small forts which his own officers could not reduce, then by the promise of a contingent under the Nawab's brother Abdul Wahab, who, however, sent only a very few men to join him. At Madura ³ Abdul Rahim came up with 2500 horse, 3000 peons, and 30 soldiers and topasses ⁴ under Lieutenant John Innis, and one gun. Innis immediately warned Cope that he had as many enemies outside the fort as in it, that the chief officers in Abdul Rahim's army had sworn to deliver his head and that of Husain Muhammad Khan, Governor of Tinnevely, into the hands of Alam Khan, and that it was only the rumour of Cope's approach with an overwhelming force that had hitherto prevented the consummation of this act of treachery. So great was Abdul Rahim's distrust of his followers that he dared not sleep in his own quarters, but was accustomed to slip away after dark to a Swami-house ⁵ not far off. It was not until Cope gave him a guard of the Company's sepoys that he felt in any way safe.

Cope and Lieutenant Merriman immediately reconnoitred the fort, and, observing some choultries ⁶ within eight hundred yards of the walls, which offered good shelter for the men and stores, moved the camp up to them. Abdul Rahim, shocked at such reckless behaviour, rode up to remonstrate; but while he was explaining to the puzzled Englishmen that if any horses were killed he, Abdul Rahim, would have to make good the

¹ Originally the Coffrees were African slaves trained as soldiers, in which capacity they distinguished themselves by their steadiness and courage.

² *Orme MSS.*, II. 268-276. Cope to Dalton.

³ This was 150 miles from Fort St. David.

⁴ Soldiers of mixed Portuguese and Indian descent. They were often included amongst the Europeans.

⁵ A small pagoda or temple attached to a village.

⁶ Rest-houses for travellers.

cost, a shot was fired from the fort which sent him and his retinue scampering off, accompanied by the hisses of the English soldiers. Cope then took up a position only five hundred yards from the fort, but so protected that no gun could reach it, and reconnoitring within one hundred and fifty yards, found that one of the batteries, manned by Europeans and flying French colours, sent its shot, though they fell short, in his direction. This he quickly silenced with his field pieces; but considering the wretched character of his army and the danger of French reinforcements arriving, Cope concluded that "expedition was the word;" so, whilst his camp was forming, a twelve-pounder was brought up and mounted,

"our grand guard was formed, and covers were made for our field pieces on the flanks, and we fired like devils, and by being so near every shot did his duty. In fact by night we brought down a great part of the wall and I would have insured the [capture of the] fort next day for sixpence."

By noon next day much further damage had been done, but only four shot remained for the great gun. The breach looked promising but hardly practicable, so the fire was kept up all night with the field-pieces. Next day it rained so heavily than an attack was impossible, but Cope assembled his officers and explained his plans, whilst fascines for filling the ditch and ladders for scaling the walls were got in readiness. He intended to attack at 3 a.m., but as his spies reported that the delay had enabled Alam Khan to erect a brick wall behind the breach, the assault was postponed until daylight. Cope visited the sepoys and promised that if any man would bring him the head of Alam Khan, his company should receive a thousand rupees, and a present of five hundred rupees was offered for the head of the traitor who had delivered Madura to Alam Khan. As an earnest of what they might expect, he distributed a thousand rupees at once amongst the men, who cheered him heartily.

Meanwhile Ensign Trusler¹ had been sent to reconnoitre, and reported the breach in the outer wall to be easy, and that

¹ Sergeant Trusler, promoted to be Ensign 27th November, 1750. *Fort St. David Consultations*, Vol. 7.

in the inner wall to be practicable with ladders. He had seen nothing of the new defences reported by the spies; but when at daylight the forlorn hope mounted the breach, it was only to find the passage blocked by two mounds of earth—one on each side—connected by trunks of palmyra palms laid horizontally, between the intervals of which were thrust the long pikes of the horsemen, working across each other “so fast that a pigeon could not get through,” and besides this they could see at the bottom of the breach the wall of which they had been warned, manned by musketeers and swordsmen. The first barrier was, however, passed by a number of the assailants, but the passage was still held by three champions in armour. Sergeant Brown, who led the forlorn hope, attacked the biggest of them, a man of immense size, but was cut down, and his life was saved only by Ensign Trusler shooting the giant as he was about to run Brown through with his sword. The wounded champion, though unable to stand, continued to wield his weapon with such vigour and dexterity that it was not until he had been shot and stabbed to death that his body could be dragged aside and the passage cleared. Trusler, a bullet brushing his temple, pushed on and climbed the wall, but as fast as his men could come up they were struck down by the defenders, and, after a hand-to-hand struggle of half an hour, Trusler had to send back word that he had no hope of success. Cope hurried to the breach, but found that not only had the natives given way, but the Europeans also were retreating, “one carrying his brother and another his messmate,” so that it was impossible to rally them. The retreat was sounded. Ninety men had been lost.

Two hours after the attack the besiegers had the mortification of seeing the breach filled up and a

“hideous set of Moor colours fixed on it, decorated by two or three of our people’s heads on spikes, and all night nothing but dancing, singing and piping, &c. Therefore to add my part as far as I could to the solemnity I ordered all the shells left to be thrown in amongst them, which proved so kind as to set one half of the town on fire all night.”

This act of revenge may have been idle, but it was not

wasteful, for Cope, though he had exhausted all his heavy shot, had barely sufficient carriage for the ammunition for his field pieces for "a single dust or broil," whilst the country through which he had to march was so difficult that he must suffer severely if he found himself attacked, whilst hampered with useless baggage, in the woods or mountains. Without listening to the ridiculous proposal of Abdul Rahim to make another assault *with his own men*, he determined to retreat at once, blew up his great gun, burned his gun-carriages, and sent the remainder of his baggage ahead. Five hundred of the horse and a thousand peons refused to march, and, as soon as Cope had disappeared, went over to Alam Khan. Cope arrived unmolested at Trichinopoly on the 10th April, 1751.¹ He was the last English officer to visit Madura before the arrival of Colonel Heron, whose entry into the town was not opposed, and his failure, being ascribed to his notorious bad luck, did nothing to impress the English with any idea of the actual strength of Madura. Governor Saunders, however, thought he might effect by diplomacy what he could not achieve by force. On the 22nd July he wrote to Alam Khan as follows² :—

"I have heard of your courage in the defence of Madura, which though against my own people I cannot but highly commend. Merit ought highly to be rewarded, instead of which I hear you are to be divested of your government and the French to take possession of the fort. This I think is but a bad return for so much bravery. You are a soldier and your sword may make your fortune. If you will espouse the cause of *Muhammad Ali* and assist his affairs, I promise you shall have a government under him which will afford you wealth and a great name and support you and your family in affluence."

Alam Khan turned a deaf ear to these offers and died gallantly in battle against the English near Trichinopoly in March, 1752.

It is difficult to obtain any exact information as to what happened in Madura for the next two or three years. When

¹ Dr. James Wilson's *Narrative*, Orme MSS., 15, p. 4. The news of Cope's failure reached the Council at Fort St. David on the 6th May, 1751. *Pub. Cons.*

² *Country Correspondence*, 1757, No. 97.

Alam Khan went to Trichinopoly he appears to have left Madura in the charge of an officer named Mayana. From him it passed into the hands of a Mysorean officer¹ named Coop Sahib, possibly with the consent of the Nawab, who at one time offered it to the Mysoreans in place of Trichinopoly. Coop Sahib defiled the town by killing and eating cows² and by cutting down cocoanut trees, and this so exasperated the Hindus that the two Maravan Poligars were enabled to expel him and to restore for a brief period the old Hindu dynasty;³ but the town falling into the hands of three Muhammadan officers,⁴ whom Orme calls Mianah (Mahomed Barky), Moodemiah⁵ (Mahomed Mainach), and Nabi Cawn Catteck, on the 29th November, 1752, these officers signed a written document⁶ acknowledging the Nawab's sovereignty over Madura and Tinnevely; but even had they wished to do so, it is doubtful whether they were in a position to pay in the revenues of the provinces or even to collect them for their own benefit. These officers, however, were the nominal rulers of Madura and Tinnevely when Messrs. Saunders and Godeheu made peace in 1754-1755 between the French and English Companies, and the Nawab was in great need of money to pay the expenses of the late war. It was natural for him to expect that the English, who were his chief creditors,

¹ In the *Mil. Cons.*, 25th Aug., 1755, it is stated that the Nawab never actually made over Madura to the Mysoreans, his offer to do so being cancelled by the Mysorean alliance with the French. Nelson (*Madura Country*, III. 270-1), seems to confuse Coop Sahib with Cope, but Cope was never in the Mysorean service, and being mortally wounded at Kistnavaram died on the 3rd Feb., 1752 (*Mil. Cons.*, 10th Feb., 1752); whilst Coop or Coke Sahib is mentioned by Colonel Heron in a letter to Council dated 29th Oct., 1754, as causing trouble in Madura with some Mysore horse and sepoy. His name is variously spelled as "Coke" and "Kukku." It is unknown whether he was a European or a native, but the Nawab distinctly refers to him as "Coob saib [*i.e.* Khub Sahib] Jemadar belonging to the Mysorian." *Country Correspondence*, 1754, No. 422.

² *Pandion Chronicle*, p. 41 (Taylor's *Oriental Historical Manuscripts*).

³ The Madras Records for 1754 show that repeated applications were made to the Nawab and the English by the Tondaiman, the Maravans and other Poligars for the restoration of the Hindu dynasty in Madura, but no notice was taken of such requests.

⁴ Orme (*History*, I. 399) calls them Pitān (*i.e.* Pathan) officers.

⁵ Col. Heron, in a letter dated 11th April, 1755, says Moodemiah was a brother of Mayana.

⁶ *Country Correspondence*, 1755, No. 32.

should assist him¹ to put his dominions in order, so that he might be able to collect his revenues, and if possible all arrears. The Nawab's legal right was based on a *farman*,² alleged to have been received from Delhi on the 24th March, 1751,³ appointing him Nawab of Arcot and so sovereign of the dependent provinces of Madura and Tinnevely, whilst the paper signed by the three officers was held to be a sufficient answer to the French complaint that the English were assisting him in attacking their allies. Accordingly, as I have said at the beginning of this chapter, the Council decided to despatch a strong force under Colonel Heron and Yusuf Khan to establish his authority.

¹ The first request made by the Nawab for an expedition appears to have been that of the 25th Nov., 1754 (*Country Correspondence*, No. 422).

² i.e. Grant or Commission. See Dr. Wilson's *Narrative*, p. 4. There was a peculiarity about the *farmans* produced by Muhammad Ali which Council was quick to note. "It has been more than once observed during the course of this war that whenever anything material has been on the carpet, the *Nawab* has always received, or pretended to receive, such letters from Court as might either divert us from our plan if disagreeable to him, or encourage us to pursue it if it suited his purpose." *Mil. Cons.*, 29th April, 1754.

³ The alleged *farman*, dated 29th Jan., 1750, is appended to No. 28, *Country Correspondence* for 1751.

CHAPTER V

COLONEL HERON'S EXPEDITION TO MADURA AND TINNEVELLY

WE left Yusuf Khan in high favour at Madras, and this was probably the reason why he was chosen to accompany Colonel Heron to Madura, though his birth in the Ramnad and his acquaintance with the country particularly fitted him to act as adviser to an officer who had been only a few months in India,¹ and was therefore wholly unacquainted with the people with whom he was being sent to deal. On the other hand, the military force provided by the Nawab was placed under his elder brother, Mahfuz Khan. This man was the only member of the Nawab's family who showed any signs of military ability,² but he was weak and vacillating and totally unfit for the position of Governor to which he was appointed by the Nawab.

Unfortunately for Yusuf Khan's influence with Heron, the relations of the two were strained from the very beginning. It is possible that his idea of his own importance³ had been unduly inflated by his rapid promotion; it is certain that he must have still been smarting at the recollection of the treachery he had met with from the Brahmans,⁴ and now he had the opportunity of taking his revenge. The troops collected for

¹ Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Heron arrived in India in Sept. 1754, as Major of the Garrison and Third in Council. *Public Proceedings*, 13th September, 1754, p. 578.

² His ability was certainly of no high order, and it was the defeat of his whole army in 1746, by a single battalion of the French under Paradis, that dissipated for ever the awe previously felt by Europeans for the immense but undisciplined forces of the Indian Princes.

³ Colonel Heron had been advised by Council to consult him: see p. 21 above.

⁴ i.e. Punniyappan and his satellites. Yusuf Khan, it must be remembered, was a convert from Hinduism, and *ipso facto* guilty of an offence which the Brahmans, otherwise the most tolerant of men, never forgive. See Dubois, *Hindu Manners*, II. chap. xi. p. 295; and Wilks, *Mysoor*, II. 280 (n.).

the expedition were encamped at Woriur, near Trichinopoly, and on the 10th January, 1755,¹ Colonel Heron wrote to Orme as follows :—

“ I really don't see occasion for above half the number of sepoy which we have now here, for more than can be under the immediate eye of the commanding officer are only employed in robbing, plundering and wheeping (*sic*) the *Brahmans*, which has been practised of late by the *Nellore Subadar* and his people and caused me a great deal of trouble on account of sums of money which he (the *Nellore*) has extorted from them. He may be a brave man, but by no means fit for a separate command, for which reason I have called in his company from the Tope known by his name² and sent *Baron Vasserot* ³ there. . . . I have forgiven the *Nellore* for this time, so that nothing need be said about it without the Service actually requires it. I have made no mention of the affair to Colonel Lawrence, who has a much better opinion of that man than he deserves.”

As this matter was not made public it is impossible to say whether the charges were true, but they sound strange when coming from such a man as Colonel Heron was soon shown to be.⁴

Colonel Heron and the Nawab left Woriur at the beginning of February, 1755, by the western road to Madura, and halted at the village of Manaparai, about thirty miles to the south of Trichinopoly. Here they sent messages to the neighbouring poligars demanding the payment of their tribute or rent. Most of them obeyed, but one named Lackenaig ⁵ (? Lakshmi Naik) refused, and it was determined to make an example of him. His village lay in the woods about ten miles to the south-west, and two miles off the road to Dindigul. About six miles from Manaparai he had erected a barrier across the road, which was

¹ Orme MSS., 48, p. 34.

² A grove or garden of trees, known as Trichinopoly Nellore, about ten miles from Woriur, where Heron was encamped.

³ Died about 1762 as Major and Governor of the Fort at Surat. Letter dated 7th May, 1764, from Thos. Worsley to Mr. Boulton, *I. O. Records, Misc. Letters Received*, 1764, No. 189.

⁴ One of the chief charges against Col. Heron was in reference to the presents he received from Mahfuz Khan. On one occasion (*Mil. Cons.*, 17th Sept., 1755) he received as much as 20,000 rupees, and proportionate sums were distributed to other English officers and their Dubashes. None, however, came to Yusuf Khan.

⁵ Poligar of Kumaravadi. *Madras Rev. Cons.*, 21st Dec., 1798.

forced with some difficulty on the 12th February, and supposing there would be no further resistance, Yusuf Khan was sent with five hundred sepoy, a few Europeans, and a field-piece towards the village. On the way they came across a second and much stronger barrier, consisting of a rampart protected in front by a thorn hedge which abutted on either side on the impenetrable undergrowth of the woods, and through which there was only a single winding passage. As the sepoy were barefooted, it was impossible to force this until the hedge was destroyed by fire or blown to pieces by guns. Apparently the thorns were too wet to be set alight, for Yusuf Khan attacked with his field-piece and musketry fire; but he lost a dozen Europeans and a hundred sepoy and exhausted his ammunition without producing any effect, and, though he was able to hold his ground, he was compelled to send back for reinforcements and a fresh supply. These were hurried up under Captain Joseph Smith, but before he arrived the enemy, who had also exhausted their ammunition, evacuated the place. Smith and Yusuf Khan then pushed on to the village, which they found abandoned, but Lackenaig was so terrified that he immediately paid up his tribute.

The Nawab had now had enough of the campaign, and, leaving Mahfuz Khan to represent him, he returned to Trichinopoly. Heron arrived at Madura on the 5th March, 1755. The Governor Mayana, terrified at the ease with which Heron had stormed the forts which had opposed his progress, made no resistance to his entry,¹ but fled for refuge to the Pagoda of Kovilkudi, situated in the village of Tirumbur, eight miles to the east. Moodemiah and Nabi Khan, who were in Tinnevely, joined the Pulidevar.² Heron now received overtures for peace from the Maravans. Their assistance was likely to be of great value, but they were the hereditary and mortal enemies of the Tondaiman and of Tanjore, upon which two countries Trichinopoly depended for its supplies,³ and therefore both the Nawab and the Council were greatly displeased with and refused to

¹ Nawab to Council, 6th March, 1755, *Country Correspondence*, No. 46.

² The Pulidevar was the most important of the western Poligars of Tinnevely. His chief town was Nelkattam-sevval.

³ *Country Correspondence*, 1755, No. 57.

ratify the treaty, which Heron, on his own authority, had concluded with them.¹ It took, however, some time for the Council's orders to reach Heron, and in the meantime he determined to attack Kovilkudi.

Yusuf Khan was sent in advance to surround the Pagoda, but owing to some misunderstanding he halted halfway, and the news of his advance being carried ahead by spies, Mayana was able to make his escape. At last Heron came up, but his heavy guns had broken down on the road, and he had forgotten to bring scaling ladders. Without these, more especially as Mayana had slipped out of their hands, it seemed absurd to risk an attack. Heron, however, was unwilling to acknowledge his failure, and accepted with delight the suggestion of one of his servants to burn down the gate of the Pagoda and so force an entrance. All his officers declared the attempt was madness.

"To silence their remonstrances [he] set the example and carried the first torch himself. Excess of courage, however desperately or absurdly employed, seldom fails to interest those who are spectators of it, and often obliges them to participate of the danger even against the conviction of their reason. *Yusuf Khan*, who had more than any one ridiculed the madness of this attempt, no sooner saw Colonel Heron exposing himself in this desperate manner, contrary to all military rules, than he followed his example and accompanied him with another torch, so that the two principal officers of the army were now seen acting the part of volunteers leading a forlorn hope."²

The gate was burned down and the pagoda entered.³ Most

¹ When asked for an explanation (*Mil. Cons.*, 27th May, 1755), Col. Heron produced a letter from the Nawab authorizing him to forgive the Maravans on their complete submission and payment of tribute. The letter, however, was so worded that it left the Nawab at liberty to disavow his permission if every condition laid down was not fulfilled to the letter. By trickery of this kind on the part of the Nawab, English officers were induced to make promises in his behalf, which he invariably refused to ratify after he had obtained every possible advantage from them. See Col. Donald Campbell's letter dated 26th May, 1767. Appendix IV., p. 269, below.

² Orme, *History*, I. 385. I have given Orme's account, but later on Yusuf Khan claimed the capture of Tirumbur as his own exploit. He says (Letter to Council, 10th April, *Country Correspondence*, 1756), "the fortress of Tirumbur, which I took with great trouble and pains in the time of Colonel Heron."

³ Heron's letter reporting the capture of the place is dated 9th March, 1755. *Mil. Cons.*, 26th March, 1755.

of the garrison were put to the sword and the place was plundered. Amongst the spoil the soldiers included a large number of the little images which the Kallans worshipped. These Heron told the Brahmans he would restore for five thousand rupees, and, on the offer being refused, placed them amongst the baggage to be sold as old brass for the benefit of the soldiers when the army should reach Trichinopoly, an action which gave great offence. The Madras Council recorded :—

“ The Committee cannot but esteem this to be an action unworthy of an English officer, and an action which must undoubtedly cause a great prejudice against the Nation all through the country where it was committed.” ¹

The Kallans were driven to frenzy, and the people who later on gave the title of “ Rumley Swami ” ² to an officer who had massacred the inhabitants of whole villages without mercy, could find no forgiveness for the men who had stormed their temple and carried off their gods. As long as Heron remained in the provinces they put to death every one belonging to his army who fell into their hands, native or European, man, woman, or child.³ This in turn led to equally savage reprisals.

Leaving a garrison in Madura, Heron and Mahfuz Khan went on to Tinnevely, where they arrived on the 25th March. The Poligars, led by one Kattabomanaik,⁴ were in rebellion, but one of Heron's first exploits was the storm of Nellicotah,⁵ forty miles to the south. The soldiers, maddened by the atrocities committed by the Kallans and in the fury of the assault, put to death every one in the place, regardless of age or sex,⁶ and this so terrified the people that the Poligars at once submitted and either paid up their contributions or gave hostages for the same.

¹ *Mil. Cons.*, 16th and 17th Sept., 1755.

² i.e. “ Lord Rumley ” (Francis, *Madura*, p. 89). The word “ Swami ” means God, Lord, or Chief, and is generally used by an inferior to one greatly superior. An account of Captain Rumley's exploits is given in *I. O. Records, Map Dept.*, MS. B. 27, f. 3.

³ Pennant, *Hindoostan*, II. 12.

⁴ Poligar of Panjalam-kurichi, fifty miles north-east of Tinnevely.

⁵ Identified by Bishop Caldwell (*Tinnevely*, p. 95) with Natta-Kottai.

⁶ Orme, *History*, I. 387.

As was the custom of the time, the Poligars when paying their contributions made handsome presents to the commanding officer of the army, and as Heron gave more attention to the amount of the presents than to the sums collected for the Nawab, the result was that the total of the latter not only left no surplus for the State, but fell short of the expenses of the expedition by over seventy thousand rupees.¹

As a general rule, the administration of a province in the Carnatic was at this time divided between a Faujdar or military governor and a collector of revenue called the Amaldar or Renter, who was also the civil governor. Mahfuz Khan had already been appointed to the former post. Heron now made the further mistake, to which he was no doubt induced by a handsome present, of appointing Mahfuz Khan to be Renter also, on payment of an annual sum of fifteen lakhs of rupees, and this without consulting Mr. Maunsell,² the civil representative of the Council, or even the Nawab, the acknowledged ruler of the country. It is not easy to ascertain what was the actual value of the country. Mahfuz Khan, it appears,³ sublet the provinces for some twenty-four lakhs, which would allow him nine lakhs for himself and the costs of the civil and military administration. The Nawab, however, declared that when he had himself administered the country, Trichinopoly, including Madura and Tinnevely which provided about half the revenue, had produced fifty-two lakhs to government, so that Mahfuz Khan, according to his calculation, should have paid about twenty-six lakhs; but Captain Dalton,⁴ to whom the Nawab made this statement, asserted that in his opinion the Nawab, since his connection with the English, had never realized so much as seventeen lakhs. Considering the state of confusion

¹ A. J. Stuart, *Manual of the Tinnevely District*, p. 49.

² Mr. Thomas Maunsell, Commissary in the Camp. According to the Governor's orders, the revenues were to be collected by Col. Heron, Mr. Maunsell, and an officer of the Nawab conjointly.

³ *Mil. Cons.*, 7th Jan., 1756. Letter from a native Vakil, Rayal Pandit, dated 5th Dec., 1755, as follows: Tinnevely, 17,00,000; Poligars, 4,00,000; and Madura, 3,00,000. Rayal Pandit was sent by Caillaud as Vakil to Mahfuz Khan.

⁴ Letter to the Secret Committee, London. *I.O. Records; The French in India*, Vol. III. p. 67.

into which the country had fallen, it does not then appear that Heron made such a very bad bargain with Mahfuz Khan; it was, moreover, for a period of three months only, but both the Nawab and the Council were extremely dissatisfied.¹

Meanwhile the Council were becoming alarmed at the successes of Bussy in the Deccan, and partly for this reason, but more because Heron had failed to make the expedition pay its own expenses, they resolved to recall him to Madras. On the 2nd May he started for Madura. Three days' march brought him to Nekkattam-sevval, the chief town of the important Poligar known as the Pulidevar.

"This fortress is well built of stone and clay, stands on a plain, has no cover near it except a hill, within the range of cannon shot,² and the bank of a tank about six hundred yards distance which runs parallel to a face of the fort. Behind this hill our troops were encamped and a strong advanced post at the bank with some pieces of cannon and cohorns to amuse the enemy withal. Colonel Heron sent his *Vakil* into the place to inform the *Pulidevar* of his business and the sum requested, which if he did not comply with his town should be battered to pieces. The fellow laughed at these threats, as he well knew we had no heavy cannon and the Colonel's servant had taken care to inform him that our stay would not be long as his master was positively ordered to return. In consequence of which, after throwing away a great quantity of ammunition and getting several of our men knocked on the head, the Colonel very prudently sent a final message into the town to tell them he would retire from before the place provided twenty thousand rupees was paid down on the spot. They returned for answer the Colonel might do as he pleased; that such a sum could not be raised, and they were

¹ The question of the proper rent or revenue of these countries is only obscured by the account given by Orme in his *History*, II. 105. He there says that at this time the total rent derivable from Madura was 1 lakh 20 thousand rupees, but the military expenditure was 3 lakhs 60 thousand, and as its possession was necessary to the security of Tinnevely, the deficiency had to be met from the revenues of that country, which amounted to 12 lakhs. If this is correct then the right rent should have been about 9½ lakhs, and the dissatisfaction of the Council must have been based on their knowledge of the character of Mahfuz Khan, and not on the amount of the rent fixed by Heron. The Nawab, on the other hand, may have preferred to arrange for a rack-rent as a pretext to cover his extortions.

² "The cannon were served by Dutch deserters and topasses." Heron to Council, 14th May, 1755, *Mil. Cons.*, 30th May, 1755.

determined not to pay even a single rupee. Our army at this time was much distressed for provisions of all kinds, and the sepoys ready to mutiny every hour of the day. This determined the Colonel to give over any further attempts on the town and march to Madura, which the army reached about the 20th May.”¹

A short stay was made here to refresh the troops and settle the garrison, composed of one thousand men under Jamal Sahib.² As the direct route to Trichinopoly lay through very difficult country, Captain Joseph Smith was sent ahead on the 28th May with a hundred Europeans, four companies of sepoys and two guns to take post at a fort³ at the southern entrance of the Nattam pass, which was six miles long and twenty miles north of Madura. How the army got through this pass Colonel Heron reported to the Council as follows⁴:—

“The 29th ultimo in passing some strong defiles in the *Nattam* woods, our baggage and *bazaar* were attacked by the *Kallans* who had in great numbers lined the woods through which we must necessarily pass. They had also attempted to stop the road by felling large trees across, so that I was obliged to detach most of the few sepoys I had to cover the coolies in clearing the road. This left the *bazaar* and baggage more exposed. Indeed the latter were so numerous that if we met any opposition the loss of a considerable part was unavoidable. The principal loss of the baggage was private property. The Company lost their old tents which were almost unserviceable, a few barrels of damaged ammunition and a few fire-locks that had been delivered into the Quartermaster’s Stores to be mended. We had four Europeans killed and wounded. These few men would not have suffered had they not been sick and unarmed and straggled out of the road. We met with no other difficulty on our route.”

So much for the official account of what was in reality a

¹ Joseph Smith’s Account of the expedition. *Orme MSS. India*, III. p. 610. Heron in his letter of the same date says the 21st May. *Mil. Cons.*, 4th June, 1755.

² The governor was one Danish Mand Khan, more commonly called Barkatullah, a servant of Mahfuz Khan. Jamal Sahib commanded only the sepoys of the Company.

³ Orme calls this fort Volsynattam (*i.e.* Velichinattam). *History*, I. 391.

⁴ Heron to Council, 7th June, 1755. *Mil. Cons.*, 19th June, 1755.

narrow escape from a serious disaster. Captain Joseph Smith supplied Orme with a very different account.¹ He says:—

“The Colonel had received intelligence that every *Kallan* in the country”—they had already surprised and cut off almost every man in a company under Sergeant Gould² whom they had caught asleep—“was resolved upon opposing his passage through this defile. Of course those officers who had passed it before knew the consequences which must inevitably happen if the baggage was not conducted with more than ordinary precaution through this wood, which is many miles in length and only admits three men abreast in the road and no possibility of turning either to right or left.”

It was, in fact, a kind of deep hollow way, closely bordered by continuous and almost impenetrable jungle, the paths through which could hardly be distinguished, though they were well known to the *Kallans*.

“The general³ beat at five in the morning,⁴ the army marched at six, in order to facilitate which Captain Lin with a detachment of military, pioneers and sepoys” [probably Yusuf Khan was with this body] “were sent on to clear the roads and reached their ground without the least obstruction.

“This was our order of march. Some companies of sepoys in front, a sergeant [and] twelve men, the first division of artillery and stores, the battalion⁵ led by Captain Polier, the rear division of artillery and tumbrils. Then followed one sergeant, twelve men and some companies of sepoys. In their rear followed the baggage of the whole army, and the rear-guard of forty *Coffrees*, twenty Europeans, two companies of sepoys and one six-pounder, fell to my lot. The Colonel with his troop of horse, commanded by Vasserot, went on in front. Some companies of sepoys were intermixed with the baggage for its protection, but they proved of little use. The front division of artillery and the battalion moved on without any difficulty or being opposed. Some part of the rear

¹ Joseph Smith's Account of the expedition, *Orme MSS. India*, III. pp. 608–612. It accompanies a letter dated the 4th July, 1763. A comparison with the account in Orme's *History* shows that Orme copied a good deal of it *verbatim*.

² *Mil. Cons.*, 12th June, 1755.

³ The signal to get ready for the march.

⁴ This affair took place on the 29th May. *Mil. Cons.*, 16th Oct., 1755.

⁵ *i.e.* the European troops.

division of guns also followed close to the battalion, but unfortunately the bullock drivers, being careless, drove one of our heavy carriages into a slough, which the oxen could not get out again. The officers of artillery, Lieutenant Raillard and Lieutenant Mollitore, imagining they should be soon able to extricate the carriage out of this hole, suffered the troops to go on and never called or sent to desire a halt, and the officer, Captain Beaver, in the rear of the battalion, seeing some tumbrils close up with him, did not suspect what had happened and of course kept on. To this blunder we may entirely impute the loss of our baggage. The carriage being stopped, nothing could pass by it. The *Kallans* had watched every motion and appeared in great numbers near my rear-guard. A few platoons and some grape shot soon dispersed them, nor did they venture to be troublesome again, but finding the battalion had advanced a considerable distance from the rear division of guns, they judged it a seasonable opportunity to attack Lieutenants Raillard and Mollitore, who had only a few gunners, lascars and some straggling sepoys remaining with them. The situation of the place prevented our people from being overpowered by numbers. Our short six-pounders with grape made such havock and terrified them so much that, after two repeated attacks for several hours, in which were killed the most of our cattle and some men, they retired with the satisfaction of having recovered the gods ¹ they fought for, which was in a tumbril near the place of the attack.

“Notwithstanding the continued firing this occasioned for so long a time, neither the Colonel or Captain Polier sent to enquire the cause, or ordered any reinforcements to our assistance. At the commencement of the firing I detached an officer with a company of sepoys, though I could but ill spare them, which secured the artillery from any further attempt. The halt had been general for some hours and I grew very impatient at my situation. The evening was closing apace and my detachment had not moved an inch since the morning—no advice from the Colonel or anybody else, nor did a soul return that I sent to learn the reason of our being stopped. The *Kallans* murdered many of the coolies, which terrified the rest [so much] that they threw down their burdens and endeavoured to reach the place where our battalion was halted. It was between four and five in the afternoon when the enemy sallied out from all

¹ i.e. the images taken at Kovilkudi Pagoda (see p. 37 above). “The Committee have besides sufficient reason to be assured that this attack of the *Kallans* was occasioned by Col. Heron’s carrying away a large number of the religious images from *Kovilkudi Pagoda*.” *Mil. Cons.*, 16th Sept., 1755.

their bypaths into the road amongst our bazaar people and coolies, with the most hideous howling and screaming it is possible to conceive. From that moment everything was hurried into the greatest scene of confusion imaginable. They, to a man, quitted their cattle, burthens and everything else and fled whither their fears led them. They looked on me as their only sanctuary. Men, women and children pressed on me so much, that with difficulty I made my way back out of the wood to a little field, in order to fix some method of penetrating through the crowd and removing the baggage out of the road for my gun and tumbril to pass along, being resolved not to lose it.

“This was the severest task I ever met with. My sepoy were reduced to about thirty, and a good number of lascars stayed with me. The sepoy were divided in front and rear with drawn swords with orders to murder any person that should dare come in between them and the gun, whilst the lascars cleared the road. By this means about dusk I reached Lieutenants Raillard and Mollitore, whose joy on the occasion could not be exceeded but by my own. No time was to be lost. We collected what draught bullocks could be found and drew off our cannon and ammunition. About two miles on the road we found our battalion laying on their arms, without the Colonel or any Captain belonging to the corps, the latter having all been taken ill with the extreme heat of the day.¹ I put myself at the head of them and marched on to that spot on which Captain Linn had halted. There we remained all night and the next morning—without [the] trouble of baggage—we reached the town of Nattam and were joined by a detachment from Trichinopoly commanded by Captain Zeigler, who escorted us through the woods, and on the 5th June,² I think, we once more encamped at *Woriur* after an expedition the most infamous I ever wish to be a witness of. The behaviour of our commanding officer and captains on that day deserved every punishment you can name. However they are at rest³—we will let them remain so.”

¹ They had been carried ahead in palankeens. Orme, *History*, I. 395.

² Heron, in his letter of the 7th June to Council, gives the date as the 6th. *Mil. Cons.*, 19th June, 1755.

³ The officers who held the rank of Captain in this expedition were, besides Smith himself, *Paul Polier de Bottens*, killed at the siege of Madras, 1758; *William Lin*, who died in Bengal in 1757; *William Lee*, died 15th July, 1756 (*Letter to Court*, 21st Nov., 1756); *George Beaver*, who disappears from the Army List after the 5th Nov., 1759; and *Alexander Callender*, killed at the storm of Masulipatam, April, 1759. Joseph Smith rose to be Brigadier-General.

Heron was tried by Court Martial ¹ at Fort Saint David, the charges being framed by Orme himself, ² who tells us that, Heron having quarrelled with Lawrence on his first arrival in India, ³ much personal animosity was shown in the trial, but Heron's conduct had been so scandalous that absolutely nothing could be said in his favour. He was convicted of having given in false accounts, of having secreted part of the money collected, and for this purpose, instead of having collected the revenues with Mr. Maunsell, of having entered into a private agreement with Mahfuz Khan and of having farmed out the countries of Madura and Tinnevely to him at a very inadequate rent. ⁴ He was dismissed the Company's service, but broke his arrest, and, escaping to the Dutch at Sadras and thence to Pondicherry, got safely away to Europe. ⁵

Heron's campaign having proved a failure, it was necessary for the English at Madras to consider matters very carefully before they undertook any further action in regard to Madura and Tinnevely, so Orme, who was a member of the Council, naturally applied to a man on the spot for his opinion as to the right course to be pursued. Captain Caillaud, then stationed at Trichinopoly, ⁶ replied to his enquiries as follows ⁷ :—

“I wish my political capacity was equal to the idea you are pleased to have of it, that I might answer your paragraph more to my satisfaction. But such as my thoughts are please to receive them. A hint is more than enough to you.

¹ *Mil. Cons.*, 5th Sept. *et seq.*, 1755.

² Orme to Payne, 9th Feb., 1757. *Orme MSS.*, 28, p. 132.

³ Orme to Payne, 26th Oct., 1755. *Orme MSS.*, 28, p. 19.

⁴ The articles of the charge against him of which he was convicted were (1) of perverting the intention of his commission ; (2) of breach of orders. Love, *Vestiges of Old Madras*, II. 476. In the text I have followed Cambridge (p. 86), who interprets the charges instead of merely quoting them.

⁵ As far as one can judge from the incomplete proceedings, Col. Heron did not receive a fair trial, for whenever the documentary evidence produced was in his favour—*e.g.* in regard to the Company's losses in the Nattam Pass affair (*Mil. Cons.*, 15th Sept.)—Council discounted this evidence by such remarks as “Yet the Committee are well informed that,” &c., &c.

⁶ Caillaud took over the command at Trichinopoly in April, 1755. *Country Correspondence*, 1755, No. 67.

⁷ Undated letter, but evidently written in 1755. *Orme MSS.*, 293, p. 59.

“The grand point now in view, I believe, is the discharge of the [Nawab's] debt [to the Company]; while that subsists we must make use of the *Nawab* to hasten the payment of it. The methods which are now pursuing towards that end are very proper ones : but there are others also which I think are worth your consideration.

“The last expedition to the southward was unfortunate owing to many causes, but in particular our intermeddling in country business ¹ of which we know very little. And in affairs of this kind it were more for our interest were we but second causes, setting the first in motion to answer our purposes.

“I think an army should again be sent there and some methods in general like these pursued.

“The *Nawab* himself should go in person, and with him a sufficient number of Europeans.

“The commanding officer to interfere in nothing but his military business. The *Nawab* to let him know when it was proper to march, where to march, who to attack and who not to attack. As to when and how, the officer might be the judge.

“Along with the *Nawab* one of your Body ² should be sent, to be present and made acquainted with everything relating to the country business, the sums agreed for and those collected, and when the troops were paid so much [should be] laid apart by him for the Company's use, the remainder to the support of the *Nawab*. This person of your Body should have nothing neither to say to the means the *Nawab* would pursue towards making the people pay nor the sums he would oblige them to give. I know what will be objected to this immediately. That the *Nawab*, if he has power in his hands, will squeeze these people unmercifully, and we should [*i.e.* ought to] see nothing but justice done. My dear Mr. Orme, our rigid northern notion of justice will make us at last the dupes and fools to the more pliant politicks of these southern climates. If we support the *Nawab* let us do it, and not prescribe to him in such cases as these. And after all, what have we more to do with their modes [of] government than their modes of faith ? The *Nawab* acts justly as an eastern prince : let him act then as he pleases. We have the power still in our hands. You know the fable of the cat, the monkey and the roasted chestnuts.

“Let our principal business be to see that we have a good account of what he collects, if we suspect he is dishonest enough to conceal it from us. For which reason let the Civil gentleman have with him some of the most creditable and intelligent of the Company's

¹ *i.e.* in the collection of revenue.

² *i.e.* the Madras Council.

dubashes ;¹ who, I engage, will not let him cheat us of much, and, above all things, let the Presidency have trust and confidence in the man they send out in that capacity, not tie him down by restrictions nor circumscribe him to time, if the expedition answers the end proposed. Let the military man be a soldier and know how to carry command."

Caillaud's advice to give the Nawab a free hand, under English protection, to fleece his subjects, was not put in practice until after the death of Yusuf Khan. Caillaud had owned it was immoral; it then proved also to be unbusiness-like.²

¹ *i.e.* interpreters or clerks.

² See p. 114 below.

CHAPTER VI

CAILLAUD AND YUSUF KHAN

WHILST waiting to see what Mahfuz Khan would make of his governorship, the Nawab thought he might try what could be got out of his northern vassals. Of these, the chief was Murtaza Ali, Faujdar of Vellore, whose riches and extensive territory in the near vicinity of Arcot rendered him almost as powerful as the Nawab himself—in fact, Dupleix had at one time considered him a suitable candidate for the succession to Chanda Sahib. At first the Nawab thought of employing Yusuf Khan in this affair; for apparently he had had no share in the spoil which had fallen to Heron and his officers, and might therefore be supposed to be a more tractable and trustworthy agent than an English officer of whom the Nawab knew nothing and whom he could not punish if he misbehaved. But Major Killpatrick and Mr. Perceval¹ convinced him that Vellore was too strong to be taken by a native force, and that he must employ European soldiers. Accordingly he applied to the Council for help. It was granted with reluctance, for the French had but ill tolerated the interference of the English in the case of Madura and Tinnevely. However, the Council at last consented and sent a force under Major Killpatrick, which arrived before Vellore on the 30th January, 1756. Murtaza Ali, aware of the Nawab's designs, had besought the protection of the French, but to make this effective he would have had to admit a French garrison, a step which he was naturally very unwilling to take. He therefore opened negotiations with Major Killpatrick; and Yusuf Khan, being sent into the fort to arrange matters, concluded an agreement

¹ Perceval and Killpatrick to Council, 24th Oct., 1755. *Mil. Cons.*


by which Murtaza Ali was to pay four lakhs of rupees in satisfaction of all claims. At this moment Mr. Orme¹ as Deputy of the Council arrived in camp, with authority to accept, if he could do no better, the much smaller sum of only one lakh. His instructions were supposed to be secret, but had been, somehow or other, disclosed to Murtaza Ali's agent in Madras and by him communicated to his master, so that when Mr. Orme, finding how much more successful Yusuf Khan had been, simply announced that he had come to receive the amount agreed upon with Major Killpatrick, Murtaza Ali, who had also received notice that the French were beginning to move to his assistance, was by no means willing to pay it. In order to gain time, he invited Mr. Orme to visit him in the fort. Orme was accompanied by Yusuf Khan, and when they came to the discussion of business, he demanded the fulfilment of the promises which Yusuf Khan had communicated to him, but Murtaza Ali coolly asserted that what Yusuf Khan had said was all a lie.

“On this, the commander of our sepoys, one of my party, the bravest and the most worthy *Muhammadan* in the East, had well-nigh sacrificed us all by the emotions of his indignation at being thus impudently charged with a falsity.”²

Yusuf Khan, in fact, drew his dagger upon Murtaza Ali, who was about to call in his guards when Mr. Orme assured him that, whatever might be the result, he, Murtaza Ali, would certainly be the first man killed if the quarrel proceeded further. So quiet was restored, but Murtaza Ali could not be persuaded to agree to anything more favourable than a payment of two lakhs, and even that only on condition that the Council would guarantee him against any further molestation on their part or on that of the Nawab. As this would have precluded the Nawab from making use of a more favourable opportunity,

¹ In his *History*, I. 418, Mr. Orme does not mention the name of the Deputy, but it is of course given in the Council's Consultations.

² Orme to Lord Holderness, 1st March, 1756, *Orme MSS.*, III. p. 711. In a letter to Payne dated October or November, 1756, Orme writes: “Yusuf Khan . . . the bravest amongst the sons of *Muhammad* in India.” *Orme MSS.*, 28, p. 41.



Mr. Orme refused to accept the offer, and, the French soon after approaching in force, Major Killpatrick, feeling he was not strong enough to take the place by a *coup-de-main* before their arrival, withdrew his army to Madras. Thus Murtaza Ali achieved his object, which was to get rid of the English without actually putting himself in the power of the French.

As was to be expected, Mahfuz Khan was already in great difficulties in Tinnevely. The three Pathan officers who had remained in hiding while Colonel Heron had been in the country, reappeared on his departure, and Moodemiah, who had sold the southern district of Kalakadu to the King of Travancore, invited him now to take possession of it. He agreed, and in alliance with Moodemiah, the Pulidevar and the western poligars attacked and defeated Mahfuz Khan in two battles. Encouraged by this success Mayana and Nabi Khan made a plot to seize Madura itself. The Nawab immediately asked the Council to send a force of their own to Tinnevely.

Meanwhile the Madras Council, dissatisfied with the farming of the Provinces to Mahfuz Khan, were in negotiation with one Tittarappa Mudali,¹ a wealthy inhabitant of Tinnevely whose family had for generations been connected with its revenue administration, to take over the rentership leased for three months to Mahfuz Khan by Colonel Heron. Their difficulties were now increased by Mahfuz Khan's proved military incapacity. If they had taken the advice given by Caillaud to Orme they would have sent a European in military command, leaving the civil and revenue administration to the Nawab under the general supervision of a member of the Madras Council; but the danger of an approaching war with France, and the strength of the French in the Deccan and at Pondicherry, made them unwilling to spare a European officer of any rank or any considerable body of Europeans, nor was it at all

¹ Orme says (*History*, II. 105) that Mudali's family had held farms of various districts for 100 years. Nelson (*Madura Country*, III. 277) calls this a rash statement, but Heron in a letter dated 4th April, 1755, calls Mudali the chief merchant in Tinnevely, and the Nawab in his letter of the 30th Jan., 1770, said that his influence with the Poligars was so great as to be dangerous (see p. 52 (n.)). Both these statements are incompatible with his being a "new man." It is even stated that Heron wished to appoint him Renter, but that Mahfuz Khan outbid him by a lakh of rupees. *Orme MSS.*, 49, p. 1.

likely that the Nawab could devote his whole attention to the southern provinces. Caillaud's scheme was therefore for the time impracticable, and the Council decided to recall Mahfuz Khan, to send in his place a native military officer whom they believed to be devoted to themselves, to take over the provinces for three years from the Nawab, to appoint their own renter or civil governor, and to divide the balance of the revenue, which would remain after the troops had been paid, between the Nawab and the payment of the Nawab's debt to the Company. To this the Nawab agreed.¹

The military officer chosen by the Council was Yusuf Khan, and on the 14th March ² Mr. Pigot wrote to inform him of his appointment, told him that he was entrusted "not only with military affairs, but also with the management of the Company's other concerns in the Madura and Tinnevely countries," that he was to remit all revenue received to Captain Caillaud at Trichinopoly, and in general to act in accordance with any orders which Captain Caillaud might send him. He concluded :—

"Thus I have entrusted you with a business of great importance, not doubting but you will act therein so as to gain an advantage to the Company and the *Nawab* and to yourself a good name, reputation and future favour."

At the same time the Council completed their arrangements with Mudali, giving him the rentership of Tinnevely only, for a period of three years, on a rent of eleven, twelve and thirteen lakhs of rupees respectively in addition to the payment of the

¹ See next page. The Council's intentions were recorded only after the Nawab's consent had been received, hence the apparent confusion of dates in the text.

² *Mil. Cons.*, 16th March, 1756. See p. 272 below. In an earlier part of the same Consultations it is stated, "*Yusuf Khan* arrived this morning, and proposes setting out for Trichinopoly the 13th. His Company and Sergeant-Major Robinson is in readiness to march with him. He is not yet determined which of the *Subadars* he will take." Sergeant-Major Robinson, however, died at Trichinopoly before the expedition started (*Mil. Cons.*, 13th April, 1756), but the names of six of his sergeants, viz. Thomas Harris, Richard Jeffrys, Samuel Underwood, Richard Sculthorpe, John McKain, and Joseph Johnson, are appended to a letter given in the *Mil. Cons.* of the 9th Nov., 1756; and from Yusuf Khan's letter of the 2nd Jan., 1757, to Council (*Country Correspondence*, No. 29) it appears that Yusuf Khan had a sergeant to each company of sepoys.

requisite troops, but they neglected to specify clearly whether he was to pay only the one thousand sepoys, whom they at first placed under Yusuf Khan, or whatever troops should be ultimately found necessary. They certainly intended that Mudali should find the money for all, but debit the excess against his rent. This agreement was concluded on the 28th June, 1756, and was to take effect from the 1st July.

Meanwhile the Nawab had changed his mind. On the 29th March news had been received that Mahfuz Khan, assisted by the Poligars of Panjalankurichi¹ and Ettaiyapuram, and the sepoys left behind by Heron, had won a great victory over the Travancoreans and the rebels near Tinnevely, Moodemiah being killed in the battle. The Nawab desired accordingly that the appointment of Yusuf Khan might be cancelled, and that only such military assistance should be despatched as Mudali, whom they might consult, should consider necessary.² This was in accordance with the weak fondness which he always exhibited towards his ungrateful brother Mahfuz Khan,³ though his acceptance of Mudali as renter was inconsistent with his declaration made many years later,⁴ that he had always considered Mudali unfit for the post, and too closely connected with the poligars to be trusted. Mudali was, however, a very timid person, and the Nawab probably thought that he would not dare to give any trouble to a man of the rank of Mahfuz Khan.

The Council, however, had no illusions in reference to Mahfuz Khan, and as they had not received the Nawab's letter until the 4th April, when Yusuf Khan had already started,⁵ they

¹ i.e. Kattabomanaik.

² Nawab to Council, 4th April, 1756. *Country Correspondence*, No. 84.

³ The Nawab's fondness for his brothers is the only virtue that I can find in his character. It proved fatal to his friends, for he never forgave the latter when, at his own request, they had reduced his rebellious brothers to obedience.

⁴ Letter to Council, 30th Jan., 1770. *I. O. Records, Home Misc.*, No. 103. "I answered in a very particular manner that it was not proper to retake them from *Mahfuz Khan* to give them to the *Mudali*, who was careless and unfit. I also wrote and further said that by giving these countrys to him it would increase the *poligars'* strength, they being friends to him, which would hurt the *Sarkar's* business."

⁵ He left Trichinopoly on the 26th March and arrived at Madura on the 6th April. Yusuf Khan to Mr. Pigot, 10th April, 1756. *Country Correspondence*, No. 94.

insisted on Mahfuz Khan's recall and the carrying out of their own arrangements.

On the 9th April a letter was received from Captain Caillaud, reporting that Yusuf Khan had already left Trichinopoly with his sepoys, and with a somewhat larger number of European gunners than the Council had ordered, but which Caillaud himself thought absolutely necessary. He had also given him an armourer named Faulkner and a hospital assistant named Lisle, and particular instructions as to his relations with the European sergeants of the sepoy and Coffree companies. He had further recommended that Yusuf Khan should try to make terms with the King of Travancore.

As Yusuf Khan had accompanied Heron, he was well aware of the dangers of the direct route from Trichinopoly to Madura through the Nattam pass. He therefore marched to the east of the Nattam forest, and took his small army of 1200 sepoys, 100 Coffrees, 150 Kallans, and European gunners with four field-pieces and an eighteen-pounder, through the Tondaiman's and Little Maravan's countries until he could strike west to Kovilkudi, the scene of his and Heron's foolhardy but successful exploit. On the 6th April Yusuf Khan arrived at Madura, which he found in a very bad condition. With some difficulty he persuaded the governor, Barkatullah, to receive an addition of two companies of sepoys to his garrison,¹ and then, taking Jamal Sahib with him, he proceeded to Tinnevely. Here he found that Mahfuz Khan, in spite of his victory, was almost in a state of destitution, for the ravages of the poligars had been so widespread that he had been unable to collect any revenue, and was unable to pay not only his own sepoys, but even those

¹ " *Danish Mand Khan* [Barkatullah] on his part did not so much as desire me to stay even ten days and settle the country, offering to pay the expenses of the troops. On the contrary, he spends his time night and day in pleasures and diversion with the dancing wenches. He is very proud of his two elephants and grandeurs, and he never minds the *Sarkar's* business. Notwithstanding, out of a regard to the *Sarkar's* affairs, I kept [*i.e.* placed] two companies of sepoys in *Madura* Fort, though it was against his pleasure and consent." Yusuf Khan to Council, 10th April. *Country Correspondence*, 1756. On the other hand, Barkatullah and the Nawab complained to the Council that Yusuf Khan placed his own officers in charge of the districts which he reduced. The Council decided (*Mil. Cons.*, 17th May, 1756) that Yusuf Khan had no choice in the matter, as he could not trust any one else.

left behind by Colonel Heron. Yusuf Khan, however, set to work in his own way, and without much regard to the loss of men,¹ he stormed the forts of some of the poligars and drove others out of their villages, creating such a panic amongst them that, by the beginning of August, he had reduced the western poligars to at least temporary submission and quiet. He then requested Mahfuz Khan to leave the country,² and on his acquiescence sent a company of sepoys with him to Madura, and also the heavy gun, which impeded the rapidity of his own marches. Having garrisoned the important fort of Srivilliputtur, which commanded the districts of the western poligars, he returned himself to Tinnevely.

Here Yusuf Khan found the agents of Mudali had already begun their operations, but were impeded by one Mir Jafar, who had hitherto managed for Mahfuz Khan. He promptly ordered him to follow his master, and allowed him to take what retinue he pleased, though he sent five companies of sepoys with him, nominally as an escort, but really to see that he did no mischief on the road. Two days after Mir Jafar had started, the escort received information of a revolution at Madura. The garrison of that town had mutinied and had made Mahfuz Khan prisoner. They therefore halted and sent for instructions to Yusuf Khan.

A mutiny in an Indian army at this time was not an uncommon occurrence, nor in fact a very serious matter. The Abbé Dubois tells us³ :—

“Mutinous soldiers frequently put their generals under arrest, send them to prison, menace them sword in hand or try to intimidate them by loud threats and insults. The generals, strange to say, will calmly and patiently put up with these mutinous outbursts. Usually they will pay the mutineers part of their arrears and promise the rest in a short time. Quiet is then restored, and the men return to duty until another such occasion presents itself.”

¹ In this fighting with the poligars Yusuf Khan's worst hurt was the loss of a horse shot under him when attacking Kollamkondan. *Country Correspondence*, 1756.

² Apparently Mahfuz Khan left Tinnevely about the 17th July. Tittarappa Mudali to Pigot, 7th August. *Country Correspondence*, 1756, No. 208. On the 31st July, Yusuf Khan reported to the Council that he had made over the whole of Tinnevely to Mudali. *Country Correspondence*, 1756, No. 223.

³ *Hindu Manners, Customs and Ceremonies*, p. 675.

Whilst the incapacity of Mahfuz Khan was thus receiving practical demonstration, the Nawab began to show, by a piece of petty spite, that Yusuf Khan had offended him in retaining his appointment to Madura after he had signified to the Council that he wished that appointment cancelled. It appears that Yusuf Khan, like Clive, found leisure amidst his military duties to look after his private business as well, and that he had rented some land—possibly at Trichinopoly-Nellore—which belonged to the Nawab. Of this the Nawab proposed to deprive him. Yusuf Khan appealed to Mr. Pigot to prevent this injustice, and Mr. Pigot accordingly wrote to the Nawab as follows ¹ :—

“ I am informed that *Yusuf Khan* has for some time past rented a district near to Trichinopoly, but that you are now inclined to give it to some other person. I think that *Yusuf Khan's* long and faithful services to you as well during the troubles ² as since, entitle him to be preferred by you to any other person, and therefore I take the liberty to write to you in his favour, and to desire that you will give him a mark of your esteem by letting him to [*sic*] enjoy the said district as formerly. In so doing you will oblige me as well as show a kindness to a man who deserves to be considered not only for his past services but for those he may do us in future.”

It is probable that this appeal to Mr. Pigot did Yusuf Khan but little good with the Nawab. I have not traced any definite reply to Mr. Pigot's letter, but from this date the Nawab was Yusuf Khan's enemy.

To return, however, to Madura. The mutiny at that place was at first supposed to be due only to the pay of the soldiers being heavily in arrears, but it soon became known that the higher officers, including the Governor Barkatullah, were as deeply implicated in the affair as the soldiers. In fact, the army did not want to give up the very lucrative job of collecting the revenue of such rich provinces as Madura and Tinnevely under the easy rule of a notoriously weak governor like Mahfuz Khan. Accordingly, when the Nawab offered to pay down two lakhs of rupees which the mutineers claimed as arrears, they immediately doubled their demand, and Mahfuz Khan, by

¹ Pigot to Nawab, 25th Sept., 1756. *Country Correspondence*, No. 279.

² *i.e.* the troubles with Chanda Sahib and the French.

bitter complaints against the injustice of depriving him of the governorship, showed that he too was in the plot. Further, as the Company's sepoys in the Fort refused to join the mutineers, Mahfuz Khan sent for their officers, on pretence of settling their arrears of pay, and made them prisoners until he had turned their men out of the fort, when he sent the officers after them.¹ They took up a position near the town and reported to Yusuf Khan. Barkatullah and his puppet Mahfuz Khan made an alliance with Mayana, who provided the Fort with provisions and with a body of Kallans, with which they terrorized the country round Madura.

As soon as Yusuf Khan received information of the mutiny he left a garrison under Jamal Sahib in Tinnevely, and, picking up Mir Jafar's escort on the way, marched hurriedly to Madura, where he was joined by the companies expelled by the mutineers. Even so, he had only 1500 men, and his only heavy gun, which he had entrusted to Mahfuz Khan,² was in the hands of the enemy. All he could do, therefore, was to take up a position at Sikandarmalai,³ three miles to the south, and watch the course of events. On the 13th September Mudali arrived with two companies of sepoys, but his influence was more likely to be of value in the south, so he went on to Tinnevely, where he was warmly greeted by his friends the poligars, who had hitherto been unable to make up their minds which side to join.

This behaviour of the southern poligars discouraged the mutineers in Madura, who now offered to treat; and Captain Caillaud, to whom Yusuf Khan had reported matters, sent

¹ Pigot to Nawab, 26th August, and Yusuf Khan to Pigot, 15th Aug. (received 29th Aug.). *Country Correspondence*, 1756, Nos. 243 and 246.

² On one occasion Mahfuz Khan had lost this gun in fight with the Pulidevar, but Yusuf Khan's sepoys had retaken it. Having no anticipation of the mutiny, he allowed Mahfuz Khan to take it to Madura, where there were also some 12-pounders left by Col. Heron, "which guns he wants now to fight us with. If he will come out in field, I'll take his head and send it to your Honour." Yusuf Khan to Pigot, 23rd Aug. *Country Correspondence*, 1756, No. 255.

³ Francis (*Madura*, p. 279) says this place is so called after a fakir named Sikandar, who lived and died on the hill so named, and that it is frequented by both Hindus and Muhammadans. Padre Schwartz wrote, "Behind the hospital in Sikandarmalai was a lofty rock on the peak of which the rebel Khan Sahib or Yusuf Khan had built a mosque, in which the graves of Alexander and of his Doctor are shown." *Geschichte der Missions anstalten in Ost-Indien*, IX. Pt. I. p. 586.

down his interpreter Narayan to discuss terms with Mahfuz Khan and Barkatullah, but Narayan was unable to persuade Mahfuz Khan to accept any conditions which involved his giving up the governorship of the Provinces. He therefore turned his attentions to the jemadars or commanders of the cavalry, who were easily persuaded to promise the surrender of Mahfuz Khan and Barkatullah on payment of their arrears. These terms were accepted, and Mudali was asked to provide the money.

Mudali, as has been already stated, had been well received by the poligars; but their troublesome retainers, the Kallans, who had accompanied their chiefs to Tinnevely, could not control their thievish propensities, and when caught were very roughly handled by the sepoys. In revenge they began to steal from the sepoys themselves, who laid the blame upon Mudali for allowing the poligars to remain in the town. To add to the confusion, the King of Travancore, expecting a speedy breach between the poligars and the English, began to renew his incursions, whilst Nabi Khan also emerged from the hiding in which he had remained since the death of Moodemiah and, with his followers, infested the country between Madura and Tinnevely, so that, when Mudali had collected about one half of the sum demanded by the cavalry officers, it was impossible to transmit it in safety.

The cavalry officers, suspicious of every one, ascribed the delay to an intention of evading payment altogether, and reconciled themselves to Mahfuz Khan and Barkatullah, but Captain Caillaud now persuaded these two to agree to terms, and started for Madras to obtain their ratification from the Council. To add to Caillaud's difficulties, a dispute had arisen between Yusuf Khan and Mudali as to the number of troops for which Mudali was to provide pay, Yusuf Khan, as it proved quite correctly, demanding that he should find the money required for all the troops employed, and Mudali asserting that he was required to settle only for the troops originally sent with Yusuf Khan.¹ Caillaud supposed that Mudali was in the right and wrote to Yusuf Khan accordingly, who sent word to

¹ See p. 52 above.

one of the European sergeants with Jamal Sahib to see Mudali and try to arrange the matter. The sergeant took Jamal Sahib and another sepoy officer named Basopanaik with him, and, when they found Mudali persist in his refusal to comply with Yusuf Khan's wishes, they placed him under arrest. If Mudali is to be believed, they also made free with his property. Instead of ascribing this rough behaviour to excess of zeal, Mudali, thinking only of the insult, convinced himself that the sergeant and sepoy officers had acted under instructions from Yusuf Khan, though the latter ordered his release as soon as he heard of it.¹ In the meantime Jamal Sahib, glad of the opportunity of revenging upon the poligars the misdemeanours of their followers, turned them all out of the town with threats of the severest punishment if they dared to return. Instead of going home, they, under the leadership of Kattabomanaik and the Pulidevar, joined Nabi Khan and concluded an alliance with Barkatullah. The latter in the middle of November broke off all negotiations with Caillaud, and went off to join Nabi Khan.

Caillaud, having received *en route* positive orders from Council not to quit Trichinopoly, had returned to that town. Considering that Yusuf Khan had been in the wrong in his difference with Mudali and hearing Mudali's account of his arrest, he was at first inclined to think that Yusuf Khan was seeking some personal advantage, and, even when he was informed by the Council that Yusuf Khan was right in his contention,² he thought that he must be deficient in temper and tact, for Mahfuz Khan, the poligars, and Mudali all combined to throw the blame of everything that had gone wrong upon

¹ This affair was reported by Mudali to Mr. Pigot, who on the 14th Nov. wrote to Yusuf Khan censuring Jamal Sahib, and telling him that in future he must take from Mudali only such money as the latter could conveniently spare and draw upon Caillaud at Trichinopoly for the remainder. *Country Correspondence*, No. 325. That Yusuf Khan was somewhat too independent in his action is shown by the fact that Mr. Pigot, on the 27th November, had to censure him for increasing by nearly one half the *batta* allowed to his sepoys without obtaining previous permission. A little later, to please Mudali, Yusuf Khan recalled Jamal Sahib and placed Basopanaik in command at Palamcotta. *Country Correspondence*, 1757, No. 16.

² See Caillaud to Council, 2nd Nov., 1756, and 8th Dec., 1756, *Orme MSS.* XII. pp. 3359 and 3364. See Appendix V. p. 273.

the one man whom they all feared.¹ He reported to the Council, therefore, that they need not expect anything to be settled so long as Yusuf Khan remained in Madura. On the 14th December² Mr. Pigot wrote to Yusuf Khan, and, without referring to the unfavourable opinion formed of his behaviour by Captain Caillaud, informed him that war³ had broken out with France, that his services were required at Madras, and that he should return immediately, leaving his troops with Lieutenant Rumbold, whom Caillaud had sent to Madura to continue negotiations with Mahfuz Khan and the rebels.

Meanwhile Yusuf Khan, who had been unable for some time to ascertain Barkatullah's designs, at last heard that he had joined the rebels in the south and surprised Tinnevely, Mudali and Jamal Sahib having barely managed to throw themselves into Palamcottah, about three miles off. He immediately marched south, and coming up with the rebels on the 1st December at Gangaikondan, twenty miles north of Tinnevely, completely defeated them, though they mustered ten thousand strong. The poligars fled to the woods, and Barkatullah back to Madura, but Nabi Khan, passing by Srivilliputtur and unable to attempt the fort, made an attack upon the pagoda, which he would have taken and plundered had not one of the temple Brahmans mounted the high tower of the gateway, and, after cursing the assailants in a loud voice, thrown himself down, dashing his brains out on the pavement, an act which so horrified and terrified Nabi Khan's followers that they left the town.⁴

Having visited the neighbouring districts and reassured the inhabitants, Yusuf Khan halted in Tinnevely. Here he was recalled to Madura by a summons from Lieutenant Rumbold.

¹ Mudali asserted that Yusuf Khan fomented the troubles in order to get the country for himself, and that he was really in league with Mahfuz Khan, whilst the Nawab asserted that the cause of Mahfuz Khan's revolt was Yusuf Khan's disrespectful behaviour to his women-folk. *Country Correspondence*, 1757, Nos. 99, 257, 374, 382.

² *Country Correspondence*, No. 361.

³ News of the declaration of war by England against France reached Madras on the 12th Nov. *Mil. Cons.*, 13th Nov., 1756.

⁴ Francis (*Madura*, p. 281) says that an inscription in the big temple of Subrahmanya, four miles south-west of Madura, records a similar occurrence in 1792, when the temple was attacked by the English.

The rebels, at the instigation of Barkatullah and Nabi Khan, had finally decided to refuse all terms, and had invited Haidar Ali and the King of Travancore to join them.

Marching north, on the 16th December, Yusuf Khan, who had left a garrison at Palamcottā, reached Gangaikondan, where he heard that Lieutenant Rumbold had left Madura. He went on, however, to Srivilliputtur, and there halted to overawe the western poligars. Here Mudali, contrary to Yusuf Khan's advice, sent messengers to the Pulidevar. The latter despatched an agent to Mudali with an escort of Kallans at the same time as he ordered his troops to join Barkatullah and Nabi Khan. Being aware of the latter fact, when five of these Kallans were caught stealing and brought to Yusuf Khan he had them blown from a gun. The Pulidevar immediately withdrew from even the pretence of negotiation, and, to make sure that Mahfuz Khan should have no further chance of negotiating with the English, persuaded Barkatullah to send him to Nelkattamsevvai, where he remained actually a prisoner though nominally the head of the poligar confederacy.

Even before the arrival of Mr. Pigot's order recalling Yusuf Khan, Caillaud had seen reason to change his opinion, and in reply to the letter, in which Yusuf Khan's recall was notified to him, he wrote :—

"I have supposed *Yusuf Khan's* and *Mudali's* forces alone not sufficient to keep the country against them" [*i.e.* the rebels]. "Perhaps it may prove otherwise, and by the former's good management in the military way and the other's interest in the country they may maintain themselves, but certainly if we are obliged to recall *Yusuf Khan* the country is lost. There is a good understanding at present between your Renter and *Yusuf Khan*. *Jamal Sahib* is also as he ought to be."¹

As to the "good understanding" Caillaud was unduly optimistic, for the incompatibility of temper between Mudali and Yusuf Khan was such that though it might be smothered temporarily it could not be extinguished. However, there was peace for the time, and on the 29th March, 1757, the Council wrote to Caillaud that they would take no further notice of

¹ Caillaud to Council, 17th Dec., 1756. *Orme MSS.*, XII. p. 3373.

Mudali's complaints. Meanwhile instead of Yusuf Khan being recalled, towards the end of December Caillaud was ordered to join him,¹ and himself attempt the reduction of Madura, for it was fully realized that its possession by an enemy would be a serious disadvantage to the English when the French forces should arrive in India.

Caillaud, for various reasons,² was unable to carry out these orders at once, and did not start from Trichinopoly until the 23rd February, 1757,³ when he took with him 120 Europeans, 500 sepoys, and two pieces of cannon. He marched direct to Tinnevely, where Yusuf Khan, after having beaten the rebels at Alwarkurichi, joined him on the 17th March, "the glorious St. Patrick's."⁴ In spite of all his difficulties Yusuf Khan's force was in fine fighting condition,⁵ and Caillaud made him a complimentary present of one of two elephants which Yusuf Khan had captured from the poligars.⁶ At the same time he quieted Mudali's apprehensions of being turned out of the rentership by assuring him he had nothing to fear so long as he performed his share of the bargain with the Council, and he explained to Yusuf Khan that no one—not even himself—had any right to interfere with Mudali in the management of the country business.⁷ It must, however, be remembered that as early as September, 1756, the Council had expressed doubts as to Mudali's fitness, and had requested Yusuf Khan to look out for other candidates for the rentership, a fact of which Mudali was probably aware; and, though Caillaud did not wish to shorten his term of office, he was becoming convinced that the division of power between the military and civil governors was a mistake,

¹ In a letter dated 28th Dec. (*Country Correspondence*, No. 387), Mr. Pigot informed Yusuf Khan of this order and that he was to put all his troops under Caillaud's orders.

² e.g. the uncertainty as to the success of Clive's expedition to Bengal.

³ Caillaud to Council, 4th March, 1757. *Orme MSS.*, XII. p. 3387.

⁴ Caillaud to Captain Pechell, March, 1758, *Orme MSS.*, 31, p. 165.

⁵ Caillaud to Pigot, 18th March and 5th April, 1757, *Orme MSS.*, XII., 3392, 3397.

⁶ These had really been captured from Mahfuz Khan, and had belonged to his father Anwaruddin. The Nawab asked for their return, but Yusuf Khan, finding it too expensive to keep, had sent his elephant to Tanjore for sale. Yusuf Khan to Council, 19th April. *Country Correspondence*, 1757, No. 175.

⁷ i.e. civil or revenue matters, but see pp. 51 above and 272 below.

62 YUSUF KHAN: THE REBEL COMMANDANT

so that on the 5th April he wrote to Mr. Pigot that a man must be appointed who

“ must prove to the merchants that he can keep the country settled and quiet, and that alone cannot be done by words, but by showing the number of troops he purposes to maintain for that purpose.”¹

Caillaud's force was increased on his junction with Yusuf Khan by a few Europeans, 2000 sepoy, and about five or six hundred cavalry, but he was delayed in his movements for a short time by a terrible storm² which laid the whole country under water. As soon as he could move he tells us³ :—

“ I began hunting Mahfuz Khan ; most of his force consisting in cavalry, about 3000, I never could come up with ; his infantry in a manner disbanded, about 10,000 ; and at last I drove him up amongst his good friends the poligars, where I left him in order to pursue my plan, which was (after making the Renter settle his accounts, remit some money to the Company, provide money for the payment of my army) to march and besiege Madura.”

Whilst Caillaud had been hunting Mahfuz Khan, Mudali had been trying to collect money, and on the 10th April⁴ Caillaud was able to start for Madura. As early as January he had been aware that the rebels were in communication with Mysore and Haidar Ali. Now he heard that they had agreed to surrender to Haidar the Solavandan districts, in which were comprised a strong pass and the only road from Madura to Dindigul. Leaving garrisons of sepoy in Tinnevely and Palamcotta under Basopanaik, Caillaud and Yusuf Khan arrived before Madura on the 20th April⁵ and took possession of the pagoda at Sikandarmalai. The next day Yusuf Khan was sent to attack Solavandan, which he captured without

¹ *Orme MSS.*, XII. p. 3399.

² “ A storm more violent than had ever been remembered in these parts, by which the land was laid under water and the crops in many places destroyed.” *Orme to Payne*, 4th July, 1757. *Orme MSS.*, 28, p. 146.

³ Caillaud to Capt. Pechell, March, 1758. *Orme MSS.*, 31, p. 165.

⁴ The dates of this expedition are taken partly from Caillaud's letters to Council (*Orme MSS.*, XII. and XIII.) and partly from his letter to Captain Pechell (*Orme MSS.*, 31, pp. 163–169).

⁵ Wrongly given as 12th May in the letter to Captain Pechell.

difficulty ; but he was prevented by heavy rain from rejoining Caillaud until the 26th. Caillaud had meanwhile received orders to be ready to return to Trichinopoly, but, though he had not the heavy guns necessary for a regular attack, he thought he might be able to carry Madura by a sudden assault. This he determined to try at once.

At this time the ditch, having been neglected, had silted up in many places, and Caillaud was informed that there was a gap of some thirty yards in the thorny bushes which filled up the *faussebraye*, near the first tower on the left hand of the western gateway. There was also a watercourse running within 200 yards from the west wall, which would afford cover to an attacking party. He made his preparations secretly in the pagoda at Sikandarmalai, allowing no one to go in or out whilst these were in process of completion.

On the evening of the 30th April, leaving a few men to guard the baggage and artillery, he marched out of the pagoda with a hundred Europeans and two hundred sepoys—the garrison of Madura consisted of eight or nine hundred cavalry and about two thousand native infantry¹—and by 3 a.m. on the 1st May his force was safely concealed in the watercourse above mentioned. Caillaud intended to lead the attack himself, and carefully explained his plan to his men. The foremost of these carried six short ladders for the outer wall, the next six longer ones for the inner. As soon as twenty men had got into the *faussebraye* they were to take over the longer ladders, which they were to plant against the inner wall, but not a man was to mount until all were fixed, and then only three at a time.

“ Everything went at first to the height of my wishes. My advanced party with their ladders had got over the first wall unperceived, unheard, and were pulling over the longer ladders to mount the inner one—by the by two walls for such an attempt is the devil !—but mark ! a cursed cur dog that had followed the party in the dark began to bark, alarms another brother cur in the fort, this puts the sentry on the *qui vive*, who, looking over the wall, had a glimpse though very dark that somebody was there. He immediately challenged and fired. The guard who was nearest hoisted some

¹ Caillaud to Pechell, March, 1758. *Orme MSS.*, 31.

blue lights (a composition these country people make use of, of sulphur and antimony) which throw a prodigious clear light all around, and by which they saw my poor unfortunate devils close under the walls with their ladders, and many more on the glaçis ready to support them. The main body was in a hollow way¹ out of their sight but within two hundred yards of the wall. The alarm was general in an instant and they began to fire very smartly from the walls. None of the troops lay far from their posts so that the fire increased every minute, and I soon found as our design was discovered it was impracticable ; so I made a retreat with much less loss than indeed I first apprehended as we were so much exposed, and returned to camp as you may suppose *de charmante humeur*. I could not bear the sight of a dog for a week after."

In his report² to the Council Caillaud said that the attack might have succeeded if the men had kept cool, but they got flurried and crowded on to the ladders, which broke down. His loss, owing to his immediate retreat as soon as he knew he had been discovered, was only one sepoy killed and one wounded.³ He now moved his camp to a deserted village some six hundred yards from the south-east part of the wall, which was of slighter construction than the rest, and tried to effect a breach with three six-pounders, but these proving useless he sent a party of sepoy to Trichinopoly to bring two eighteen-pounders. Meanwhile he blockaded the town, and was joined by several of the neighbouring poligars, who supplied his camp with provisions and cut off the communications between the besieged and their friends outside. This induced one of the rebel officers to offer to betray the town, but on the 11th May Caillaud received imperative orders to march to Trichinopoly, and started with the best of his men—120 Europeans and 500 good sepoy—leaving Lieutenant Rumbold and Yusuf Khan with the Coffree company, the guns, and the rest⁴ of the sepoy to maintain the blockade and, if possible, conclude matters with the traitor. Yusuf Khan was very unwilling to stay. He had found it impossible to work with Mudali, and he saw little

¹ i.e. the watercourse mentioned above.

² Caillaud to Council, 16th May, 1757. *Orme MSS.*, XII. p. 3404.

³ Orme, *History*, II. 212.

⁴ i.e. eight companies. Letter dated 22nd May, 1757, from Lieut. Rumbold to Council. *Orme MSS.*, 61, p. 44.

chance of distinction with the motley force that remained. However, he soon recovered his usual equanimity, and when a number of the sepoy, who had been left behind by Heron and had received practically no pay from Mahfuz Khan, broke out into mutiny, it was only by his influence and intervention, together with "an example made upon the spot of the most riotous" ¹ by Rumbold, that they were persuaded to return to their duty.

With, or rather before, Caillaud went Mudali; for, afraid to remain with Yusuf Khan with no one to protect him but Rumbold, Mudali had begged Caillaud to take him with him, and on his refusal had disappeared from the camp the day before Caillaud's departure. No one knew where he was until Caillaud wrote back from Nattam that he had found Mudali waiting for him at that place. Mudali afterwards complained ² to Mr. Pigot that Captain Rumbold and Yusuf Khan in his absence seized his property and imprisoned his servants, whilst Basopanaik kept his brother Alagappa in prison for a couple of days, and another sepoy officer Ramanaik forced the people to pay their rents to him instead of to Mudali's agents. As regards himself, he said that when he sent some of his people with a letter from Captain Caillaud, Yusuf Khan told them that if they came near him again he would cut off their ears.³

On hearing of Caillaud's departure and learning its cause, namely the approach of the French, the traitor who had promised to betray the town broke off negotiations. Neither Rumbold nor Yusuf Khan was of the stamp to tolerate the tedium of a blockade. Having heard that the water in the tanks and wells which supplied the town was putrid, they determined to cut off the besieged from the river. For this purpose they moved their camp to the north of the river and seized an entrenchment which lay between the river and the north-east angle of the town; but though this caused a great deal of sickness amongst the garrison, the latter showed no

¹ *Orme MSS.*, XII. p. 3142. Caillaud to Council, 5th June, 1757. Rumbold was promoted Captain 6th June, 1757.

² Letter dated 21st June, 1757. *Orme MSS.*, 51, p. 59.

³ Lawrence (letter to Council 24th June, 1754) reports a similar threat on the part of Nandaraj to one of his messengers.

signs of giving in. Accordingly, taking the opportunity of a favourable night when a strong wind was blowing, Rumbold and Yusuf Khan crossed the river and burnt down the northern gateway, only to find that the inner gate leading to the town had been built up with a brick wall, so that they were forced to retreat.

Mahfuz Khan was all this time congenially engaged in plundering the district of Tinnevely and negotiating with the King of Travancore for an alliance. The only obstacle in his way was the garrison at Palamcottā, and not being strong enough to take that place by force he determined to obtain it by treachery. For this purpose he sent messengers to Rumbold, who, thinking there might be something in their proposals, despatched Ramanaik,¹ escorted by fifty sepoys and under a pass from Mahfuz Khan, to discuss them with him. On their approach Mahfuz Khan suddenly surrounded the little force with his cavalry and demanded from Ramanaik an order to the officer in Palamcottā to surrender that town. Ramanaik drew up his men and declared he would sooner die than disgrace himself by giving such an order. Mahfuz Khan therefore bade the cavalry attack him, but before they could do so one of his officers, named Ali Sahib, "who had more honour than his master,"² declared he would not permit such an act of perfidy against a man who had come to them under a safe conduct, and not only joined forces with Ramanaik, but conducted him to Palamcottā in order to protect him from any further attack. Ramanaik soon after returned to Madura with six companies of sepoys who had formed the garrison of Tinnevely. Mahfuz Khan renewed his attacks upon Palamcottā, but Basopanaik, finding his provisions running short, won over the poligars Kattabomanaik and Ettaiyapuram by the cession of some land which they coveted, and with their assistance defeated Mahfuz Khan and drove him away.³

When the rebels received news of the approach of a heavy

¹ Ramanaik is also written Ramanapanaik in the *Country Correspondence* of 1757.

² Rumbold to Messrs. Lawrence and Wynch, 11th June, 1757. *Orme MSS.*, 61, p. 25.

³ Orme, *History*, II. 237. Mudali says that Basopanaik gave his elephant and horse to Kattabomanaik. *Country Correspondence*, 1757, No. 349.

gun sent by Caillaud from Trichinopoly and of the sepoys from Palamcottah, they determined to anticipate their arrival by a sortie. Rumbold, being informed of their intention, flooded the ground round his camp and placed Yusuf Khan with two companies of sepoys in charge of the entrenchment across the river. The sortie was made on the morning of the 9th June. Owing to the inundation the sallying party were unable to attack Rumbold in his camp, but fell in force on Yusuf Khan's entrenchment. For some unexplained reason, almost as soon as the first shot was fired, Yusuf Khan's men broke and fled, only about a dozen of them standing by him. Orme suggests ¹ that this was done in revenge for Yusuf Khan's severity, but it may have been due simply to panic, for, as has been mentioned above, the best of the sepoys had gone with Caillaud. At any rate, as it was impossible to defend his position with such a handful of men, Yusuf Khan retired to a *choultry* ² on a small island in the river. Such buildings, being square in form, with no external windows and with only a single entrance, are well adapted for defence, and Yusuf Khan though attacked by 400 of the best of the rebel troops—dis-mounted horsemen—was able to hold his own until relieved by the arrival of Rumbold when he and his men had been reduced to almost their last cartridge. Rumbold caused the cowardly sepoys to be drummed out of the camp with halts round their necks.³

The eighteen-pounder sent from Trichinopoly arrived on the 11th June, and was fired for three days until all the ammunition which had been sent with it was exhausted, without any damage being done to the walls that could not be easily and immediately repaired by the besieged, and it was evident that a more powerful battery would be necessary. As Trichinopoly now appeared to be safe, Caillaud was ordered by the Council to return to Madura. He set out on the 25th June with some ninety Europeans, most of whom were Dutch or French

¹ *History*, II. 223.

² *i.e.* a rest-house for travellers.

³ Rumbold to Council, 11th June, 1757. *Orme MSS.*, 61, p. 24. Orme says Rumbold "found Yusuf Khan defending himself with only ten men against the whole body of the enemy, who could neither take, destroy, or put to flight this invincible spirit." Orme to Payne, 4th July, 1757. See Appendix V., p. 272.

deserters, for there were 500 French prisoners at Trichinopoly, and he did not dare to leave them to be guarded by their own countrymen.

He arrived at Madura on the 3rd July, and determining that the enemy should have no time given them to repair the damage done by his guns—he had now two eighteen-pounders and four field-pieces—he got everything ready in secret, and on the 9th, marching late at night to the watercourse previously mentioned, he had them mounted in position by daylight. This time he attacked the curtain close to the spot where he had made his first attempt. The outer wall was quickly demolished, and also the parapet of the inner. The assault was ordered at once, and, as he laconically puts it, he “made a breach, attacked it, and got a damnable drubbing.”¹ His official account is as follows:—

“The battery was finished by that time and opened in the morning and a breach made by twelve at noon. They had however in the morning begun to work behind it. Not to give them time to do more, an immediate disposition was made for the assault, and at two the troops marched for it, but could not carry their point. The best, who were in front as is usual upon all such occasions, were almost all killed and wounded. The few that returned disheartened the rest, who in spite of their officers’ efforts to encourage them on to another trial thought rather of returning, which was done in an instant. I thought we might make another push for it, but on examining my numbers when returned I found I had lost between thirty and forty of my best Europeans and Coffrees, either killed or disabled, and about one hundred sepoys. In short I find such a motley crew as my detachment is composed of, French and Dutch deserters, topasses and Coffrees, are not to be depended on in such cases where the bravest men are requisite. The few that are really so are commonly sacrificed as it has been now. I luckily lost no officers, but four of my best sergeants killed and as many wounded.”²

In this report Caillaud makes no mention of misconduct on the part of any of his officers, or of the extraordinary recovery of those of the sepoys who had been wounded,³ both of which

¹ Caillaud to Captain Pechell, March, 1758. *Orme MSS.*, 31.

² Caillaud to Council, 9th July, *Mil. Cons.*, 25th July, 1757.

³ “Of the sepoys 100 were disabled, but few of this body were killed and fewer died afterwards of their wounds.” *Orme, History*, II. 225.

are mentioned by Orme. As to the greater chance of recovery from wounds enjoyed by the natives of the country over Europeans, Major Rennell wrote some ten years later,

“ ‘Tis remarked that amongst an equal number of wounded persons of both countreys the blacks recover in a proportion of six to one.” ¹

Caillaud was in bad health at the time of the assault, and disappointment at his failure so aggravated his illness that he was forced to retire for rest to the neighbouring village of Tiruvadur,² whilst the blockade was continued by his subordinates.³ The rebel confederation, however, now showed signs of dissolution. More of the poligars came in or submitted, and even Mayana joined Caillaud, bringing with him his family, the strongest pledge that could be given of his good faith. The garrison, despairing of assistance from either Mysore or the French, offered to treat, and on the 8th September surrendered the town on a payment of 170,000 rupees, which was sanctioned by the Madras Council. Caillaud wrote to his friend Captain Pechell: “ I am studying hard attack and defence. I have been beat from one breach and am bound to defend one,” ⁴ a soldierly aspiration the fulfilment of which, though not granted to Caillaud, was seven years later given to his trusty comrade Yusuf Khan.

The importance of the surrender of Madura was greatly enhanced by the fact that, on the very day upon which it took place, large French reinforcements under M. de Soupire arrived at Pondicherry,⁵ so that to meet the new danger it set free the English forces in the south, commanded by two of the best of the younger officers in the English service.

¹ Rennell to the Rev. Mr. Berrington, 20th Jan., 1768 (*unpublished*).

² Tiruvadur was 10 miles from Madura. *Country Correspondence*, 1757, No. 332.

³ On the 20th Aug. Mr. Pigot wrote to Yusuf Khan: “ I have received your letter advising of your having surrounded the Fort of Madura on every side, in company with the *Poligars*’ troops, &c. Captain Caillaud has also acquainted me of your diligence and bravery which gave me great pleasure. . . . I regard you as a faithful servant to the Company, and therefore you may be assured of my friendship.” *Country Correspondence*, 1757, No. 338.

⁴ Caillaud to Captain Pechell, March, 1758. *Orme MSS.*, 31, p. 169.

⁵ Orme, *History*, II. pp. 235, 239.

With the capture of Madura the question of the administration of the provinces had again become acute. It was now recognized by every one that the division of authority between two possibly antagonistic interests was incompatible with good government. Mudali's period of tenure was near its end, for his timidity disqualified him for the post of sole governor. All who knew Yusuf Khan declared that he was the only man who could be expected to manage the country, so that it should be a source of revenue to the Nawab and the Company, instead of a continuous drain of both blood and treasure, as well as, politically, a cause of great anxiety through the danger of its falling into the hands of the French or the Mysoreans. Orme, as is shown by his letter to Payne,¹ was for giving him almost autocratic power on condition of the payment of a small but fixed revenue. Caillaud wrote ² :—

“ I will venture to assure you Yusuf Khan is the proper man to command in that place ³ and rent the country round it. The neighbours he has will require a brisk, active man amongst them to keep them to their duty and obedience. It is a large trust, but if there is faith in man, he is as honest and true a servant to the Honourable Company as ever eat their bread.”

On the 11th September Yusuf Khan wrote to Mr. Pigot, giving detailed information as to the possible value of the country when pacified, and on the 26th September made through Caillaud a definite offer himself to rent the province of Madura alone for three years at $1\frac{1}{4}$, $1\frac{1}{2}$ and 2 lakhs respectively, ⁴ these sums to be set against the cost of maintaining the necessary troops, including European sergeants and gunners, etc., which was reckoned at 3,71,700 rupees, the deficit to be paid out of the Tinnevely revenues ; a proposal which was referred back to Caillaud, as the Council preferred that Yusuf Khan should take both the provinces, but for these he would not undertake to propose any fixed rent. On the 24th October the Council

¹ See Appendix V., p. 271. Orme to Payne, 4th July, 1757.

² Caillaud to Council, 4th Aug., 1757. *Orme MSS.*, XIII. p. 3430.

³ i.e. Madura.

⁴ The revenue actually collected from the districts dependent upon Madura in the years 1754, 1755, and 1756 was Rs. 156,983, Rs. 143,714, Rs. 121,390. *Orme MSS.*, 51, p. 183.

decided that Yusuf Khan should manage the provinces temporarily, and that Mudali should come to Madras to settle up his accounts. This arrangement continued for a year, and in October, 1758,¹ Yusuf Khan wrote to Madras to ask for a final decision, as the bankers who had lent him money for his troops were pressing for repayment. From a letter from the Nawab² it would appear that Yusuf Khan had boasted that he would obtain the Rentership for himself if he could only get the consent of Mr. Pigot; upon which account the Nawab begged Mr. Pigot to make him understand that, if he got the Rentership at all, it would be by the permission of the Nawab, and that he would have to comply with the Nawab's wishes. A little later³ when Yusuf Khan was recalled to take his part in the defence of Madras against Lally, he was ordered to leave the collection of revenue in the hands of his agents. Thus a final decision was again postponed, the Nawab nominating one man as Renter and Yusuf Khan proposing another, their mutual relations not being improved by the process or by the exhortations of Mr. Pigot to the Nawab to accept Yusuf Khan as the only man capable of filling the post, or by his reminders to Yusuf Khan that the country belonged to the Nawab and that proper respect was due to him as its ruler.

¹ *Country Correspondence*, 1758.

² Nawab to Council, 25th Oct., 1758, Postscript. *I.O. Records, Home Misc.*, 104.

³ *Mil. Cons.*, 2nd Nov., 1758.

CHAPTER VII


THE SIEGE OF MADRAS BY LALLY

THE news of M. de Soupire's arrival at Pondicherry reached Caillaud, *viâ* Devikottai and Fort St. David, some days before he heard from Madras. Without waiting for orders, he left Yusuf Khan at Madura and started for Trichinopoly, which he reached on the 20th September. In October he sent for Yusuf Khan, but no sooner¹ did the latter join him than he was ordered to return to hold Madura and to try to recover Tinnevely, which, with the exception of Palamcotta, was practically in the hands of Mahfuz Khan and his allies. Barkatullah indeed, after his surrender, had been despatched to see if he could persuade Mahfuz Khan to come to terms, but the latter had been so much encouraged by the news of the arrival of the French that he refused to consider any arrangement which did not provide for his retention of the government.

During Yusuf Khan's short absence, Haidar Ali had arrived at Dindigul with a strong force of Mysoreans, and had seized the fort of Solavandan. He did not attempt to attack Madura, but plundered the country round about, and, when he received news of Yusuf Khan's approach, he took post with a part of his army near the southern end of the Nattam pass. Yusuf Khan, making his way through the pass unmolested, attacked him without hesitation, beat him and sent him hurrying back to Dindigul.² He then marched to Tinnevely, and by the end of November he had reduced Mahfuz Khan to the condition of a

¹ Yusuf Khan arrived at Trichinopoly on the 8th October, and left for Madura on the 12th. See Caillaud's letters to Council of the 9th and 20th Oct., 1757. *Orme MSS.*, XIII. pp. 3439 and 3442.

² Major Stewart (*Memoirs of Hyder Aly Khan*, pp. 10-13) says Haidar's incursion took place in October, and that Yusuf Khan defeated him in November.



penniless refugee amongst the poligars, and had recovered Kalakadu from the King of Travancore.

At Tinnevely he narrowly escaped assassination. On leaving Madura, he had enlisted four hundred of the best of Barkatullah's troops. One of their jemadars determined to kill him. Yusuf Khan reported the affair to Mr. Pigot as follows ¹ :—

“I must now inform you that on the 28th of the last month ² Woomady[? Umar Din] Singh, Jemadar of the horse, with his company went against the house of Ramanapa Naik at first with a design to kill him, afterwards they came and attempted to kill me while I was sleeping at the time aforesaid, but by the blessing of God and your Honour's good fortune I happily awaked and punished the said Jemadar &c. disturbers and faithless people as they deserved, in such manner that they were sent into hell. Though he was in our service yet in a faithless and deceitful manner he acted as aforesaid, which is owing to the badness of the times.” ³

Early in December, Yusuf Khan was recalled to Madura by a premature report of the despatch of a French force to assist Haidar at Dindigul, and accordingly he took post at Sriviliputtur to protect the western border, and rebuilt the fort of Solavandan, which Haidar had destroyed. As a matter of fact, a French force under M. Astruc, a good officer, did arrive at Dindigul in January, 1758, but Haidar's attention was diverted by a Maratha attack, which compelled his return to Seringapatam, on which account M. Astruc left that part of the country.⁴ These repeated threats from Mysore were attributed by the Nawab to a personal insult offered to Haidar by Yusuf Khan, in the killing of one of his agents.⁵ It is not at all unlikely that Yusuf Khan had put such a man to death, because at that time it was very difficult to distinguish between an agent and a spy, and Yusuf Khan was not the kind of man to give any suspected person the benefit of the doubt. Moreover, we know that he

¹ Yusuf Khan to Mr. Pigot, received 22nd Dec., 1757, *Orme MSS.*, 61, p. 105.

² *i.e.* November, 1757.

³ It is still the custom in India to ascribe any atrocious act to the evil character of the time in which the actor is living.

⁴ Major C. Stewart's *Memoirs of Hyder Aly Khan*, p. 10.

⁵ Nawab to Council, February, 1757. *Country Correspondence*.

did hang a messenger sent him by Mahfuz Khan, for Mr. Pigot wrote to remonstrate and warned him

“to be very cautious of proceeding to such extremities, which may be productive of bad consequences, if they are committed without just cause.”¹

Yusuf Khan, on the other hand, ascribed Haidar’s hostility to the instigation of Mahfuz Khan; but probably the real reason was that given by Haidar himself, namely, the treachery of the Nawab in refusing to hand over Trichinopoly, as he had promised, to the Mysoreans for the assistance they gave him in his war with the French and Chanda Sahib.²

Yusuf Khan had now a short period of leisure, which he utilized in repairing the fortifications of Madura and restoring order generally. There was much to do, for Barkatullah’s hand had been heavy upon the Hindus, and, whatever may have been his resentment against the Brahmans in the past, Yusuf Khan was, like Haidar, one of those men who could easily put aside any personal feeling when it stood in the way of policy. The Pandion Chronicle³ makes but a very short reference to the rule of Barkatullah, but, such as it is, it is of importance as showing the character of his government. It tells us that he allowed the great temple to be desecrated by a Muhammadan Fakir, who planted his umbrella on the chief gateway and began to build a small shrine there. All representations to the Governor to prevent this act of sacrilege were in vain, nor was Barkatullah moved in any way by the miraculous opening of her eye by the great goddess, Bhadra Kali, a portent which drew crowds of horrified spectators. Fortunately the surrender of the town to Caillaud put an end to this incident. The Fakir and his umbrella were removed, and Yusuf Khan, visiting the temple, was so struck with its grandeur that he gave orders for its purification and the renewal of the usual worship. He also restored the temple revenues, which had been sequestered by Barkatullah to his own use.

¹ Pigot to Yusuf Khan, 1st March, 1758. *Country Correspondence*.

² See Kirmani’s *Hydur Naik*, p. 246. “Muhammad Ali Khan . . . apprehensive that the affair of Trichinopoly, where he had so grossly violated his faith, still rankled like a thorn in the breast of the Nawab [*i.e.* Haidar Ali].”

³ Taylor’s *Oriental Historical Manuscripts*, Vol. I. pp. 42–44.

The months of March and April were spent by Yusuf Khan in further operations in the south ; but no sooner had he reduced it again to quiet, than he was summoned to Trichinopoly with as many troops as he could collect. Lally had landed in India, and with an overwhelming force begun his attack on the English Settlements on the Coast. On the 3rd-4th May he captured Cuddalore,¹ and on the 2nd June Fort St. David surrendered. On the 16th June Yusuf Khan arrived at Trichinopoly with 2000 sepoys, a reinforcement which enabled Caillaud to give effective assistance to the King of Tanjore, whose capital was besieged by the French. The latter were forced to retire, though rather by their own mismanagement than by the efforts of their opponents, and Caillaud, to encourage the poligars who sided with the English, determined in September to attack Turaiyur, the Reddi or chief man of which was a French *protégé*. For this purpose he despatched Captain Joseph Smith with 70 Europeans, 50 Coffrees, 2 field-pieces, and 1000 Sepoys under Yusuf Khan.

The chief town or village of the Reddi was situated in the middle of a thick wood, which extends some twenty miles along the foot of the western mountains and ten miles into the plains. The direct approach was a long, narrow, and difficult forest path, in which it was known that many obstacles might be expected. Four companies of sepoys, under the command of Ramanaik, whose courageous behaviour when treacherously attacked by Mahfuz Khan has already been mentioned, were sent round another way to take the enemy in the rear. Having without much difficulty overcome some lesser obstacles, Captain Smith and Yusuf Khan came across the main defence, a wall fourteen feet high, protected by a barrier of thorns and completely blocking the road. The ammunition of the field-pieces was exhausted in a vain attempt to breach this obstruction. Yusuf Khan himself was wounded in the arm,² but bound up his hurt and refused to leave the ground. At 7 o'clock in the evening there were no signs of the approach of Ramanaik. The Coffrees,

¹ Orme, *History*, II. 304.

² This is the only occasion on which Yusuf Khan is mentioned as having been wounded, and it was believed by his followers that he was invulnerable owing to the possession of a charm or amulet. See pp. 228 and 311 below.

sepoys, and lascars were seized with a sudden panic and fled, and Captain Smith and Yusuf Khan had not a man left except the Europeans, a lascar corporal, a fakir, and Verdapu, Captain Smith's Indian servant; but the Europeans still kept up a desultory fire, and at 8 o'clock a supply of ammunition arriving, the field pieces were just getting to work when shouts of "Din Muhammad,"¹ the charging cry of the Muhammadan sepoys, were heard behind the barrier. Ramanaik, delayed by the desertion of his guides, had at last arrived; the Reddi's troops broke in confusion, and the path was open to the town, which surrendered without further opposition. The Reddi offered Captain Smith a bribe amounting to ten thousand pagodas for the restoration of his town, and when this was refused he made the same offer with a similar result to Yusuf Khan. A small garrison was left to hold the place, whilst Smith and Yusuf Khan returned to Trichinopoly.²

When Fort Saint David had fallen the English expected an immediate attack upon Madras, but the long delay of six months, which passed before Lally advanced against that town, gave the Council every opportunity for completing their plan of defence. This was very simple, consisting in the concentration within Madras of all the best of their forces, and the withdrawal of all the outlying garrisons, except those of Trichinopoly and Chingleput. The former place they held to maintain their control over the southern provinces, the latter to serve as a *point d'appui* for a small army of observation or flying column, which was to act in the rear of the besiegers, to harass the forces engaged in the siege by rapid and unexpected attacks from all quarters of the compass, and to intercept, if possible, convoys from Pondicherry. Much might be said as to Lally's wisdom or unwisdom in not seizing Chingleput before attacking Madras, but the continual quarrels in which he was engaged during his stay in India have so obscured the facts of the occurrences in which he took part, that it is impossible to ascertain his real reasons. On the one

¹ It is probable that Ramanaik was a Hindu, but the sepoys were very largely Muhammadans.

² Joseph Smith to Orme, 1776. *Orme MSS.*, 62, pp. 51-54; and 72, pp. 17-20.

hand, there is no doubt that the besiegers did suffer severely from the attacks of the English flying force. On the other hand, Lally's own officers thought that he paid too much attention to this force and spent too much effort in trying to destroy it. However this may be, Chingleput was left unmolested by Lally, and the English placed in it a small garrison under Captain Achilles Preston.¹ On the 23rd September, Caillaud arrived at Negapatam with 180 Europeans and 50 Coffrees, and embarked for Madras. His timely arrival at the latter place to some extent compensated for the departure of Admiral Pocock, who was compelled in October, by the approaching monsoon, to withdraw the English squadron, and also enabled the Council to strengthen the garrison of Chingleput. At the same time, the Council sent word to Yusuf Khan to join Preston with 2000 sepoy and any reinforcements he could obtain from the poligars and the King of Tanjore. The latter, however, was not inclined to commit himself on the side of the English whilst the French star remained in the ascendant. On the 1st December, Caillaud left Madras in an open country-boat for Tranquebar, whence he intended to pass to Tanjore to see what he could effect by his personal influence over a man whom he had so lately assisted in his dire necessity.

Yusuf Khan had not waited for the King of Tanjore's decision. On the 21st November he left Trichinopoly, and having enlisted about 100 horse on the way, arrived on the 29th at Tiyyagadurg, where he was joined by the *kiladar*, Krishna Rao, with 250 horse and 1000 foot. On the 1st December he captured the small fort of Elavanasur, in which there was a French garrison, and Krishna Rao went off with his troops to plunder. This delayed Yusuf Khan until the 5th. On the 6th he was joined by 200 horse, 1500 Kallans, and 250 peons sent by the Tondaiman. On the 7th he attacked and took Tirukovilur, and then, following the track of Krishna Rao, he marched eastward, plundering and ravaging the country, which as far

¹ Achilles Preston went to India on the *Grantham*, and was engaged by Mr. Benjamin Robins in place of one of his assistants who had died (*Letter from Fort St. David to Court*, 24th Oct., 1750, para. 56). The Directors approved of this nomination in their despatch of the 13th March, and appointed Preston as a Writer. He served as a volunteer and was wounded at Kaveripak, and was given an ensign's commission on the 3rd Dec., 1752.

as the sea was tributary to the French. On the 15th he appeared at Villianur, and came in sight of Pondicherry, causing so much terror that the people from all sides crowded into that city for protection. On the 18th he cut the mound of the great tank at Valdavur so as to flood the country and ruin the cultivation. He was now right across Lally's direct communication with Pondicherry, and so dreadful was the devastation he effected that Lally threatened Mr. Pigot to retaliate by putting men, women, and children to the sword in the territory of Madras; a threat which, to his credit, he did not carry out.¹ On the 21st Krishna Rao returned to Tiyyagadrug with his men, so that Yusuf Khan, who had received a reinforcement of 300 Tanjore horse (not sent by the King of Tanjore, but levied with his permission by Yusuf Khan's agents), was able to continue his march. On the 25th he arrived at Chingleput, having ravaged the whole country on his way, and joined Captain Preston. His force consisted of 1500 sepoys, of whom only about 700 were good, and 2000 horse, absolutely untrustworthy in the field but admirably adapted for plunder and ravage.

Lally had commenced the siege of Madras on the 12th December, having taken up his quarters in Mr. Pigot's country house, which, in accordance with the mutual courtesy shown by the officers and officials of the two countries to each other, Mr. Pigot had left fully furnished for the convenience of the besieging general.² The approach of Yusuf Khan and his marauding force made clear the danger to which any convoys

¹ "It was to Mr. Pigot himself and to Major Caillaud that I complained of the unheard-of cruelties which their black troops committed even to the gates of Pondicherry; all the answer I could obtain was that they were black troops and it could not be prevented" (Letter from Lally to Admiral Steevens. *Mil. Cons.*, 18th June, 1760, p. 565). Later on Lally allowed much damage to be done by his troops, especially in the Black Town (*i.e.* the native portion of Madras), but at the beginning of his campaign he showed great moderation. Thus the 1759 *Report of the S.P.C.K.* says that on the capture of Fort St. David, when, in conformity with orders from France, Lally destroyed everything else in the place, he spared the House of the Protestant Mission. In the *London Chronicle*, July 23-25, 1761, it is mentioned that the Danish missionary, Mr. Hutteman, visiting Cuddalore after the fall of Pondicherry, found the church and houses of the English Mission "in good repair."

² *Memoires de la guerre de Lally* by the Vicomte de Fumel. *Orme MSS.*, India, XIV. p. 3864.

by land from Pondicherry would be exposed. Accordingly at the end of the month Lally seized the Dutch settlement at Sadras, which is on the sea, only forty-two miles south of Madras, and therefore a very suitable place for unloading stores and provisions from Pondicherry. Almost at the same time as Lally decided to take Sadras, the English at Madras sent their ladies to the same town, in order that they might escape the inconveniences of the siege. Arriving after its seizure by the French, they were made prisoners, but allowed to live where they pleased, and were politely assured by the French Commandant, M. de Maudave, that they should be warned if any danger arose of fighting taking place.

On arriving at Chingleput, Yusuf Khan immediately sent his horse, now about 1000 in number, to ravage and destroy the country about Conjeeveram, from which place the besiegers drew both money and provisions. On the 27th, however, he received orders from Mr. Pigot to attempt the surprise of the French troops at St. Thomé,¹ in conjunction with a sally from the garrison :—

“ Our people, both horse and foot, Europeans and Sepoys, shall wear a green branch in their hat or turban, let yours do the same.” ²

Captain Preston, according to the original intention of the Council, had been ordered to hold Chingleput,³ but later on he had been instructed to leave the garrison under a subaltern and to take command of the army of observation, which now consisted of Yusuf Khan's men and some 80 Europeans and 600 sepoy of his own. His exact relation to Yusuf Khan is not clear, but apparently Preston assumed command when the whole force was acting together, though the two corps remained distinct ⁴ and the two officers communicated with Mr. Pigot and received his orders independently. On this occasion Preston considered the attack on St. Thomé to be so dangerous that

¹ On the sea four miles south of Madras, now a suburb of that town.

² *Orme MSS.*, 278, p. 17.

³ In a letter dated the 14th Nov., 1758, Mr. Pigot mentions to Preston that he has sent him a Union flag. *Orme MSS.*, 278, p. 8.

⁴ “ It having been agreed, in order to prevent jealousies as well as confusion, that the two commands should move and encamp in separate bodies,” *Orme, History*, III. 407.

he ought to take part in it himself. On the 29th he and Yusuf Khan arrived in full force at the Mount,¹ which is situated inland some eight miles to the south of Madras, where instead of surprising the French they were very nearly surprised themselves, on the morning of the 30th, by a force of 500 Europeans, 600 sepoys, and 800 black horse, under M. de Soupire.² The French superiority in Europeans ought to have given them a decisive advantage, but apparently finding that they had failed in making a surprise and that the defence was stronger than they had anticipated, they retreated at 11 o'clock with the loss of two guns and 15 Europeans killed. This action, whilst it clearly illustrated the worthlessness of the native cavalry on both sides, was of happy augury for the future of Preston's and Yusuf Khan's little force. Its result so much annoyed Lally that he postponed the opening of some fresh batteries from the 1st to the 2nd January whilst he made dispositions to cope with the new danger. In fact, weak as were Preston and Yusuf Khan, their presence kept the French army every night on the alert, and the French soldiers "could not get a moment's rest."³

The French, after their repulse at the Mount, retired on St. Thomé, which Soupire knew to be the English objective, whilst Preston and Yusuf Khan marched on the 31st a couple of miles east to the village of Tiruvamiyur, to intercept a convoy which the French were expecting from Pondicherry. Tiruvamiyur⁴ is situated in the angle formed by the St. Thomé river and the sea, and in this angle and close to the bar at the mouth of the river Yusuf Khan's men were encamped, whilst those of Preston were placed on the south of the village to watch for the approaching convoy. Neither of these officers expected an attack from St. Thomé, but Soupire with 650 Europeans, horse and foot, crossed the bar at 3 o'clock in the morning of the 1st January, 1759, and falling suddenly on the camp of Yusuf Khan threw it into utter confusion,

¹ St. Thomas' Mount.

² Orme, *History*, II. 401.

³ *Recueil des Lettres par Messieurs de Leyrit et de Lally*, p. 202.

⁴ The description of the fight would seem to apply to the village of Urur rather than to that of Tiruvamiyur, but the site of the latter may have been shifted.

Yusuf Khan himself barely managing to escape by the back of his tent, in which he left his pay-chest behind him. The French, thinking their victory complete, dispersed to collect the plunder, and were suddenly surprised by the field-pieces of Preston's detachment opening upon them. Preston, having been alarmed by the firing, had advanced under cover of the village, and being supported by as many of Yusuf Khan's men as he had been able to rally, opened such a heavy fire of grape and musketry on the French that they were unable to form their ranks, and at last fled in confusion, leaving 36 Europeans dead on the field. Yusuf Khan found his pay-chest untouched, but of his whole force there mustered next morning only 700 men.¹ Of the rest all who had escaped alive, including the market people and the whole train of provisions, had fled without halting to Chingleput. Preston and Yusuf Khan, therefore, perforce followed the fugitives as far as Vendalur, where they arrived on the 3rd January and found a small supply of provisions.²

Here they received fresh orders from Mr. Pigot to return towards Madras to harass the besiegers; but the fugitives at Chingleput—especially the horse—complaining bitterly of the loss of the plunder they had collected and, saying that they had not enlisted to fight against Europeans, would listen to no persuasions, so that Preston and Yusuf Khan had again to follow them to Chingleput, where they arrived on the 6th. Thinking it wise to humour his men, Preston now led them into the country round Conjeeveram, which he permitted them to plunder, but, when on the 13th he ordered a march towards Madras, all Yusuf Khan's horse and Kallans deserted in a body.

¹ Apparently Preston complained to Caillaud somewhat bitterly of the behaviour of the sepoy after Tiruvamiyur, for on the 20th January Caillaud wrote from Trichinopoly (*Orme MSS.*, 278, p. 26):—"I never depended upon sepoy, yet they sometimes by chance behave tolerably, but oftener by choice very ill. All the service I expect from them according to Hudibras is 'That they who fight and run away, may live to fight another day.'" This was, of course, in reference to the so-called sepoy who had received European arms but had not been subjected to European discipline. In a letter from Preston himself (*Call's Diary*, 2nd Jan., *Orme MSS.*, 224), Preston says that the Trichinopoly sepoy made a brave defence at first, though they gave way afterwards, and Mr. Pigot in a letter to Preston dated 3rd Jan., 1759, says, "The behaviour of the sepoy is also to be commended for making so vigorous an opposition against so strong a detachment of the enemy." (*Orme MSS.*, 278, p. 20.)

² Call to Orme, 22nd Sept., 1776. *Orme MSS.*, 62, pp. 87, 88.

Without horse Preston could not hope to effect anything material, so he marched towards Arcot, where he heard there were some bodies of mercenary cavalry, who, he thought, might be induced to take service with him.

Near Arcot, they found Abdul Wahab, the Nawab's brother, who at this time was in alliance with the French, but who, on his mother's representation of the miserable condition into which the Nawab's affairs had fallen, joined Preston with 1000 horse. Five hundred Moorish and 600 Maratha cavalry were also engaged, and on the 26th January a detachment sent by Yusuf Khan to Punamallu¹ captured 3000 sheep and oxen, which had been collected for the French. On the 27th they marched to Trimliwash² (? Tirumalavasu) and Yusuf Khan, riding with a party to Maskelyne's garden, two miles to the north-west of Madras,³ where most of the oxen belonging to the French army were kept, put the guard to flight and carried off the cattle. Lally had good reason to say of Preston's and Yusuf Khan's men that "they were like the flies, no sooner beat off from one part but they came to another."⁴ To inform Mr. Pigot of his success, Yusuf Khan fired a number of huts, and on the 29th wrote to inform him that he was returning towards the south.

For some time Mr. Pigot had been urging Preston and Yusuf Khan to force their way into Madras, and Preston, though he disapproved of this apparently useless movement, prepared to obey. On the 2nd February he started, intending to cut his way through the enemy at Vepery⁵ and thence on to St. Thomé. Lally, whose cavalry had been constantly on the alert to meet the raiding parties of Preston and Yusuf Khan, being informed of the intended march, determined this time to deal with them in person. Bussy says⁶ :—

"It was the garrison of *Chingleput* which worried us, joined by

¹ Thirteen miles west-south-west of Madras.

² Twelve miles to the north-west of Madras. Orme, *History*, III. 425.

³ "Ground in the angle west of the present Perambore Barracks road and north of Pursewaukum high-road is still called Maskelyne-tottam (Love, *Vestiges of Old Madras*, II. 463).

⁴ Cambridge's *Account of the War in India*, p. 147.

⁵ Now part of Madras.

⁶ Note to Lally's letter to De Leyrit, 14th Feb., 1759. *Letters of M. Bussy*, p. 36, note 2, appended to *Mémoire pour le Sieur de Bussy*, Paris, 1764.

some natives from the south,¹ the whole comprising from sixty to eighty Europeans, two thousand five hundred sepoy, fifteen hundred bad black cavalry and four guns, commanded by one Preston, an infantry captain in the Company's service. M. Lally himself marched against this force, to the great astonishment of the natives and in spite of my representations. He had nearly six hundred Europeans, the *élite* of his army, more than three thousand sepoy and two thousand black horse. He was beaten and returned, accusing, according to his custom, his officers of cowardice."

The English accounts,² however, state that Lally had only 300 Europeans and 500 sepoy, that he was unable to induce Preston to advance from the strong position he had taken up behind a morass, and that, after some indecisive fighting, Lally withdrew to Vepery, and Preston, owing to lack of provisions, to Trimliwash. Soon after Preston, seeing that he could not force his way through the French, marched round them and arrived at the Mount on the 5th February. The same day the Governor and the Committee³ which managed the defence of Madras resolved to reward Abdul Wahab and Yusuf Khan for their recent services. To Yusuf Khan they sent an amethyst ring set round with diamonds. The Council's presents were despatched by Captain Vasserot, who made his way out of the town with 10 European troopers, each of whom carried a bag of a thousand pagodas at his saddle.⁴

On the 7th February Major Caillaud arrived at the Mount. His visit to Tanjore had been practically fruitless, and all the reinforcements he brought were about 400 horse and three companies of sepoy; but as senior officer he took command of all the troops with Preston, Yusuf Khan, and Abdul Wahab. On the morning of the 9th⁵ he was attacked by Brigadier-General Michael Lally (a relative of the General) with a largely superior force; but though his native cavalry behaved in such a cowardly manner that Caillaud, whose own horse was shot under him,⁶

¹ *i.e.* the force under Yusuf Khan.

² Orme, *History*, III. 430.

³ See Orme, *History*, III. 388.

⁴ Transactions during the siege of Fort St. George. *Madras Records, Public Dept. Sundry Book*, No. 13.

⁵ Orme, *History*, III. 443.

⁶ Caillaud to Orme, 28th June, 1778. *Orme MSS.*, 72, p. 60. In this battle

only narrowly escaped death or capture, he had posted his men so well and the sepoys with Yusuf Khan fought with so much steadiness, that every attack made by the French was repulsed, and about five o'clock in the afternoon they retired when the English had nearly come to their last cartridge. Caillaud immediately withdrew to Chingleput to renew his supply of ammunition and to find his fugitive cavalry.

Caillaud had, on his first arrival, represented to Mr. Pigot the uselessness of attempting to enter Madras, and recommended that he should be allowed to continue to harass the besiegers.¹ For this purpose he proposed to attack Sadras, and having received some money and ammunition proceeded to invest that place. It has been said above that the English ladies from Madras had taken refuge at Sadras, and had been promised warning of any approaching fighting by the French commander, but Caillaud's movements did not allow of his fulfilling his promise, as appears from the following letter from Mrs. Vansittart² to her husband :—

“MY DEAR MR. VAN,

“I have just received your letter by Count d'Estaign,³ which you must believe afforded me real satisfaction. We last Sunday heard the siege was raised, to our unspeakable joy ; the treatment we having met with by the orders of Mr. Lally being most unhappy.⁴ We frequently desired leave to go to some other place,

the French troopers did not charge Caillaud's native horse, but advancing at a trot suddenly halted and fired their carbines, which quickly put Caillaud's men to flight. When Orme objected that this was not the usual practice of the French cavalry, Caillaud replied (*ibid.*, p. 59) that European cavalry had no chance against native cavalry *à l'arme blanche*, and hence this manœuvre. See also pp. 187 and 189 (n.) below.

¹ Caillaud to Pigot, 8th Feb., 1759. Appended to *Transactions during the Siege of Fort Saint George*. Public Dept. Sundry Book, No. 13.

² Orme MSS., 52, pp. 169–172. Mr. Vansittart was afterwards Governor of Bengal.

³ Captured by the English in Draper's sally of the 14th December, and subsequently released on parole.

⁴ “Lally's behaviour has savoured more of Galway than Paris. He has detained and made women prisoners. His messages were rude and ill-bred. He has basely burnt the Governor's and Colonel Lawrence's country houses and sent the doors and window-frames to Pondicherry. In short I can't pity them” [*i.e.* the French] “as one might a generous enemy.” Letter from Col. Draper, 18th Feb., 1759. *Brit. Mus. Addl. MS.*, 35893, f. 207.

but were always refused. The day Major Caillaud came to this place we had no notice given us, as we were before promised, till the fort began to fire, upon which we, to save our lives, run (*sic*) to the house of the other ladies, when a soldier with a drawn sword came to us and told us we must go into the fort, which unhandsome message we absolutely refused. The gates were then shut and we exposed to the fire of both partys for more than half an hour, after which there was a lull and an officer with a guard of sepoy came to us. We told him we would not go ; upon which the Commandant came into the house with a boy with two pistols, and as I talked French was desired by my Mama ¹ to speak to him. I asked him what his business was with us. He answered me to carry us into the fort. I told him that, as they had not kept their word but let us be so exposed to the fire for so long a time, that we were resolved to see it out and would not go into the fort. He then told me he came with the orders of Count de Maudave and that we must go : upon which I said to him ' What, are we your prisoners ? ' He told [me] that signified nothing, but that if we did not come along, their sepoy would come in the night and plunder every one of us and cut our throats, upon which I called to the ladies and told them there was no time to be lost, and as we went in there was firing very near us. I have a great deal to say when I see you, which God grant may be soon, as we are now out of the fort and are under apprehensions every night of having alarms. I have desired Count d'Estaing to use his interest for our liberty, who has assured me he will do the utmost of his power. We have been told that we are prisoners and must not stir without the leave of Mr. Lally. I will write to you for palankeens when we receive the happy news, but desire you will not think of coming to meet me for very good reasons. We are all well and the children well recovered of the measles. We all join in hearty wishes for your welfare and the rest of our friends, especially our noble governor.

" I remain ever my dear Mr. Van's most sincerely obedient and affect.

" EMELIA VANSITTART.

" Sadras, Feb. 24th, 1758." ²

Mr. Vansittart forwarded this letter to Clive ³ in Bengal that he might show the French ladies of Chandernagore how

¹ Mrs. Morse, wife of Nicholas Morse who surrendered Madras to Labourdonnais in 1746. Love's *Vestiges of Old Madras*, II. 336.

² *i.e.* 1759.

³ Malcolm, *Life of Robert Lord Clive*, II. 51 (n.).

much better was the treatment they received from the English officers, but it is doubtful whether any English officer could have rivalled the tact with which the Commandant persuaded Mrs. Vansittart that it would be wiser to go into the fort than to persist in being killed outside.

Mrs. Vansittart's letter shows that the siege was over. On the 17th, finding that the British squadron had returned and that his chance of taking Madras was lost, Lally raised the siege and returned to Pondicherry without making any attempt *en route* upon Chingleput, to which place Caillaud had hurriedly sent Yusuf Khan with 1200 sepoy to reinforce the garrison.

Much has been said derogatory to Lally because he failed to take Madras, and his conduct was very unfavourably compared with that of Mr. Pigot,¹ but in spite of all that has been said by his enemies it appears very probable that he had attempted the impossible. It will be remembered that Caillaud arrived at the Mount on the 7th February, and that Lally raised the siege on the 17th. On the 3rd January Colonel Francis Forde wrote from Rajahmundry to Clive as follows :—

“ I believe Mr. Lally will find work enough on his hands before he gets into Madras. I must own I have no notion of 3000 men (allowing he has so many) taking such a place as Madras with a garrison of 1500 men at least besides sepoy, who are very good behind walls. The affair of the 14th December will convince him he has some of the best soldiers in India to deal with, and if the Nellore Subadar arrives in time with the sepoy from Trichinopoly and Caillaud gets a body of Tanjore horse which he is sent to solicit, the French will be so harassed that they will not be able to continue the siege six days.”²

¹ “ Such was, Sir, the famous siege of Madras, in which two men, by behaviour the most opposite, immortalized themselves ; the French general by failing to take a town owing to his unwillingness to learn anything from the experience of others, and the English merchant by saving the same with a courage and prudence worthy of the highest praise.” *Mémoires de la guerre de Lally*, by the Vicomte de Fumel. *Orme MSS.*, XIV. pp. 3883–4.

² *Orme MSS.*, 292, p. 35. Admiral Pocock held the same opinion as Forde, for in a letter to Clive, dated Negapatam, 25th May, 1759, he wrote, “ Mr. Lally's attempt against Fort St. George I never thought would succeed, considering the fortifications were made compleat, and according to all the Rules of War the number of men he sett down with was not sufficient.” *Orme MSS.*, 290, p. 65.

Lally's real mistake—for which the French Government was very largely responsible—was in attacking Madras with inadequate forces.¹ This mistake ruined the finest army the French had ever landed in India, and led naturally to the fall of Pondicherry; but, as Eyre Coote declared,² even that catastrophe could not have been delayed so long as it was by any one but Lally. Probably the opinion of two such men as Forde and Coote will outweigh anything put forward by those of his own countrymen who were interested in bringing about his ruin.³

Forde's reference to what might be expected from the efforts of the army of observation enables us to judge of the value of Yusuf Khan's services to the English during the siege. After all the credit due to Preston and Caillaud has been discounted, it is evident that what most distressed Lally's army was the constant attacks of Yusuf Khan's bands of raiders, and this was universally acknowledged by Europeans as well as natives.⁴ It is, therefore, interesting to note what was the cost to the English of his assistance. On the 3rd March, 1759, the Council sanctioned payment of his account, amounting to rupees 177,075 and pagodas 30,327, or roughly 3 lakhs of rupees, for 1996 horse and 1425 sepoys from the 20th November, the date when he left Trichinopoly, up to the end of February, which works out at an average cost of about twenty-five rupees

¹ Clive, writing to the Right Honble. W. Pitt from Calcutta on the 1st Jan., 1759, says that a fresh division of French troops is reported to have arrived at Mauritius. "I presume it must have been in consequence of this intelligence that M. Lally took post before Madras, as I cannot think he would have been so imprudent as to come there with a force not double that of the garrison, were he not in expectation of a re-inforcement." *Public Record Office, Chatham Papers*, Vol. XXVI.

² *Plaidoyer du comte de Lally-Tolendal . . . contre M. Duval d'Eprémessnil*, p. 36.

³ "He was so generally hated that (if I may be allowed the expression) the very dogs howled at him. It is a convincing proof of his abilities, the managing so long and vigorous a defence in a place where he was held in universal detestation." Extract from a letter from a gentleman at Fort St. George, dated 1st Feb., 1761. *London Chronicle*, 21st-23rd July, 1761.

⁴ "Our black army and the few Europeans which were left in Chingleput were of great service to us by cutting off the enemy's supplies of provisions and obliging M. Lally to make frequent detachments to oppose them." Letter dated 7th March, 1759, from Mr. Pigot to (?) W. Pitt. *Public Record Office, Chatham Papers*, Vol. XCIX. See also pp. 161 and 295 below.

per man per mensem, and that including his native officers as well as the European sergeants and gunners.¹ At the same time, the Council made him a present of three pieces of red cloth and two of velvet,² worth about 300 pagodas, whilst Mr. Pigot made over to him a number of firelocks and pistols, no doubt for distribution amongst his men. On his own part, Yusuf Khan enlisted a number of sepoys now dismissed by Council on the ground of economy.³

Lally being for the moment discomfited, the first object of the Council was naturally to recover the ground they had lost around Madras before the siege, but Yusuf Khan's thoughts would as naturally turn to his unfinished work in Madura and Tinnevely. On the 28th February he made an offer to rent the provinces for four years, at five lakhs for the first year and six for the remaining three, Yusuf Khan himself to pay for the upkeep of the troops necessary for the pacification of the provinces and the maintenance of peace and order, but not any expenses incurred for their defence against external attack. Unfortunately the three years' term upon which the provinces were held by the Council from the Nawab was now nearly completed, and the Council had explained to the Nawab that as the cost of administration had exceeded the revenue he was not entitled to any arrears. The Nawab, however, pretended that Yusuf Khan had received much more money than he had ever accounted for, and was eager to resume the management of the provinces. In March, 1759, he wrote ⁴ to Mr. Pigot protesting in the strongest terms against Yusuf Khan being given the rentership; but before his letter was received, the Council had on the 8th March accepted ⁵ Yusuf Khan's offer, which, however,

¹ Haidar Ali paid his horsemen, who provided their own horses, 40 rupees *per mensem*; to ordinary horsemen, sepoys and artificers he gave 10 rupees *per mensem*, and to peons or irregulars 5 rupees *per mensem*. Orme MSS., 33, p. 115.

² Mr. Eden Philpotts, in his *American Prisoner*, says Congress presented General Stark, the conqueror of Burgoyne at Saratoga, with two ells of blue and one of yellow cloth and six shirts of Dutch linen.

³ John Call to Dupré, 8th Aug., 1768. Orme MSS., 304, p. 5.

⁴ Nawab to Pigot, March, 1759. *I. O. Records. Home Misc.*, 104. See Appendix V., p. 275.

⁵ *Mil. Cons.*, 8th March, 1759. "Madura and Tinnevely, which have to this time been a losing estate, are now let to Yusuf Khan for one year,

they had limited to a term of one year only, dating from the 11th July, 1759 ; his accounts up to that date were to be made up, and if any balance existed it was to be remitted to Madras. The Nawab was at the same time requested to provide for Mahfuz Khan in some other part of his possessions. He complained that Yusuf Khan never did make up his accounts, but it is pretty certain that whatever money had been paid by Yusuf Khan had been remitted to Madras, and there is nothing in the records of the Council to show that Yusuf Khan had failed to satisfy its demands.¹ The Nawab was so much worried by this affair that he fell ill—according to Orme,² he was just recovering from the jaundice—nevertheless the Council decided that it was too late to alter their arrangements, and that Yusuf Khan should return to Madura as soon as his services could be spared by the army.

The English army had taken the field under Lawrence on the 6th March. On the 18th he arrived near Conjeeveram. Here Yusuf Khan, as usual riding in advance, managed to overtake a small body of French horse, which he, having the superiority in numbers, promptly attacked and put to flight with the loss of one of their officers.³ Shortly after Lawrence was compelled by ill health to resign the command, and Colonel Draper for the same reason being unable to accept it, he was succeeded by Major Brereton, Major Caillaud holding the distinct command of the Company's troops. Lawrence returned to Madras, and on the 9th April ⁴ resigned the Company's service in order to go home for a time to England. The same day Major Brereton was ordered to relieve Yusuf Khan as soon as possible.

commencing July 1759, to July 1760, for rupees 500,000, he to bear all expenses and remit the said sum nett to the Company notwithstanding all the troubles of the *Nawab's* brother and the *poligars*. Could they be reduced these provinces would be worth twice as much." Letter to Court, 28th July, 1759, para. 10.

¹ "In paragraph 23rd of our Select Committee's address to the Secret Committee dated 5th Oct. last, mention is made of the accounts of Madura and Tinnevely transmitted by *Yusuf Khan* and the former renter, *Tittarappa Mudali*. These accounts have undergone a thorough examination of our Committee of Accounts, whose reports with the accounts current annexed are transmitted in our Book packet." *Ibid.*, para. 12.

² *History*, III. 465.

³ Lawrence to Council, 19th March, 1759. *Mil. Cons.*, 22nd March, 1759.

⁴ *Mil. Cons.*, 9th April, 1759, p. 109.

The advance of the English had caused the French to retire from Conjeeveram, in which they had left a garrison under a partisan named Muzaffar Beg, who had once been in the English service, but being refused an increase of pay,¹ which he had impudently demanded when Lally was approaching Madras, had gone over to the French. Negotiations for surrender proving fruitless, Brereton on the 16th April attempted to storm the Pagoda, the Europeans under Caillaud attacking the main gateway whilst the sepoys under Lieutenant Airey² and Yusuf Khan climbed the opposite wall. The main attack had very nearly failed, almost all the European officers being wounded, when Airey and Yusuf Khan made their appearance in the rear of the defenders. The gateway was then carried, and many of the garrison were killed. Muzaffar Beg, who had hidden in one of the shrines, gave himself up, but as he was being led to the camp he was met and recognized by Yusuf Khan, who with a single stroke of his sword nearly severed his head from his body, exclaiming, "These are the terms to be kept with a traitor." Such is the account of Muzaffar Beg's death as given by Orme. In his report to the Council Major Brereton said simply that Muzaffar Beg was killed whilst attempting to escape; so even if he fell by the hand of Yusuf Khan, the latter can only be said to have refused him quarter—an act not unjustifiable in the heat of action.³

On the 25th April Major Brereton allowed Yusuf Khan to start for Madura, for news had arrived that the little garrison in Palamcotta⁴ was confined to the fort by Mahfuz Khan and the Pulidevar, and speedy help was necessary if the whole of Tinnevely were not to be lost. It was decided in a Council of field officers that Yusuf Khan should march to Trichinopoly

¹ From Council's letters to Preston of the 14th and 19th Nov., 1758, it appears that he demanded twice the usual pay. *Orme MSS.*, 278, pp. 8, 9.

² Wilson (*Madras Army*, I. 186 (n.)) says Airey commanded the 5th N.I. at the siege of Madura, but he was commandant at Wandiwash in March, 1764. *Mil. Cons.*

³ Orme, *History*, III. 472. Brereton to Council, 16th April, *Mil. Cons.*, 20th April, 1759.

⁴ Orme (*History*, III. 467-8) mentions that the garrison was so reduced that they had to apply for help to the English at Anjengo, and that it was only on the credit of letters sent by Yusuf Khan that they were able to obtain money with which to purchase ammunition.

with the Tanjore troops and those of the Tondaiman *viâ* Viceravandi and Tiruvadi in order to assist Krishna Rao to plunder the French districts on the way. Yusuf Khan made no opposition to this proposal in the Council itself, but afterwards represented to Major Brereton the probability that objections would be made by the Tanjore and Tondaiman troops, who would run the risk of losing the plunder which they had already acquired. Brereton, not realizing the difficulty which Yusuf Khan would have had in stating these reasons openly, refused to cancel the order, and Yusuf Khan said no more on the subject.

The party started on the 26th, Yusuf Khan having six companies of sepoys, sixty of the horse and six of the European gunners he had brought with him. The Tanjoreans numbered three hundred horse and the Tondaiman's troops two hundred and fifty, with eleven hundred Kallans. After the first day's march the troops of Tanjore and Tondaiman refused to run the risk of marching through the territory of the French, and declared they would proceed by a safer route to the west; Yusuf Khan might accompany them or not as he chose. Impatient to reach his destination,¹ Yusuf Khan made them put their refusal in writing, and agreed to accompany them rather than break up the force. Even so these people would only accompany him as far as Tiya-gad-rug, and when he reached Trichinopoly on the 14th May he had beside his own men only fifty of his allies; the rest had gone off home with their booty. Meanwhile Brereton, who had been informed immediately by messengers of Yusuf Khan's change of route, was much incensed and wrote to Council:—

“ This proceeding of *Yusuf Khan* is so manifest a contempt of orders that if it had not been in consideration of his services to the Company and those so lately, I would have sent orders to the commanding officer at Trichinopoly to put him in arrest. But I leave the affair to you, gentlemen; only give me leave to say that for your own sakes, you should require a submission from him, for I apprehend he will soon be too great to remain a servant of the

¹ “ Yusuf Khan, impatient to reach his destination, yielded to, if he did not suggest, their repugnance, and consented to go the way they chose.” Orme, *History*, III. 496. When Orme wrote this (1778) he was much under the influence of General Richard Smith, who always disliked Yusuf Khan.

Company. Besides, I can expect but little respect from the country powers if your servants are deficient in their parts.”¹

On the receipt of this letter Council called upon Yusuf Khan for an explanation, which was satisfactorily furnished ;² but the affair was unfortunate, and no doubt rankled in the mind of Yusuf Khan, who must have realized that the officers who had known him well were gradually disappearing from the country, and that the new men who were taking their places were, at the best, more liable to be influenced by the insinuations of his enemies. This was probably one of the reasons why later on he refused to come to Madras to answer the charges brought against him.

Yusuf Khan stayed only two days at Trichinopoly, and by a forced march reached Madura on the 20th May. The shortness of his stay and the rapidity of his march may possibly be accounted for by a quarrel with the Nawab which appears to have taken place at this time. Of this we have only the account given by the Nawab, who said in a letter to Council, dated the 30th January, 1770,³ that on one occasion when he was lying ill at Trichinopoly he happened to be alone with Captain Joseph Smith when Yusuf Khan, coming in, drew his sword upon him, and would have killed him but for Smith’s interposition. A native life of the Nawab⁴ gives the further detail that Yusuf Khan had come with a large retinue to inquire

¹ Letter dated 30th April. *Mil. Cons.*, 3rd May, 1759. Council resolved, “ We are much surprised that *Yusuf Khan* should have gone to the southward by a different route than that resolved upon at a consultation of Field Officers, as it is the first instance he has given of his disobedience of orders.”

² Yusuf Khan to Council, received 18th June, 1759. *Mil. Country Correspondence*, VII. No. 124.

³ See Appendix V., p. 281.

⁴ *Life of the Walajah*. *Wilson’s Madras Army*, Vol. I., Appendix E, p. 387. “ It is evident from H.H.’s despatch that when His Highness, the Lord of Wealth and Country, was located at Trichinopoly and confined to bed owing to ill health, and being deprived of rest and sleep was seated one day on his cot by himself with only one attendant waiting upon him with folded arms, and General Smith allowed an audience, Muhammad Yusuf Khan, apparently with a view of enquiring into H.H.’s health accompanied with an imposing retinue called on H.H. and observing the Royal Court void of guards and doorkeepers unsheathed his sword ; but when the eyes of that villain fell on General Smith he was overawed by the majestic appearance of that lion of the forest of war. He began to tremble and dropped the sword from his hand.”

after the Nawab's health, and found the court empty of its usual guards. The inference is that Yusuf Khan thought he had found a suitable opportunity for revenging himself upon the Nawab; but the fact that Joseph Smith never reported the affair to the Madras Council, as would have been his duty had Yusuf Khan really attempted to kill the Nawab, shows that either the whole story is false or that the quarrel was a trifling one,¹ which the Nawab afterwards exaggerated when there was no possibility of disproving his statements.

¹ Yusuf Khan mentions (Appendix I., p. 244) that on coming to Trichinopoly after the siege of Madras the Nawab deprived him of certain allowances he had always received from the Company, "which vexed me very much."

CHAPTER VIII

YUSUF KHAN AS GOVERNOR

YUSUF KHAN was now the acknowledged ruler of Madura and Tinnevely, though only for a limited period and as the nominee of the Madras Council holding office contrary to the wish of the Nawab. The exact conditions of his appointment are nowhere stated, but there is little doubt that, subject to the payment of the rent, he was given absolute discretion in all matters civil and military. No questions were asked as to the number of his troops or the pay he gave them. That they were, in fact, as Orme had suggested to Mr. Payne,¹ in the service of Yusuf Khan and not in that of the Company is practically proved by the fact that after the fall of Yusuf Khan, none of his followers were punished by the Nawab. Such were Yusuf Khan's ability and the resources of the country that, in provinces which had hitherto been a source of loss instead of revenue,² he was not only able to remit his rent regularly and in full, but in three short years to create and equip a force with which he was prepared, not without some chance of success, to bid defiance to the combined forces of the Nawab and the Company; nor does it appear that, in amassing the wealth required for his enterprise, he was guilty of tyranny or oppression,³ for his

¹ Orme to Mr. John Payne, 4th July, 1757. *Orme MSS.*, 28, pp. 170-1. Appendix V., p. 271. When, in 1756, the Council had proposed to recall Yusuf Khan, they wrote (*Mil. Cons.*, 16 Dec.) to Caillaud that the troops left with Mudali were to be absolutely in his service:—"The *Subadars*, *Jemadars*, etc., Officers and Seapoys being first made acquainted that they are from that time to look upon *Mudali* as their only paymaster, and that the Company is no wise answerable for their pay while they are in his service, but whenever he sees occasion to discharge them, as many as can produce his certificate of good behaviour shall be received into the Company's service again."

² *Mil. Letter to Court*, 28th July, 1759, para. 10, *Madras Records*.

³ See, however, the opinion of Mr. J. Sullivan. Appendix V., p. 300.

people stood by him to the end and held his memory in grateful recollection, and their constant prayer to the Nawab and the English was for a return to his methods of government.

When he arrived in Madura on the 20th May, 1759, he found the whole country relapsed into confusion, and the garrisons of Madura and Palamcotta practically beleaguered in the towns from which they were supposed to control the country. It was no time to draw up a report, such as Mr. Pigot required, on the state of the provinces and the possibilities of future revenue, nor, though its intended preparation is frequently referred to,¹ is this report in the Records. His first task was to restore order. He began with the Nad Kallans in the immediate neighbourhood of Madura, as soon as he had organized some kind of a military force. From Conjeeveram he had brought six companies of sepoy and sixty horse. At Madura he was joined by three thousand men, horse, Kallans, and sepoy, sent him by the Tondaiman and the two Maravan poligars, with whom he had always been upon friendly terms. This force was not of much military value, and Yusuf Khan was so destitute of military stores that he had to make his own gunpowder and to purchase firearms and guns from the Dutch at Negapatam and the Danes at Tranquebar—a business connection which was begun at the suggestion of the Council,² but later on formed a subject of complaint when used against the English themselves. With this force, however, he took in hand the Nad Kallans, and on the 6th July³ reported to the Council :—

“ I remained so long in Madura in order to punish the *Nad Kallans* and to enquire into the accounts. Now the affairs of the *Kallans* are finished in so effectual a manner that they will commit no manner of disturbance in the *Sarkar's* country in future.”

Orme⁴ explains how this business was finished :—

“ As all of the troops with Yusuf Khan were fit for hostilities against such an enemy, he resolved to employ them in attacking

¹ e.g. in his letter of the 6th July. *Country Correspondence*, 1759, No. 140.

² Pigot to Yusuf Khan, 6th Sept., 1759. *Country Correspondence*.

³ *Country Correspondence*, 1759.

⁴ *History*, III. 562.

their haunts, whilst his levies were forming to better discipline. He however attended the service himself, which appeared more like one of the general huntings peculiar to Asia than a military expedition. Avenues were cut into the forest, and the inhabitants shot as they fled; but some were reserved to be released or executed on occasion."

M. Marchand¹ gives other details of Yusuf Khan's methods:—

"Scarcely had he taken over the administration of Madura when, having carefully considered the troubles which agitated the province, he resolved to arrest them at their very source by an example of severity which would terrify every malefactor. Combining prudence with courage, he calculated that the milder the example the less would be the impression produced by it. He attacked therefore first the least powerful of the rebel poligars, hoping that his weakness would hasten both his defeat and the promptitude of the chastisement by which he wished to intimidate the other rebels. Success justified his expectations. The poligar upon whom he fell could not resist the impetuosity of his attack and offered to capitulate and submit, but Yusuf Khan forced him to surrender at discretion, and then hanged him as well as five hundred of his Kallans who had fought for him. These he executed in a single day. This cruel instance of severity frightened the boldest. It is true they did not all submit, but they kept quiet and the province was pacified for the time."²

By such means Yusuf Khan quickly forced the Nad Kallans—

"to beg quarter and to pay cattle, their only money, mostly collected by theft, which with the others he procured, to the amount of 1000 beeves and 2000 sheep, were sent to Trichinopoly, from whence they were forwarded at different times by Captain Joseph Smith to the sea-coast for the use of the squadron, and enabled them to keep the

¹ *Précis Historique*, p. 8.

² This extract from Marchand's *Précis* appears to refer rather to 1757 than to 1759, but the story of the massacre of the surrendered Kallans is probably only a *réchauffé* of the storm of Nattakottai, or, as Orme calls it, Nellicotah, in the time of Colonel Heron, see p. 37 above. On the other hand, the *Tamil Ballad* gives the site of a similar massacre as the Piratta Hill (? Tiruppurankundam).

windward station without consuming their own stock of provisions." ¹

This payment was, however, only in the nature of a fine for past misconduct, or perhaps merely an act of restitution, for Yusuf Khan did not impose rent upon a people who must have stolen from others that with which the rent was to be paid. After having erected forts at Melur and Vellalapatti to overawe them by military force, he simply demanded that they should keep up the roads, discharge the duty of watchmen, refrain from robberies, not molest those going to visit the government's managers at Madura, and deliver up any one who broke the agreement.² At the same time he is said to have encouraged their private quarrels, teaching them to refer these to himself as the supreme arbitrator.³

As soon as this business approached completion Yusuf Khan sent a body of three hundred horse and seven hundred sepoy⁴ to relieve the garrison at Palamcotta and to ravage the territory of the Ettaiyapuram poligar, and thus to prevent the junction of the two poligar leagues—the western led by the Pulidevar or poligar of Nelkattamsevval, and the eastern led by Kattabomanaik, the poligar of Panjalamkurichi. On the 2nd July he followed with 600 horse, 3000 sepoy⁵, and 2400 men belonging to the Tondaiman and the two Maravans. Orme says ⁵ :—

"The muskets of his sepoy⁵ were old, infirm, of various nations and not sufficient in number, and were supplied [*i.e.* supplemented] by fowling pieces and any fuzees he could collect."

¹ Orme, *History*, III. 562. The King of Tanjore, being a Hindu, not only could not allow cattle to be sent from his country for the consumption of the English army, but would not even permit them to pass through his country. Yusuf Khan to Council, 6th July, 1759. *Country Correspondence*, 1759, No. 140.

² Col. de Beck to Council, 5th July, 1767 (*Mil. Cons.*, 13th July, 1767), mentions an agreement to this effect entered into with the Kallans by him "as it has been customary in the time of Yusuf Khan."

³ Nelson, *Madura Country*, II. 46. *India Office Map Dept.*, MS. B. 27, f. 2. *Sketch of the History of the Southern Divisions of the Peninsula*. See Appendix V., pp. 302, 309.

⁴ Under "Ravanah Naick," probably the same man as Ramanaik mentioned p. 66 above. Yusuf Khan to Council, 3rd July, 1759. *Country Correspondence*, 1759, No. 135.

⁵ *History*, III. 563.

He was also short of flints for his muskets, and had to ask a supply from Madras, begging at the same time for a couple of eighteen-pounders and two field-pieces of six, with a supply of shot.

He began by the capture of Kollamkondan,¹ which had been garrisoned by the Pulidevar and the poligar of Vadagarai, and then sent the detachment which had been ravaging Ettaiyapuram to Kollarpatti, half way between Madura and Tinnevely and about fifty miles from each. Kollarpatti was taken in three days, and the detachment rejoined Yusuf Khan, who marched *viâ* Gangaikondan to Tinnevely. Here he received a letter from Mahfuz Khan offering to quit his allies and retire to the Carnatic, provided a sufficient maintenance were allotted him. As Yusuf Khan knew that the Council had already proposed this arrangement to the Nawab, he gave the required promise without waiting for formal permission, though he sent on the letter to Madras. Mahfuz Khan's hopes of establishing himself in the provinces had long been idle, but that these had been continually buoyed up by promises from Pondicherry is shown by the following extract from an intercepted letter from M. Lally ²:—

“*Srirangam* is in danger of being attacked by the garrison of Trichinopoly if the English gain any advantages in the Madura country. I amuse *Mahfuz Khan*, Prince of that country, with hopes of a speedy succour in order to cause him to make efforts to resist the English. . . . I leave always an officer in the Madura country to make a diversion without being obliged to send any troops thither.”

Next, to defend the rich open country to the north and west of Tinnevely Yusuf Khan garrisoned the fort of Uttumalai and a post at Sorandai, which left him free to deal with the south. This had suffered severely from the ravages of the Travancoreans, who had allied themselves to Mahfuz Khan and the poligar leagues; but it happened that the Kallans of the poligar of Vadagarai had raided the territories of Travancore, which so

¹ Five kos, i.e. about ten miles, from Srivilliputtur. Caldwell's *Tinnevely*, p. 102.

² Letter dated 15th March, 1758. *Orme MSS.*, 17, p. 357.

incensed the King of that country that in August he made proposals of alliance to Yusuf Khan. A meeting was arranged, and the King, having promised his assistance against Vadagarai and the Pulidevar, sent a force of ten thousand men, which in September marched to Vadagarai, whereupon the terrified poligar abandoned his fort and fled for refuge to the Pulidevar. The latter, who had but a short time before surprised and destroyed at Sorandai ¹ a small force under one of Yusuf Khan's officers, was so impressed by his recent increase of strength, that he wrote to the King to try, if possible, to reconcile him to the poligar of Vadagarai. But the King was a man of craft, like his predecessor, Martanda Varma, of whom Sampati Rao, the Nawab's *diwan*, in 1756, wrote to Caillaud ² that "among black men he never met with so wise a one." He had not joined Yusuf Khan merely in order to take revenge upon so small an enemy as the poligar of Vadagarai, but because he wished to establish his claim to the Kalakadu District by its cession from the real governor of the provinces. He took the letter to Yusuf Khan, pointed out to him that, owing to his assistance, Yusuf Khan had already conquered much more territory than that of which he asked the cession, and also that, if he himself assumed a hostile attitude, it would be very difficult for Yusuf Khan to keep order in the south. He asked, therefore, as the price of his alliance the cession of the Kalakadu district. Yusuf Khan was probably not much surprised by this proposal. At his first coming to the provinces he had been advised by Caillaud to secure the friendship of Travancore,³ for which a price would certainly be asked, and moreover he was not in a position to resist the demand, for he had just received information that the heavy guns requisitioned from Madras together with a supply of five hundred muskets had been lost at sea, whilst the two field-pieces, though safely landed, had been detained by the Dutch Agent at Tuticorin. Under these circumstances Yusuf Khan made over Kalakadu to the King on condition that the latter should assist the Nawab and the English against all

¹ Letter received 28th Aug., 1759, from Yusuf Khan. *Orme MSS.*, 221, p. 207.

² Caillaud to Council, 12th Aug., 1756. *Orme MSS.*, XII. p. 3340.

³ See p. 53 above.

their enemies whenever called upon to do so. He reported his action to the Madras Council, and on the 3rd December, 1759, they formally approved the arrangement, but the Nawab declared that the cession of Kalakadu was the price paid by Yusuf Khan for the King's assistance in his schemes of independence.

On the conclusion of the alliance the Travancoreans assisted Yusuf Khan to ravage the territory of the Pulidevar, and on the 4th December, the field-pieces having arrived from Tuticorin and other military stores from Anjengo and Negapatam, Yusuf Khan laid siege to Vasudevanallur, one of the strongest of the Pulidevar's forts. Though he had a very large force, the position of the town exposed his camp to constant attacks from the Kallans, whilst the garrison was composed of excellent material, for Donald Campbell tells us of the natives of this place ¹:—

“The resolution and contempt of death which they have acquired is inconceivable. When the four guns played upon the breach, they were repairing it very steadily with palmeira [trees] and heaps of straw; nor did the survivors seem in the least concerned for the fate of their companions, some of whom every discharge from the battery tore to pieces.”

In another letter ² he says they were as superior to other natives of the Carnatic “as the best Europeans that ever were in the East Indies.”

Yusuf Khan's only heavy gun burst the day after it was mounted, but he determined to risk an assault. He lost two hundred men, and the Travancoreans about the same, but though the enemy's loss was heavier they repulsed the assault, and want of ammunition forced Yusuf Khan to raise the siege. News of this failure reached Madras on the 28th January, 1760. The Travancoreans returned to their country, and Yusuf Khan retired to Tinnevely.

Vasudevanallur was Yusuf Khan's only failure. The country was fairly tranquil—in December he had remitted two

¹ Donald Campbell to Council, 20th May, 1767. *Orme MSS.*, 77, p. 102.

² Donald Campbell to Orme, 1st December, 1777. *Orme MSS.*, 72, p. 112.

lakhs of rupees to Captain Joseph Smith at Trichinopoly—and Mahfuz Khan had, as has been mentioned, at last resolved to throw up the game. In January he joined Yusuf Khan at Tinnevely, whence he was sent to the Tondaiman at Pudukkottai. There he stayed for some time pretending to fear the vengeance of the Nawab, but at last came into his camp and was forgiven. On the 22nd July he joined the army of Colonel Eyre Coote with a body of horse. The Colonel was by no means on good terms with the Madras Council, a fact of which the Nawab took advantage to inform him that that body had “from time to time compelled him to quarrel with all his brothers.”¹

At this time the Nawab was in great want of money, and on the 7th February, 1760, the Council received a letter from Yusuf Khan, saying he had, in accordance with their orders, sent two lakhs of rupees to Trichinopoly as the first instalment of his rent from Madura and Tinnevely. On the 27th March, Council received notice of a further instalment being on the way, and decided to instruct Yusuf Khan to send his rent direct to Madras, as the Nawab would not allow a penny to escape him if the money once got into his hands. It looks, therefore, as if the Nawab had detained the first instalment.² In June Yusuf Khan sent a further remittance, which must have been much appreciated by the Council in their desperate and expensive campaign against Lally, but they were still unable to make up their minds to accept Yusuf Khan's proposals for a three years' tenure of the rentership.

In June the Council ordered Yusuf Khan to co-operate with Captain Richard Smith against the Mysoreans, for it was reported that Haidar had made a secret treaty with the French, by which they promised to assist him in the conquest of Madura and Tinnevely. On the other hand, Yusuf Khan wrote to say that the Dutch were preparing an expedition which seemed to be aimed at Tinnevely. Captain Smith declared this was only

¹ Eyre Coote's Journal, 9th May, 1760. *Orme MSS.*, VIII. p. 1945.

² In his letter of the 20th Sept., 1762 (Appendix I., p. 243) to Mr. Pigot, Yusuf Khan says: “When our army besieged Pondicherry I sent from hence to the Nawab about two lakhs of pagodas, the rent of these countrys, as the Nawab said he wanted them for the use of his army.”

an excuse,¹ and later on² requested that Yusuf Khan should be instructed to obey any orders he might send him, whilst even Colonel Coote expressed doubts³ as to the Dutch being in a position to despatch so many Europeans as Yusuf Khan reported. Orme, however, says⁴ that some four hundred men were landed and approached Tinnevely, but on Yusuf Khan's approach decamped on the 18th June without fighting. On the other hand the Dutch Records mention only a small expedition of some forty-four men, sent under a Captain D. E. Medeler to punish the natives for insults offered to the Dutch employés. If this is correct, then Captain Smith's suspicion was justified.

Though unable to join Captain Smith himself, Yusuf Khan sent 300 horse, 1500 sepoy, and 3000 peons under an officer named Shir Khan. This force reached the Dindigul district in the middle of July. Having taken a few smaller places, Shir Khan managed to reduce the fort of Vattila Gundu in September, but in October his garrison was driven out. Shir Khan, effecting a junction with them as they were retreating, defeated the Mysorean general in a pitched battle, killing him and taking all his artillery. He also made himself master of many of the neighbouring poligarships in the Dindigul district, and is said to have been still in possession of them at the time of the death of Yusuf Khan, when he found it advisable to surrender them to the Nawab.⁵

According to the native memoirs⁶ Yusuf Khan reduced all the poligars, without exception, to obedience. The last

¹ "Yusuf Khan has wrote me a long story of Dutchmen coming from Batavia, 400 being landed and 1000 more expected at Tuticorin. I am not at a loss to know what artifice gave rise to his intelligence; he has requested my orders, the first time he ever required any orders from hence. In consequence of your general letter in February I have directed him to oppose all Europeans that shall attempt to enter those districts of which he is Renter." Rich. Smith to Council, 24th June, 1760. *Mil. Cons.*, 9th July, 1760, p. 613.

² Richard Smith to Council, 6th Sept., 1760. *Mil. Cons.*, 15th Sept., 1760, p. 793.

³ Coote to Council, 1st July, 1760. *Mil. Cons.*, 3rd July, 1760, p. 596. See Appendix V., p. 275.

⁴ *History*, III. 706.

⁵ Nelson, *Madura Country*, III. pp. 280, 290.

⁶ *Ibid.*, III. 281.

apparently to submit was the Pulidevar, and as late as May, 1761, we find Yusuf Khan reporting the capture of three of the Pulidevar's forts.¹ M. Marchand says ² that it took Yusuf Khan three years to subdue this chief, but with his submission came that of all the others. As we have seen, the Nad Kallans paid no tribute, and the same was true of the two Maravans, who had been practically independent since the year 1733. Secured on the south by his alliance with Travancore, the only military power from which Yusuf Khan was now in any danger of attack was Mysore under the rule of the ambitious Haidar Ali.

As has been stated, Yusuf Khan's tenure of the rentership was contrary to the wishes of the Nawab, and even his patrons in Madras did not think it wise to incense the Nawab by making it tenable for more than one year at a time. It was naturally Yusuf Khan's object to make it as nearly as possible a permanency. In March, 1760,³ he again applied for a three years' term. In June of the same year, when he remitted his rent, he made an effort at reconciliation with the Nawab through Mr. Pigot, who wrote to the Nawab:—

“I send you a letter I have received from Yusuf Khan, which must satisfy you he is a good man, as the contents show that he fears, without a friend to recommend him to you, he is ruined. He is as good a man as Mr. Smith,⁴ I will answer for it; and if he wants arms they are to defend your country and add to your honour. If I can procure him any he shall have them and I will answer for his being a good servant to you.”⁵

The Nawab, perforce, agreed to what was practically an order, and Yusuf Khan was allowed to continue in his post for another year, but apparently it was on the understanding that

¹ Namely, Nelkattamsevvai, Vasudevanallur and Paniyur. *Country Correspondence*, 1761, No. 111.

² *Précis Historique*, p. 10.

³ *Mil. Cons.*, 27th March, 1760, p. 310.

⁴ Captain Joseph Smith.

⁵ Mr. Pigot to the Nawab (no date) enclosing a letter to Mr. Pigot received 9th June, in which Yusuf Khan, hearing that he was leaving Madras for England, wrote:—“I beg you, Honourable Sir, to settle my affairs in good time, for I am quite ruined and have no other friends at all.” Appendix No. 17 to Sir John Lindsay's Letter to Court dated 13th Oct., 1770. *I.O. Records, Home Misc.* No. 103.

the revenue should be sent to Trichinopoly and not to Madras as the Council had ordered. Then followed the Dutch expedition and the despatch of a force to Dindigul. It will be remembered that Yusuf Khan had not undertaken to pay for the expenses of defending the country against external attack; accordingly on the 11th September, 1760, Council received a letter from him saying that, owing to the expenses of the Dindigul affair, he was unable at the time to make any remittance, and on the 30th of the same month came another letter asking for a full receipt for the year 1759-60. That he had paid his revenue so far is shown indirectly by the fact that a further sum of 20,000 rupees was demanded from him to make good the loss by exchange.¹ In October Yusuf Khan asked for orders as to the mode of payment, as the Nawab was now demanding that the rent should be paid to him.²

On the 20th November the Council received a letter from the Nawab, saying that Yusuf Khan was building a fort south of the Nattam pass. As this would block the direct road from Trichinopoly, the Council ordered Captain Richard Smith, Commandant of the garrison there, to make inquiries by a proper person. He sent Lieutenant Matthew Horne, who reported that he could not reach the place as the pass was blocked owing to private quarrels between the local poligars,³ a report which the Council apparently accepted as explaining the reason of Yusuf Khan's establishing a post near the pass, for nothing further was said on the matter.

On the 17th January, 1761, Pondicherry surrendered to Eyre Coote. The best of the French soldiers and officers were now prisoners, and all that remained to represent the interests of France were the refugees in neutral settlements, and a number of men who in various ways had escaped into the interior and taken service with native princes.⁴ Curiously enough, some

¹ Letter dated Trichinopoly, 21st Nov., 1760, from Mr. Andrew Newton. *Mil. Cons.*, 4th December, 1760, p. 1054.

² *Country Correspondence*.

³ *Mil. Cons.*, 24th Dec., 1760, p. 1107.

⁴ In para. 4 of the Court's letter dated 9th December, 1762, the number is given as 500. In Council's letter to Court, dated the 26th March, 1764, para. 6, they put the total number of these at 1500. *I.O. Records, Madras Letters Received*, I. A.

thirty French prisoners had in October, 1759, been allowed to take service with Yusuf Khan as an alternative to the hardships of prison life—an engagement which involved no dishonour, as it was not likely to bring them into conflict with their own countrymen.¹ No one could have anticipated that these men and their vagabond companions from the native states would form the backbone of the force which caused the English and the Nawab as much loss in blood and treasure as they had suffered in the reduction of the French Settlements.² From what happened later, one cannot help feeling a certain amount of amusement in reading that the Council received congratulations from such persons as the King of Tanjore and Yusuf Khan on the fall of Pondicherry. Yusuf Khan for his part sent a present of thirty-three Venetians³ to Mr. Pigot.⁴

In June, 1761, it appears that Mr. Pigot formally ordered Yusuf Khan to pay his rent to the Nawab, and to hoist his flag, instead of that of the Company,⁵ at Madura and Palamcottah, his chief fortresses, an order which possibly he was privately instructed to disobey, for, though he sent the money to Trichinopoly, it was, as we shall soon see, to the Company's officer at that place, and it was the English flag,⁶ which he lowered when he declared his alliance with France. In August Mr. Pigot again wrote to the Nawab begging him to confirm Yusuf Khan in the Rentership, and to accept his offer of 9, 10, and 10 lakhs respectively for a term of three years.⁷ Messrs. Bouchier and Dupré, who were with the Nawab as deputies from the Council,

¹ Orme, *History*, III. p. 534.

² At the siege of Pondicherry in 1760–61, the English loss in Europeans between the 10th Sept., 1760, and the 16th Jan., 1761, was only 37 killed and 149 wounded. Orme *MSS.*, 27, p. 75.

³ *i.e.* sequins.

⁴ *Country Correspondence*, Vol. IX. p. 31, Feb. 1761.

⁵ At Fort St. George the Company flew the Union flag from the year 1688, but its own flag at sea was a white flag with red stripes. Fryer describes Governor Langhorne as having a "flag with 2 Balls on a Red Field," which Mrs. Penny (*Fort St. George*, p. 110) calls the Company's flag, but Colonel Love (*Vestiges of Old Madras*, I. 283 and II. 272) calls the Governor's flag. In the second of Col. Love's instances there is a charge for dyeing the Governor's flag or flags blue, which would show that the Governor now had the Union flag carried before him.

⁶ Marchand, *Précis Historique*, p. 18.

⁷ See Council's estimate of the real value of the Provinces, pp. 89, 90 (n.) above.

pressed him to accept these terms, but he demanded 12 lakhs, which Yusuf Khan's agent refused.

Messrs. Bouchier and Dupré reported as above on the 1st October. On the 8th the Council resolved :—

“ With regard to the letting out the Tinnevely and Madura countries *Yusuf Khan* hath ever proved himself a faithful servant to the Company and has on frequent occasions manifested his attachment to their interest. Such a person the Board would wish to hold the management of these countries at least until the Nawab has somewhat reduced his debt to the Company. It is therefore agreed that he be recommended in the strongest terms to the Nawab as the properest person to be continued in Madura and Tinnevely, and at the same time to remind him that much is owing to the conduct and good management of *Yusuf Khan* in bringing these countries to the state they are now in. We do not mean they should be let for less than their real value ; at the same time we think it necessary to desire the Nawab not to insist on such terms as Yusuf Khan must be obliged to reject.”

The same day Mr. Pigot wrote to Messrs. Bouchier and Dupré to this effect, concluding his letter as follows :—

“ It should be as fresh in his [*i.e.* the Nawab's] memory as in ours, the money and trouble it has cost us to bring the country to what it now is, and he should at the same time remember that we owe the merit entirely to the good conduct and good management of the present Renter.”

On the 30th October the deputies wrote that the Nawab had lowered his demand to 11 lakhs, and on this being refused, had ordered Yusuf Khan's *vakil* to go and consult his master. They added :—

“ We must say that the Nawab's reluctance to continue *Yusuf Khan* in the management of these countries seems not to arise so much from the difference between the rent offered by him and that offered by others as from some personal insults and slights which have at times been shown him by *Yusuf Khan*.”

This answer was considered on the 11th November, when the Council resolved :—

“ Although *Tittarappa Mudali*'s offers for the rent of the Madura and Tinnevely countries are more considerable than those of *Yusuf*

Khan, we doubt much whether they would in the end prove so advantageous, and are therefore still of opinion that *Yusuf Khan* and no other person in the present situation of affairs should be entrusted with the management. The *poligars* in those countries, who are ready upon every occasion to take up arms, are very powerful, and it is well known would never submit to pay tribute were they not kept in awe by a force which *Yusuf Khan*, with the large army he maintains and the military talents which he possesses, is scarce able to effect. These circumstances considered and for the reasons heretofore urged we think it should be recommended to the *Nawab* to continue the rent to *Yusuf Khan* for the present year, and not expose us to the risk of having these countries, scarce yet settled, again involved in troubles through the mismanagement of a Renter. Ordered that a letter also be wrote to *Yusuf Khan* recommending to him to behave himself on all occasions towards the *Nawab* with the respect due to his rank and dignity."

On the 17th Mr. Pigot wrote to this effect to the *Nawab* and reminded him that when they had last met he had fully explained the necessity of this step, and that the *Nawab* had then consented to appoint *Yusuf Khan* at a rent of 11 lakhs. The *Nawab*, it will be remembered, had at first asked for 12 and had only lowered his demand to 11 as a pretence at concession. At the same time, to humour the *Nawab* and to show some attention to his repeated assertions of *Yusuf Khan's* intention to make himself independent, *Yusuf Khan* was told that he must be prepared to receive English garrisons at Madura and Palamcotta—a warning which Mr. Pigot probably had no intention of carrying into effect, but which must have been very annoying to *Yusuf Khan* as a public expression of distrust.

On the 30th November a letter was received from the *Nawab* that he had been paid no revenue from either Tinnevely or Nellore, and the Council recorded:—

"It is certain that the *Nawab* has not hitherto received any money on account of the Tinnevely or Nellore countries. We hope however he will see the expediency of *Yusuf Khan's* holding the management of the former and will accordingly continue him for the present year, when he will immediately receive the amounts of the *kists* ¹ due to this time."

¹ i.e. instalments of rent or revenue.

From this it appears that, as said above, Yusuf Khan had sent his rent to the English officer at Trichinopoly and not to the Nawab.

A short time after there happened an event which strongly affected the course of events in the south. The Council had determined to enable the Nawab to pay his debts¹ to the Company by assisting him to reduce his tributaries, and they thought it wise to begin with the reduction of Vellore. How Murtaza Ali foiled the Nawab's attempt to seize his capital in 1756 has been narrated already in Chapter VI., but now that Pondicherry had fallen he had no one to play off against the English. His reduction would be a useful lesson to all the other tributaries of the Nawab, and as the Council wrote to the Court of Directors² :—

“We have chose to begin with the *Kiladar* of Vellore as he is a bad man³ and we shall have less remorse should things be carried to extremities : an example made of him may be a means of the other powers coming easily to terms.”

Murtaza Ali made a good defence, holding out from the 28th September to the 18th December,⁴ but was then forced to surrender and carried away prisoner to Arcot. Some of his dependants appear to have betaken themselves to Yusuf Khan at Madura.⁵ His defence, unaided by a single European, covered, says Colonel Monson, the English with derision and the Nawab with debts.⁶

¹ “A detachment of the army is still in the field to support the Nawab's demands on kiladars, poligars and rajas in order to enable him to pay the Company the very large debt he has contracted with them.” Letter from Col. G. Monson to Lord Chatham, dated Fort St. George, 15th April, 1762. *Public Record Office, C.O. 77, No. 22.* See pp. 240 (n.) and 308 below.

² Letter to Court, 2nd October, 1761, para. 17. *I.O. Records, Madras Letters Received, Vol. I. A.*

³ He is credited by Orme with the murder of more than one person who stood in his way.

⁴ Lawrence in a letter of the 31st March, 1762, says the 26th December. *Public Record Office, C.O. 77, No. 22.*

⁵ Letter from Murtaza Ali to Yusuf Khan. *Orme MSS., India, XIII.* pp. 3695-7.

⁶ “As soon as the army appeared he came out of his fort and surrendered himself and would have paid a very large sum of money to the *Nawab*, allowing the superiority of the *Nawab's* army and saying it was impossible for him to

On the 9th January, 1762, Mr. Pigot advised the Nawab to let Yusuf Khan have the Rentership for 9 lakhs, which it will be remembered was Yusuf Khan's first offer, and on the 18th the Nawab's reply was received saying he had arranged with Yusuf Khan for that sum. On the 29th the Council received notice from Mr. Newton, Paymaster at Trichinopoly, of a remittance from Yusuf Khan of nearly four lakhs of rupees, asking how he should dispose of the same. They ordered him to inform Yusuf Khan that "*as the Madura and Tinnevelly countries are let to rent by the Nawab and not by us, the rents should be paid to the Nawab.*"

This order he appears to have received on the 8th February, and this final settlement of the question, though Yusuf Khan had obtained the Rentership on his own terms as regards the amount of the rent, placed him in the position of a servant of the Nawab, whom he hated and distrusted. Ever since Mr. Pigot had assumed the governorship, the Nawab's vassals had been taught to look to the Madras Council rather than to the Nawab as the supreme authority in the Carnatic; and, so long as they satisfied such demands as were made by the Council or with its consent, the Nawab was not allowed to interfere with them. Accordingly the enforcement of the order given to Yusuf Khan to pay his rent to the Nawab, which exposed him to all the exactions and petty annoyances inflicted by the Nawab's officials on his tributaries, was a distinct change of policy, which Sir John Malcolm¹ ascribes to Mr. Palk. For the time Yusuf Khan kept his own counsel, but he never paid a rupee into the Nawab's treasury, and began his preparations for rebellion.

Mr. Palk, as a matter of fact, did not replace Pigot until the end of 1763, but Pigot was easy-going and indolent, and therefore Palk's influence in Council was probably already

stand against the force that had taken Pondicherry. His offers were rejected, he went back into his fort and defended it without the assistance of a single European near three months, so that we exposed ourselves to the derision of the natives, who had before a great opinion of the force of the English, lost a number of men and run the *Nawab* more in debt to the Company." Letter dated Fort St. George, 15th April, 1762, from Colonel George Monson. *Public Record Office, C.O. 77, 22.*

¹ *Life of Robert, Lord Clive*, II. 295. See Appendix V., p. 307 below.

very great. He was commonly reputed¹ to dislike the military, and he knew that the Court of Directors did not approve of the Council diverting its attention from commercial affairs to political.² The main thing at the time was to enable the Nawab to pay his debts to the Company, and, not understanding the military temperament, he may have thought that Yusuf Khan could be persuaded to pay a higher rent to the Nawab than the Council could ever extract from him as long as he remained their servant. The fallacy of this idea is well illustrated by the Rev. Mr. Gleig in his comments on the mutiny of the European officers in Bengal. He says:—

“There is no order of persons with whom under common circumstances greater liberties may be taken by the governing power than with soldiers. Where the spirit of discipline has been well preserved soldiers obey, through the force of custom, commands which they feel to be unjust, and submit to wrongs, grumbling perhaps all the while yet never dreaming that to go beyond a little idle complaint is possible.”³

The danger comes when discipline is weak, and Yusuf Khan had been for years practically uncontrolled. High-spirited as he was he now felt himself touched in his self-respect, and he had a lively fear of what must happen if he submitted to the rule of a mean and grasping enemy. A peculiar conjunction of circumstances made it just possible that rebellion might prove successful, but before we proceed to discuss these circumstances a few words are necessary in reference to Yusuf Khan's civil administration. On this subject unfortunately our information is but meagre.

In the first place his duty was to restore confidence amongst all classes of the people, from the Brahmans down to the cultivators. To please the Brahmans he, as has already been said, renewed the worship in the celebrated shrines and temples of

¹ “Mr. Palk is to succeed to the Governorship of Madras. Like a true priest he worries everybody. He hates military men and has just succeeded in suppressing all the privileges and perquisites which used to be allowed them.” Maudave to Desforges, 29th July, 1762. *Archives du Ministère des Colonies, Paris*, 97 C², f. 281.

² See Appendix V., p. 284.

³ *Life of Robert, first Lord Clive*, p. 215.

Madura.¹ The revenues of these were derived from lands which had been seized by Chanda Sahib, the priests being compelled not merely to close the temples, but in some cases to conceal the sacred images. The Marathas gave back the revenues when they captured Madura in 1741, but they were taken away again by Barkatullah, and Yusuf Khan found the temple lands partly in the possession of Government, and partly held in private by the priests. He resumed those held by the latter, and seeing that the amount of the whole was more than sufficient for the support of the ceremonial and of the temple attendants, substituted a fixed grant from the public revenues for all purposes. This was just, but could hardly be considered, at least by the Hindus, as generous, and therefore cannot have done much to make him popular amongst the priests, though it quieted active discontent. I find no record of his making direct gifts to the temples—for a Muhammadan ruler this might have been difficult—but when the Woodiataver² and his Pradhan Tandava Raya Pillai presented him with a golden cradle on the birth of his son in 1762–3, he acknowledged the gift by granting to the latter, in *jagir*, the village of Sakkudi, which the Pradhan, “not being in want of the village,” presented to the temple of Sri Minakshi.³ On the other hand, Mr. Schwartz tells us he greatly embellished the tomb of Alexander at Sikandarmalai.

As regards the largest class of the population, *i.e.* the peasants and the Kallans engaged in cultivation, we have already seen how he reduced the latter to submission. To keep them quiet it was necessary to apportion their burdens to their ability, and hence, in the case of people like the Nad Kallans, he was satisfied with the mere performance of certain public services,⁴ whilst with the inhabitants of more fertile tracts the rents were moderate, and whatever agreement he entered

¹ In the *War of the Khan Sahib*, it is stated that Yusuf Khan made himself master of immense treasures, which he found in the temple of Minakshi, having propitiated that goddess by a human sacrifice.

² *i.e.* the poligar of the Greater Marava or Ramnad. *Pradhan* means “chief minister.”

³ *Memorandum of the Villages allotted to the Temple of Sriminachi at Madura.* Mackenzie MSS. (India Office), Vol. XVI. Nos. 5–13. Another village, Alla Colum (?) was given for the same purpose by Moota Pilla, who was Yusuf Khan's *samprati*, *i.e.* vakil or accountant. *Ibid.*

⁴ See p. 98 above.

into was rigidly observed by himself, whilst any infraction by others was severely punished. Colonel Fullarton writes ¹:—

“While he ruled those provinces his whole administration denoted vigour and effect: his justice was unquestioned, his word [was] unalterable, his measures were happily combined and firmly executed, the guilty had no refuge from punishment. His maxim was that the labourer and the manufacturer should be the favourite children of the *Sarkar* because they afford strength and comfort to the Public Parent, but that the *poligar* and *Kallan*, though equally entitled to truth and justice have no pretension to indulgence, because they are the worthless prodigals who waste their own means and ravage those of others. ‘Let them become Zamindars’ ² said he ‘and cultivate their own lands instead of plundering their industrious neighbours, then they shall be cherished; but whilst their habit is idleness and their business devastation, I will treat every one as a public enemy who wields a pike ³ or wears the turban of a *poligar*.’ On comparing the state of that country with his conduct and remarks, I found that wisdom, vigor and integrity were never more conspicuous in any person of whatever climate or complexion.”

Of the Kallans Yusuf Khan speaks in one of his letters to Mr. Pigot as “rather devils than men,” ⁴ and yet they became his firmest adherents. The common cultivator of other castes he assisted not only with grants of money, but by the proper upkeep of the tanks and embankments which are necessary to cultivation in a country in which violent downpours of rain alternate with prolonged droughts.⁵ The artisans, e.g. the weavers of Madura, he assisted with advances of money without which people of this class, living as they do from hand to mouth,

¹ Colonel William Fullarton, *A View of the English interests in India and an Account of the Military Operations in the Southern part of the Peninsula*, 1782-4, p. 139. Also Letter to Lord Macartney and the Select Committee, 7th Jan., 1785, p. 212. *I. O. Records, Home Misc.*, 331. See Appendix V., p. 298.

² i.e. landlords.

³ The long pike was the usual weapon of the Kallans. Mr. James Landon in a letter, dated 29th July, 1793, to the Madras Board of Revenue, says Yusuf Khan disarmed the *poligars*, and that, in his opinion, there would be no real peace until Yusuf Khan's method of dealing with them was adopted.

⁴ Yusuf Khan to Mr. Pigot, 26th Aug., 1759. *Orme MSS.*, 221, p. 207.

⁵ On the Nadiyunni Anicut on the Tamraparni River, there is an inscription stating that it was made as a charitable work by Yusuf Khan in 1759. Caldwell's *Tinnevely*, pp. 63, 64.

were unable to prepare the cloth which was not only sold locally but bought for export by the Company. For military purposes he had men trained to make gunpowder and muskets, and even to cast cannon.¹ The general commerce of the country was facilitated by his arrangements with the Kallans, which provided for the security of the roads, and by the erection of choultries or rest-houses for travellers. The village authorities looked after these as long as he ruled, but on his fall they soon began to appropriate the funds set apart for them to their own uses.

In his report ² on the province of Tinnevely, Mr. S. Lushington, afterwards Governor of Madras, sums up his account of Yusuf Khan's administration as follows :—

“Notwithstanding the disadvantages under which he laboured of an usurped authority he accomplished by the vigour of his mind and military talents the complete subjugation of the Province. In his time the tribute of the poligars was regularly collected, private property was in no danger from their depredations and the revenue of the *Sarkar* lands was very largely increased. The effect of the subordination he established may be seen in his *Jamabandis* ³ from the year 1761 to 1764, when they never fell below 1030,489 [chakrams] ⁴ and were in one year as high as 1244,530.”

The lower of these figures is higher than that for any year between 1749 and 1760. In 1770 the *Jamabandi* fell as low as 739,035. This was after the Council had followed Caillaud's advice,⁵ and allowed the Nawab to govern and collect revenue as he pleased under the protection of a military force placed absolutely at his disposal. The disgust with which the military

¹ “The *Kallans* had several Malabar guns in their forts and they manage them surprisingly well. They have them on barbit (*sic*) and in several of the forts which I have taken from them they had three four-pounders cast in the European manner by some of the natives that was learned with *Yusuf Khan* at Madura.” Donald Campbell to Orme, 1st Dec. 1777. *Orme MSS.*, 72, p. 111.

² Report by Mr. Stephen Rumbold Lushington, Collector of Tinnevely, dated 28th May, 1802, to the Board of Revenue, para. 18. *I. O. Records, Board of Revenue Proceedings*, 16th Aug., 1802, p. 9027. For a fuller extract from this Report, see Appendix V., p. 303.

³ Statements of rent or revenue from land due to the Government.

⁴ The *chakram* equalled in Tinnevely at this time 2½ rupees.

⁵ See Chapter V., pp. 45, 46 above.

officers performed their degrading task is clearly shown in the following extract from a letter written by Colonel Donald Campbell, brother of the conqueror of Yusuf Khan, who had been specially chosen by the Nawab for the military command¹ :—

“The Nawab’s Accounts with the poligars will clearly evince the prodigious disproportion between the sums demanded and those actually paid from the beginning of their connexions with one another, and it is with a view of giving the gentlemen [of the Council] a thorough idea of their nature that I have sent them. . . . Most of the persons whose names stand in capitals in those Accounts are prisoners here and at Madura, nor is their misery confined to the mere loss of liberty ; stripes innumerable have been made use of to induce them to pay what are called their debts ; some have been tied upon the muzzle of a cannon and threatened to be blown off, yet they still denied their being able to satisfy the demands of the *Sarkar*. It is difficult to believe that they would purchase the possession of a little money with the deprivation of life and liberty, and if it can be supposed possible it must proceed from a circumstance which reflects a still greater disgrace upon the Government, [*i.e.*] that they have no security against the repetition of the same treatment as soon as they could be imagined in a condition to repeat paying for their enlargement.

“Such is the case of the poligars who are allowed to retain a kind of ideal sovereignty in their territories ; the countries immediately under the management of the *Sarkar* are to the full in as deplorable a condition : for every *cottey*² of seed the cultivator sows he pays as rent 150 Tinnevelly *fanams*.³ If the soil is good it produces on an average fifteen fold ; these fifteen *cotteys* of grain selling at 12 Tinnevelly *fanams* each are worth 180 *fanams* so that the labourer has only 30 *fanams* for his own support and that of his family, nor indeed has he that clear of deductions, for the *amaldars* and other officers of the *Sarkar* are always sure to have their part.

“To be a spectator of such scenes of oppression is of itself painful to a humane mind, much more so when it becomes his duty to support

¹ Letter from Donald Campbell dated Palamcotah, 18th July, 1767. *Orme MSS.*, 308, p. 53. Donald Campbell was appointed Commandant of Madura and Tinnevelly on the 10th Nov., 1764.

² *i.e. kati*, an old grain measure.

³ Twelve *fanams* equal one rupee.

the authors of it. The Nawab told me once he would put all his countries on the same footing with that of Arcot. If he established it in Tinnevely it would become in a few years the most valuable part of his dominions. . . . I cannot dismiss this subject without observing to you that if the Nawab was to receive annually one half of the sums he demands he will be very well off, and I dare say you will, upon a review of what has been received heretofore, be of the same opinion.”¹

Temporary confinement for the non-payment of revenue might be considered a mild punishment in those times, but Palamcotta, the place from which the letter just quoted was written, was in reality a kind of Bastille or State Marshalsea. There exists a list of Government prisoners at Palamcotta dated 13th July, 1782.² The first prisoner is noted as having been “confined by Yusuf Khan since 20 years,”³ then follow eight men with the remark:—

“Poligars confined for seventeen years by the *Nawab* soon after the place was taken from *Muhammad Yusuf Khan*. The *kiladar* can give no information of their crime, but it is said that they were confined as a pledge for the payment of the taxes due from them.”

Caillaud’s anticipations of what would happen under the unchecked government of the Nawab are thus shown to have been well founded, and what was patent to a foreigner like Caillaud must have been at least equally so to the people of the country, emphasized as it was by their previous experience of the government of his brother Mahfuz Khan.⁴ The first

¹ This was the condition of the country two years after it had come under the rule of the Nawab, who on the 29th Jan., 1765, had written to the Court of Directors as follows: “The stated payments [*i.e.* instalments of the debt due to the Company] fixed for the last year have been duly discharged though not without difficulty. The reduction of the Rebel Yusuf Khan having involved me in a most incredible expence, the remaining balance shall be paid off as soon as possible, but in this I must request your patience, it being necessary my country should be restored to its cultivation and the poor inhabitants, distressed and harassed for near twenty years, be encouraged.” *Letters to and from the East India Company’s Servants at Bengal, Fort St. George and Bombay*, . . . 1756–1766.

² *I. O. Records, Military Miscellany Book*, 11th to 30th Sept., 1782, p. 276.

³ *i.e.* two years before the fall of Yusuf Khan. He had been the Nawab’s prisoner therefore for 18 years!

⁴ “Soon after, the six companies of Sepoys began their march from Tinnevely to Madura, and the harvest began, on which the enemy’s army entered the

reason, therefore, which Yusuf Khan had for thinking he might be successful in his rebellion was his knowledge of the detestation in which the Nawab was held by the people of Madura and Tinnevely.

In his letter of the 12th February, 1763,¹ the Nawab mentions as one of the crimes of Yusuf Khan that he had built a new house. Local tradition says that Yusuf Khan had a residence in the village of Sarmattipuram, two miles west of Madura, where he was executed, and where his tomb was erected. Marchand in his plan of Madura marks Yusuf Khan's town dwelling in the south-west corner of the city, and this probably explains the local tradition that when the mutiny, in which he was seized, broke out he fled to the Temple of Perumal, which is close by.

town where *Mahfuz Khan* proclaimed his dominion, which his agents and dependants exercised with much violence and injustice. Even the shroffs or bankers did not escape, although the necessity and neutrality of their occupation protects their persons and property throughout Indostan from the violence either of the despot or the conqueror." Orme, *History*, II. 237.

¹ See Appendix V., p. 278. The *Tamil Ballad* says that Yusuf Khan built himself a magnificent palace with the wealth which he obtained from the temple of Minakshi. See p. 112 (n.) above.

CHAPTER IX

THE CHANCES OF REBELLION

AT the moment when Yusuf Khan determined to rebel against the Nawab the probability of success, though not so small as to warrant the supposition of a "temporary lunacy" ¹ on his part, could hardly be described as more than a "fighting chance." The English were at peace with all the native Powers, and the Nawab, who was, by reason of his heavy debt to the Company, little better than their servant, was entitled to all the assistance they could give him in the support of his authority. Their military prestige, it is true, had reached its climax in the capture of Pondicherry, and had been somewhat tarnished by the difficulties they had experienced in the capture of Vellore, ² and their actual force on the Coast was soon to be diminished by the despatch, contrary to the opinion of all the Council's military advisers, of a strong detachment to attempt the conquest of Manilla. ³ It has been already said that Yusuf Khan could rely on the loyalty of his people, and it seemed likely that he would receive the sympathy of his neighbours, if not their active assistance. The Maravans, long practically independent of Madura, had always been his friends, as might well be expected seeing that he was born in the Ramnad or Great Marava country and was by birth a caste-fellow of its Chief Minister. Travancore had assisted him

¹ David Leighton, *Vicissitudes of Fort St. George*, p. 113.

² See p. 109 above.

³ The expedition left Madras on the 1st August. The town of Manilla was captured on the 6th Oct., 1762. (Wilson, *Madras Army*, I. 161.) Maudave says that it was only when Yusuf Khan knew that the Manilla expedition had started, that he determined to declare his independence, and even this he would not do until he had been joined by Marchand and the French from Tanjore.

in the conquest of the southern poligars and had been paid her price in full by the cession of the Kalakadu District. Mysore, in the west, was growing strong under the rule of Haidar Ali. Himself a successful rebel, Haidar Ali could have no prejudice against rebellion, and the fact that he had twice been foiled by Yusuf Khan was not likely to weigh in his mind against his hatred for the Nawab, who had so disgracefully broken his promise to cede Trichinopoly to Mysore, and for the English, who had supported the Nawab in spite of his disloyalty, more especially as Yusuf Khan could promise the return of the Dindigul districts which he had wrested from him in 1760, and possibly the ever-coveted Trichinopoly itself.¹ Lastly, there was the wealthy kingdom of Tanjore constantly fretted by the spiteful action of the Nawab, who wished to treat it as he had treated Vellore. The King was avaricious and timid, but Trichinopoly depended upon Tanjore very largely for provisions, and mere inaction on the part of the King would hamper the advance of an army despatched from Trichinopoly, and might be fatal to such an army if compelled to retreat.

From his European neighbours Yusuf Khan could not expect much. The French settlements were in the hands of the English. The Dutch and the Danes were at peace with England, but had, under the sanction of the Madras Council,² opened a business connection for the sale of military weapons and stores, which Yusuf Khan knew would continue in secret as long as he could pay the price that might be asked.³ That he had plenty of money is clear from the single fact that after settling to pay a rent of only five lakhs of rupees in 1759 he had recently offered of his own accord a rent of nine lakhs, and it would give him infinite pleasure to spend upon fighting the Nawab the money of which the Nawab was seeking to

¹ Yusuf Khan's agent in Mysore was one Alizaman Khan, brother-in-law of Badruzaman Khan, one of Haidar's chief officers. He failed to obtain Haidar's assistance for Yusuf Khan, but he was one of Haidar's representatives when that chief made peace with the English in 1769 at the gates of Madras. Kirmani, *History of Hydr Naik*, p. 285. The Nawab (see Appendix V., p. 279 below) mentions another agent, Ghulam Hussain.

² Pigot to Yusuf Khan, 6th Sept. *Country Correspondence*, 1759.

³ "The foreign companies, particularly the Danes, bring out arms as merchandize." Letter to Court, 14th Oct., 1765, para. 80.

deprive him.¹ Tondi, Vaippar, Tuticorin, and Manapad were all ports with fair roads to either Madura or Palamcottā, so that communication with the Dutch and Danes was easy.

As regards the military strength of the country, Madura and Palamcottā were well fortified and strongly held. The former was separated from Trichinopoly, the nearest English garrison and the residence of the Nawab, by eighty miles of rough country, without any made roads and almost impassable if Yusuf Khan could rely upon the Kallans of Nattam and the two Maravas to defend their woods.² Palamcottā, nearly a hundred miles further south, within easy reach of Tuticorin and with a good road to Madura, would serve as a collecting point for recruits, provisions and stores, and a *point d'appui* for a flying force which might harass an army besieging Madura if things should come to such a pass. The road to Trichinopoly was covered by the little fort at Velichi-nattam, that to Dindigul by Solavandan, and the western passes by the forts of Srivilliputtur and Vadagarai, through the latter of which he could communicate with the western coast. Of Yusuf Khan's army we have no definite figures. Excluding the Kallans (whose numbers varied probably from time to time, but of whom he could have as many as he might want at a moment's notice), the garrison of Madura appears to have consisted of about 3000 sepoys, 1000 Moor horse, and 200 to 300 Europeans; that of Palamcottā of 2000 sepoys, 100 horse, and a few Europeans.³ His flying force is stated by Yusuf Khan himself to have comprised 4000 sepoys, 2000 Kallans, 1000 Moor horse, 100 topasses, and 6 guns with two officers and 30 gunners,⁴ but perhaps he included in these figures part of the garrison of Palamcottā, which would have been available in case of a determined

¹ "In short, *Yusuf Khan* spares neither money nor provisions; and he has plenty of both, which must fall into our hands if he does not use it." Call to Lawrence, 4th Sept. *Mil. Cons.*, 15th Sept., 1763, p. 188. See also Appendix V., p. 287 (n.).

² Court to Madras, 24th Dec., 1765, para. 7. *I. O. Records, Madras Despatches*, Vol. III. See Appendix V., p. 284. Hamilton (*Hindustan*) in 1820 gives the distance from Madras to Madura as 307 miles. Trichinopoly was about 80 and Tondi about 50 miles from Madura.

³ Letter from Palamcottā, 22nd Oct., 1764. See Appendix V., pp. 287, 289.

⁴ Intercepted letter dated 26th Feb., 1764 to M. Haussé. *Orme MSS.*, 281.

attempt to relieve Madura. In all it is probable that, including the garrisons scattered about the country, Yusuf Khan had at his disposal at least 10,000 sepoy, 2000 Moor horse, 50 to 60 European horse, and from 400 to 600 Europeans, topasses, and Coffrees, as infantry and artillery. He had also an indefinite number of Kallans, a full supply of labour for his fortifications, and the country people in his favour. If he could not face the enemy in the field, he might still hope, with good luck, to prolong operations until hardship and disease had so reduced the invading force that he could count upon being granted favourable terms, if not actual independence.

In including Europeans in the above calculation I have anticipated Yusuf Khan's alliance with the French. Every one in India expected that the latter would make some attempt to recover their possessions from the English; but at the time, their strength in India was almost a negligible quantity, being limited to the fugitives who had betaken themselves to the neutral settlements of the Dutch and Danes, or who had entered the service of the native princes.¹ No one knew better than Yusuf Khan the value of European soldiers, as well as of European discipline and training for the sepoy. He had never been in command of European officers, but he had served with them; his own sepoy companies had European non-commissioned officers; ² his artillery had always been manned by Europeans; and, as we have seen, French prisoners had been allowed to enlist with him in 1759.³ Probably many others had joined him unnoticed by the Council. There is no mention of his having ever experienced any difficulty in controlling his Europeans from the time when Caillaud gave him special instructions as to his conduct towards his European sergeants.⁴ To employ Europeans, therefore, under their own officers can hardly have appeared to him as a hazardous experiment, and at this moment the temptation must have been irresistible.

Since the fall of Pondicherry there had been no representative of the French nation in the Carnatic of any importance or ability, but on the 4th April, 1762, there arrived at Negapatam

¹ The numbers of these fugitives in southern India was estimated as high as 1500. See note, p. 105 above.

² See p. 51 (n.). ³ Orme, *History* III. p. 534. ⁴ See p. 53 above.

from Mauritius the French frigate *Fidèle*, on board of which was M. de Maudave,¹ who had served as a Colonel under Lally, but had left the Coast before the fall of Pondicherry. Forced to leave France again by the loss of his property, he determined to pay another visit to India, and when he arrived at Mauritius² he received a general commission from the French Council of that island to represent France in India, to make an effort to resuscitate the French party amongst the Indian princes, and to give the English as much trouble as possible. All Frenchmen in the service of the King or the Company were ordered to obey his instructions. He had but little money, and what more he wanted he was to raise as best he could in India from well-disposed persons, to whom he was to promise the speedy arrival of a large French force. All this, of course, was to be done without giving his hosts, the Dutch or the Danes, any tangible grounds for supposing that he was violating their neutrality. On his landing, therefore, he gave out that his only concern was to alleviate the sufferings of his scattered compatriots. This furnished an excuse for a voluminous correspondence with the Deccan, Mysore, Malabar, Goa, Masulipatam, and Tanjore. He tells us that the very amount of his correspondence enabled him to lull the suspicions of the Dutch Governor, Van Teylingen, whose chief characteristics, according to Maudave, were the love of drink and the English, and "a violent and imbecile hatred of the French."³ His chief hope lay in the strong force of French cavalry, under M. Hugel,⁴ an Alsatian Captain of Hussars in the French service, who had joined Haidar before the fall of Pondicherry ;

¹ Maudave's *Relation*. See Appendix II., p. 250, and Pouget de St. André, *La Colonisation de Madagascar sous Louis XV.*

² Known by the French as "Île de France."

³ Admiral Pocock's letters in 1758 constantly refer to the hatred of the then Dutch Governor, Van Eck, towards the French. *Orme MSS.*, 290.

⁴ See a paper (N.A.F. 9365, ff. 370-373) in the Bibliothèque Nationale. Hugel joined Haidar Ali in 1760, and with great difficulty was allowed to leave him in 1764. Not being able to obtain any suitable employment on the Coast, he returned to France, and in 1769 proposed to the Duc de Choiseul to go out to India, collect his old soldiers and join Haidar. This he did in 1771, but was mortally wounded at the battle of Chinakurali on the 8th May, 1771, when Haidar was defeated by the Marathas. He was succeeded in his command by Le Sieur Russel le Cadet.

but Haidar was already surfeited with the unfulfilled promises of French adventurers, and declined to make any move until the promised French force showed itself in the country. The only Prince ¹ from whom Maudave received a promising reply was the King of Tanjore, who, though already distrustful of the French owing to the villainy of a certain Jean Dumont, who had pretended that he represented the French Government, was so moved by the danger of his own position that he at last gave a qualified assent to his propositions. The King had already in his service a small body of Frenchmen, which he allowed to be increased and at the same time he provided a rallying point for others in his dominions, but soon becoming frightened at his own audacity and horrified at the expense ² into which M. de Maudave appeared to be leading him, he advised him to write to Yusuf Khan, with whose feelings towards the Nawab he was well acquainted. Maudave wrote to Yusuf Khan, and, receiving a favourable reply, despatched to Madura first M. Mallet and then a M. Charles Flacourt.³ In July the latter, it is said, persuaded Yusuf Khan to enter into an agreement by which he acknowledged himself a subject of France in return for French assistance; ⁴ Maudave was to write to Mauritius to obtain reinforcements and a French fleet, whilst in the mean time, Yusuf Khan supplying the necessary funds, all the French

¹ Maudave says his brother was at Goa, but could obtain no assistance from the Portuguese. At Calicut his agent was M. Haussé.

² Possibly also the King of Tanjore thought, in view of a treaty concluded towards the end of 1762 by the mediation of the English, that the immediate danger of a rupture with the Nawab had been averted.

³ The Dutch accounts (letter of 24th Jan., 1764, from the Council of Ceylon to the Governor-General and Council of India at Batavia, and "Short Accounts" of occurrences in Madura, Madras, Travancore, etc., by *opper-koopman* Godfried Sweepe for 1763 and 1764. Col. Arch, *The Hague*, say the treaty was negotiated by M. Charles Flacourt assisted by Johannes Landeman and his secretary, Anthony Damois, but Maudave says that Flacourt went to Madura only when M. Mallet had been despatched to Mysore with money from Yusuf Khan to extricate Hugel. The date of the Treaty between Yusuf Khan and Maudave is given as July, 1762, by M. Flamicourt in his letter of 2nd Sept. to the Madras Council. *Mil. Cons.*, 15th Sept., 1763.

⁴ It is fairly certain that Yusuf Khan obtained a promise of French assistance at this time, but that he ever acknowledged allegiance to France is very doubtful, for Marchand says (see Appendix III. (b), p. 261), that the mere suggestion of such a thing made Yusuf Khan frantic and was the cause of his first quarrel with him.

in Southern India were to be collected in Madura. The French in Tanjore were to join him immediately, and M. Mallet was to be despatched with money to bring M. Hugel and his force from Mysore. To the Council in Mauritius Maudave explained his plan as follows. The English on the Coast being much weakened by the despatch of the expedition to Manilla, it would suffice if the Council were to send him 500 Europeans, with whom he was to join those collected at Madura, who, as he calculated, would amount to about the same number. With these and Yusuf Khan's own army he proposed to march towards Trichinopoly so as to draw the whole remaining English force in that direction, whilst the fleet would make a sudden attack upon Madras, which it was expected they would find absolutely defenceless. However feasible this plan appeared upon paper, its weakness lay in the fact that of all the essentials to success only one, *i.e.* the disposal of the Tanjore contingent, was under the control of Maudave himself. Yusuf Khan, indeed, would have marched on Trichinopoly with this alone, but Maudave was not prepared to take such a risk.

The Tanjore contingent was commanded by Messieurs Marchand and Flamicourt. The latter, a gallant young gentleman, had been in the service of the King of Tanjore when Maudave arrived at Negapatam. He immediately wrote to ask for a commission, which Maudave, on the recommendation of M. Desforbes, formerly Chief Engineer at Pondicherry, sent to him. M. Marchand was an extraordinary personage, of whom it is necessary to give a more detailed account. In his *Précis Historique des deux sièges de la ville de Maduré*, he signs himself simply "the Chevalier Marchand," and I have not been able to ascertain even his Christian name, much less any details of his parentage. This was apparently humble, for he first appears as a servant (*domestique*)¹ or secretary of the Chevalier Jacques Law, who, according to M. Louis Bruno,² seeing his capacity for the military life, made him a partisan or officer of irregulars. In one or other

¹ *Plainte du Chevalier Law contre le Sieur Dupleix. Lettre de M. de Maissin à M. de Boisserolle, 6th June, 1759, pp. 63-71.*

² *Journal.* See Appendix V., p. 296 (n.).

of these capacities he was with Law in the disastrous campaign of Srirangam. Law, released on parole by the English, returned to Pondicherry, where he was placed under arrest by Dupleix, and a military court was appointed to examine into his conduct. The president of this Court, M. Maissin, an officer new to the country and ignorant of the vernacular, was astounded to find that, whilst practically all the evidence tendered by the European officers who had been with Law was in his favour, that tendered by the Indians *through an interpreter* was against him. He also noticed, as did his assistant, who knew something of the vernacular, that the interpreter appeared to tutor the Indian witnesses as to what they should say. M. Maissin, therefore, refused to accept their evidence. Upon this, says M. Maissin, M. Dupleix presented as witnesses two partisan officers, Messieurs Marchand and Lambert; but in spite of great pressure to give evidence against Law, they refused to admit anything disadvantageous to him. Law was accordingly acquitted, and Dupleix compelled to set him at liberty.¹ Marchand's loyalty, united to previous good conduct, was so much appreciated that, when he determined to go to Bussy in the Deccan, he took with him recommendations not only from Law, de Leyrit, and others, but from Dupleix himself. Bussy gave Marchand the command of his own bodyguard of hussars, an appointment which excited some jealousy, for certain officers wrote to de Leyrit, who had now succeeded Dupleix as Governor, that they objected to associate with a man who had once held a menial position. De Leyrit referred the complaint to Bussy, remarking that it might be necessary to take notice of it, though Marchand was a fine fellow who deserved any favour that Bussy could show him. To this Bussy replied that none of his officers who had served at Trichinopoly with Marchand, and of these there were many, had ever objected to his promotion, and, moreover, that Marchand's duties kept him near his own person apart from the other officers. Apparently the matter went no further.²

¹ This did not prevent Dupleix, in his *Mémoire contre la Compagnie*, 1759, from repeating his charge of incompetence and treachery against Jacques Law—a peculiarly ungracious act as, subsequent to Law's acquittal, he had allowed his own nephew de Kerjean to marry Law's sister, Rébéca Louise.

² Letter, dated 25th Jan., 1756, from De Leyrit to Bussy, and letter dated 25th Feb., 1756, from Bussy to De Leyrit. *Bibliothèque Nationale*, N.A.F. 9360.

In the Deccan, says Bruno, Marchand distinguished himself by many deeds of desperate valour, and whilst other officers enriched themselves, all that he gained in the service was a number of wounds, one of which never completely healed, causing him at times to vomit great quantities of blood, but such was the iron constitution of his body and the strength of his will that he was able to undergo hardships and fatigues which few men in sound health could have endured.

Apparently Marchand left the Deccan when Bussy was recalled by Lally in 1758, for he tells us he was present at the siege of Madras, and that he took part in all the rough fighting against Preston and Yusuf Khan, and was not only wounded again but had the misfortune to see his brother killed at his side.

In March, 1760, Marchand and a brother officer, Captain St. Denis, were captured near Devikottai by Captain Richard Smith whilst on their way to Tranquebar.¹ Being both in a bad state of health, they were allowed, on giving their parole, to proceed to Negapatam. Here Marchand, having recovered his health, decided that he had been captured in neutral territory and that he was therefore entitled to ignore his parole. This he proceeded to do, entering the Dutch service and collecting European recruits for that nation.

In January, 1762, some French prisoners, residing on parole at Wandiwash, ran away, but being pursued and captured, a letter was found on one of them written by Marchand, in which he incited the prisoners to break their parole and offered to provide for them in the Dutch service. The Council of Madras, therefore, on the 31st January, addressed the Dutch Council at Negapatam, saying that, as this was a breach of the parole which Marchand had given, they revoked the same and requested his surrender. The Dutch replied that Marchand had misrepresented his position, and had acted without their authority ; accordingly, though they could not surrender him to the English, they had punished him severely and turned him out of the town, and he had gone to Tranquebar.² Here he proceeded to take

¹ R. Smith to Council, 30th March. *Mil. Cons.*, 15th April, 1760.

² Letter from Council of Negapatam, dated 7th Feb., 1762. *Mil. Cons.*, 22nd March, 1762, p. 148.

his revenge upon the Dutch by trying to induce the French in their service to desert and join him, and the Danish authorities, on receiving a complaint from the Dutch, turned him out of their town also.¹ He now managed to make his way to Mysore, where he joined the force under M. Hugel, but, owing partly to some annoyances to which he was exposed, and partly to the natural restlessness of his character, as soon as he heard of the arrival of Maudave he left M. Hugel, came down to the coast, and from a hiding-place at Tranquebar wrote to offer his services to Maudave. The latter, as he says, knew of but one good quality in Marchand, namely, "a rare and brilliant valour," unfortunately combined with a total want of *bon sens et raison*, so that he was quite unfit to be trusted in a delicate position. At the same time he was the very man for a desperate undertaking. Maudave, therefore, gave him some money and sent him with a small troop to Tanjore to join and take command of the force already there under Flamincourt. There Marchand remained until he received orders from Maudave to march to Madura, which in December, 1762, he succeeded in doing without the Madras Council being aware of his movements.

Maudave now made every effort to enlist men, both French and sepoys, even going so far as to attempt to excite a revolt amongst the French prisoners at Trichinopoly, but this becoming known to the Dutch Governor, Van Teylingen, was disclosed to Captain Preston,² who took the necessary measures to prevent it. On the 12th July, 1762, Preston reported to the Council that owing to his having observed a spirit of desertion amongst the sepoys, affecting the very best men, he had offered a reward for the discovery of the instigators, and that these were found to be agents of Yusuf Khan, and that he was informed that Yusuf Khan was largely increasing his army. He said :—

"Yusuf Khan (by all accounts) is raising a very considerable army. I am told that he has already above 6000 sepoys and 300 horse, all completely armed by himself, and that he has bought up many thousand firelocks from the Dutch and Danes, that he has

¹ *Mil. Cons.*, 22nd March, 1762, p. 151.

² Preston was at this time Commandant of the English garrison at Trichinopoly. The English Records do not mention this incident.

likewise collected many Europeans and Coffreys and that he is employing some thousands of Cooleys upon the fortifications of Madura.”¹

According to the Nawab, Trichinopoly was itself in danger of attack from both Yusuf Khan and Haidar Ali. This unwelcome news the Council refused to believe, and replied to Preston that, so far as Yusuf Khan was concerned in the desertion of his sepoy, he must have been misinformed through some trickery of the Nawab, that Trichinopoly was in no danger, and that the Nawab had better come and stay in Madras. This they wrote on the 26th July, though on the 19th they had warned Preston to be on the watch for the emissaries of M. de Maudave, whom they suspected of wishing to join Haidar Ali.

Though “snubbed” for excess of zeal, Preston did not relax his caution. On the 28th August he wrote that the Nawab

“put several questions to me what I would do in a case of treachery, that convinced me he was very uneasy and that he didn’t think it safe to leave any of his family here. His intelligence relating to Yusuf Khan he was pleased to speak of in a tender and restrained manner, as if he was afraid of appearing prejudiced against him.”²

However much the Council distrusted the Nawab, they at length realized that something very serious was in the air, and on the 7th September Mr. Pigot wrote to Yusuf Khan that his conduct was suspicious, that he had better come to Madras to clear his character, that his affairs with the Nawab should be settled, and that he should be confirmed in the Rentership for the present year. On the 13th September the Council received a letter from the King of Travancore, saying that Yusuf Khan had asked for his assistance against the Nawab, who, according to Yusuf Khan, was at variance with the Council, and was about to attack Madura. He had

¹ *Mil. Cons.*, 26th July, 1762, p. 143.

² Many years later the Nawab had the face to assert that the Madras Council forced him into war against Yusuf Khan—“Afterwards they obliged me, *without the least reason*, to take the field against *Yusuf Khan* at Madura, which cost me about one crore of rupees, besides the revenues of that country for two years, which I lost also.” Letter dated 5th Feb., 1770, from the Nawab to the Court of Directors. *Rous’ Appendix*, Vol. III. p. 1507.

refused Yusuf Khan's request, of which refusal Council wrote their approval.

It is quite possible that if Yusuf Khan had gone to Madras at this time, he could have obtained what terms he pleased in regard to the Rentership, for it is certain that nothing was known of his arrangements with Maudave, but of this he could not be certain. What he did know was that his English friends at Madras were now few in number, and that the Nawab would use all his influence against him.¹ His friend the King of Tanjore² wrote to warn him against going. Murtaza Ali³ did the same, and also bade him remember that Mr. Pigot's term of office was nearly over and that he would do well to seek the friendship and protection of his successor, Mr. Palk, who, he wrote, "has quitted God's service for money,"⁴ and might therefore be accessible to bribes, a poor consolation to Yusuf Khan, for, if he had believed anything so foolish, he must also have known that his offers would easily be outbidden by the Nawab. He followed, therefore, the advice given by his friends, and on the 20th September replied to Mr. Pigot in a long letter,⁵ enumerating his services to the English, complaining of the ingratitude and injustice of the Nawab, and promising to come to Madras as soon as he had collected the next instalment of revenue and settled the arrears of his troops.

The possibility of trouble between the English and Yusuf Khan had now become public. In fact, it could not well be concealed any longer, for on the 22nd October the Council had written to its agents at Tellicherry and Anjengo warning them

¹ Colonel Richard Smith in a note written in 1763-4 says that Governors of Provinces would seldom come to the capital when summoned to give in their accounts, as they could never trust even the most solemn promises of safety given them by their masters. *Orme MSS.*, 88, p. 180.

² *Letter from Muhammad Ali, Nabob of Arcot to the Court of Directors . . . with an Appendix of original papers*, p. 46. *Translation of a letter from Pertaub Sing, Raja of Tanjore, to the famous rebel Isouf Cawn.*

³ Murtaza Ali was at this time a prisoner at Arcot. His letter, the authenticity of which is uncertain, is to be found in the *Orme MSS.*, *India*, XIII. pp. 3695-7.

⁴ *Orme MSS.*, XIII. p. 3697. Mr. Palk first came to India as a chaplain on the fleet of Admiral Boscawen, and soon passed into the civil employ of the Company.

⁵ See Appendix I., pp. 242-245.

to prevent the passage of stores and ammunition to Yusuf Khan, as it was feared that he was meditating rebellion.¹

To send news of this kind to Anjengo was the same thing as sending it to Travancore, for Anjengo lies in the territory of that kingdom. From Madras Mr. Thomas Pelling, formerly a clerk in the service of Mr. Orme, wrote ² to his old master,

“Yusuf Khan sticks fast to the Tinnevely countries. This man has played his part very keen hitherto, but his reigning star to me seems to be on the decline.”

On the 14th November the King of Travancore wrote to say that Yusuf Khan had attacked him on his refusing to join him in his contemplated rebellion against the Nawab, and on the 22nd of the same month the Council resolved as follows :—

“The many trifling excuses alleged by *Muhammad Yusuf Khan* to avoid coming hither notwithstanding the repeated summons sent him for that purpose, and his now taking upon himself to march against the King of Travancore without either the *Nawab's* or our approbation appear to us but as so many indications of his resolution to rebel, and the President acquainting the Board that the *Nawab* recommended our writing a letter to him in terms of some severity which he hoped would have the desired effect of inducing him to come hither, it is agreed that a letter ³ of that kind be wrote to him, and at the same time promising him in case he obeys the summons to confirm to him the Cowle ⁴ of protection promised him in the President's letter to him of 7th September last. But lest he should after all remain obstinate, it will be necessary for us to fall upon some other methods to reduce him to obedience, it is therefore resolved that a sufficient quantity of stores and ammunition be sent immediately at Trichinopoly that we may be ready to march against him whenever we shall find it expedient. General Lawrence ⁵ is therefore desired to call to his assistance the Engineer and Commandant of

¹ *Mil. Cons.*, 1762, p. 332.

² Thomas Pelling to Orme, 8th November, 1762. *Orme MSS.*, 30, p. 29.

³ This was despatched on the 24th November, 1762.

⁴ *i.e.* *Kaul*, a promise of pardon, a safe-conduct, also any agreement granted by a superior to an inferior. See p. 128 above.

⁵ Lawrence went home in 1759. He was made Major-General 11th March, 1760, and returned to Madras as Commander-in-Chief in October, 1761.

Artillery to consider what quantity of stores will be necessary to be sent thither for such an enterprise.”¹

On the 24th the Council, without making any inquiry, wrote to Yusuf Khan forbidding him to make war upon the King of Travancore, and it was not until the 29th that they received a letter from him saying that his visit to Madras would be delayed by the necessity of repelling an attack from that country. On the same day they heard from Captain Charles Campbell² at Vellore that the King of Travancore had cut off seven companies of Yusuf Khan's sepoys and taken three guns near Tinnevely. It appears, therefore, that the King, no doubt relying upon the immediate action of the Nawab and the English, had followed up his alleged refusal to assist Yusuf Khan by invading his territory, and that it was he and not Yusuf Khan who commenced the war.

Yusuf Khan had already marched south, and, if we are to believe M. Marchand, found he had no easy task before him, and, in fact, was saved from defeat only by the arrival of Marchand himself with the contingent from Tanjore.³ This took place on the 9th January, 1763, when with Yusuf Khan's permission, Marchand hoisted the French colours in place of the English, which he lowered and burnt in the midst of the camp. On the 16th February the King of Travancore submitted and signed the following agreement⁴ :—

“I . . . King of Travancore, &c. . . do give the following agreement to *Muhammad Yusuf, Khan Bahadur*, ruler of the Madura

¹ The wording of this resolution is important as it shows that Council took the advice of the military on this subject. Macpherson, in his *History and Management of the East India Company*, p. 145 (n.), asserts that Council treacherously sent insufficient supplies so as to ensure the failure of the expedition. “The late General Monson knew a great deal about this business. He did not ascribe the want of success to *accident*. But it would have been cruel to have deserted an *old friend* in his distress.”

² Charles Campbell to Council, 25th Nov., 1762. *Mil. Cons.*, 29th Nov., 1762, p. 44.

³ Marchand left Tanjore in December. *Précis Historique*, p. 17. The Kings of Travancore, Martanda and Rama Varma, had in their service a Flemish officer, Eustace Benedict de Lannoy, who is said to have disciplined a large number of his sepoys in the European manner. Buckland, *Dictionary of Indian Biography*; also Orme, *History*, I. 400.

⁴ Enclosure to the Nawab's letter to Council, dated 18th October, 1764. *Country Correspondence*, 1764.

country. That if an enemy marches against you in Madura country I shall in such case regard your enemy as my own and send an army of horse, sepoys, &c., with necessary ammunition relating to the same and assist you in what I can. The charges of the troops which I may send shall be defrayed by myself. I shall commit no hostilities in your districts nor give a place to your enemy in my dominions. On the contrary I shall act in perfect union and friendship with you. Thus I give this agreement to you."

The Dutch records tell us that the King promised an asylum to Yusuf Khan's wife, and that valuable presents were exchanged, Yusuf Khan giving the King three horses with their saddles and receiving in return one horse with its saddle, a gold bracelet, and a gold chain upon which was hung a gold medal set with diamonds. The relative value of these presents is not stated, but the fact that the King, in spite of his promises to the Nawab and the English, did not dare to stir hand or foot during the war shows of itself that the beating he got was a severe one. He practically confessed this in a letter which the Council received *viâ* Anjengo on the 21st March, 1763, explaining that he had been compelled to make peace.¹

Meanwhile, Maudave had made Negapatam too hot to hold him. Van Teylingen, he says, quarrelled with him for no reason whatever and forced him to leave the town on the pretext that he was trying to seduce the soldiers in the Dutch service. Accordingly he went to Tranquebar, where he arrived on the 1st January, 1763, and setting about in earnest to do that of which he had been falsely accused, managed to enlist two-thirds of Van Teylingen's men. About this time Maudave received *parwanas* from Nizam Ali,² Subah of the Deccan, appointing Yusuf Khan Governor of Madura and Tinnevely.

¹ See also p. 138 below.

² Nizam Ali Khan deposed his brother Salabat Jang on the 27th June, 1762.

CHAPTER X

PREPARATIONS

ON his return from Travancore the Dutch Records say that Yusuf Khan ravaged the lands of all the poligars adverse to him, and also, in order to make it difficult for the English to obtain supplies, all the country round Madura. In the excess of their zeal his officers plundered close up to the Dutch factory at Tuticorin and seized some of the native messengers, but on a representation being made by Heer Sweepe, these were set free with an apology.¹

All through December repeated letters came from the Nawab to the effect that Yusuf Khan was collecting troops and receiving supplies from Mysore and Tanjore, from the Tondaiman, the Maravans, the Dutch, and the Danes,² whilst as late as the 28th December a letter was received from Yusuf Khan repeating his assertion that the Travancore invasion would not allow of his coming to Madras, but that if the Council insisted on his coming he would do so. The Council did insist, but still he did not come, and he was clever enough to prevent trustworthy news of his doings from getting through to Trichinopoly.

On the 13th January, 1763, a letter was received from Yusuf Khan with further excuses, upon which the Council resolved :—

“As we find there is no possibility of his obeying the summons sent him but seems, on the contrary, to be endeavouring by all possible methods to render himself independent, we think that some steps should be taken to reduce him to obedience.”

As the Nawab suggested that Yusuf Khan might be

¹ *Dutch Records*, Sweepe's Short Account for 1763.

² *Mil. Cons.*, 20th Dec., 1762, p. 91.

intimidated by the despatch of a force to Trichinopoly, and that others would, at any rate, be thereby convinced that he was considered to be in rebellion, that step was also agreed to, and letters were written to Tranquebar and Negapatam requesting that no assistance should be given to the rebel. The Danes replied very promptly that they would give no assistance to Yusuf Khan, and the Dutch in February that Yusuf Khan had never asked their assistance, but that if he did so they would refuse.¹ Lawrence meanwhile went to Cuddalore to review the troops that were to go to Trichinopoly, and Preston met him there to take over the command; after which Lawrence returned to Madras, leaving to Preston the task of appointing European officers to the sepoy companies, which, though they had European sergeants, had as yet no European officers permanently attached to the battalions.²

On the 5th February Preston first heard of Yusuf Khan's public declaration of his alliance with the French. He wrote:—

“About fifteen days ago he hoisted French colours in his camp and sent orders for the same to be done in all his forts. *Till then he had always hung out English colours.* One of our artillerymen³ that is with him showing some discontentment at this proceeding, Yusuf Khan ordered him to be tyed up in his presence and flogged in the severest manner, and the poor wretch has been kept in a miserable manner ever since.”

The punishment of this brave fellow appears to confirm the Dutch account, also mentioned by Sir John Lindsay,⁴ that Yusuf Khan, when the English colours were hauled down, had them blown away from the mouth of a cannon, which, as has been said above, was the usual punishment for treachery.

¹ Council's letter to the Dutch and Danes was dated the 15th Jan., 1763; the Danes replied on the 20th Jan. and the Dutch on the 4th Feb.

² *Mil. Cons.*, 1763, p. 243.

³ It is improbable that Yusuf Khan would at this time, when he was trying to attract Europeans to his service, have publicly flogged a European; the man was therefore probably a topass.

⁴ *Narrative*. (Appendix 46 to his letter of the 13th Oct., 1770.) *I. O. Records, Home Misc.*, 103. See Appendix V. p. 294.

Marchand, however, who was present at the hauling down of the colours, does not mention this additional outrage, saying only that the English colours were burned in the middle of the camp, which was itself sufficiently insulting.

On the 7th February the Council received a letter from Yusuf Khan,

“desiring that some person might be sent to him to take an account of the rents of the country together with the charges he has been at in keeping up the *Sibandi* ¹ and procuring stores and ammunition, and to receive from him the charge of the country, which done he desires leave to go where he pleases as he is not willing to come to this place.”

In reference to this proposal the Council naturally decided that it was—

“only intended to prolong the time. It is therefore agreed that he be informed we shall not send any person to him, but that we insist upon his coming hither and that we are making all the necessary preparations to compel him by force in case he continues obstinate.”

To this Yusuf Khan made no reply.

Preston, meanwhile, was making every effort to obtain trustworthy information about Yusuf Khan. On the 7th March he reported his force to be 10,000 sepoy, 15,000 Kallans, over 1700 black horse, 300 of which were very good, being clothed and accoutred like English hussars, 200 European foot, and 20 or 30 French troopers.² Yusuf Khan was also reported to have ordered, in accordance with Indian practice, all the tanks, wells, and watering-places to be spoiled for some distance round Madura. Both Tranquebar and Tanjore were supplying him with stores. On the 13th March Preston sent to the Council a letter,³ in which he dealt with the whole situation. He pointed out that the long delay was having a

¹ *Sibandi*, i.e. irregular troops. Here apparently local levies as opposed to State troops.

² On the 21st March Preston sent in a complete statement of Yusuf Khan's garrisons. The total number of men was $74\frac{1}{2}$ companies (or 7450) of sepoy, 1580 black horse, and 6700 matchlock men and Kallans. *Mil. Cons.*, 4th April, 1763, p. 173.

³ *Mil. Cons.*, 1763, p. 138.

very bad effect upon the native chiefs, who were hesitating which side to take; that it was not a mere question of beating Yusuf Khan, but of crushing him so completely that he should not be in a position to demand any conditions for his submission; that for this purpose the invading army must be strong enough to be able to make two simultaneous assaults¹ on the fortress; that the direct route to Madura through Nattam was destitute of water and blocked against an advance, and might therefore be left for the present whilst the army advanced through the country of the Tondaiman and the Little Maravan, whose woods had never been attacked as yet by Yusuf Khan, and would therefore allow a safe passage for the army into the open country round Madura; that this plan would deprive Yusuf Khan of the chief advantage he expected not only from his Kallans, but also from his sepoys, namely, the damage they might inflict on the English during their march through difficult country. For the dangerous duties of the advanced guard he proposed to enlist some of the French prisoners to form a Select Picket, as he considered the extra pay would ensure their loyalty. In conclusion, he deferred sending any final report on Yusuf Khan's strength as he found that the reports of his spies were not always trustworthy.

As a matter of fact, Preston's spies did not care to enter Madura, for they were well known to many of Yusuf Khan's sepoys who had served under the Company. Two of them Yusuf Khan caught and hanged, and others, rather than face the risk of discovery fled to the Tondaiman's country. Quantities of stores poured into Madura from the Karur and Dindigul countries. Some had been stopped on suspicion by Lieutenant Hart, and to encourage the vigilance of his men, Preston had the captured stores sold for the benefit of the captors.

The Council now thought it worth while to take some direct notice of Maudave, whose presence at Tranquebar they

¹ "I am still of opinion Sir, (as I mentioned in my first letter to Council) that the army should be such as to admit of two attacks on it [*i.e.* Madura]. One of 'em to be a grand one and the other (if ever so small) can't but make a very essential diversion." Preston to Lawrence, 15th Dec. *Mil. Cons.*, 27th Dec., 1763.

were aware of, but had hitherto ignored. They did not possess, it is true, sufficient knowledge of what he was doing to demand his expulsion from the neutral Settlements, but they shrewdly suspected that his actions were dangerous, and thought to embarrass him by demanding ¹ that he should, as representative of the French nation, pay for the subsistence of the French prisoners in their hands. He replied on the 28th March, saying that he had no funds for such purposes, and refusing to make any payment on this account, whilst warning the English that any failure on their part to make proper provision for their prisoners, whether in prison or on parole, would justify them in making their escape.² Of course, Maudave hoped that if the English ill treated their prisoners in any way the latter would make every effort to join him. The Council, however, made them the usual allowance.

On the 22nd March the Laboratory or Powder Factory at Trichinopoly was accidentally blown up, eighteen artillerymen being killed and six wounded. This unfortunate event caused some delay to the expedition. It also suggested to the good Padre Schwartz the necessity of a European orphan asylum at Trichinopoly.

Towards the end of the month ³ the King of Tanjore wrote to say that, on the conclusion of the treaty between himself and the Nawab in 1762 by the mediation of the Council, he had disbanded some of his sepoy, topasses, and the French in his service, and that, having no suspicion of Yusuf Khan's intention to rebel, he had allowed them to go to him, but that he would send him no more assistance. The King, however, at this time did not seem much inclined to give any active support to the Nawab.

On the 15th April the Council refused to allow Preston to enlist any of the French prisoners, as they feared the latter would enter the English service only in order to facilitate

¹ *Mil. Cons.*, 11th March, 1763.

² In a letter to Council dated 16th Sept. (*Mil. Cons.*, 26th Sept., 1763, p. 250) Maudave used the same argument in protest against the Council's declared intention of using the utmost rigour towards any Europeans who might be captured in Madura, the greater part of these having, he said, been ill-treated by the English.

³ *Mil. Cons.*, 24th March, 1763.

their own escape to Yusuf Khan. The same day they considered a letter from Lawrence, now in Madras, reviewing the military situation. He said:—

“*Yusuf Khan* has thrown off his allegiance. He has despised your orders and declared himself independent, and considering the enterprising genius and ambition of this man as well as the preparations he is making and the large body of forces he now entertains, it becomes highly necessary to put a stop to his usurpations as soon as possible, lest, by the daily reinforcements he receives from the French at Tranquebar and Negapatam and *Haidar Naik's* army, he should become too powerful for us to subdue, and like another *Chanda Sahib*, lay the foundations of a ten years' war, which will not only immediately stop the Nawab's payments towards clearing his debt, but entail again the whole burden of expense upon the Company.”

Lawrence enumerated the forces of Yusuf Khan, and described the strength of his position and the force which he considered necessary for his reduction—about 900 Europeans, 5000 of the Company's and 2000 of the Nawab's sepoys, 2000 black horse, and as many poligars and Kallans as the Nawab could persuade to join him. He also enumerated the force which the Council could rely upon obtaining from Bombay and Bengal as well as what they had on the Coast, which barely came up to his requirements.¹ He concluded this long letter by remarking:—

“I regard the Company's possessions on this Coast in more imminent danger than they have long been exposed to, and unless the Gentlemen at Bombay make a speedy effort to reinforce us I see not how the misfortunes we have to apprehend can be avoided.”

These were very serious words, but after-events showed that, if anything, Lawrence, underrated the strength of Yusuf Khan, and more especially that of his fortress of Madura. The same day news arrived from the King of Travancore that he

¹ The force in Madras alone consisted of 182 cavalry, 162 artillery, 1674 Europeans and Topasses, and 6963 sepoys. Of these there could be spared 182 cavalry, 44 artillery, 780 infantry, and 4680 sepoys. *Mil. Cons.*, 11th April, 1763, p. 193.

had been compelled to conclude peace with Yusuf Khan, which, in spite of a promise to assist the English when he should be required, convinced the Council that they must expect nothing from him.¹ Further ill news came from Preston, who, though he had managed to capture two of Yusuf Khan's spies, one of whom was living quietly in Srirangam on a regular salary, now reported ² that two *harkaras*, who had been sent to Yusuf Khan at Tinnevely and received politely by him, had been murdered by the Kallans whilst on their homeward journey. This somewhat improbable story is repeated by Maudave, who, whilst reprobating the action, says that Flacourt had remonstrated with Yusuf Khan on his receiving the *harkaras* so politely, and had been grimly told to await the end of the story. This showed, says Maudave, how impossible was any chance of reconciliation between Yusuf Khan and the English. On the other hand, if Yusuf Khan really took the share ascribed to him in this business, one cannot understand how any agent of his would ever have dared subsequently to show his face in Madras.³

A little later ⁴ Preston reported that Yusuf Khan was occupying the country through which he had advised the advance should be made, and it was expected that he would soon attack the Little Maravan. His forces were increasing rapidly. He had now more than 400 Europeans and a still larger number of topasses and about 50 European cavalry. The French were building a handsome church in Madura, and had charge of all the ammunition and a very good laboratory. As regards the French horse, these were largely deserters from Karical, where Captain de Beck was stationed with some Hussars originally recruited from cavalry who had come over to the English after Lally's failure to take Madras. Their Captain, Riquet, appears to have been a German, and so possibly was their quartermaster Hurts,⁵ and many others.

¹ Repeated orders were sent to Anjengo to persuade the King to make a diversion by attacking Tinnevely, but he never moved. See letter from Anjengo to Madras, 2nd May. *Mil. Cons.*, 4th July, 1763, p. 45.

² Preston to Council, 8th April, 1763.

³ See p. 166 below.

⁴ Preston to Council, 18th May. *Mil. Cons.*, 25th April, 1763, p. 216.

⁵ De Beck to Council, 21st April. *Mil. Cons.*, 25th April, 1763.

At the end of this month or the beginning of May ¹ Yusuf Khan visited Tinnevely with a small force of sepoys, returning about the middle of May to Madura with some six lakhs of rupees which he had collected. This shows that the rumours of approaching war had not disturbed the southern province.

Whilst matters were in this unsettled state, news arrived from Bombay on the 19th May that a cessation of arms had been concluded between England and France. This was unsatisfactory to both Maudave and the Council. The former had pledged himself to support Yusuf Khan in his rebellion, but could no longer do so openly, and yet he could not either safely or honourably withdraw the men he had sent to Madura. The Council, on the other hand, feared the early recall of the King's regiment ² to England, and knew that such a reduction of their strength would make the capture of Madura almost impossible, nor could they wait for further orders,

“as there is all the reason to imagine that the French will lose no time in endeavouring to settle their affairs in India, and should Yusuf Khan remain unreduced till their arrival, he may probably co-operate with them in such a manner as to make the reduction of them very difficult.” ³

On the 1st June, in order to put the French prisoners at Trichinopoly and other out-stations beyond Maudave's reach, they were all ordered to Madras, and on the 6th Lawrence informed the Council that he would, on his own authority, retain Colonel Monson and his regiment on the Coast, though they had received orders to return to England, and that as his own health did not allow of his taking the field, he should place the army for Madura under the command of Colonel Monson. The latter accepted the command, but he strongly disliked assisting the Nawab in coercing his recalcitrant vassals,⁴ whilst his men, disgusted at being retained in India, showed but

¹ Letters from Preston to Council, dated 5th and 23rd May. *Mil. Cons.*, 11th and 31st May, 1763, pp. 251 and 253.

² The 96th, under Lieut.-Colonel George Monson.

³ Letter to Bombay, 14th June. *Mil. Cons.*, 15th June, 1763, p. 25

⁴ See above, p. 109.

little enthusiasm for the service.¹ Lawrence went to Trichinopoly, where he arrived on the 1st July, to superintend the preparations for the campaign.

At Trichinopoly Lawrence found the Nawab engaged in negotiations. It was important to secure a safe route for the army through the country of the Little Maravan, and to obtain supplies from Tanjore. Fortunately for the Nawab, Tanjore and the Little Maravan were hereditary enemies, and were now engaged in one of their periodical quarrels. He gave each to understand that if he would assist him in the present expedition, he, in turn, after the fall of Madura, would assist him against his enemy.² This, with the addition of a little money, persuaded both to take sides against Yusuf Khan. Tanjore sent a large supply of rice, and the Little Maravan gave the English free passage through his territory. Nothing now impeded actual invasion. Preston was ordered to go to the support of the Little Maravan, and on the 8th July Lawrence, without waiting for orders, affixed the following proclamation to the gates of Trichinopoly³ :—

“I, Major-General Lawrence, do hereby give notice that I have joined the *Nawab* against the rebel *Yusuf Khan*. Whoever is taken with him will be deemed a rebel and treated accordingly. But those who leave him in due time or before his troops come to any action will be favourably received by the *Nawab*.

“As the English are in peace with all nations, Europeans who are found with him will be treated as rebels likewise, except they will leave before his forces act against the English, in which case they may be assured of a favourable reception.

“Trichinopoly, 8th July, 1763.”

Lawrence would doubtless have done better to leave the issue of this proclamation to the Nawab, whose ally he was, and against whom Yusuf Khan had rebelled. It would also

¹ “It was most unfortunate that the King’s regiments and artillery should be ordered home just at such a juncture, and consequently perform any duty very unwillingly.” Call to R. Smith, 18th Jan., 1764. *Orme MSS.*, 27, p. 112.

² *Select Committee Proceedings*, 11th Feb., 1771, and *A General History of the Kings of the Ramanad*. *Mackenzie MSS.*, IV., No. 21, pp. 195–8.

³ *Mil. Cons.*, 18th July, 1763, p. 74.

seem doubtful for the same reason whether he had any right to declare that Europeans in the service of Yusuf Khan should be treated as rebels. Maudave pointed out ¹ that Frenchmen were not English subjects, and whether France and England were at peace or war such a declaration was unjustifiable. It was, in fact, merely a threat, made possibly in order to force Maudave to declare his intentions, and it was certainly never actually carried out. As Maudave says:—

“In the petty combats which took place [in the field] and later on during the course of the siege, prisoners have been exchanged and the wounded sent back to their own party. This has been the case all through.” ²

However this may be, Lawrence could count on the approval of the Council, for on the 12th July, *i.e.* before they had heard of his proclamation, they wrote giving him a free hand as to the preparations for the expedition, suggesting that as England was at peace with all European nations, any Europeans assisting Yusuf Khan should be warned that they would be “treated with the utmost rigour practised in such cases,” asking him to warn the Nawab to waste no time in negotiations with Yusuf Khan, and instructing him to grant no terms except surrender at discretion if Yusuf Khan persisted in defending his fort, but requesting that he might be sent to Madras if he were taken alive,

“though the nature of Yusuf Khan’s rebellion is such that he deserves to be punished in the severest manner and it is our firm resolution to proceed with the utmost rigour against him, not only for what he has done but as an example to deter others from the like.”

At the same time Lawrence was granted discretion, if he thought the reduction of Madura too difficult and too costly on these terms, to modify them according to his own judgement. Lawrence, however, was a man who never pardoned a deserter or a rebel,³ and, if he had ever entertained any idea of mercy in

¹ Maudave to Council, 15th Aug. *Mil. Cons.*, 25th Aug., 1763.

² See Appendix II., p. 248.

³ In 1753 one cause of quarrel with Governor Saunders was a supposed insinuation that Lawrence was over-severe in dealing with deserters. *Mil. Cons.*, 4th Dec., 1753.

the instance of Yusuf Khan, this was wiped out by what he believed to be a direct insult to himself and his officers. The two Maravans, having come to Trichinopoly at the invitation of the Nawab, paid a visit to Lawrence, and, as he writes :—

“they informed me that *Yusuf Khan* had always frightened them by telling them that he was certain no expedition would ever take place against him, that possibly a force might come as far as Trichinopoly with a view of pleasing the *Nawab*, but no further, and that even should they [the English] march from hence [Trichinopoly] he could easily subdue them by his bribes. *Yusuf Khan* will soon be convinced of the absurdity of his notions, for Major Preston marches to-morrow morning.”¹

The absurdity of the idea that he could bribe the English commanders should have shown Lawrence that it had not originated in the mind of a man so shrewd and so well acquainted with English officers as Yusuf Khan, and that its mention had probably been suggested to the Maravans by an enemy who wished to ruin Yusuf Khan irretrievably in the eyes of the English. He, however, believed the story, and seeing in the order of the Council to send Yusuf Khan to Madras an intention to show mercy, he strongly objected to such an arrangement,² and declared that he ought to be made over to the Nawab, whose countries he had usurped. This, though he had yet to be conquered, decided the ultimate fate of Yusuf Khan, for the Council replied on the 1st August :—

“We observe what you are pleased to say relative to *Yusuf Khan* should he be taken alive. Our desire of having him sent to Madras proceeds not from any willingness we have to show him the least favour. On the contrary, it is that we may in our cooler hours dispose of him in such a manner as might appear properest. We confess to you we think he will be a dangerous man to be entrusted in the hands of the *Nawab* if his intentions are to make him a State prisoner, but if it be agreeable to you to order the commanding officer to execute him upon the first tree in the sight of the army, it will be quite satisfactory to us.”

¹ Lawrence to Council, 13th July, 1763.

² Lawrence to Council, 22nd July. *Mil. Cons.*, 1st August, 1763, p. 102.

Of the members of Council who were responsible for this order, Lawrence, Pigot, and Bouchier had been present on the 27th March, 1755, when Yusuf Khan had been awarded a medal for gallantry and loyalty. Lawrence replied briefly that he would order Colonel Monson to consult the Nawab

“concerning the disposal of the rebel should he be taken alive, but if I find the *Nawab* averse to put him to death, I will send further instructions to Colonel Monson to hang him up in the sight of the army.”¹

There was not, however, any necessity to apprehend undue lenity on the part of the Nawab towards an enemy whom he feared, and who had always treated him with contempt.

¹ Lawrence to Council, 6th Aug. *Mil. Cons.*, 9th Aug., 1763, p. 114.

CHAPTER XI

FIRST SIEGE OF MADURA

As soon as Yusuf Khan discovered the defection of the Maravans, he invaded and ravaged their territory,¹ but this caused no serious impediment to Preston, who left Trichinopoly on the 14th July, and taking the eastern route arrived unmolested at Tirupuvanam, fifteen miles south-east of Madura, on the 6th August. The Nattam Pass, having thus been turned, was abandoned by Yusuf Khan and taken possession of by Mr. West, an officer in the Nawab's service. In this way direct communication with Trichinopoly was open to the invaders.

Though, on the advice of Maudave, Yusuf Khan had given up the idea of attacking Trichinopoly, it was necessary to his prestige to make some effort to check the English advance, but at first he ventured only upon small skirmishes. On the 11th August ² a more serious affair took place. With a superior force he attacked one of Preston's reconnoitring parties and almost destroyed it, the English losing 150 sepoy killed and wounded and 40 missing, as well as 200 stand of arms.³ Yusuf Khan sent word of this success to Haidar Ali, who replied with congratulations and promises of assistance, but reminded him that he had not yet returned the districts taken in 1760.⁴ It was probably, therefore, at this time that Yusuf Khan returned Periyakulam to Mysore, but beyond supplies of all kinds and

¹ Nawab to Pigot, 21st Aug., 1763. *I. O. Records. Home Misc.*, 104.

² Lawrence to Council, 18th Aug., 1763.

³ At a Court Martial held 18th Aug., Abdul Kadir, Commandant of Sepoys, was acquitted of cowardice, but convicted of not having sufficiently exerted himself, and was reduced to the rank of Subadar. *Orme MSS.*, 47, p. 74.

⁴ Haidar Ali to Yusuf Khan. *Country Correspondence*, 1764. Enclosure No. 4 to Nawab's letter of 18th Oct.

permission to recruit secretly in Mysore, Yusuf Khan received no material assistance from Haidar. Kirmani tells us ¹ that Haidar was too busy elsewhere—in Malabar and with the Marathas—to give effective assistance to Yusuf Khan, but if he had really wished to help him it would have been easy to postpone other matters, and it would seem that all he intended was to support Yusuf Khan so as to weaken the Nawab by a prolonged war, but not so far as to enable the former to establish his independence, for that would have only been the creation of a more dangerous rival to Mysore.

It was now necessary for Maudave to make good his promises of assistance to Yusuf Khan. He had probably received news of the signature ² of the Preliminary Treaty about the same time as the English. His position, through no fault of his own, had become terribly difficult. M. Jean Law, writing a year later, said:—

“I don't know in what state I shall find this affair. Perhaps there will be no question of *Yusuf Khan*, for if the English have been able to employ their full strength against him, he must probably have fallen, but if he still holds out how heart-breaking for us! what shame also in the eyes of the people of the country, who will never understand our policy in abandoning this man! how much tact will be required on the one hand to reassure the English and on the other to guard the Frenchmen in the service of *Yusuf Khan* against his ill-humour! If in the end this man, either by force or accommodation with the English, manages to secure his position, what have we not to fear from him? He will make incursions even as far as Karical in spite of the King of Tanjore, who certainly will not trouble to protect us.” ³

Such were the difficulties which Maudave had to solve. His knowledge of the Peace made it impossible for him to assist Yusuf Khan any longer openly, that is, effectively. He could hope to save the reputation of the French in the eyes of the Indian Powers only by mediating an honourable reconciliation

¹ *History of Hydur Naik*, p. 162.

² The Preliminary Treaty was signed at Fontainebleau 3rd Nov., 1762. *Collection of Treaties*, I. O. Library, 15 G. 17, p. 1.

³ Letter to M. Bertin, Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat, dated 16th Nov., 1764. *Archives du Ministère des Colonies*, Paris, 98 C², p. 95.

between Yusuf Khan and his enemies ; but negotiation is fruitless when one has nothing to offer. Had the war in Europe continued the English might have been intimidated by the threat of an attack upon Trichinopoly by the combined forces of Yusuf Khan, Haidar Ali, and the French, but now the French were unable to act and Haidar Ali would not move until he saw a French force landed in India. Maudave, recognizing that Yusuf Khan alone could not attack Trichinopoly with any hope of success, succeeded in dissuading him from making so rash an attempt, and placed his last hope in the effort to check the English advance by persuading them that Madura was protected from attack by the lately signed treaty. On the 15th August he wrote to this effect to Madras, claimed Madura as a French possession, asserted that the officers of the French corps in Madura held commissions from him, and that the corps was therefore a regular corps belonging to the French King and Company, and that the right of Yusuf Khan to dispose of Madura ¹ was as good as that of Muhammad Ali himself to his dominions ; stating in conclusion, that he was authorized by Yusuf Khan to arrange an accommodation. To this the Council for the time gave no reply, ignoring the letter on the ground that as Maudave had refused to provide subsistence for the French prisoners,² and had produced no credentials,³ there was no need to recognize him as the representative of France. Maudave's brother had been arrested at Tiyyagadrug early in August. His papers revealed nothing, but he was supposed to be recruiting for Yusuf Khan.

Preston on his arrival before Madura had encamped at

¹ " By an act or deed signed at Negapatam by M. de Maudave on the one part and by Yusuf Khan on the other." Flamicourt's letter to the English, dated 2nd Sept., 1763. *Mil. Cons.*, 16th Sept., 1763, p. 196.

² By Article III. of the Treaty it was settled that each country should pay for the subsistence of its own soldiers, whilst prisoners in the hands of the enemy.

³ In this letter of the 15th Aug., Maudave claimed to have full powers as representative of France. In his *Relation* he speaks of " la mission donnée à M. de Maudave par le Comité de l'Île de France." M. Pouget de Saint André says he held his commission from the King. Under any circumstances, as this commission authorized him to annoy the English in every possible manner the production of the original or even of a copy would have justified his immediate expulsion from any neutral territory.

Chittapet in the bed of a dry tank. On the 17th August this was flooded by sudden, heavy rain, and much of his musketry ammunition was spoiled. That brought for the artillery had already suffered from other causes, and stores of all kinds were wanting, for nothing could be obtained locally, Yusuf Khan having thoroughly devastated the surrounding country.¹ Major John Call, the Company's Chief Engineer, who had now joined Preston, wrote to the Council :—

“I can form no idea of the plan *Yusuf Khan* intends to adopt for his defence, but his cruelties are unparalleled to men, women and children, as well as the destruction of the country.”²

On the 19th August news arrived direct of the signing of the Definitive Treaty and the conclusion of peace in Europe on the 10th February, 1763.

In spite of his difficulties, Preston on the 20th August took the fort of Tiruvadur, and on the same day Colonel Monson with the main army arrived in camp. He had told the Nawab that he expected to take Madura in eighteen days.³ On the 23rd Preston took Tirumbur, and the two forts of Velichinattam and Umasatrum, on the way to Nattam, were abandoned by Yusuf Khan. The English now advanced, and on the 28th came in sight of Madura, where they found Yusuf Khan's army encamped outside the walls, upon which were flying the French colours as well as those of Yusuf Khan. Here they learned that Yusuf Khan had wished to send his wife and family to a place of safety, but that his officers had refused to allow him to do so unless he sent their own families also.

“So it seems,” wrote Major Wood, “all their families are still in the fort, on which account most people think he will make the better defence.”⁴

¹ Nawab to Pigot, 21st Aug., 1763. *I. O. Records, Home Misc.*, 104.

² Call to Council, 18th Aug. *Mil. Cons.*, 29th Aug., 1763, p. 153.

³ Nawab to Council, 26th Nov., 1770. *I. O. Records, Home Misc.*, 104. Lawrence's letter of the 2nd Aug., 1763, to the Council shows that he expected the reduction of Madura to be an easy matter. He says, “I hope I shall soon be able to give you an account of the reduction of Madura.”

⁴ Wood to Council, 31st Aug. *Mil. Cons.*, 4th Sept., 1763, p. 163.

On the 1st September the army passed close to the town, and was fired on by the Fort. On the 2nd September Monson encamped at Teppakulam about two miles to the south-east of Madura. There is no official return of his force, but it was stated by an officer who served in it as "about 1600 Europeans, including two troops of dragoons, *i.e.* German Hussars, 4000 sepoy, 2000 black horse and many thousands of Kallans." The same officer gives the garrison of Madura as consisting of 3000 sepoy, 1000 horse, one troop European Hussars, 200 French, and a large body of Kallans.¹ As soon as Monson had encamped he received a protest from M. Flamicourt against his attacking a fortress belonging to the French.

The besiegers being in absolute ignorance of the defences of Madura, Monson rode out the next day to reconnoitre the western side. He had with him the European cavalry, about 300 Moorish horse, a battalion of sepoy, a European picket, and two guns. Near the south-west angle of the fort they came to a bank behind which the enemy had about 250 or 300 native horse with another high bank in the rear. There was a fine plain between the two banks, and though the ground was under the fire of the fort, as the enemy appeared to be retiring, Monson posted his sepoy behind the first bank and ordered his cavalry to cross it into the plain. The hussars went over in a moment, and without waiting to form charged at once, but the native horsemen, who owned their own horses and were nervous of exposing them to artillery fire, hesitated to follow. Yusuf Khan's men, noticing this hesitation, immediately turned,

¹ Letter from Palamcottah dated 22nd Oct., 1764. *Scots Magazine*, 1765, p. 264. See Appendix V. p. 287. Marchand (see Appendix, p. 267) says the English had 2500 Europeans and 30,000 Indians, Yusuf Khan 200 Europeans and 5000 Indians in garrison. In a letter dated 1st Oct., 1763, when he had given up all hopes of success, Monson wrote that the minimum force required to reduce the place would be 1000 European infantry and 250 artillery, which leads one to suppose that his army was at the time less than this and much less than that given in the text. In all probability Monson had taken to Madura only (exclusive of his regiment, possibly 700 strong) about 900 Europeans and Topasses, the number estimated as necessary in Colonel Lawrence's letter of the 11th April. See p. 138 above. Colonel Wilson (*Madras Army*, I. p. 186) asserts that Lawrence's proposals were sanctioned, adding that about 100 Europeans from Bombay joined later on. Godfried Sweepe, in his *Short Account for 1763*, says Preston's detachment contained 200 to 300 Europeans and the main army 1400.

charged the small body of hussars and drove them in confusion back to the bank, which the survivors crossed in safety, their pursuers being checked by the steady fire of Monson's sepoy. Sixteen or seventeen troopers were killed or wounded. Lieutenant [Samuel] Stevenson was killed, and Captain Donald Campbell wounded and taken prisoner.

"When Yusuf Khan, who was out to see the fight, met Donald Campbell stripped and wounded, he shed tears, said he was sorry for his misfortune and wished it had happened to another person. After that Donald was treated very civilly by the Rebel and the French."¹

In fact, Yusuf Khan sent him back to the English camp. Though very severely wounded—he was still in the year 1767² suffering from a wound received this day—he speedily recovered sufficiently to resume his duties, but he was not present in the camp at the time of Yusuf Khan's capture and execution.

Apparently Yusuf Khan himself directed his men in this affair—it is the last occasion in which he is mentioned as being actually on the field—but the French commander in the town was now M. Flamicourt, M. Marchand being at the time in disgrace. On the 2nd, as has been said, M. Flamicourt had written to protest against the attack on the town, but to this Monson only replied on the 5th, pointing out that he had himself commenced hostilities by firing on his men on the 1st, and summoned him to surrender. On the 6th he sent in a printed copy of the Definitive Treaty.³ Flamicourt replied that he held the place under orders from M. de Maudave, and could and would do nothing without his orders.

On the 9th Maudave wrote to Madras protesting against the English threat to hang any European taken with Yusuf Khan.

"I would willingly believe," he said, "Gentlemen, that this indecent declaration is rather a vain threat than a determined

¹ Call to Lawrence, 4th Sept. *Mil. Cons.*, 15th Sept., 1763, p. 188. Call explains the bad behaviour of the native cavalry as follows: "Yusuf Khan has bought all the horses of his people, so that they are not afraid of having them killed, whereas most of ours bestride their whole dependence."

² Donald Campbell to Council, 17th Aug., 1767. *Orme MSS.*, 77, p. 149.

³ *Mil. Cons.*, 1763, p. 186.

resolution. I impute it indeed to the character of one of the commanders of your troops more known in this country by the childish hatred he affects against the French than by his exploits." ¹

This letter crossed one from the Madras Council, ² who had reconsidered their determination to ignore M. de Maudave. They refused to recognize him as the accredited representative of France (as his statement that he had no funds for the support of the French prisoners whilst he had funds to raise troops, showed that he was a representative of his nation only as far as it suited his own purposes), but demanded that he should, in his private capacity, and in conformity with Article XI. of the Definitive Treaty, ³ by which Muhammad Ali was acknowledged as Nawab of the Carnatic, refrain from assisting in any way the rebel Yusuf Khan, "whom you call Khan Sahib," ⁴ and notify the same to the officers he had sent to Madura. On the 16th the Council demanded that he should order M. Flamicourt to cease all acts of hostility and either evacuate or surrender the town.

Matters meanwhile were not going well for the English before Madura. It was all very well to adopt a haughty tone towards M. Flamicourt, but the troops were disheartened by the defeat of their small force of cavalry on the 2nd, and the cavalry and Kallans of the enemy made it very difficult to approach near enough to the town to begin the siege works; sickness had already appeared amongst the troops, and desertion commenced amongst the Europeans. ⁵ Call suggested that the offer of a reward of 50,000 rupees when the siege was over would reanimate the ardour of the men, and on the 9th September Lawrence wrote to Monson that the Nawab had promised to give them this amount at once and a similar amount on the fall of Madura.

¹ *Mil. Cons.*, 15th Sept., 1763, p. 191. Apparently Maudave alludes to General Lawrence, who seems to have been personally disliked by the French.

² Dated 10th Sept., 1763.

³ See p. 154 below.

⁴ Yusuf Khan is repeatedly referred to in the English Records as the "Khan Sahib;" in fact, this is the usual mode of reference to one who has been granted the title of Khan Bahadur. Yusuf Khan's right to this title was acknowledged by the inscription on the medal presented to him in 1755: see p. 21 above.

⁵ Call to Council, 4th Sept. *Mil. Cons.*, 15th Sept., 1763, p. 188.

So early as the 5th September at Call's advice Monson asked for fourteen heavy guns and sufficient ammunition for a ten days' bombardment, with the intention of attacking the north-east angle of the fort and the east face adjoining, but Call then declared that, owing to the great extent of the glacis and esplanade, it would be impossible to fix his camp at a less distance than two and a half or even three miles, or to commence breaking ground for the trenches closer than twelve or fifteen hundred yards. On the 7th Monson called a Council of War, comprising Majors Piers, Chapman,¹ Preston, and Call, which decided, contrary to the opinion of General Lawrence, that without more guns and ammunition, it was useless to prosecute the siege. This conclusion was communicated to Lawrence, who replied on the 12th² that the reduction of Madura could not be laid aside with due regard to the reputation of his Majesty's troops and without sensibly affecting the security of the Company's possessions; and again on the 14th,³ when he had received a letter from Monson, pointing out that the immense amount of labour required for a regular siege would need more time than was likely to be available before the coming of the heavy rains, Lawrence wrote that if the siege had to be deferred to another season it would have to be deferred altogether, but if Monson still thought that the siege could be raised consistently with the honour of England, "after the insults we have met with from the French,"⁴ he hoped he would favour him with his opinion to that effect. Meanwhile he would supply him with everything required to continue operations.⁵ At the same time he forwarded Monson's letter with his own replies to Madras, where the Council, after considering them on the 19th September,

¹ These two officers belonged to the 96th Regiment, and left Madura with Monson at the end of the first siege.

² *Mil. Cons.*, 17th Sept., 1763, p. 212.

³ *Mil. Cons.*, 20th Sept., 1763, p. 219.

⁴ e.g. the burning of the English colours by Marchand in Yusuf Khan's camp on the 9th Jan., 1763.

⁵ Lawrence's difficulty in sending artillery to Madura lay in the impossibility of finding draught cattle. He so denuded Trichinopoly of men that he had not 30 left fit to bear arms. Lawrence to Council, 4th Sept. *Mil. Cons.*, 19th Sept., 1763, p. 218.

decided to send whatever might be needed, and then came to the following extraordinary resolution ¹ :—

“ If after all, the difficulties that may occur should appear insurmountable and the siege of Madura cannot be undertaken with any probability of success, it may be more advisable for the present to desist from the enterprise, for though the consequences to be apprehended from a fruitless retreat are very bad yet those from an ineffectual attempt must be much worse. It is therefore agreed that General Lawrence be fully acquainted with our sentiments on this head as well [as] with the measures we have taken, and that in case he should think it advisable to order Colonel Monson to retreat it is to be recommended to him to cause a formal declaration to be delivered to M. Flamicourt, as we shall to M. Maudave, setting forth that, as they have hoisted French colours on the fort and declare it to be the property of the French acquired in the year 1762, we refrain from hostilities against it, expecting their compliance with the Treaty of Paris as soon as they shall be authorized. It is also to be recommended to the General, in case of a retreat, to keep possession of the forts they have taken and, if possible, to secure the pass through the Nattam woods.”

In reference to the Treaty of Paris the only article of importance in this connection is the eleventh,² which runs as follows :—

“ In the East Indies, Great Britain shall restore to France, in the condition they are now in, the different factories, which that Crown possessed, as well on the coast of Coromandel and Orixá, as on that of Malabar, as also in Bengal, at the beginning of the year 1749. And his most Christian Majesty renounces all pretension to the acquisitions which he had made on the coast of Coromandel and Orixá since the said beginning of the year 1749.³ His most Christian Majesty shall restore, on his side, all that he may have conquered from Great Britain, in the East Indies, during the present

¹ *Mil. Cons.*, 20th Sept., 1763, p. 221.

² This corresponds to Article X. of the Preliminary Treaty. The latter, however, does not contain any mention of the mutual recognition of Muhammad Ali as Nawab of the Carnatic and of Salabat Jang as Subah of the Deccan. George Chalmers, *Collection of Treaties*, I. p. 467.

³ Madras itself was in the possession of the French at the beginning of the year 1749, but as the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, signed 7th Oct., 1748, provided for a general restitution of conquests, Madras was considered as being in the possession of the English from that date.

war: and will expressly cause Nattal and Tapanouly, in the island of Sumatra, to be restored; he engages further, not to erect fortifications, or to keep troops in any part of the dominions of the *subah*¹ of Bengal. And in order to preserve future peace on the coast of Coromandel and Orixá, the English and French shall acknowledge *Muhammad Ali Khan* for lawful Nawab of the Carnatic, and *Salabat Jang*² for lawful *subah* of the Deccan; and both parties shall renounce all demands and pretensions of satisfaction with which they might charge each other, or their Indian allies, for the depredations or pillage committed on the one side or the other during the war."

It is clear that it was not easy to bring the case of Madura under this article. If Madura belonged to the Nawab, then the French could point out that there was nothing in the treaty to require them to restore places³ which they had taken from the Nawab, whilst on the other hand the English might retort that there was nothing but Maudave's alleged treaty with Yusuf Khan to show that Madura had ever been in the possession of the French before the signature of the Preliminary Treaty on the 3rd November, 1762, and therefore that, Muhammad Ali being recognized by the Definitive Treaty of the 10th February as the lawful Nawab of the Carnatic, the English had a perfect right to assist him in putting down the rebellion of his vassal Yusuf Khan, but the French no right to support a rebel against him. It would have been fatal to the prestige of the English to have postponed the settlement of the

¹ i.e. Subahdar, or Governor for the Mughal.

² Salabat Jang had been deposed before this time. See p. 132 (n.) above.

³ "Upon considering the 11th Article of the Treaty we find a distinction is made between such places that may have been conquered from Great Britain and all other acquisitions since the beginning of 1749. It is stipulated that the conquests made from Great Britain shall be restored, but his Most Christian Majesty [i.e. the King of France] only renounces all the pretension to other acquisitions. It follows from hence that we acting in right of the Company cannot demand of the French restitution of Madura unless it can be made appear that it was theirs [i.e. the Company's] at the time *Yusuf Khan* made a cession of it to the French." *Mil. Cons.*, 21st Sept., 1763, p. 231. "It is very possible that the French may on their resettling in India endeavour to form connections with any of the Country Powers, who may be best able to assign to them countries for the maintenance of their forces, as that will be the only means by which they can support them, and it does not appear that they are by the Treaty of Peace restrained from obtaining new grants." Letter to Court, 7th Nov., 1763, para. 5.

case, as Maudave proposed,¹ until the arrival of the French Commissary for the settlement of affairs on the Coast, and they decided that only two courses were open to them. The first was to claim that Madura had belonged to them before Yusuf Khan had signed his agreement with Maudave, which could be proved only by the production of a *Sanad*² from the Nawab, bearing an anterior date and giving them the provinces of Madura and Tinnevely.³ Fortunately for the credit of the Council, this solution of the difficulty was put aside. The second course was to compel Maudave to disavow all connection with the French now in Madura. This, though apparently difficult, was feasible, for the reason that, if they were under his orders and continued to carry on war against the English, he could not at the same time continue to enjoy the protection of the Danes, the latter being at peace with the English. The Danish Governor, M. Abestie, and his Council were on the best of terms with Madras, and accordingly on the 23rd September a letter was despatched to Tranquebar complaining of Maudave's behaviour. On the other hand Colonel Monson was instructed to withdraw the threat to hang any Europeans taken in Madura.⁴

Monson, already doubtful of success, continued his operations. On the 15th September work was commenced on the trenches at a distance of fifteen hundred yards. Fire was opened on the 24th. On the 28th Call reached the foot of the glaçis by a double sap and established himself on the counter-scarp. But the ditch was wide—28 yards it is said—and it would have needed 15,000 fascines to make a passage only 12 feet broad, and this work, moreover, would have to be done in face of 8 or 10 guns and a heavy musketry fire which, with the amount of ammunition at their disposal, the English could not keep down. Even had the passage been completed, further

¹ M. Maudave to the Madras Council, 16th Sept., 1763. *Mil. Cons.*, 26th Sept., 1763, p. 250. The Commissary appointed by France was M. Jean Law. His commission was dated 18th March, 1764, and he did not leave France until April, 1764 (*Mil. Cons.*, 31 Jan., 1765), but his appointment was known in India early in 1764. See p. 171 below.

² An official grant.

³ *Mil. Cons.*, 21st Sept., 1763, p. 231.

⁴ *Mil. Cons.*, 26th Sept., 1763, p. 254.

success was doubtful when the assault had to be made on such a narrow front against a determined garrison, "which at any time could retreat when they were sure they could no longer oppose us."¹ It was clear, therefore, that with the guns and limited amount of ammunition at their disposal nothing further could be done. Monson wrote to this effect to the Council.

All this time the besiegers were unable to prevent Yusuf Khan from communicating with his friends outside the fort, and he constantly received supplies without the English being able to intercept them.² As has been said, M. Flamicourt commanded the French in Madura. M. Marchand appears to have been in command of a mixed force acting from outside. We have seen that he joined Yusuf Khan in Travancore. From his own account it then fell to his lot to conduct negotiations for loans with Yusuf Khan, whose disgust and suspicion were quickly roused by the little assistance which he received from the French. Maudave says that Marchand was a man of violent temper, and that it was impossible for Yusuf Khan, who was also of a fiery disposition, to get on with him for any length of time. After a number of minor quarrels Yusuf Khan became at last so exasperated that, without consulting Maudave, he threw Marchand into prison³ and gave the command to the German, M. Riquet.⁴ The latter behaved very badly and proved incompetent, and both Maudave and M. Charles Flacourt begged Yusuf Khan to restore Marchand to his post. To this he would not consent, but gave him charge of the mixed force already mentioned, with which he caused much annoyance to the English, whilst Flamicourt took command in the fort. On the night of the 4-5th October, Marchand entered the town with a large convoy, and, according to his own account, two nights later he made a successful sortie, causing heavy loss to the besiegers.

As early as the 28th September,⁵ Monson had written that he was hopeless of success. In this and subsequent letters he

¹ Call to R. Smith, 18th Jan., 1764. *Orme MSS.*, 27, p. 110.

² *Letter to Court*, 26th March, 1764, para. 5.

³ In an undated letter (see below, p. 171) Marchand says that during the months of August and September he was ill in Tinnevely and Palamcottah, but he mentions his imprisonment in his *Précis Historique*, p. 22.

⁴ "Un mauvais officier Allemand." Maudave, *Relation*.

⁵ *Mil. Cons.*, 10th Oct., 1763, p. 260.

explained that his own health was unsatisfactory, and he wished to be relieved of the command, though he offered to leave as many men of his regiment behind as might be necessary, and to use every endeavour to induce them to enlist in the Company's service. He advised the postponement of further operations until after the rainy season, and that in the mean time Major Preston should take the command and retain possession of the forts already captured. These proposals were accepted by the Council on the 17th October,¹ for by this time they had received a favourable reply from the Danes at Tranquebar, which solved their chief difficulty, *i.e.* the risk of fresh embroilments with the French.

On the 6th October,² M. Abestie, the Danish Governor, replied to the Council's letter of the 23rd September that Maudave had arrived in Tranquebar on the 1st January, 1763, that they had received no intimation from him as to whether he came in a public or in a private capacity, and that therefore on the 1st March they had asked him to declare his position. He had replied that his commission was merely passive and concerned with the maintenance of the friendly sentiments of those of the native princes who were well inclined towards the French. Since that date M. Abestie had received no complaints from the English until the arrival of their letter under reply, when the Danish Council had immediately asked Maudave for an explanation. He had appeared before the Council on the 28th September and again on the 3rd October and disowned any connection with M. Flamicourt. Thereupon the Danish Council had required him to write to M. Flamicourt to that effect, and to give them the letter with a copy which might be sent to M. Flamicourt through the Madras Council. This he did, and declared at the same time that he was about to leave India. His letter to M. Flamicourt was as follows³ :—

“I have the honour to inform you, Sir, that I am preparing myself to quit this country and to return to the Isles. I think myself

¹ Lawrence had returned to Madras and resumed his seat in Council on the 10th October.

² *Mil. Cons.*, 5th Nov., 1763, p. 280.

³ *Mil. Cons.*, 5th Nov., 1763, p. 284. The translations of Maudave's letters entered in the Madras Consultations are very badly made, but it seemed best to copy them *verbatim*.

obliged to acquaint you also that I do not by any means meddle in the affairs of Madura nor in those of your army. It will entirely depend upon you to answer to your conduct in the present circumstances, and you are only to listen to reason and your duty in the resolutions you have to take. Therefore I now request and desire that you do not consult me in anything, for I have the honour to repeat that I cannot anyways concern myself in these kind of things. I hope you may be able to content all the world, but I beg you may find the means through your own prudence without having any manner of recourse to my advice or to my orders, which I have a thousand solid reasons for refusing you. I hope that this declaration will be sufficient, and that you will conform yourself accordingly."

In his *Relation* M. de Maudave informs us that, finding himself hard pressed by M. Abestie, he wrote to warn Flamicourt to pay no attention to any letters which might be transmitted through the English, for such would only be written under compulsion and intended to deceive them ; but this letter supplied all that the English required, namely, a disclaimer of any connection between the French in Madura and the representative of the French nation in India. In other words, it was a withdrawal of the French claim to Madura and a practical confession that, whatever the terms of his alliance with the French, Yusuf Khan's cession of his country to the French was all a fiction. The English were now free to deal with Madura as they pleased, and were able to represent to the native powers that the latter could expect nothing more from France.

All through October, under pressure from Lawrence, Monson continued his efforts against Madura. Early in November he twice reconnoitred the Ditch,¹ and convinced himself that it was impossible to cross it, and the approaching bad weather made it imperative for him to retreat, whilst it was still possible to move his guns. Before he did this he thought it worth while to attempt negotiations for a surrender, but speedily convinced himself that Yusuf Khan wished for nothing better than to waste his time in this way. On the 6th November he wrote ² to

¹ Monson to Lawrence, 5th Nov., *Mil. Cons.*, 15th Nov., 1763. "An unfordable ditch 28 yards broad which they had not the means to fill up being an insurmountable object." Madras Council to Bengal Council, 18th Nov., 1763.

² *Mil. Cons.*, 17th Oct., 1763, p. 267.

the Council that he was about to retire from Madura, and that, in his opinion, the best course would be to retain their hold on the Nattam Pass and the forts they had taken near Madura, to collect provisions and stores and resume the siege after the rains before the harvest was gathered, so as to force Yusuf Khan either to fight in the open or to give up the country outside his forts. The guns were withdrawn the next day and the army retreated to Tirumbur, where it arrived on the 12th, just in time to escape a heavy fall of rain, which continued incessantly for about ten days, and, says Major Call, would have made it impossible to save their artillery; as it was, not a shot or anything was left behind.¹ On the 18th Monson and Majors Piers, Chapman, and Call departed for Madras, Major Preston being left in command.

Maudave tell us ² that in this siege the English fired more than 40,000 cannon shot, and threw into the town more than 18,000 shells, and that they lost by death and desertion 700 Europeans, and spent about a million pounds sterling, not to mention that they had been prevented from using their forces in any expedition which might have injured France, and that all this had been achieved without costing France or the French Company a penny. There exists no record by which to test these statements. Monson kept no Journal, and submitted no returns. Maudave mentions that the gallant M. Flami-court was killed a day or two before the siege was raised, thus forcing Yusuf Khan to replace Marchand in command of the French troops. On the side of the besiegers Lieutenant Stevenson and a young engineer named Barnard ³ were killed, and Captain Donald Campbell wounded.⁴ A

¹ Call to R. Smith, 18th Jan., 1764. *Orme MSS.*, 27, p. 111.

² See Appendix II., p. 248.

³ Letter to Court 4th May, 1764, para. 59.

⁴ Call in his letter of 18th Jan., 1764, to R. Smith (*Orme MSS.*, 27, p. 116), says that with the exception of himself all the members of his Corps were wounded and one killed. The officer killed was certainly Barnard; William Stevenson was in Manila, so the officers wounded must have been Edward Cotsford and John Maclean. He also says that three pioneer officers were wounded, but only two pioneer officers, Abraham Bonjour and Thomas Casemore, are mentioned in the Army Lists. Capt. Grant says vaguely (*Journal*, 11th Jan. 1764. *Orme MSS.* 4, p. 57) "We lost a great number of men and some gallant officers before it [*i.e.* Madura]."

Dutch account indeed says that Preston's younger brother was killed, and M. Bruno says that Captain Rudolph Marchand (no connection of the officer of that name in the fort) lost a leg, but I can find no corroboration of the former statement, whilst Captain Rudolph Marchand certainly lost a leg at the siege of Vellore in 1761, and remained in the service for some years after the siege of Madura, so that it seems improbable that he lost a leg in this affair also.

Thus ended the first siege of Madura, undertaken in almost absolute ignorance of the difficulties of the undertaking, and conducted apparently without either skill or energy. The failure was universally ascribed to the lack of ammunition and military stores,¹ and some people went so far as to say that these were intentionally withheld so as to prevent success, but, seeing that Lawrence denuded all his garrisons of practically every man capable of active service, and that he and Major Cail were given a free hand as to the stores they considered necessary, one can only conclude that the ability and strength of Yusuf Khan had been grievously underrated.² So severely did the prestige of the English suffer that the Subah, Nizam Ali, wrote to Maudave that he was thinking of appointing Yusuf Khan to be Nawab of the Carnatic in the place of Muhammad Ali.³

The latter was now at Madras. At first the Council wished him to go to Madura, but it was feared that the presence of the rabble which always accompanied him would only hinder the military operations. On the 4th October he came to Madras, and was treated with the usual display of respect. On the 17th October he attended a meeting of the Council, and was solemnly assured that in the event of his death the English would protect and support his sons, and that, in future, care would be taken

¹ e.g. Monson, in his letter of 3rd Oct. (*Mil. Cons.*, 17th Oct., 1763, p. 268), says: "It gives me great concern this attempt has proved unsuccessful, which has been entirely owing to the want of military stores."

² See pp. 131 and 152 above. "Madura is much better provided than we could have imagined." Lawrence to Monson, 4th Nov. *Mil. Cons.*, 15th Nov., 1763.

³ Many years before this the Nawab asserted that Mr. Orme had told him that he had been offered 40,000 Pagodas by Yusuf Khan to secure for him the Rentership of the Trichinopoly and Srirangam countries. *Public Consultations*, 25th Sept., 1758.

“to place no persons designedly in the management of any of his countries who may be disagreeable to him.”

On the 14th November Mr. Pigot, who had always been a good friend to Yusuf Khan, made over the Governorship to Mr. Robert Palk. The influence of the latter in Council had long been very great, and it is unlikely that the actual change made any difference to Yusuf Khan¹ except to convince him that under no circumstances could he ever hope for any favour from the Council. A native of Madras named Sunku Rama, formerly in the service of Robert Orme, wrote to him as follows²:—

“Sir, You know well what faithfull services that the Commandant, *Muhammad Yusuf Khan*, done it to our army at the time of siege of Trichinopoly for to carry the provisions to our garrison and also at the time of siege at Madras by Mons. Lally he brought forces from Tinnevely and prevented all the French undertakings and fought well at St. Thomas Mount, which will appear by the history book³ made by General Lawrence at England. All which our President and Council did not think of it and sent the army against him by the perswation of the *Nawab*. I believe this is thankful kind for the faithfull services he done to us, and now I am informed by severall hands that the Commandant beat well to our army and killed good many men, which makes to retreat our army to this side the river, but I cannot recollect it particularly whether it is certain or not.”

Apparently Maudave had but little communication with the French in Madura after his letter advising Flamicourt that he must in future act as he thought best, and must expect no further orders. Though he had informed the Danish Council in October that he intended to leave India shortly, he lingered on until the *Expédition* frigate, at the end of January, 1764, brought orders for himself and M. Flacourt to return to the Île de France. He finally left Tranquebar on the 6th March. On the 20th of the same month a letter from M. Marchand to M. Haussé was intercepted, in which he wrote that they had not heard from M. de Maudave for three months, but that he and M. Flacourt had left for the Île de France, taking Yusuf Khan's money with them.⁴

¹ See, however, p. 110 above.

² Postscript to letter dated 6th Nov., 1763. *Orme MSS.*, 30, p. 45.

³ Cambridge's *Account of the War in India*. See also p. 308 below.

⁴ *Orme MSS.*, 281, pp. 18, 19.

CHAPTER XII

SECOND SIEGE OF MADURA ¹

YUSUF KHAN was well satisfied with the retreat of the English. Marchand writes :—

“ He came himself to my house to wish me joy and to thank me for his success, all the glory of which he attributed to me. He gave me a written promise for 50,000 rupees and distributed money to my men.

“ However, I felt we must profit by the rest which our enemies were giving us to prepare ourselves for fresh combats. I had the damaged fortifications repaired and constructed several redoubts at some distance from the fort.” ²

In other words, Yusuf Khan, no doubt with the assistance of Marchand and a M. Perigny, who had at one time served as an engineer at Fort Saint David, set about strengthening the town. The damage done by the first bombardment was repaired,³ the ditch cleared, and, as it was found that the approaches of the besiegers had been facilitated by the numerous watercourses which intersected the plain round Madura, these were filled up.⁴ Further, to delay the actual attack on the town and at the same time to protect that portion of his army which was encamped outside, a ring of redoubts was constructed at distances of six and even eight hundred yards from the ditch.⁵

¹ For this and the remaining chapters I have made use chiefly of Colonel Campbell's Journal (*Orme MSS.*, 74), indicating always where facts are taken from other sources.

² *Précis Historique*, p. 27.

³ “ The east face of Madura is entirely new repaired. Above 3000 workmen are constantly employed upon other parts of the Fort.” Preston to Council, 15th Jan., 1764. *Mil. Cons.*, 23rd Jan., 1764, p. 45.

⁴ Preston to Council, 25th Jan., 1764. *Mil. Cons.*, 6th Feb., 1764, p. 87.

⁵ Call to Council, 15th Feb., 1764. *Mil. Cons.*, 23rd Feb., p. 128.

Provisions¹ and warlike stores of all kinds were collected, powder was made, and some new guns were cast.² Yusuf Khan was so sure of the revenue of his provinces that he sent out orders for it to be collected half in money and half in grain.³ Finally the Kallans in the neighbourhood were confirmed in their loyalty by the gift of arm-rings and other presents of cheap trinkets with which Yusuf Khan appealed to their love of finery.⁴

Yusuf Khan was, indeed, under no illusion as to the intentions of the English. He expected them to return with increased forces, and he was determined that they should find Madura still stronger than before.⁵

As soon as Preston had taken over charge from Monson on the 18th November, he wrote to the Council to announce his intention to return towards Madura and to convince the people of the country that the war was by no means ended ; but when the cessation of the heavy rain⁶ made it possible for him to move, and he wished to start on the 25th, the men of the 96th Regiment (*i.e.* Monson's Regiment) refused to march. They knew that their regiment had been ordered home, and their colonel and field officers had already started for Madras. They acknowledged that Colonel Monson had advised them to enlist in the Company's service, but they could not be compelled to do so, and there was no one present whose orders they were bound to obey. Captains Johnson and Lysaght of the 96th used what influence they had to persuade the men to follow Preston ; but they were obstinate, and he had to leave them at Tirumbur until they were recalled to Madras.⁷ However, before this happened, some 400 were induced to enlist by certain

¹ These came chiefly from Dindigul. Preston to Council, 15th Jan., 1764.

² Letter from Palamcotta, 22nd Oct., 1764. *Scots Magazine*, May, 1765.

³ Preston to Council, 15th Jan., 1764. *Mil. Cons.*, 23rd Jan., 1764, p. 44.

⁴ Call to Council, 15th Feb., 1764. *Mil. Cons.*, 23rd Feb., p. 128.

⁵ In spite of Yusuf Khan's efforts, the weakness of his walls is shown by the fact that, on more than one occasion, portions fell down in consequence of the concussion produced by the firing of his great guns and from similar causes ; *e.g.* see pp. 199, 200, below. See also Appendix V., p. 297.

⁶ The rains actually ceased on the 22nd Dec.

⁷ See p. 140 above. Apparently neither of these officers (Johnson and Lysaght) entered the Company's service themselves.

of their lieutenants, to whom the Council granted Captains' commissions on condition that they each enlisted fifty of their men. A similar difficulty had arisen in 1749 when Lawrence¹ had tried to enlist the men in the Independent Companies brought out by Admiral Boscawen, as they refused to engage unless placed under the command of their own officers, who in turn could be persuaded to enter the Company's service only by the offer of higher rank, since by doing so they forfeited their standing in the King's army. At that time the want of officers was so great that this concession to the new men did not seriously affect those already in the Company's service, but now the case was different, and the Company's subalterns suddenly saw their promotion indefinitely blocked and a dangerous precedent established. To this grievance was added the fact that they conceived the Council had acted by no means generously in regard to their field allowances whilst they were serving at Trichinopoly,² and that, much against their will, the best of them were forced to take extra turns of duty with the sepoy companies, a duty which often deprived them of all chance of distinguishing themselves, for the loss of which they did not consider the allowances granted an adequate compensation.³ Thus whilst the private soldiers in the King's regiments were by no means eager to enter the Company's service, the

¹ Lawrence to Council, 8th Oct., 1749. *Orme MSS., India*, XI. p. 2987.

² A demand for half-batta was granted by the Council on the 2nd of May, 1763, only because "the present situation of our affairs obliges us to overlook their behaviour," and Captain Black, the senior of the officers concerned in this demand, was dismissed as an example to the remainder.

³ At this time, though the sepoy companies were grouped in battalions, apparently the European officers were appointed only when they took the field—*e.g.* when they concentrated at Trichinopoly, Preston was ordered to appoint European officers (see above, p. 134). Preston accordingly consulted Colonel Monson, and wrote to Lawrence (*Mil. Cons.*, 7th Dec., 1763): "Our sepoys, Sir, at present are upon a very bad footing, I may indeed say upon no footing at all. . . . The Colonel is of opinion that each Battalion ought to have a captain, two subalterns, and nine sergeants, and that these officers ought to be fixt to them; those at present seem heartily tired of their situation and can't help at times complaining of it. They say (I believe you will allow with some justice, Sir) that the extraordinary pains and trouble which is required for the proper discipline of the sepoys and the little credit to be got by them in comparison of Europeans, makes it but fair and just that every officer in [the] Battalion of Infantry should take his Tour. But it's not every officer in the Infantry (as you are very sensible, Sir) that will do for the sepoys."

officers already in it were in some doubt as to whether it was worth their while to retain their commissions.

Meanwhile, on the 15th December, Pratab Singh, King of Tanjore, died unexpectedly, and was succeeded by his son Tulsaji. The Nawab¹ asserted that Pratab Singh had been murdered by his son, and that both Haidar Ali and Yusuf Khan² had been privy to the crime. One cannot conceive any reason for this charge, but it is quite certain that Tulsaji was as hostile to the Nawab and as friendly to Yusuf Khan as his father had been. The Council, knowing well the reasons for the Nawab's hostility to whatever Prince might be on the throne of Tanjore, refused to make any enquiries as to the cause of Pratab Singh's death. On the 22nd Preston wrote to the Council that Yusuf Khan had received 200 sepoy from Dindigul, who, he pretended, had been sent to him by Haidar Ali, though they had really been recruited by his own agents and with his own money. It was shown later on that Haidar Ali publicly dismissed large numbers of his men, to whom he secretly gave orders to enlist with Yusuf Khan.³ These reinforcements, however come by, necessitated Preston's own army being strengthened, and he again insisted on being provided with a force sufficient for two simultaneous assaults.

On the 27th December the Council decided to issue regular commissions to all Subadars and Jemadars attached to sepoy companies. This matter, which was of great importance for improving the status of the sepoy officers and the discipline of the native troops, had been under consideration for some years, but Colonel Wilson points out that the present order was not carried into effect until 1766.⁴

¹ John Wood to Council, 16th Dec. *Mil. Cons.*, 22nd Dec., 1763.

² In their letter to Court of the 24th March, 1764, the Council mention this matter, but refer only to Tulsaji and his minister Mankoji.

³ "Yar Khan, who had the command of 40 horse in the King of Tanjore's service, having desired a Cowle from *Haidar Naik* went from thence to him, in all appearance as dismissed from the former's service. *Haidar Naik* made him a present of an elephant and gave him permission to go and assist *Yusuf Khan*, and wrote a letter to the people in garrison at Dindigul ordering that every one under pretence of being dismissed his service should repair to Yar Khan." Extract of news from Dindigul received with the Nawab's letter of 5th April, 1764. Rous' *Appendix*, No. XIII. p. 193.

⁴ *Madras Army*, I. 181.

On the 29th December Preston was at last able to make a start from Tirumbur, and, leaving the 96th behind him, he advanced to Andakottaram, only one mile from Madura. The enemy made a display of force, but did not offer any actual resistance, and by the 5th January, 1764,¹ Preston had received ample supplies of provisions and reported that he was fortifying Teppakulam. His plan of campaign was, by means of strongly fortified posts, to cut off all communications between Madura and Yusuf Khan's supporters in the Provinces and so force a surrender by famine, without running the risk of losing a number of men in assaults on the town itself, which was sure to be desperately defended.² On the other hand, Yusuf Khan received early in January a reinforcement of 100 Europeans collected from all parts of Southern India.³ This showed that it would be necessary to cut off his communications with the south before the investment of the town could be considered complete.

On the 20th December Yusuf Khan had despatched his *vakil* Ishwant Rao to Madras with letters to the Council and General Lawrence, in which he expressed regret for his past conduct, and promised obedience for the future on condition that he might be allowed to continue as Renter of the Provinces at seven lakhs of rupees a year. The *vakil* reached Madras on the 9th January,⁴ but though the Council, very naturally, did not believe in the *bona fides* of his mission, they on the 12th gave him the following answer:—

“Whereas *Muhammad Yusuf Khan*, late Renter of the Madura and Tinnevely countrys, has, by letters to the Honourable President and to General Lawrence, expressed himself sorry for his late disobedient conduct and desirous of returning to his obedience, we, the Governor in Council of Fort Saint George, do hereby engage our words and honour, that in case *Muhammad Yusuf Khan* does

¹ Captain Thomas Adair says it was not until the 18th January that Preston received sufficient supplies of provisions from the poligars, and that even then he was in want of military stores. *I. O. Records, Misc. Letters Received*, Vol. 47, No. 63.

² See pp. 205 (n.), 211, and 286 below.

³ *Mil. Cons.*, 16th Jan., 1764, p. 33. If one is to believe all the reports of additions to Yusuf Khan's European Corps, he must have enlisted, immediately preceding and during the course of the war, between five and six hundred men.

⁴ *Mil. Cons.*, 9th Jan., 1764, p. 22.

restore to such persons as we appoint to receive them, the forts of Madura and Palamcotta, together with all other forts and places under his orders belonging to the Madura and Tinnevely countrys, a fair account shall be taken of all the guns, stores, ammunition, provisions and expenses, which he has been at, on account of those countrys and places, and that for all these articles he shall have due credit, and if it appears, after he has been debted (*sic*) for the rent due from the country at nine lakhs *per* year since July, 1761,¹ that any balance is coming to him, it shall faithfully be paid, and *Yusuf Khan* may freely come under our protection to Madras or go to any other place he please without any hurt or hindrance being offered to him.”²

Either *Yusuf Khan* did not trust this offer, which was practically an acceptance of the terms he proposed in his letter received on the 7th February, 1763,³ or he had sent *Ishwant Rao* only to spy out the state of affairs at Madras, for the *vakil* so employed himself that on the 31st of the month the Nawab suggested to Council that he should be turned out of the town; but before this request was received the man had been sent away under a guard of peons.⁴

¹ This shows that *Yusuf Khan* had cleared his accounts up to that date at least. He had certainly sent instalments at later dates (see p. 110 above), but, probably, had not sent in his final accounts.

² *Country Correspondence*, also *Wilson, History of the Madras Army*, I. 188. This letter is hardly as stern as one would expect from Council's *Letter to Court of 26th March, 1764, para. 5*. “Soon after he found we were preparing to recommence the siege, he sent his *Vakil* to Madras with a letter signifying the concern he was under on account of his late behaviour and promising to return again to his allegiance provided he was permitted to continue to rent the countries. We know not whether this proceeding (*sic*) from fear or an intention to amuse us and induce us to enter into a negotiation with him and by that means delay our operations. We however returned his *Vakil* immediately to him with a letter informing him that nothing but his immediately surrendering himself to us could entitle him to expect any favour.” (*B. M. Addl. MS.*, 34688, f. 76.) Yet the letter to Court is in conformity with the actual resolution of the Council, which runs as follows:—“Tho’ we have no reason to imagine *Yusuf Khan* has any other view in writing the above letters than to amuse us for the present, it is however agreed that an answer be returned to him informing him that he cannot expect to continue in the management of those countries and that the only means he has for securing to himself his Life and Effects are to surrender up immediately all the places in his possession to the Company and rely entirely upon our mercy.” (*Mil. Cons.*, 9th Jan., 1764.) Apparently the actual letters despatched were left entirely to the Governor.

³ See p. 135 above.

⁴ *Mil. Cons.*, 31st Jan., 1764, p. 74.

On the 27th December reports were received from Preston that Yusuf Khan was trying to seduce the officers of the Maravan poligars. On the 15th January he wrote that one of them had brought him a letter,¹ which had been sent them by Yusuf Khan, warning them that in supporting the Nawab they were only preparing their own ruin after he himself should have fallen. This was a true warning, but their ruin was certain whatever course they took.

Yusuf Khan's *vakil* had much information to give to his master. On the 31st December the *Pitt* had arrived with 250 Europeans, and these were sent on to Tondi on the 25th January under Captain Villiers Fitzgerald. Artillery of all kinds was being collected, and was thus described by Call²:—

“Our artillery for the siege is now to consist of 8 twenty-four pounders, 12 eighteen-pounders, 4 twelve-pounders and 4 nine-pounders, with near 40,000 shot, three or four hundred shells and 5,500 barrels of powder, a pretty apparatus indeed for the reduction of a rotten old country fort, but it is at a great distance from Madras, and as there can be no sending for repeated supplies we must have a sufficient stock with us.”

It had been the intention of the Council to leave the conclusion of the campaign in the hands of Preston, with whose conduct and plans they were fully satisfied, but on the 23rd January Lawrence informed them that Major Charles Campbell,³ then at Vellore, had requested that, as he was the senior officer on the Coast, and practically the whole of the Company's force was being concentrated at Madura, he might be placed in command. The Council recorded the following resolution:—

“We are much concerned that Major Campbell should by the above application put us under the disagreeable necessity of taking

¹ This was simply a repetition of his appeal to them before the beginning of the struggle. *General History of the Ramnad* (Mackenzie MSS. Translations, IV. 21).

² Call to Richard Smith, 18th Jan., 1764. Call, who was a member of Council, had returned to Madras by the 7th Dec., 1763. *Orme MSS.*, 27, p. 112.

³ “Campbell, I believe, will go and take the command soon, because every man of the Company's troops is to be employed, and he thinks it would be a reflection on him if he did not insist on having his right.” Call to Richard Smith, 18th Jan., 1764. *Orme MSS.*, 27, p. 110.

the command from Major Preston, with whose conduct we have the greatest reason to be well satisfied; yet as we cannot, agreeable to the rules of the Service, well refuse Major Campbell's request, and as there is an absolute necessity for more field officers in camp, it is agreed that Major Campbell do take upon him the command of the army and that instructions be prepared for him accordingly. It is also resolved that a letter be addressed to Major Preston,¹ thanking him for his services and informing him that we do not doubt but he will still continue to exert himself as usual in conjunction with Major Campbell for the good of the Service."

On the 26th the command was given to Major Campbell with practically the same instructions as had been drawn out for General Lawrence at the beginning of the war,² the only difference being that he was to consult Majors Preston and Call before consenting to any modification in favour of Yusuf Khan.

On the 31st January news arrived of the despatch of a strong detachment from Bombay. The same day the French frigate, the *Expédition*, arrived at Tranquebar. Yusuf Khan was informed that it had brought a promise of French assistance. It had really brought the recall of Messieurs Maudave and Flacourt.³

Some time in the course of this month M. Hugel had arrived at Goa, *i.e.* in Portuguese territory.⁴ It was over a year since M. Mallet had been sent to fetch him, provided with the money requisite to pay the debts incurred by himself and his men in Mysore, as it was obvious that Haidar Ali would not do anything to facilitate their departure. M. Mallet, fearing that a direct request to Haidar to release M. Hugel would meet with a refusal, halted at Salem, and, whilst he communicated with M. Hugel, ostensibly engaged in trade. It

¹ Despatched 26th Jan., 1764.

² See p. 142 above.

³ Letter from Mr. Brouwer. *Mil. Cons.*, 8th Feb., 1764.

⁴ *Letter to Court*, 20th Oct., 1764, para. 34. According to this letter Hugel arrived at Goa in Jan., 1764. Apparently he stayed at Goa for some months, as Campbell heard from Anjengo only on the 2nd April (*Orme MSS.*, 74, p. 30) that he had marched through the Pass near Calicut with 200 Frenchmen. From what port he embarked for Tranquebar is not mentioned, but he did not reach that place until the 3rd June, 1764 (*Mil. Cons.*, 7th June, 1764). The details regarding M. Mallet's visit to Mysore are taken from M. de Maudave's *Relation*.

was reported to Yusuf Khan that M. Mallet was using his money for his own private purposes. He therefore sent one of his officers to make inquiries. This man, being of a talkative disposition, when he got to Dindigul, let slip the object of his mission to Haidar's governor, who immediately sent word to his master. The latter thereupon refused to allow M. Hugel to leave Mysore, and when he was told that it was important that all the French should rendezvous in one place so as to be ready to act when the French fleet and army should arrive, Haidar replied that in that case they might as well come to him as go to Yusuf Khan, and that he would willingly let them march as soon as they were really required. M. Mallet naturally did not think it wise to return to Madura, and, though the money he had brought relieved M. Hugel's necessities, it was some time before Haidar would let him go. In fact, he did not do so until he had heard that peace had been concluded between England and France, and had satisfied himself that no help was to be expected from the latter country. Instead, however, of sending him by the direct route through Dindigul, he sent him down to the Portuguese settlement at Goa, so that if M. Hugel chose to go to Yusuf Khan and thus cause a fresh rupture between the English and French, the Madras Council would have no tangible ground for offence against himself.

On the 2nd February Mr. Colley Lucas was appointed senior surgeon with the army at Madura with instructions to inspect the work of the other surgeons.

On the 10th February ¹ Campbell arrived at Madura and took over command from Preston. On the 13th ² the latter reported that he had occupied Sikandarmalai on the road to Tinnevely, and that his posts now closed all communications between Madura and Dindigul and Tinnevely. According to information received from deserters, there were 200 Europeans and about 300 Topasses and Coffrees in Madura. Preston also wrote ³ that an Englishman, the first European to desert from Madura, had come in with a letter from a M. Riquet, proposing

¹ Campbell's Journal, *Orme MSS.*, 74, p. 3.

² *Mil. Cons.*, 27th Feb., 1764, p. 144.

³ Preston to Council, 13th Feb., 1764. *Mil. Cons.*, 27th Feb., p. 144.

to bring over his corps of hussars, and he forwarded a copy of a letter to the Council which had been sent into camp by M. Marchand, closed and without any covering letter to the officer in command. He had taken a copy of it, and then returned it with as little ceremony as it had been delivered. This letter was as follows :—

“ Gentlemen, I make no doubt that you know I came into Madura a year ago with a French detachment, empowered to join Yusuf Khan, then carrying on war with the Raja of Travancore. I joined his army on the 9th day of January, 1763, when I raised the standard of the King, my master, in the place of yours, which was hoisted in his camp.

“ I cannot suppose, Gentlemen, that you are ignorant of the treaty of alliance which Yusuf Khan entered into with M. Maudave in the year 1762, or that he received some time ago *sanads* for the Kingdom of Madura from the Subah of the Deccan. Sickness obliged me to leave this place during the months of August and September, 1763, during which time I remained at Tinnevely and Palamcotta to re-establish my health. I gave the command of my troop at my departure to M. Flamicourt, one of my officers.¹

“ On my return to the Capital at the beginning of October I found that your army had been firing at that place for some days.

“ I learned at the same time that you had paid no manner of respect to the protest which M. Maudave made you, nor to that made by M. Flamicourt to M. Monson in regard to the march of your army against that place. I immediately perceived that I had no choice but to oppose your army, which was daily drawing nearer by sap to that place, of which it was at last obliged to raise the siege.

“ Yusuf Khan has just showed me, Gentlemen, the two letters which you have written to him. I was much surprised at your style, and at the same time I reproached him for having written to you and for having despatched a *vakil* to you without my knowledge. For I declare that, if he had consulted me upon this occasion, as he ought to have done, I should have saved you the trouble of returning him such answers. I am to acquaint you, Gentlemen, that in consequence of my powers and the treaty of alliance existing between Yusuf Khan and my nation, he can by no means dispose of Madura, Tinnevely or Palamcotta, without my concurrence, and as for me I can do nothing without that of M. Law (Governor-General of our Settlements in India), whose arrival with our forces on the Coast is

¹ See p. 156 above.

daily expected.¹ It is with him, Gentlemen, that you must discuss the matter of Madura. . . . I entreat you, Gentlemen, to consider seriously in reference to your second and unjust expedition against this Capital, for my orders and intention are to support it as well as the standard of the King, my master, which is hoisted over it, until the arrival of our Governor-General."

On the 14th February Major Call arrived in camp, and at once set out to inspect a new post which was being established on the north side of the river opposite the camp, probably that named Fort Defiance.² It is the only outpost erected during the siege which can be identified with any approach to confidence. Portions of it are said to be included in what is now known as the Tamakam. It was a lofty building, an old pagoda being utilized in its construction, and was used as a signal station for communicating rapidly with all the other outposts.

On the 15th Call wrote to Madras, reporting very unfavourably on the state of affairs :—

"By means of presents of rings &c. Yusuf Khan has found the means of drawing over the *Nad Kallans* again to his interest and to infest *Tiruvadur*, *Tirumbur* and Nattam. Yesterday while I was entering Oury Sahom [? Uma Satrum] with 300 horse and 200 sepoys they attacked our rear and wounded 5 men. They have also promised to surprise *Tiruvadur* or *Tirumbur* and have invested the road to Tondi, so that we have had no letters from thence for ten days. In short there are here so many clashing interests and the Nawab expects such immediate returns from the conquered country that it is impossible to reconcile all parties." ³

Call asked for carpenters, fascine makers, and even coolies, for, said he :—

"we cannot get one here by means of the deficiency in their pay in bandying (*sic*) their money in exchange."⁴ Yusuf Khan, however, has


¹ See p. 155 (n).

² "The Paymaster lived in a very roomy building, of eastern architecture, about two miles to the northward across the river, called Fort Defiance." Col. James Welsh. *Military Reminiscences*, I. 23. 1830.

³ *Mil. Cons.*, 23rd Feb., 1764, p. 128.

⁴ Even the sepoys found it difficult to furnish themselves with provisions upon the Batta allowed them. The Nawab therefore, in lieu of Batta gave them rice "sufficient for them to live on," and paid the excess cost out of his own pocket. Charles Bouchier to Joseph Smith, 11th April, 1767. *Orme MSS.*, 76, p. 71.

2000 at least working out of the fort on the glacis, and at several redoubts besides a great number within the walls. I



am astonished how he makes his people stay with him or finds money to pay them. We shall most certainly want all the troops

we can assemble together even though we had all the Manilla garrison."

This may well have been the case, seeing, as he says in a letter dated the 16th :—

"We have not here above 400 effective Europeans and about 1200 sepoys, and we had only 2 field-pieces last night in the line."¹

This is the first reference made to the number of troops with which the siege was recommenced,² and even allowing for the withdrawal of a large portion of the 96th Regiment, it shows how heavy had been the losses suffered by the English in the first siege. Marchand says the English resumed the siege with 3000 Europeans, but that is, according to the Madras records, practically twice as many as the highest number that the English ever had effective at any time during these operations.³

Call went on to advise that, in order to avoid the delays of the sea passage, all reinforcements should be sent by land. He concludes :—

"Unless something very favourable happens you must not expect that we can begin any siege or even attempt it till we have double the force we have now in Europeans, and have entirely taken from the rebel all the forts within fifty miles of Madura. He has really made great additions to the fort and has outposts to a considerable distance on three sides,⁴ so that we shall be obliged to take them all before we can get near to begin our approaches, and we shall want more sepoys as well as horse to cut off a communication of ten miles round or more. The *Kallans* are now very troublesome both near Nattam and between *Tirumbur* and *Tiruvadur*, and I fear will continue so unless we can contrive to buy them over by means of arm-rings and such things as Yusuf Khan distributes plentifully amongst them."

¹ *Mil. Cons.*, 23rd Feb., 1764, p. 130.

² In an intercepted letter dated 23rd Feb., 1764, from Yusuf Khan to M. Mallet, the former says the English had renewed the siege with 500 fewer Europeans than the first time. *Orme MSS.*, 281.

³ *Précis Historique*, p. 31. See also p. 188 below.

⁴ Yusuf Khan had no outposts on the north side because of the river.

The same day Campbell moved his camp towards Preston at Sikandarmalai and began the construction of a new post called the Exagon,¹ in front of his camp to the west of the town.

On the 17th Preston was despatched with a small force to intercept a convoy, which was reported to be coming for Yusuf Khan from Tinnevely; but saw nothing of it and returned to his camp.

On the 13th February the Council had received a letter from Mr. Brower² at Tranquebar, saying that the French at that place had formed a kind of Council under a M. Dupetitval, formerly first bookkeeper at Pondicherry, and now a councillor. The Madras Council therefore thought it advisable to draw up a formal protest against French interference, in which they summoned the French commander in Madura to surrender and threatened the severest penalties if he failed to comply. To disprove the French claim to Madura, reference was made to Yusuf Khan's letter of the 20th December, 1763, as proof that he had acknowledged himself to be a servant of the Company at a date much later than his alleged transfer of Madura to France. On the 17th the Council requested M. Dupetitval to forward their Protest to the Governor of the Île de France and to M. Law. M. Dupetitval replied,³ with quiet mockery, that he did not understand English, and that, even if he had been able to do so, he had no authority to deal with such matters, but that, if he could obtain trustworthy translators in good time, he would forward their letter as requested. A copy of the Protest was also sent to Major Preston, to be delivered to the commander of the French forces in Madura.⁴

The same day Campbell despatched Ensign Hamilton to open a new road to Nattam through Satrum, the old one being infested by the Kallans.

On the 19th Yusuf Khan fired a salute of twenty-one guns in the fort. It was supposed that he had received news of the

¹ This fort is always so called, though Campbell probably meant Hexagon.

² Apparently a Danish gentleman who acted as an agent or special correspondent for the Madras Council.

³ 21st Feb., *Mil. Cons.*, 27th Feb., 1764, p. 152.

⁴ *Mil. Cons.*, 17th Feb., 1764, p. 18.

arrival of the *Expédition* with its pretended promise of French support.¹

On the 20th Campbell gave orders to repair the great tank to the west of Madura in order to secure a good supply of water for the various outposts.

Captain Fitzgerald arrived in camp on the 21st with the 250 men who had come by the *Pitt*.

On the 22nd a letter from Yusuf Khan to M. Mallet, and on the 23rd one to M. Hugel, were intercepted. In these he said that the English had renewed the siege, but with greatly reduced numbers, and that he hoped with the aid of M. Hugel not only to repulse them and capture their train of artillery, but even to drive them back to Trichinopoly and possibly to Madras. He accepted M. Mallet's explanation of the delay in extricating M. Hugel from Haidar Ali's clutches, and requested that they would go to Calicut, where they would be supplied with money by M. Haussé,² and then, going by sea, effect a landing between Manapad and Tuticorin. From thence it would be easy to pass to Palamcotta and march on Madura together with the army of observation, which was based on that fortress.³

On the 22nd Campbell and Call reconnoitred the high ground in front of Yusuf Khan's outposts, and thinking there was possibly something in Riquet's offer to bring over his troop, sent in a man, who pretended to be a deserter, to confer with him and to fix the attempt for the morning of the 26th.

On the 23rd Yusuf Khan's cavalry showed signs of activity, and Campbell on the 24th strengthened all his outposts so as to be prepared against a sortie. This day Campbell received the Council's reply to Marchand's letter and also their Protest, which he sent in with a proposal that, as he himself did not understand French, Marchand should come out and have an interview with Captain Bonjour, a Swiss officer who knew

¹ See p. 169 above.

² M. Haussé (see p. 123 (n.) above) was the agent for Maudave and the French generally at Calicut. After the war the Nawab made many efforts, with what success is uncertain, to force him to surrender property alleged to have belonged to Yusuf Khan.

³ See p. 120 above.

that language. Marchand agreed, and the interview took place on the 25th. Marchand describes it as follows ¹ :—

“After the usual compliments Captain Bonjour notified me, in the name of the Colonel, [*i.e.* Major Campbell] of the ratification of peace in Europe between France and England. He summoned me to quit Madura immediately with my troop and not to bear arms any longer against the English under pain of being punished as one who had broken the treaty concluded between our two sovereigns.

“I replied to this summons that, having been sent under superior orders to Madura, only the revocation of those orders could authorize me to quit the party of Khan Sahib ; that it was my duty to obey, without questioning as to whether I was right or not in fighting against the English, and that, without being intimidated by the threats of Captain Bonjour, I would scrupulously fulfil what honour and obedience to my superiors might require of me.

“Captain Bonjour became milder at this reply, and no longer addressed me as the Commandant of the French corps. He tried to tempt and dazzle me as a mere private man. It was no longer the captain of 200 Frenchmen whom he sought to detach with his troop from the party of Khan Sahib : it was only the private person, whose judgement, zeal and courage he had the honour to fear. ‘Why,’ said he to me in the name of the Colonel, ‘why attach yourself to a hopeless cause ? Yusuf Khan cannot escape being beaten ; what use is there in sacrificing your life and reputation ? What do you expect from this Rebel ? Even if you succeed in maintaining him against our efforts, have you forgotten his treacherous treatment of you ? He will be all the more treacherous the more he owes you, and will pay you only in the coin which traitors use. Consider on the other hand what is offered you—immense and certain rewards, your honour saved by the conclusion of peace between our two countries and your fortune assured !’

“I replied to this harangue that, when it was a question of doing my duty, I calculated neither dangers nor rewards ; that the former were equal for us both, and, if Fortune favoured me, I hoped to escape them and to enable Yusuf Khan to triumph, even at the risk of making him ungrateful to me. I withdrew after this reply and reported to Yusuf Khan on my return what had been said to me, without however mentioning the proposals which had been made to me at the same time.”

¹ *Précis Historique*, pp. 32-34.

Before retiring Marchand gave Bonjour a written reply ¹ to the Council's Protest of the 17th February, in which, after saying that he could do nothing without orders from M. Law, he added :—

“ Therefore I exhort you, Gentlemen, to reflect on the topic of your last article,² for I think you will be responsible for the Christian blood shed in the first siege and for that which may be in the second. As to your threats, Gentlemen, they do not in the least affright me, the more so as the right of reprisal is allowed to be made against those who act contrary to the laws of humanity. . . . As to myself I am so little master of political affairs that I understand no other business than to make use of my sword against all those who attack or shall attack the French flag [now] hoisted in Madura.”

When the Council received this letter (14th March), they recalled the fact of Marchand's breach of his parole (see p. 126 above), and decided to write to Campbell, that if Marchand was the same man who was taken prisoner by Captain Smith in 1760, in case he

“ should come out again with a flag of truce or should by any means fall into his hands, to detain him . . . and send him to Madras.”

Apparently Campbell took no notice of this order.

On the 26th February the German officer Riquet brought over his hussars to the English. It will be remembered that this officer had succeeded to the command of the French when Marchand was imprisoned by Yusuf Khan. Marchand says ³ he crept into Yusuf Khan's favour by flattery and tale-bearing, and that he was a coward, and was saved from punishment only out of respect to the prestige of the Europeans. However this may be, in his first letter to Preston ⁴ Riquet

¹ *Mil. Cons.*, 14th March, 1764, p. 185.

² This article (see p. 175 above) or paragraph protested against the continuance of the French in Madura, and demanded that they should either deliver up the town or leave Yusuf Khan, under penalty of being “ treated with the rigour due to so manifest a violation of the Treaty of Peace.” *Mil. Cons.*, 18th Feb., 1764, p. 122.

³ *Précis Historique*, pp. 23, 24.

⁴ See p. 170 above.

asked that matters might be so arranged that he should appear to be taken in an ambush, that he might be sent to Chidambaram with his men, none of whom should be allowed to enter the English service, and that he should receive 15,000 pagodas for maintenance until the arrival of M. Law. Preston agreed to these terms, with the exception of the price of his treachery, which he reduced to 8000 pagodas. Nothing more was heard from Riquet, and so Campbell was in some doubt as to whether the whole affair was not a trick contrived by Yusuf Khan. However, on the chance of Riquet being in earnest, he, as has been said, sent in a man to say that the pretended ambuscade would be arranged. He hoped that if Riquet came out of the town he would be accompanied by the native horsemen, and that thus, by a proper disposition of his own troops, he might capture at one stroke not only Riquet's troop, but the bulk of Yusuf Khan's cavalry. An ambush was therefore formed of 200 grenadiers, 150 Europeans, all the European hussars, 1700 sepoys, six field-pieces, and 800 native horse, who took up their positions on the evening of the 25th near Fort Defiance on the north side of the fort, the signal to be given by the firing of rockets.

“Early this morning I sent to Major Preston to send out small parties from the high ground to endeavour to induce the enemy's cavalry to skirmish, but none appeared for some time. At last the enemy's hussars came off in full gallop and surrendered themselves to our cavalry, which wheeled from the right and left on them. They were immediately conducted to camp, in number 45,¹ including officers, all extremely well mounted. The enemy's black horse not coming out, partly deprived us of putting our whole scheme into execution by cutting them off.”²

Of the officers one was Lieutenant Fowkes, and they were accompanied by the surgeon, Carere,³ who was much in

¹ In his letter of the 26th Feb., Campbell says 3 officers and 41 hussars (*Mil. Cons.*, 2nd March, 1764, p. 167), but there was also the surgeon, M. Carere.

² Campbell's Journal, 26th Feb., 1764. *Orme MSS.*, 74, p. 9.

³ This gentleman was apparently a Protestant, for he received promotion in due course, whilst none of the other French surgeons admitted to the English service in these times ever rose above the rank of Asst.-Surgeon. His connection with Riquet, a German, probably implies that he was Swiss and not French.

favour with Yusuf Khan, and was taken into the English service.

According to the agreement it was proposed to send Riquet away with his troop, but some of the latter asked to enlist with the English, and on being refused, said they would not accompany their leader. They were then shown the agreement and discovered how they had been betrayed, for it now appeared that Riquet had not sought their consent to his act of treachery. Enraged at this,

“sixteen of them again declared that, if they were not suffered to remain in our service, they would take the first opportunity of killing M. Riquet and enter into some other service, for they were fully determined not to serve under him or the French again.”¹

Upon this Riquet willingly consented to Major Campbell enlisting them, which he did on the double ground that they could not be safely allowed to wander off into the native states, and that he was positively certain that they would be loyal owing to their fear of Yusuf Khan, who punished any attempt at desertion on the part of his Europeans in the most cruel manner.² Riquet, however, had, later on, the impudence to complain that Campbell had broken his agreement. Campbell retorted, in proof of his scrupulous observance of the terms, that,

“though his [Riquet’s] quartermaster³ had been a deserter from our service, and made no secret even in our camp of his having with his own hand killed one of our troopers after he had surrendered himself prisoner, I took no notice of it.”⁴

Riquet’s desertion was a serious blow to Yusuf Khan, but he bore it with more philosophy than Marchand, who did not wish him to communicate it to M. Hugel. Yusuf Khan, however, wrote to the latter that all he considered was the loss of the horses, for which he had paid 40,000 rupees. As a matter

¹ Campbell to Council, 7th Sept., 1764. *Mil. Cons.*, 13th Sept., p. 701.

² Campbell to Council, 2nd March. *Mil. Cons.*, 14th March, 1764, p. 180.

³ Probably the man Hurts mentioned on p. 139 above.

⁴ Campbell to Council, 7th Sept. *Mil. Cons.*, 13th Sept., 1764, p. 701.

of fact, Yusuf Khan might well have spared the hussars themselves, but it was the consequences of their act which were of really serious importance. Up to this date many desertions had taken place from the English,¹ and Marchand asserts² that 300 men who had formerly been in the French service had agreed to come over to him, but now changed their minds. From this time on the desertions were mostly from and not to Madura.

On the 27th Yusuf Khan abandoned his most advanced post on the south. This stood on a high bank. It was immediately occupied by Preston, and from it he cannonaded the camp under the walls, so that it had to be evacuated. Whilst choosing a site for a new post³ on the west, Major Call was thrown from his horse and broke his arm, but this accident was not sufficiently serious to keep him very long from the discharge of his duties. The same day Ensign Davis reported the capture of a small fort at Pudukudi, twelve miles south of Madura.

On the 29th the hospital was fixed at Sikandarmalai,⁴ and the camp moved to the south of the town, Preston taking up his position on the west.

On the 1st March Yusuf Khan ordered his men to cut the banks of the great tank on the south. As the camp was on higher ground, Campbell did not notice the full amount of the damage done by the escaping water, and on the 2nd he wrote to Council :—

Major Preston's detachment will this night move to *Teppakulam*, and then the Rebel will be completely invested and find it extremely difficult for to get out or in from the country a single *harkara*, as our posts are within gunshot all round. . . .

¹ Letter to Court, 26th March, 1764, para. 6.

² *Précis Historique*, p. 37.

³ ? the post at Pollypollam.

⁴ "The hospital was in a great Rest House, wherein were at the least 300 sick people. I have never seen such a beautiful Rest House. It is all of hewn stone. The roof also of broad hewn stones, which are well fitted together, is supported upon a number of splendid pillars covered with carved figures. At the entrance one sees a crowd of lions and horses with riders all carved in stone. It is lofty, wide and long, but as air can come in only by the entrance, it was very unhealthy for the sick." *Geschichte der Missions*, Vol. IX., Pt. I., p. 586.

"The Rebel's communication being now entirely cut off with the country and his troops within the walls, I imagine they will soon be greatly distressed, especially the horse. By all intelligence the ditch of Madura dries fast, and that of the south face is now very low. . . . I do not find that much or hardly any of this year's grain has been carried into Madura or yet cut, so that I hope the Nawab will have the advantage of it." ¹

As mentioned in this letter, Preston left the same evening with a detachment to strengthen Teppakulam. On his way it was found that the water from the southern tank had flooded all the low ground between the Tinnevely road and Teppakulam. The rear guns of the detachment stuck fast in the mud, and one of those which had got through appearing to be too far ahead, Lieutenant Baillie and some artillerymen riding after it were ambushed, the Lieutenant being very severely wounded and seven of his men killed. Preston did not reach Teppakulam until the morning of the 4th, and in the mean time on the 3rd, another party from the fort, having concealed themselves in a tank near the Nattam redoubt on the north, cut off a guard of sepoy bringing in letters and returned safely into the fort, in spite of Campbell's efforts to intercept them.

The investment was evidently not as effective as Campbell had supposed, so he spent some days in strengthening the posts and increasing their number, but he was able on the 6th March to send a small force under Captain Hart to take the little fort of Chinampettah, eighteen miles south of Madura, at which he heard Yusuf Khan was establishing a magazine of stores. Hart started on the 7th, and reported its capture the next day.

"Upwards of three hundred of the enemy were killed and wounded in the fort and endeavouring to escape. This was agreeable to my orders for an example which, I hope, will have a good effect." ²

On the 9th Ensign Dawson, who was in command at Solavandan, which covered the road to Dindigul, was ordered to

¹ *Mil. Cons.*, 14th March, 1764, p. 180.

² Campbell to Council, 8th March, 1764. *Mil. Cons.*, 17th March, p. 211.

attack Ariyur, about ten miles from him. It was the last fort held by Yusuf Khan in the Madura district.

On the 12th March ¹ the Council received a friendly letter from Haidar Ali, denying that he was giving any assistance to Yusuf Khan, and saying that he had ordered his officers at Dindigul to help the English in every way. The letter was accompanied by a present. It is quite possible that Haidar, who had excellent means of communication with Madura, had heard of M. Riquet's desertion, but the letter may have been only a blind.

The same day Campbell managed to repay Yusuf Khan for the attack on Lieutenant Baillie by ambushing a body of his horse which had made a sally. On the other hand, Ensign Dawson wrote to say :—

“ that he had marched to *Ariyur* and had summoned the place, which refused to surrender, and that from his knowledge of the place, being there some time with Yusuf Khan, when in our service,² he knew the walls to be strong and high, and as he had neither guns nor ladders he thought it most prudent to encamp within two miles . . . and to wait for orders.”

A few days later Captain Harper was sent to reinforce him with guns, engineers, etc. On the 15th news arrived that the enemy had abandoned Ariyur, also two forts on the road to Tinnevely, the garrisons of the latter retreating towards that town.

On the 13th Campbell wrote to the Council : ³—

“ I have caught one of *Yusuf Khan's* head *harkaras*, a person who has been years in his service, and who by all accounts he had great confidence in, and who seems thoroughly acquainted with his affairs. As I keep him close prisoner I have assured him his future punishment or reward will entirely depend on the truth of his intelligence. He has promised to make me acquainted with everything he knows, and that if after the reduction of Madura I find he has told the least untruth he will desire no mercy. I hope he will be of some service as he is perfectly well acquainted with the spies of

¹ *Mil. Cons.*, 1764, p. 178.

² This was probably when Caillaud was in the Madura country.

³ *Mil. Cons.*, 19th March, 1764, p. 212.

Yusuf Khan, some of whom he hopes soon to discover to me. Eight of the Rebel's sepoys have deserted to us these two days past, and all agree that the sepoys in general are greatly discontented and would certainly come off, was it not on account of their families which are prisoners in the fort. No provision but what is served out of His Magazines.

"*Poligars* and others are coming daily for Cowle, and *Daud Khan* who commands for *Yusuf Khan* in the *Tinnevelly* country has only 250 black horse and 900 sepoys with him and nothing but small mud forts between me and *Palamcotta*."

The *harkara* mentioned by Campbell was Ramalinga. There is no evidence that he gave any information of any value to Campbell, and no mention of his ultimate fate.

On the 14th Major Call received a large number of lascars, coolies, and a supply of tools from Madras. Preston advanced from Teppakulam and seized the high ground near the enemy's outposts on the south-east, the enemy vainly attempting to dislodge the victors. On the other hand, their cavalry very nearly cut off a convoy coming from Satrum, but it was brought in safely by the English horse, "not a bullock load missing."

On the 16th Campbell wrote to the Council:—

"there has been no arrack for the army for twenty days past, and our sick list is a hundred more than last month, which the surgeons impute to the want of arrack." ¹

It seemed, indeed, that the unhealthy climate of Madura was having that fatal effect upon the English forces which *Yusuf Khan* had anticipated. On the other hand, as we learn from a letter from Marchand,² whilst outside the English soldiers both native and European were suffering much from illness, there was no sickness in the city; a fact which, considering the general poverty of the inhabitants, the lack of any food supplies outside *Yusuf Khan*'s own magazines, and the presence of a large garrison, including a numerous body of wild Kallans, speaks volumes for the order and organization maintained by *Yusuf Khan*, as compared with the dreadful condition of the town even when it had been under

¹ *Mil. Cons.*, 24th March, 1764, p. 219.

² Marchand to M. d'Haumartin, 20th March, 1764. *Orme MSS.*, 281, p. 18.

English rule for a considerable number of years. In 1820 Hamilton writes: ¹—

“The natives with a few exceptions are miserably poor and their huts of the worst description. The streets are narrow and filled with dirt and rubbish, and the old drains having been choked up the rain stagnates everywhere in pools. Thousands of cattle are kept within the walls, where filth of all sorts accumulates. The fort is also too crowded with trees, which retard evaporation and infect the air with exhalations from their decayed leaves, and the water in the fort tanks, being seldom renewed, becomes putrid and sends forth a deleterious effluvia (*sic*).”

This state of affairs could not naturally be maintained for ever, but for the present, at any rate, the health of the garrison was much better than that of the besiegers. Campbell was, however, troubled not only by the sickness prevailing in his camp, but by the want of provisions. Preston had obtained promises of supplies from the southern poligars—it will be remembered that Yusuf Khan had devastated the Madura district before the war, and consequently its reduction was of little value to the English—but these petty chiefs, probably through fear of Daud Khan, the commander of Yusuf Khan's flying corps, failed to keep their promises.² As I have said, Campbell had now learned that this corps had been reduced to insignificant dimensions, and so he thought it advisable to detach a small force towards Palamcottā, to take that place if possible, but at least to dispose of Daud Khan and to reduce the rich district of Tinnevely.

On the 16th March Major Preston started with 130 Europeans, one troop of hussars, 600 black horse, 1200 sepoy, and 500 Kallans. On the 26th he reported the capture of Sundarapandiyam, the commandant of which place, Muhiuddin, was looked upon as one of the most faithful followers of Yusuf Khan. He was, it is said,³ persuaded to surrender without fighting by a Jemadar in the English

¹ *Description of Hindustan*, II. p. 472.

² Letter dated — April, 1765, from Captain Thomas Adair to the Court of Directors. *I. O. Records, Misc. Letters Received*, Vol. 47, No. 63.

³ The Old Sepoy Officer. Narrative of the Illustrious Services of Meer Sahib. *English Historical Review*, April, 1913.

service, to which Muhiuddin was admitted. Apparently Muhiuddin wrote to his brother Parced Sahib,¹ *kiladar* of Srivilliputtur, to follow his example, for that place also surrendered without waiting to be attacked. Meanwhile, Captain Hart, Preston's second in command, had taken Nemilly,² and it was reported that Muhammad Yakub, Governor of Palamcottā, was on bad terms with Daud Khan, so that it seemed possible that he too might be induced to surrender. Preston therefore pushed on to Palamcottā and arrived in its neighbourhood on the 5th April,³ where at last he came into touch with Daud Khan. He writes:—

“About three miles from Palamcottā we fell in (a little *mal-à propos*) with Mr. Daud Khan, who it seems was just come out to watch our motions. He had a considerable body of horse with him in a hollow way, which had something the appearance of a post, and, as he might have had a larger body of troops concealed from us than what appeared to us, I thought it prudent to make a halt with the hussars for the coming up of the black horse (which you may judge were not very thick together after a march of sixteen miles succeeding the one we had yesterday of twenty). In the meantime an advanced guard of hussars and a few of the black horse that were with us amused the enemy with a little scampering and popping till they thought proper to move out of their hole, observing us, as I suppose, increase very fast in our number of black horse. Their number we judged to be about three hundred. Our hussars were ready formed for an attack and immediately made towards them upon a gallop. They waited but a very little while before they betook themselves to a general flight without waiting to give us a chance to get up with them but by a general pursuit. I accordingly let loose the whole of our black horse and Mr. Heyne to attend them with his little troop, keeping the hussars in a squadron to support them. The most of Innis Khan's horse, about fifty of Asserah Beg's horse and Mr. Heyne with about eight of his troopers were up with them before they could all cross the river of Tinnevely. A few of Innis Khan's and Asserah Beg's (who had been skirmishing with them from the first) were in the thick of them and behaved

¹ Parced Sahib brought most of his men with him, but “twenty-two sepoys deserted him upon the road, being doubtful of the bread they were coming to.” Preston to Campbell. *Mil. Cons.*, 12th April, 1764, p. 275.

² ? Nemmeni.

³ *Mil. Cons.*, 16th April, 1764, p. 286.

themselves very gallantly. Six of them came back severely cut [*i.e.* wounded] and two of them are lost entirely. One of them overtook Mr. *Daud Khan* himself and made two cuts at him, but unluckily this fine fellow was apart from his fellow pursuers and was therefore cut down himself, but there's great hopes of his getting better of his wounds. It's very certain that *Daud Khan* has got a sliver over his neck and that above twenty of his men were overset from their horses, for the horses are brought into camp. Mr. Heyne with eight of his troopers, one of Innis Khan's jemadars, one of Asserah Beg's jemadars and about 20 of their black horse pushed over the river where it was breast high, and Mr. Heyne, with his sergeant, the above jemadars and about eight of the black horse pushed on fairly into the skirts of the enemy's camp, which lies close under the wall of Palameotta. Heyne has acquired a great name amongst the black cavalry.¹ One of the jemadars assured me that he saw him cut down three of the enemy's horsemen himself. I promised him that I should make his good behaviour known to you and I hope you'll communicate it to the *Nawab*. It's very remarkable that several prisoners were brought to me by the black horse without being cut or so much as plundered of their clothes.² *Daud Khan's* bodyguard of sepoy (consisting of one havildar, one naik and eight privates) were taken with their arms, all extreme good English firelocks. I have no more room here you see than to subscribe myself,

"Your affectionate,
"ACHILLES PRESTON."

Preston's subscription to this letter shows that his supersession by Campbell had not given rise to any unfriendly feeling between the two men, and this, as well as other instances of Preston's kindly character, explains why he was such a favourite with all ranks of the army.³

Preston now went on to Palameotta. Parced Sahib and the other prisoners had written to their friends in the place advising them to surrender, but Muhammad Yakub showed no signs of following their advice; in fact he could not well

¹ "It was found that in single combat the address of a native horseman is seldom equalled by a European." Wilks, *History of Mysoor*, II. 392. See also p. 84 (n.) above. Mr. Heyne was an officer in the Nawab's service. Campbell's Journal. *Orme MSS.*, 74, p. 37.

² In his letter of the 26th March, reporting the capture of Sundarapandiyam, Preston said he had vainly tried to prevent his men from stripping the prisoners of their clothes. *Mil. Cons.*, 4th April, 1764, p. 216.

³ See Appendix V., p. 289.

do so, as his wife and family and those of his chief officers were in the hands of Yusuf Khan at Madura.¹

On the 17th Preston left Captain Hart with part of his force so posted as to make it dangerous for the garrison, which consisted of 2000 sepoys, 200 horse, and a few European gunners,² to make any movement, and himself returned to Madura, where he arrived on the 20th April. His expedition had been so successful that the agents of the Nawab were now in a position to collect revenue throughout the province of Tinnevely, as they were already doing in that of Madura. On the other hand, the King of Travancore, who might now have been supposed free from all fear of Yusuf Khan, made no effort to advance to the help of the English.

We must now return to Campbell at Madura. With Call's assistance he continued the building of posts to hem in the besieged, whilst Yusuf Khan constantly harassed his movements but avoided an actual engagement. Campbell now had at his disposal practically all the troops that he could expect to receive. On the 26th March³ the Council wrote home saying :—

“Our force at present consists of about 1784 Europeans and Coffrees, including non-commissioned officers and private men. But of these, in which are included infantry, artillery, cavalry and the Bombay detachment [which did not arrive at Madura until the 7th June], 200 will generally be in hospital. This may be said to be your whole force of Europeans on the Coast, as those who are left in the different garrisons consist almost entirely of invalids, pensioners and men unfit for field or even garrison service . . . about 5500 sepoys are also employed on the expedition.”

On the 4th April Campbell was warned that he must not expect any more reinforcements after the arrival of the Bombay detachment above mentioned.

On the 27th March Captain Thomas Fitzgerald, with his

¹ See p. 238 (n.) below, and Letter from Palamcottah, 22nd Oct., 1764. *Scots Magazine*, May, 1765, p. 266. Appendix V., p. 290.

² Letter from Palamcottah, 22nd Oct., 1764. See Appendix V. p. 289.

³ Letter to Court, Para. 7. *I.O. Records, Madras Letters Received*, Vol. I. A., and *Brit. Mus. Addl. MS.* 34688, f. 77.

own troop of European cavalry and three hundred Tanjore horse, which formed part of a contingent which the King of Tanjore had at last found himself compelled to send, repulsed several attacks made by a superior force from the fort. Possibly Yusuf Khan counted on the defection of the Tanjoreans, but they behaved extremely well—"as well as Europeans"¹—and Campbell gave each man a present besides saluting the whole body with nine guns in acknowledgment of their valour.

It has been mentioned that the Company's European officers were at this time suffering under various grievances. Campbell, like Preston, did not hesitate to place these before the Council, drawing upon himself a somewhat severe rebuke from the Governor² :—

"I have received your two very extraordinary letters of the 24th and 25th, from which I perceive that you, the commanding officer, cannot easily give up the article of grievances, and instead of putting your orders in execution and sending away those that are resolved to be discontented, and by that means banishing Faction and establishing Obedience and Subordination, you have descended to little pitiful stories that, I suppose, never had any existence but in brains full of malice, rancour and revenge, and notwithstanding we have condescended to explain ourselves sufficiently and to give you reasons for what we have done, you still suppose it may be altered and amended."

But the outbreak came before this letter was even written by Mr. Palk. On the 28th March³ Campbell reported that Lieutenants Hunterman, Ward, and Phillips had requested permission to resign their commissions owing to the grant of Captains' commissions, involving their supersession, to King's officers, and that others would probably follow their example. He asked permission to promote some of the ensigns in their

¹ Campbell to Council, 28th March, 1764. *Mil. Cons.*, 4th April, p. 244. Fitzgerald had only one troop of hussars and a few Tanjore horse. His success was due to the steady fire kept up by his men, which drove back the enemy, who numbered 5 or 6 hundred men, on three successive occasions. These were the tactics adopted by the French at the battle of the Mount. See above, p. 84 (n.).

² *Brit. Mus. Addl. MSS.*, No. 34686, f. 10. Palk to Campbell, 2nd April, 1764.

³ *Mil. Cons.*, 4th April, 1764, p. 242.

place, and to give ensigns' commissions to the best of the sergeants. On the 31st he reported that Lieutenants Bridger and Buck had been permitted to throw up their commissions, and he thought these would be the last. He recommended that severe measures should be taken with all the men who had behaved in this way whilst on active service, but he must have felt his position keenly, for in the Military Consultations of the 26th August, 1754, there stands the following entry :—

“ In regard to Captain Campbell's letter to the President that he would resign his commission in six days and come in, the Board are of opinion that his offering to throw up his commission, when on the march at the head of a party he had been particularly singled out to conduct, was an action unbecoming an officer, for which he might be called to account by a Court-Martial, but, that he might first have an opportunity of justifying himself before the Board, he was ordered to attend, and the President having acquainted him with the sense of the Board he acknowledged his fault, imputed it to rashness and promised a more strict regard to his duty in future, whereupon the Board thought proper to reprimand him, but in consideration of his past services and submission to pass over that wrong step without further notice.”

Campbell had grown wiser with age. On the 4th April the Council approved of his action so far as the acceptance of the offered resignations and the promotion of the ensigns, but they strongly disapproved of the grant of commissions to sergeants.¹ Mr. Palk wrote :—

“ Your making sergeants officers, especially such sergeants as we are blessed with, is a step I cannot approve. We have lately refused two very good men, recommended by Colonel Monson, because we see the ill effects of it too often.”²

On the 23rd April the Council formally accepted the resignation of the five officers named above.

After the capture of Sundarapandiyam, Preston had sent in most of his prisoners to Madura. Campbell wrote to

¹ It seems that seven sergeants received commissions on the 26th March, (Council to Campbell, 19th July. *Mil. Cons.*, 1764, p. 510) ; possibly Campbell had to fill up other vacancies besides those caused by the five resignations.

² Palk to Campbell, 2nd April, 1764. *Brit. Mus. Addl. MS.* 34686, f. 10.

Yusuf Khan that he would treat these men well if Yusuf Khan would do the same with his prisoners. This was on the 3rd April. Yusuf Khan replied very curtly, asking that they might be sent to him along with his *harkara* Ramalinga, a request which was naturally ignored. Into Yusuf Khan's letter had been slipped a note from his Portuguese clerk, Bartholomew Rowling (or Rowland), which ran as follows :—

“ I take this opportunity of enclosing this little billet to your Honor, begging your protection, as your Honor certainly must know by some people or other in what cage I have got at present here, that have no way to come down to your Honor's feet. I beg your Honor will not write to me anything, for if come to know or be ketched I shall lose my life. Six months provisions have got here in the fort and expects some forces from the Dindigul country. I remain with great submission &c &c. P.S. If anybody see or know this, some spy will certainly tell and I must die.”

Campbell sent on this letter to Madras, where the Council expressed their opinion that Rowling had written it with the knowledge of Yusuf Khan, and that he was not to be trusted.

On the 4th April a large supply of money arrived in camp. This day being a fast amongst the Muhammadans, a salute was fired in the town together with volleys of firearms. Outside the fort all Major Call's workmen took a holiday. The same day Yusuf Khan sent out of the town some four hundred poor people, chiefly women and children ; which was looked upon as evidence of an increasing want of provisions.

On the 5th Campbell reported that the Nawab had sent him a man who had promised to bring over a part of the garrison of Madura :—

“ By my intelligence the troops there are, in general, very much discontented, but *Yusuf Khan* behaves with such severity and cruelty to them that even brothers are afraid of revealing their sentiments to one another. He hangs and cuts heads, hands and ears off for trifling affairs, and I hear he has got several of his *jemadars* of horse in irons for being repulsed by Captain Fitzgerald.”

On the 6th it was discovered that the enemy were building a redoubt across the river to cut off communications with

Nattam and facilitate the entry of the Kallans. As it would have been very risky to attack this redoubt, it was determined to post Captain Frischman between the Nattam redoubt and Fort Defiance to keep its garrison in check.

On the 7th Campbell received "an insolent letter from the Rebel." In this, after offering to exchange an English gunner for Ramalinga, Yusuf Khan goes on : —

"My last intention is, as I have wrote before to Colonel Monson, as long as I have got a drop of blood in my body I never shall render the place to nobody. As for some of my hussars joining you, you must not think that everybody will play the same tricks with me as those rascals and rogues, who never did the least service in all the time they was here but only put me to expense. As they played tricks with you when they came to me from Karical, the same they did to me, at which I am not surprised. Of their desertion I think no more lost than so many cooleys from the fort." ¹

On the 8th Campbell received news of the European mutiny in Bengal, which not only put an end to any hope of reinforcement from that province, but seemed likely to involve a fresh drain upon the resources of Madras. The same day he managed to catch some thirty Kallans engaged in carrying Betel and tobacco into the fort. As the Abbé Dubois ² has noted, Betel and tobacco are almost the only luxuries known to the lower classes in India. Supplied with these and a little rice, they will cheerfully undergo hardships intolerable to Europeans.

In spite of the intercepted letter in which Yusuf Khan bade M. Hugel come by sea, the later news from Anjengo caused Campbell to expect him by Dindigul.³ He made special inquiries to ascertain whether Yusuf Khan ever spoke of him. His spies reported that he never mentioned his name. This added to Campbell's suspicion :

"he is so extremely close and secret on matters of consequence, that I shall be as much on the watch as if I had certainty of *Hugel's* approach." ⁴

¹ *Country Correspondence*, 1764, slightly altered to make it intelligible.

² *Hindu Manners, Customs and Ceremonies*, p. 526.

³ See pages 169 (n.) and 176 above.

⁴ Campbell to Council, 12th April. *Mil. Cons.*, 19th April, 1764, p. 291.

On the 15th Lieutenant Bawdwin,¹ riding between the Nemilly redoubt and the river, was taken by the enemy. As he was reported by those who witnessed the incident to have made no resistance or effort to escape, Campbell supposed that he had deserted, but the next day a letter arrived from M. Marchand, saying that Lieutenant Bawdwin was in much distress of mind in consequence of his capture, and that Yusuf Khan was prepared to exchange him for Muhiuddin Sahib, his brother Parced Sahib, and Ramalinga the *harkara*. In reference to which proposal Campbell remarked in his Journal² : —

“ I answered these letters, but could not consent to an unprecedented action by exchanging blacks for whites, beside I knew the prisoners he desired to be his principal Trustees and of great consequence to his present affairs.”

On the 17th Yusuf Khan, for the first time in the course of the siege, moved out some big guns and cannonaded the English camp ; an act which made Campbell suppose that, willingly or unwillingly, Lieutenant Bawdwin had disclosed its disposition. On this day Captain Hooker arrived with one hundred and eighty men and two 6-pounders from Madras.

On the 18th the camp was cannonaded again. Captain Cotsford of the Engineers, who had been at Manilla, arrived at Madura.

On the 20th Major Preston returned,³ and the next day Campbell reported to Madras that the whole of the two provinces, with the exception of Madura and Palamecotta and a few small places, were in the hands of the Nawab's people, and must bring in a considerable revenue, but he wished the Nawab would himself come to Madura,

“ especially as he has now got so extensive a country here to look after, for too often those employed under him make but a bad use of their power, and the people in this country are in a manner new subjects, and it requires a good deal of art in managing them.”⁴

¹ Of the Bombay Artillery. His name is given as Lieutenant Fireworker Thomas Bawdevin in Col. F. W. M. Spring's *Bombay Artillery*, p. 70.

² *Orme MSS.* 74, p. 40.

³ Accompanied by his Aide-de-camp Lieut. Adair. *Orme MSS.* 74, p. 43.

⁴ *Mil. Cons.*, 27th April, 1764, p. 299.

Thus early were the inhabitants of the provinces to experience the effects of a return to the rule of their lawful master !

Campbell was now free to set about the second stage of the siege, *i.e.* the reduction of the ring of redoubts erected outside the walls by Yusuf Khan and Marchand. On the 25th Preston captured a small fort, taking many prisoners, amongst them a M. Colombe, Lieutenant of Artillery. On the 27th two Englishmen ¹ managed to escape by means of a rope from the north-west bastion, and reported that there was only "two foot" of water in the ditch at that point—Campbell noted the appearance of their clothes to test this statement—and that the north and west faces were quite dry.

Campbell's plan was to attempt first the redoubts on the south and east, taking those on the south himself, whilst Preston, with his right at Teppakulam, dealt with those on the east. By the 28th all the batteries intended to prepare the way for and to cover the combined attack were ready. The redoubts to be assailed were protected in the usual way by thorn hedges, which, if they had been dry, might have been fired, but heavy rain fell in the night, making this impossible. Nevertheless, at 8 a.m. on the 29th the attack began. Campbell thus describes his own share of it :—

"The moment our cannon began, the enemy abandoned theirs in the redoubts and quitted the highest part, sheltering themselves in the reverse and ditch. Our cannon soon ruined the parapet of that on the bank [of the tank] though it was of good turf, ten feet thick, and by noon it was imagined that the shot had broke many of the thorns and that our conquest would be made easy, that obstacle removed. Therefore a party of volunteer *Coffrees* with fireballs and portfires, covered by about twenty sepoys, undertook to set fire to the thorns, and crept, under favour of the bank, very near the redoubt. They were then discovered by the enemy who fired so warmly on them that they could not proceed. However they kept their ground and I, thinking it might encourage the enemy if they retreated, resolved that instant to attack the redoubt on the bank

¹ One, a cavalryman, had been captured on a patrolling party, the other was a deserter from Tellicherry, and belonged to the Highland Regiment. *Orme MSS.*, 74, p. 51.

with the second troop ¹ of horse dismounted and armed with carbines, pistols and swords, as being better able to proceed through the thorns with their boots. The first company of grenadiers [under Captain Robert Orton] supported them and near two hundred of the battalion ² followed, with a battalion of sepoys. The whole marched off very briskly under the bank, not discovered by the fort or redoubt, and instructed not to push on hastily until they were pretty near the redoubt, as the day was so excessive hot ³ and the consequence of too great a hurry to be apprehended. The first troop of cavalry [under Captain James Kirkpatrick], and all the black horse were ordered out on the plain in full view of the fort, to be ready to cut off the retreat of the troops in the redoubts and to confuse the enemy. The instant our dismounted troopers approached close to the thorns the enemy quitted their first redoubt. Our horse rode full gallop towards them. They then quitted their second redoubt, which was to support their first; and their troops in that on the high ground, observing Major Preston's party close on them, took to their heels and joined the race. Our cavalry rode amongst them and cut many desperately under a heavy fire of round and grape from the fort. We took 4 good guns, 7 Europeans, 8 topasses and a few sepoys and many were killed and wounded. Our loss 2 troopers killed and 2 wounded, one hussar and 2 gunners killed, 2 grenadiers of the 2nd company killed and 5 wounded by one shot from the fort. We immediately turned the enemy's guns on them and made the necessary preparations for repairing these redoubts, which will keep the enemy within their walls on this side. The Brigade Major [Captain Blake ⁴] had his horse shot under him by an eighteen-pounder from the fort; many of our people fainted away with the heat, and was it not for a most fortunate breeze which, immediately after the places were carried, sprung up, I am inclined to believe we should have lost more men by the heat and fatigue of running than we did by the enemy's fire."

The men on the besiegers' side, both European and native, behaved very well in this affair; on the other side not with so much spirit as had been expected. Campbell ascribed the merit of his success to the batteries, which had been erected

¹ i.e. of Captain Thomas Fitzgerald. Campbell to Council, 29th April. *Mil. Cons.*, 6th May, 1764, p. 307.

² i.e. the Company's European infantry.

³ This is always the case in India after heavy rain in the hot season.

⁴ See letter undated from Campbell in *Mil. Cons.*, 24th May, 1764, p. 342.

by Major Call, and to the courage shown by Major Preston¹ in the field. Yusuf Khan lost five redoubts at one stroke, 16 Europeans and topasses were made prisoners, and 400 sepoy, 8 Europeans, and 20 topasses killed and wounded.² In the evening he sent out a flag of truce for permission, which was granted, to bury the dead. Soon after he abandoned all such outposts as appeared to be too far from the town to be easily protected.

The news of this affair, the first important success in the war, reached Madras on the 7th May, simultaneously with information that a body of Yusuf Khan's partisans had arrived in the Trichinopoly country and were plundering it. Several such expeditions are mentioned during the siege; but all of them were easily dealt with, and the only interest attaching to them lies in the fact that Yusuf Khan's old comrade Jamal Sahib was killed whilst opposing one of his parties.³

On the 1st May Campbell agreed to exchange Lieutenant Colombe and four French privates for Lieutenant Bawdwin and four prisoners in Yusuf Khan's hands,

"out of compassion to Lieutenant Bawdwin, who was threatened to be put in irons, and on account of one sergeant and three Europeans, who were loaded with irons and have undergone a long and severe confinement because they would not serve the Rebel."⁴

Bawdwin was tried by Court Martial and acquitted.⁵ By him Rowling sent out a letter, regarding which Campbell wrote:—

"part of which I knew to be false and indeed [I] have little dependence on anything he writes, for I have intelligence out of the fort almost every day. Two companies of the Rebel's sepoy intended

¹ Preston seems to have been invariably successful when he commanded in person, up to the assault of Madura on the 26th June, when he was mortally wounded. Campbell's letters to Council, dated 29th and 30th April. *Mil. Cons.*, 1764, pp. 307, 308. The English lost 8 Europeans killed and 17 wounded, and 30 sepoy killed and wounded.

² *Mil. Cons.*, 11th May, 1764, p. 313.

³ Letter from Yusuf Khan to Narasa Naik and Mahomed Yakoob 26th Sept., 1764. *Country Correspondence*. Enclosure to Nawab's letter of 9th Oct., 1764.

⁴ Campbell to Council, 4th May. *Mil. Cons.*, 11th May, 1764, p. 312.

⁵ *Mil. Cons.*, 11th May, 1764, p. 314.

deserting to me the other night, but a rascal of a sepoy discovered it to *Yusuf Khan*, who has executed the *subadars* and put most of the others prisoners. He is grown crueller and crueller every day and cuts off people's heads with his own hand on the most trifling occasions. His whole garrison are extremely discontented and wish to be away from him. He is jealous and suspicious of all his officers and entirely supports his authority now by murder and bloodshed, and I doubt not but that this manner of his proceeding will shortly be his ruin, for he seems to be quite deprived of his usual reason. I shall let no opportunity pass of augmenting the discontent of his people."

The withdrawal of the garrisons from Yusuf Khan's most distant outposts enabled Campbell on the 5th May to despatch Captain James Fitzgerald with a small force to deal with one of Yusuf Khan's raiding parties in the Karur country.

On the 7th May¹ Campbell sent to the Council the substance of a discussion with Majors Call and Preston as to the advisability of attacking and capturing Palamcotta at once, so as to allow the force in Tinnevely to take part in the approaching assault of Madura. It was supposed that the garrison of the latter was now much reduced, and that there were effective only

European artillery, 50 out of 65.

Topasses and Coffrees, 50 out of 55.

European military, 56 out of 85.

Topasses, 250 out of 285.

Sepoys, 2200 out of 3000.

Peons and Kallans, 500 out of 1000.

Horse, 800 out of 800.

Total, 3906 out of 5290.

Preston was of opinion that he could go to Palamcotta, take it, and return in six weeks; in which case they would have 1000 Europeans for two assaults on Madura of 600 and 400 men respectively. This number of men he considered absolutely necessary, whereas Campbell would have, without the Tinnevely force, only 750 men available. Campbell, however, thought that the loss incurred in taking Palamcotta would be

¹ *Mil. Cons.*, 13th May, 1764, p. 318.

greater than Preston anticipated, whilst if Madura fell first it was quite certain that Palamcottah would surrender without further resistance, as the wives and families of the chief officers of the garrison would then be in the power of the Nawab. He therefore advised the postponement of any attack on Palamcottah, and the Madras Council agreed with him.

On the 11th May, Major Preston, having ascertained that the Kallans were still running betel and tobacco into the fort by night, was despatched with 2 guns, 200 horse, 600 sepoy, and 500 Kallans to Alagarkovil,

“to burn and lay waste all the villages and to make some examples of those they found in arms.”¹

On the 17th Campbell was informed of the arrival of the Bombay Detachment at Karical, and fired a salute of twenty-one guns to welcome the news. The same afternoon Yusuf Khan fired a salute, which, says Campbell, “I imagine to be a stroke of Policy in the Rebel to keep up the spirits of his people.”

On the 21st May Yusuf Khan abandoned a fort on the north and one on the west. These were the last works of any importance outside Madura, and their abandonment marked the end of the second stage of the siege. On the 22nd Campbell wrote to the Council :—

“From this night I will reckon the siege begun, and from the spirit and willingness that appears in the officers and soldiers, I flatter myself it will be carried on with such vigour and resolution that success must speedily follow . . . and I doubt not but that the month of June will determine the fate of Madura.”

¹ *Orme MSS.*, 74, p. 60.

CHAPTER XIII

ATTEMPT TO STORM MADURA

ON the 26th May the besieged removed their heavy barbet ¹ guns, and could be seen hard at work on the glacis and at thickening the parapets, for they now realized that the siege was to begin in form, though it was not until the night of the 30th that actual work was commenced upon the trenches. A pretended attack was made against the south-east angle, but the point actually chosen was the north-west. The working party consisted of 1100 men, and they started operations about half-past nine. Their number being so great, the first strokes of the picks were heard by the advanced sepoys of the garrison, who, imagining that an assault was intended, fired and ran off shouting the alarm. Blue lights were hoisted on the walls, and the lascars in the trench, thinking that the garrison was about to sally, also ran away. But though the musketry began again and discharges of round and grape were fired all through the night, the enemy did not appear, and the lascars managed by the morning to make a good trench within four hundred yards of the counterscarp, and some sepoys were left to guard it.

On the 1st June part of the curtain adjoining the north-west bastion fell down, probably owing to the concussion caused by the firing of one of Yusuf Khan's 18-pounders.

On the 2nd June the besieged were seen raising the glacis and scouring out the ditch before the north-west angle, and on the 3rd a coolie who came out of the fort reported that deep holes were being dug in the ditch. This important information was neglected.

¹ i.e. placed upon mounds so as to fire over the parapet instead of through embrasures.

On the 6th evening one of the towers near the north-west bastion fell down after a few shot had been fired against it; probably because it was too weak to bear the weight of the earth which had been laid on it to make it cannon-proof. The same night the Nawab arrived in camp. His presence at Madura was considered necessary to check the oppressions committed by his people,¹ but the rabble which accompanied him was a source of considerable inconvenience to the operations of the army.

On the 7th a much more useful arrival was that of two hundred Europeans who had been sent *viâ* Karical from Bombay.

By the night of the 10th the batteries for making the breach were ready. Accordingly, on the 11th the Nawab's flag was hoisted and a gun discharged as a signal to the batteries to open fire. Yusuf Khan replied to the challenge by hoisting a yellow flag in sign that he intended to fight to the death;² but only two of his guns were in a position to reply direct to the new batteries. They were quickly silenced, and after a few shot had been fired the yellow flag came down with some thirty feet of the wall all in a heap. The Nawab celebrated this successful opening of the bombardment by the promise of 130,000 pagodas to the troops as soon as the siege should be ended. Of this sum three-eighths were to be given to the soldiers, sepoys, and lascars, one-half to the captains and subalterns, and one-eighth to the field officers.³ The same

¹ See page 193 above.

² "The Rebel hoisted a desperate yellow flag, by which we are to understand he is resolved to die in defence of his walls." (Campbell's Journal, 11th June, 1764. *Orme MSS.*, 74, p. 79.) I have not come across any other reference to the use of "yellow" by the Muhammadans in this way, but Lawrence (Letter to Council, 19th April. *Mil. Cons.*, 23rd April, 1753) says that the Marathas after the death of Bajirao "have put on yellow clothing and swear they'll give no quarter," and the Rajputs in the ceremony of the *Jauhar*, when they have devoted themselves to death, put on saffron robes, so that this symbolic meaning of yellow seems to be common in India.

³ Campbell's Journal, 11th June. *Orme MSS.*, 74, p. 79. The exact sum received by each officer is not known, but as at the capture of Ramanadpur in 1772 the Nawab promised to the Company's troops the same as he gave at the reduction of Madura (Smith to Council, 5th June, 1772) we can get some idea. In this case each Major received 2400 pagodas, each Captain 1200, and each Subaltern 600. George Nixon (letter dated 17th March, 1765, *Universal Magazine*) says his share was small, but it enabled him to remit £100 home. Probably he did not send home the whole of what he received.

evening Lieutenant Colombe, Adjutant Boistel, and two officers of topasses deserted from the fort.

On the 13th Captain Eley was wounded, and Surgeon Buchanan lost his leg by a shot. On the 14th the besieged made a desperate sally, and though they were repulsed with a loss of fifty men, Captain Alexander Smith and four Europeans were killed, Captain John Croley was mortally wounded, and Lieutenant Maitland lost his leg and died soon after.

15th June.—Lieutenant Whithear and two Europeans were killed and two wounded.

16th June.—Campbell, being confident that the place would soon fall, wrote to the Council for orders as to the military command of the Provinces after the departure of the army. The Nawab had asked that either Preston, Donald Campbell, or Blake might be appointed, but Preston, who intended to return to England after the campaign, declined to accept the appointment. The Council accordingly chose Donald Campbell.

17th June.—Major Call began preparations for springing mines opposite to a pair of redoubts which Yusuf Khan had constructed close to the ditch, on either side of the point at which it was now evident the breach would be made.

18th June.—James Hamilton, engineer, was killed by a musket ball.

20th–21st June.—The mines were sprung, but did little damage, nor did the falling débris fill up the ditch as had been hoped, but they made an easy descent into it, and the *faussebraye* was breached in several places. After dark three grenadiers and three pioneers went down into the ditch, and reported that there was but little water and that it could be easily crossed. But heavy rain—the first for fifteen days—was falling, and a Council of War, consisting of Campbell and Majors Preston, Call, and Wood, decided that the assault which they had intended to make the next day should be postponed until the 23rd.¹

22nd June.—Preparations for the assault were pushed on. There were six practicable breaches in the *faussebraye*, and at least five hundred yards of the rampart were totally ruined,

¹ Campbell's Journal, 22nd June, 1764. *Orme MSS.*, 74, p. 89.

and the storming parties were to consist of 800 Europeans and 3000 or 4000 sepoys. Campbell was certain of success, and intended to make the assault at 10 a.m., a time at which it was reported that the sepoys were usually engaged in preparing their food or in praying or taking their rest. He wrote to the Council :—

“ Our officers and men are all in great spirits, and if it pleases God to grant us success, I think we shall make such an example as will deter all India from rebelling, at least those in the Company’s service.” ¹

His field officers, however, were not so confident, and at a Council of War held in the evening, though they were all agreed that the breaches were practicable, the majority considered that, whilst an attack by night was too dangerous owing to the inevitable confusion attending such attempts, an attack by day would be attended with a great loss of life, as the troops would be exposed to a heavy flanking fire whilst crossing the ditch. It was also strongly suspected that Yusuf Khan had constructed retrenchments behind the breaches, which would also have to be forced under the same deadly fire. There seems, however, to have been no anticipation of any difficulty in crossing the ditch itself, as the men who had examined it had not found any of the holes which Yusuf Khan had been reported to be digging in it. It was decided, therefore, contrary to the opinion of Campbell, and though two passages with straw and hurdles had already been made across the ditch, to postpone the assault once more, “ to establish a lodgement on the north-west bastion and carry an *épaulement* across the ditch on the west side.” ²

23rd June.—This was attempted after dark, but the fire of the besieged was so severe that, when two Europeans had been killed and twenty-seven wounded, it was given up. Preston and Wood both declared that an immediate assault was impossible.

¹ *Mil. Cons.*, 29th June, 1763, p. 438.

² Campbell’s Journal, 23rd June, 1764. *Orme MSS.*, 74, p. 91. By an *épaulement* is here meant, I presume, a shelter on one side of the passage over the ditch to cover the men, as they crossed, from the fire on their flank.

24th June.—Campbell again called a Council of War, but the majority would not agree to an immediate attack. They proposed to continue the bombardment during the 25th and the next night, and to assault on the 26th. Campbell gave in to the majority and wrote to the Madras Council, sending copies of the proceedings of his various Councils of War and the opinions of his field officers.

“ Mine,” he said, “ was always for an immediate attack, but as I mentioned yesterday I thought it most prudent to agree with the others rather than take the whole upon myself. As now our final resolution is taken, I hope in God the morning fixed upon will prove fatal to Yusuf Khan.”¹

It was resolved to storm the north-west angle tower, on which apparently the French flag was flying,² and three others to the right and left, to attempt to escalade the north and west gateways and to make an attack with sepoys on the centre in each front. Major Preston was to command on the right, and Major Wood on the left. The two troops of horse were dismounted and were to act as grenadiers. The time fixed was the break of day. It will be seen that the assault was to be made upon a very wide front, practically on half of the north and west faces of the fort, but it was on a continuous front, and not, as Preston had advised, at two different points so as to divide the attention of the besieged.

26th June.³—At 3 a.m. the disposition was made and the covering and assaulting parties posted, but some “ blundering artillerymen ” missed their disposition, and it was broad daylight⁴ before the signal was given, and the enemy, of course, were fully prepared for resistance. The forlorn hopes rushed into the ditch, and, though many of the men fell into the deep holes of which Campbell had been warned, and all were wet through by the depth of the water caused by

¹ *Mil. Cons.*, 30th June, 1764, p. 440.

² According to the dispositions for the attack Preston was ordered “ to take possession of the Bastion where the French flag is.” *Mil. Cons.*, 2nd July, 1764, p. 448.

³ The description of the assault is taken chiefly from Campbell's Journal and his letter of the 26th June to Council.

⁴ Marchand says 4.30 a.m. *Précis Historique*, p. 36.

the recent rains, they struggled across, and in a moment stormed the two redoubts on either side the main breach and put the defenders to the sword; but the breach itself had been blocked, and pikemen under cover kept pushing their weapons across one another ¹ so that it was impossible to pass, whilst showers of stones, hand-grenades, and shells came pouring upon the assailants from the walls and towers above.² The English hussars found their swords of no avail against such a defence, and, to their dismay, their cartridges were discovered to have been so damaged in crossing the ditch that they were useless; whilst, so heavy was the fire from the walls, no fresh ammunition could be brought forward by the covering parties. Still they pressed on stubbornly, and some of them even managed to reach the summit of the walls, only to be killed or thrown down. Preston, in spite of, or perhaps I should say because of, the fact that the assault had been made against his advice, fought as if he sought for death.³ Marchand says he saw him everywhere encouraging his men. Finally, with his *aide-de-camp*, (Thomas Adair,⁴) Mir Sahib, and another sepoy officer, he made his way to the tower upon which the French flag was flying, but the little party was unsupported. Preston went down with a bullet in the groin. Mir Sahib ⁵ was also wounded, and the two remaining heroes, seeing that no one could join them, with great difficulty helped Preston and Mir Sahib down to the breach and back to their own friends, who, after about an hour's desperate fighting, were forced to retreat. As he was being carried "covered with dust and blood" to his tent, Preston was met by the good padre Schwartz, and exclaimed, "I am now punished for my sins." He lingered until the 12th July, being, in fact, thought out of danger, and

¹ See p. 29 above.

² Marchand says he arranged these, and that they with the steady fire of the musketry decided the day.

³ Mr. Bruno's Journal. See Appendix V., p. 297.

⁴ Captain Adair, in a letter dated April, 1765, to the Court of Directors, says very modestly that he was with Preston when the latter received his mortal wound. *I. O. Records, Misc. Letters Received*, Vol. 47, No. 63.

⁵ Narrative of Mir Sahib. *English Historical Review*, April, 1913, p. 278. The fourth member of the party was probably Tondria Jemadar, who was given a company in 1766 for his gallantry with Preston at Madura. *Mil. Cons.*, letter from Cuddalore, 1st July, 1766.

then died to the great grief of the whole army.¹ No soldier could wish for a more honourable epitaph than that contained in a letter from the Madras Council to the Court of Directors :—

“The loss of so good and so gallant an officer will, if there was no other consideration, make us look upon Madura, whenever it falls, to be dearly purchased.”²

Great as was the loss suffered by the army in the fall of Major Preston, it was by no means all they had had to endure. Marchand says they lost 800 Europeans killed and wounded, and more than 2000 sepoys—a somewhat ridiculous statement. The most dangerous share in the assault had been allotted to the Europeans, and their losses amounted to 120 men, the sepoys losing only some 50.³ Captain Bullock and Ensigns Vashon and Macdonald were killed, Major Preston, Captains James Kirkpatrick, and Thomas Fitzgerald, Cornet William Knox, Lieutenants Daniel Wear, Thomas Colby Owen, and Gilbert Painter, Ensign Thomas Bruce, and four volunteers were wounded. Of the last two died.

The retreat having been effected, it was expected that the besieged would attempt to sally, but they made no movement, so a flag of truce was sent in to ask permission to remove the dead and wounded, which was granted.⁴

Campbell and the two remaining field officers, Call and Wood, wished to make another assault, but this was given up,

“the very heavy rains which fell immediately after for two or three nights having rendered it impossible to renew the assault immediately

¹ Schwartz says, “The Nawab came and lamented much over him [when he was brought to his tent] but he told him the plain truth and grieved that a number of such brave soldiers had been sacrificed without the faintest chance of achieving their object.” *Geschichte der Missions*, Vol. IX. Pt. I. p. 583. In a letter dated 31st July, 1764, to Mr. James Bouchier the Nawab gave as his reasons for not writing sooner “the concern I felt at Major Preston, my friend’s being wounded, our miscarriage in the storm, the disagreeable news of my wife’s sickness, and my own indisposition.” *Rous’ Appendix*, I. p. 210.

² *Letter to Court*, 20th Oct., 1764, para. 22.

³ Campbell to Council, 26th June. *Letter to Court*, 14th July, 1764.

⁴ “Mr. Campbell having asked for a suspension of arms came close up to the breach to compliment me. He could not help showing surprise when he saw what had caused the repulse of his troops and warmly praised the defence we had made.” Marchand, *Précis Historique*, pp. 36, 37. In his *Journal*, p. 94, Campbell says, “A flag of truce was received on both sides.”

as the soldiers were greatly fatigued and sickly. The enemy by the same favourable circumstances had time to repair their works and clear the rubbish between the faussebraye and [the] inner wall in such a manner as to render the breaches impracticable without being battered again, and the approach to them was made still more difficult by the means of thorns and *chevaux de frise* placed round the towers and in the most practicable places.”¹

On receiving Campbell's first report of his repulse, the Council remarked :—

“ We could have wished that if the breaches were really so practicable as they have been represented the attack had been made on the 23rd, when we have great reason to imagine they would have succeeded as there were not then so many obstacles to surmount. We conceive no time should ever be given an enemy after the breach is once practicable.”²

In spite of this they wrote to Campbell :—

“ We are greatly concerned at the contents of your letter of the 26th in which we find Major Preston and so many good officers and men have suffered, but as we are convinced they all did their utmost, and that with the greatest bravery and resolution, we desire you will thank the whole army, men as well as officers, in our name, for their gallant behaviour, and in particular Major Preston, of whom and the other wounded officers we are very anxious to hear they are out of danger.”³

There is perhaps no more saintly character in the annals of Madras than that of the Danish missionary, Christian Frederick Schwartz. At Trichinopoly he had made the acquaintance of Preston, and when, shortly before the war with Yusuf Khan,

¹ Reflections appended to Campbell's letter of 3rd July, 1764. *Mil. Cons.*, 9th July, 1764, p. 484.

² *Mil. Cons.*, 2nd July, 1764, p. 451. In a letter of the 28th June, Campbell remarks, “ The breaches were so suddenly made that by all accounts the enemy were in the utmost consternation, and of course could not possibly be so well prepared the 22nd as the 26th, besides it was very natural to think that they would recover fresh spirits by seeing us lay four days looking at the breaches made, and I believe it is justly remarked that in all military operations the less time that is given to an enemy to recollect themselves and the more spirit things are carried on with the more chance there is of success.”

³ *Mil. Cons.*, 2nd July, 1764, p. 452.

a number of European soldiers were killed by the explosion of the Laboratory at Trichinopoly,¹ he, at Preston's suggestion, founded a school for the education of their children. From Madura, horrified at the sufferings of the wounded and the despair of the dying soldiers, Preston wrote and begged him to visit the camp. He came during the hot weather of 1764, arriving in Madura on the 13th June,² and found five hundred sick and wounded in the hospitals. These, in spite of the dreadful odour which filled these buildings,³ he visited in the mornings, sitting by their straw beds and giving them what comfort he could. The afternoons he spent with the sick officers in their tents. After the assault of the 26th June he wrote :—

“ When I came into the hospital after the assault I saw such a scene as I had never before witnessed in my life. Oh ! War is a terrible punishment from God ! I went from one to the other, talked with them and prayed with them, but at times I felt dumb, for the misery was too great. Some prayed, some cursed their enemies, some moaned; the instigators of the war were not forgotten.”

Schwartz' visit to Madura lasted only two months, when it was cut short by illness ; but so much were the labours of the good padre appreciated that, when after the return of the troops to Trichinopoly, the Nawab's donation was distributed, 600 pagodas were offered to him. He had not asked for anything, but he accepted the unlooked-for gift and divided it between his Tamil congregation and the school for European orphans. So pleased was the Nawab with his behaviour in this matter that he sent him a further present of 300 pagodas for the school, a present which was supplemented by a subscription from the Governor, Mr. Palk.⁴

Yusuf Khan's elation at his victory was great. He rewarded

¹ See p. 137 above.

² *Geschichte der Missions anstalten in Ost Indien*, Vol. IX. Pt. I. p. 581-587 and 594-597.

³ “ The dreadful smell of those whose wounds had mortified or who had been attacked by dysentery.” *Geschichte des Missions*, Vol. IX. Pt. I. p. 582.

⁴ Report of the S.P.C.K. for 1765.

Marchand handsomely for his services,¹ and to his friend the King of Tanjore he wrote :—

“ The English have erected batteries opposite the north and west side of the fort and have day and night kept up a fire for twenty days both from cannon and mortars. On the 26th Zehige, being Tuesday, they stormed the fort and scaled the walls at the same time, but they were beat off as the people in the fort fought very well. They left their ladders behind them and retired to their batteries. By the assistance of God ² and your favour I gained a great victory. Report will inform you of the number of Europeans and sepoy killed and wounded. There are but fifteen sepoy killed and fifteen wounded ³ belonging to the garrison ; should they attack us again I will beat them well.” ⁴

It took some time, however, for the news of the English repulse to spread across India. On the 15th October, the very day when Yusuf Khan was hanged and Marchand with his crew of valiant vagabonds were prisoners in the English camp, M. Bernard Picot de la Motte, afterwards Governor of Mahé, was writing ⁵ :—

“ The news of the delivery of Madura has given us much joy, and, for myself, I am charmed that our Messieurs, who were in the place, have got out of their difficulty in a manner so glorious for themselves. This event makes it clear that the French, when they like, can make head against the English, and that our party in India needs only a leader. It has at last obtained the reward of its conduct. Praise be to God ! ”

The most terrible feature of war in these times was the dreadful suffering and mortality amongst the wounded, owing

¹ *Précis Historique*, p. 37.

² According to the Diary of the Danish Mission at Tranquebar (29th June, 1764) there was a rumour that Yusuf Khan had consulted the Goddess Minakshi, who had replied, “ Fear not for thyself. The enemy shall do thee no harm.” *Geschichte des Missions anstalten in Ost Indien*, Vol. IX. Pt. I. pp. 569-570.

³ A Subadar who deserted to the English on the 2nd July reported that Yusuf Khan lost 250 men (see p. 211, below) and Marchand (*Précis Historique*, p. 37) says that he also had lost a number of his men in this assault.

⁴ *Letter from Mahomed Ali Chan, Nabob of Arcot, to the Court of Directors . . . with an Appendix of original papers*, p. 49. Letter from Isouf Cawn to Tulsajee, Raja of Tanjore.

⁵ *Bibliothèque Nationale Nouv. Acq. Franc.*, 9074, f. 218.

to the absence of proper surgical and medical appliances, but even this deficiency furnished occasion for the display of courage and fortitude. Padre Schwartz ¹ writes :—

“Another young Englishman was wounded in the arm. When I came to the hospital at Sikandarmalai, where he was, he came to me and discovered with a flood of tears the condition of his soul, eagerly received instruction, and though . . . he had some difficulties, the compassionate High Priest allowed him to taste of consolation. Mortification attacked the wound and his arm had to be amputated. The surgeon ² asked him whether he felt much pain. To which he replied, ‘It is of no consequence, you also suffer whilst you perform an operation.’ Later on splinters came out of the arm, and consumption with several other diseases brought him to his grave but *his soul*, we may believe, to the peace of the righteous.”

¹ *Geschichte der Missions anstalten in Ost Indien*, Vol. IX. Pt. I. p. 584.

² Schwartz mentions no names, but from the *Military Consultations* of 1st Aug., 1764, p. 553, it appears that the senior surgeon, Colley Lyon Lucas, was at Sikandarmalai at the time of the assault of the 26th June.

CHAPTER XIV

BLOCKADE AND FALL OF MADURA

It is not easy to follow the rest of the story, as Major Campbell's Journal now becomes very irregular, and Marchand's *Précis Historique* is rather an apology for his conduct than a narrative of actual events. There remains, however, the official correspondence, including translations of several letters from Marchand by which it is possible to check the statements made in his *Précis*.

Yusuf Khan, as has been said, was in high spirits, and assured his men that the English would now give up the siege, though after his own experiences in 1757, when he and Caillaud persisted in the siege of Madura in spite of repeated failures, he can hardly have believed that the English would be satisfied with a single repulse. Later on, when there was no sign of retirement, he conceived that they intended to resort to negotiation, and gave out that General Lawrence was coming from Madras to settle the terms of peace in person.¹ The inaction of the besiegers was however due to the fact that Campbell could not make up his mind as to what course he should pursue. Personally he would have preferred another attempt to storm the town, being firmly convinced

“that if Englishmen can but once get within reach of bayonets the most resolute black troops will give way;”²

but he was doubtful whether the state of the Company's affairs would bear the results of another failure. Moreover, though the wounded were doing well, there were great

¹ Campbell to Council, 5th Aug. *Mil. Cons.*, 13th Aug., 1764, p. 590.

² Campbell to Council, 27th June. *Mil. Cons.*, 3rd July, 1764, p. 457.

numbers of men sick in hospital owing to the heavy rain and the fatiguing duty. Some of the officers thought an assault impracticable without further works, and many went so far as to say that, even if they could carry the walls, they had to deal, in Yusuf Khan and his chief followers, with such desperate men that it was extremely likely that they would be, even then, driven back. Preston, whose gallantry in the assault had saved him from any loss of prestige, still maintained his opinion that it was foolish to throw away men in attempting to storm a place so desperately defended, that the proper course was a blockade, which could now easily be made effective, as practically all the poligars had submitted to the Nawab and were available for cutting off communication between Yusuf Khan and his friends outside, and he again urged that Palamcottah should first be taken, so as to concentrate the whole army at Madura. From the town itself came news of increasing scarcity of provisions; the horses in particular were reported to be starving, and though the garrison had plenty of ammunition, the men were discontented and in constant terror of another assault. In fact, on the 2nd July a Subadar, stationed outside the fort, came over with his company of 46 men—the only instance during the siege of any large number of Yusuf Khan's native troops deserting in a body.¹ He said that Yusuf Khan's loss in the assault had been 250 men.

All this Campbell reported to the Council,

"though I must still think that if our men could come within push of bayonets of them that (*sic*) they would soon conquer."²

He went himself to Palamcottah to judge of the feasibility of its capture, but decided that it was wiser not to make the attempt, for the reason already mentioned, namely that, as the wives and families of the garrison were in Madura, it was certain the Commandant of Palamcottah would make a most determined defence as long as Madura was untaken, and it was equally certain that he would surrender without resistance as soon as he should hear that his family had fallen into the hands of the

¹ Campbell's Journal. *Orme MSS.*, 74, p. 95.

² Campbell to Council, 2nd July, 1764.

Nawab.¹ The Council, therefore, though they expressed a fear that Yusuf Khan might make an attempt to cut his way through to Palamcottah when Madura became untenable, acquiesced in his proposal to leave that town for the present and to turn the siege of Madura into a blockade.² They ordered him to prevent any one leaving the town—an order which, out of motives of humanity, he disobeyed—except now and then single persons from whom he might obtain intelligence, and as the pioneers had returned from Manilla, they were sent on to Madura, where they arrived on the 12th July (the day on which Preston died, having lived just long enough to see his advice finally accepted), and immediately set to work on a deep ditch, with places of arms and redoubts, either palisaded or surrounded with thorns, which, as may be seen from Marchand's plan, was carried completely round the town except on the north or river face, forming a circuit of about six miles. This task proved very difficult, for, as Campbell says:—

“Our labour and fatigue was on these occasions very great as the heavy rains had set in and the trenches being full of water brought on sickness among the troops, the works often washed down and the magazines often filled with water notwithstanding the greatest care being taken to prevent it.”³

To the actual manual labour was added the worry of having to watch against the constant efforts of the besieged to interrupt the work by almost daily skirmishes, and also the necessity of preventing the Kallans from communicating with the garrison. On the 18th July, however, two of these last were caught carrying Betel into the fort, and from them it was ascertained that a large store of this very necessary article was hidden in a village three miles away. This was partly destroyed and partly brought into camp by a party sent by Major Wood, who commanded during Campbell's absence in Tinnevely. Another possible source of annoyance was disposed of on the 19th, when Captain Kelly reported the capture of Vadagarai. This strong fort, with a garrison of 3 officers and 8 European gunners, 94 topasses,

¹ Campbell to Council, 12th July. Council to Campbell, 19th July, 1764.

² Council to Campbell, 10th July, 1764.

³ Campbell's Journal. *Orme MSS.*, 74, p. 95.

3 companies of sepoys and many Kallans, with 16 guns, 3 of which were fit for the field, commanded the passes into Travancore, by which Europeans and topasses, recruited for Yusuf Khan on the Malabar Coast, were accustomed to join him—in fact, those taken in the fort were only waiting a favourable opportunity of doing so.¹ There was not, however, much danger now of any one attempting to assist Yusuf Khan. Even in June his agents in the sea-coast towns were beginning to look upon his cause as hopeless. On the 19th of that month Mr. Brower wrote from Tranquebar: “Yusuf Khan’s agents here glorify themselves in being masters of his money.”² The failure of the assault had certainly brightened the prospect, but even this was not sufficient to induce M. Hugel, who had now safely arrived at Tranquebar, to run the risk of involving himself in the penalties which he would have incurred by attempting to join Yusuf Khan. He remained quietly where he was, made a merit to the Madras Council of abstaining from joining the enemies of the English, and actually had the hardihood to ask them to support his troop until the arrival of M. Law.³ Haidar Ali, for his part, wrote to the Council protesting his friendship for the English.

The rest of July, the whole of August, and part of September passed without any slackening in the vigour of the defence, though the increasing stringency of the blockade added greatly to the sufferings of the defenders. The Europeans and topasses, many of whom were deserters, were alarmed at the certainty that the place must ultimately fall, and began to desert by twos and threes, in spite of the severity with which Yusuf Khan punished any who were caught in the act. The horsemen, apparently the least loyal of the native portion of the garrison, complained loudly “of their horses dying and the prospect they have of starving themselves.”⁴ On the 14th August, Campbell wrote:—

“By all the intelligence I can learn from the fort, the provisions which is served out is very bad and in smaller quantities than before,

¹ Campbell to Council, 22nd July. *Mil. Cons.*, 28th July, 1764, p. 549.

² *Mil. Cons.*, 7th and 22nd June, 1764, pp. 364, 405.

³ *Letter to Court*, 20th Oct., 1764, para. 34.

⁴ Campbell to Council, 5th Aug. *Mil. Cons.*, 13th Aug., 1764, p. 590

the garrison in general extremely unhappy. They continue to kill and eat their horses—are grown very sickly. *Yusuf Khan* appears very melancholy and dejected, seldom goes near his family or suffers any person to come near him excepting two companies of his oldest sepoys. From all reports of the situation of the fort I hope we shall not be obliged to make another attack but get the place by famine.”¹

So certain was he of this that on the 29th he sent away a detachment under his brother, Donald Campbell, to assist the Nawab in the Arcot country against roving parties of the friends of *Yusuf Khan*, and also strengthened Captain Hart's detachment at Palamcotta. At Madura itself, to check the increasing sickness amongst his troops, he moved the camp up into the high ground and built huts as a protection against the rain. On the 30th a French sergeant deserted from the fort and confirmed the reports of the distress of the garrison. He stated, says Campbell :—

“that the severe rains we have lately had and bad rice and provisions that are served [out] has such an effect upon the troops that they swell and become dropsical and die with a few days sickness ; that three more Europeans were coming off with him but were taken and, I suppose, hanged, as *Yusuf Khan* does everybody he catches. It is astonishing how he can keep his troops from delivering up himself and the fort, for by all reports everybody is ready for such an action ; the Frenchmen and sepoys say that dead horses, dead men, women and children lie unburied amongst the ruins of houses, which must, I think, increase sickness. In short if any credit is to be given to any intelligence that comes from the fort they must be in a terrible situation.”

There is little doubt that the deserters, in self-justification, exaggerated their sufferings ; but it must be remembered that the second advance on Madura was so calculated that *Yusuf Khan* was unable to collect the new harvest, and that the blockade prevented the native troops from obtaining any supply of vegetables, the chief article of Indian diet, or of, what distressed them most,

“betel, an aromatic plant which the natives of India constantly

¹ *Mil. Cons.*, 20th Aug., 1764, p. 629.

chew, and which they feel the want of as much as an Englishman would that of beer and roast beef.”¹

The writer of the words just quoted adds :—

“ You’ll easily form an idea of Yusuf Khan’s abilities from his being able to keep together a body of men of different nations, who with cheerfulness undergo the greatest miseries on his account ; wretches who have stood two severe sieges, one assault and a blockade of many months.”

On the 12th September a woman brought Campbell a letter from Rowling, in which he said that Yusuf Khan was turning all his property into money and forming a party of his best sepoys with the intention of attempting to cut his way through the camp of the besiegers. Rowling’s communications had always been looked upon with suspicion, and this particular letter is peculiar because two days later Yusuf Khan made proposals for a capitulation. It looks as if the letter was only intended to influence Campbell in favour of granting terms, for fear lest Yusuf Khan, with the bulk of his treasure, should escape him. Marchand tells us² that he strongly advised Yusuf Khan not to make any attempt at negotiation, on the ground that it would certainly be taken to be a confession of weakness, that his only hope of safety lay in himself, and that it would be better to die sword in hand cutting his way through the ranks of his enemies or buried beneath the ruins of his capital. Such suggestions, even if they were ever made, were heroic only in appearance, for they involved either the desertion or destruction of Yusuf Khan’s family. It would appear, moreover, that though Yusuf Khan was now willing enough to accept an honourable capitulation he did not really trust Marchand, but thought that, if the proposals came from the latter, Campbell, influenced by Rowling’s letter, might possibly accept them. Accordingly, on the 14th September,³ Campbell received a letter from a sea-captain named Rawlinson,

¹ Letter from Palamcottah dated 22nd Oct., 1764. *Scots Magazine*, 1765, p. 266. See Appendix V., p. 289.

² *Précis Historique*, p. 40.

³ Campbell to Council, 15th Sept. *Mil. Cons.*, 21st Dec., 1764, p. 716.

who had been for a long time a prisoner in Madura, saying that he had been recently made over to M. Marchand and would be set at liberty if Campbell would write to the latter gentleman. Supposing that something must underlie this strange communication, Campbell wrote as requested to Marchand, who immediately sent Rawlinson out with a letter from himself proposing an exchange of prisoners and a personal interview. Rawlinson said that Marchand had pressed him again and again to obtain the desired interview, and he also brought a small note from Rowling saying that Yusuf Khan had authorised Marchand to settle a capitulation, and that he only demanded to be allowed to go where he pleased. Rawlinson had been so closely confined that he could give no information about the town beyond confirming the reports of general distress and the existence of a report that Yusuf Khan, if he could not obtain terms, would attempt to cut his way out of the place.¹

Campbell refused the personal interview at first, but, on the 16th, when Marchand had conferred with Majors Call and Wood, they brought him to Campbell's quarters, where he proposed that Yusuf Khan should be allowed to retire to Dindigul with his family, his troops and a few guns. Campbell replied that he would accept of nothing but a surrender at discretion, and flatly refused a further proposal to allow Yusuf Khan to go away with his family and only a few troops. It was clear, from what was admitted by Marchand, that the garrison was in the greatest distress, and that if he could find any way of getting off with his own men he would take it. He was asked to consult with Yusuf Khan and come again, for Campbell had some doubts as to how far Yusuf Khan and Marchand were in agreement. On the 17th Marchand returned with a letter from Yusuf Khan, in which he asserted that his only reason for not coming to Madras when summoned by the Council was his fear of the hostility and treachery of the Nawab, and in which he also complained that his request to be relieved of his governorship and to be allowed to go elsewhere had not been granted, though as a matter of fact this had been conceded on the 12th January, 1764.² Marchand supported Yusuf Khan's letter

¹ Campbell to Council, 16th Sept. *Mil. Cons.*, 22nd Sept., 1764, p. 718.

² See pp. 166, 167, above.

with all the arguments he could think of, even threatening Campbell—

“with the most positive assurances that he [Yusuf Khan] can make the garrison hold out to the end of the year, even though they had nothing to eat for the last month of it.”

Campbell, however, persisted in his refusal to grant any terms. He would not consent to Yusuf Khan taking any troops with him, and said that Yusuf Khan's only chance of obtaining any favour was to surrender at discretion, and that it was idle to submit any other proposals to the Council. Whilst Campbell was writing his report to Madras, one of Yusuf Khan's confidants brought him a letter in which Yusuf Khan suggested that Campbell should send his boy, Sultan, into the fort to talk with him, or, if he preferred it, he would send out Rowling. Confirmed in his suspicion that Yusuf Khan and Marchand were not on confidential terms, Campbell, in the hope of increasing the jealousy between them, asked that Rowling might be sent out; but apparently Marchand's report had convinced Yusuf Khan that any further negotiation was useless, and on the 18th he wrote repeating his request to be allowed to pass with his family and a small force as escort,¹ but saying that he could not send Rowling as he had fallen ill. Campbell forwarded a full account of the negotiations and all Yusuf Khan's letters to Madras, where Council decided on the 22nd and 24th September that they would accept nothing but a surrender at discretion, and that they had no further orders to give on the subject. This decision appears to have been communicated to Yusuf Khan and Marchand about the 29th. Marchand ascribes the inflexibility of the Council to the persuasions of the Nawab, and it is true that the Nawab wrote to the Council advising them to refuse Yusuf Khan's proposals on the ground that in money alone his rebellion had cost them a crore of rupees, and that it was improper to let him go away “for so long as he is safe so long will there be disturbances in the country;”² but this letter

¹ Yusuf Khan's last proposals were that he should be allowed to go off with 1000 sepoy, 300 horse, 2 covered waggons and 2 field-pieces, with, of course, his family. *Letter to Court*, 20th Oct., 1764, para. 21.

² *Country Correspondence*, 1764.

was not written until the 27th September, and was not received by Council until the 8th October.

As Campbell fully believed that Yusuf Khan would attempt to cut his way out, he had strengthened his outposts, and had sent warning throughout the country to be prepared to arrest him if he succeeded in forcing his way through the line of circumvallation, round which the Nawab's horsemen kept up a constant patrol.¹

Meanwhile affairs went from worse to worse within the fort. Yusuf Khan sent out poor people and weavers by hundreds.² The Europeans were reported to be eating horses, monkeys, donkeys, and cats ; " it was necessary to resort to those horrid expedients which great hunger suggests." ³ The native portion of the garrison had long been reduced to a diet of old rice and a modicum of salt.⁴ Worst of all, dissension had sprung up among the defenders. Marchand tells us ⁵ that Yusuf Khan, after the failure of his proposals, had fallen into a lethargy of despair, from which he roused himself only to indulge in wild outbursts of fury, when he terrified every one by his violence and cruelty. But we have seen that from the very beginning of their association it was difficult for the two men to keep upon friendly terms, and now, when co-operation was above all things necessary, they quarrelled incessantly,⁶ and it is asserted ⁷ that on one occasion passion flamed so high that Yusuf Khan actually struck Marchand with his riding whip, an unpardonable insult never before offered to a European officer in this part of India. From that moment, Marchand, who had been prevented only by superior force from taking immediate vengeance,

¹ Campbell to Council, 15th Sept. *Mil. Cons.*, 22nd Sept., 1764, p. 718. Nawab to Council, 13th Oct., 1764. *Country Correspondence*.

² Campbell received and settled these people in the deserted villages and gave them employment. Campbell's Journal. *Orme MSS.*, 74, p. 96.

³ Letter from Captain Eccles Nixon, dated 12th Oct., 1764. *Edinburgh Advertiser*, 23rd April, 1765. Marchand, *Précis Historique*, p. 38.

⁴ Letter from Palamcottah. See Appendix V., p. 289.

⁵ The rest of this chapter is compiled from (1) Letter from Campbell and Call to Council, dated 16th Oct., 1764 ; (2) Campbell's Journal ; (3) Marchand's letter to Council, dated 17th Oct., 1764 ; and (4) Marchand's *Précis Historique*. Details from other sources are indicated in the notes.

⁶ See Appendix III. (b), p. 264.

⁷ Bruno's *Journal*. See Appendix V., p. 297.

forgot his duty in his thirst for revenge.¹ To attain his object was not so very difficult, for it will be remembered that a report prevailed that Yusuf Khan intended to cut his way out of the fort if terms were not granted him.² I have shown that this was a course which it was impossible for a man like Yusuf Khan to take for himself, whilst none of his best men would have left their wives and families in the fort to the vengeance of the Nawab, in order to follow a man who by so cowardly a flight was betraying the instincts of his race and profession.³ But the fatal report had spread abroad and must have been known to all, and without doubt there were many who, having fallen into disfavour, thought that they at any rate would be left behind when the attempt to escape should be made, and so began to watch every movement of their leader with suspicious eyes. All this was known to Marchand, and he fanned the flame, urging the native officers to use force to prevent Yusuf Khan from escaping. A conspiracy to seize Yusuf Khan and hand him over to the Nawab was formed, with Srinavas Rao⁴ and Baba Sahib as its leaders.

“The latter had private causes of complaint against Khan Sahib, by whom he had often been ill-treated, and burned for revenge.”

¹ In their letter of the 16th Oct., Messrs. Campbell and Call refer to a previous attempt on the part of Marchand to arrange for the surrender of the town. See Appendix III (a), p. 257.

² See pp. 215, 216 above.

³ On the 29th Sept., Mr. Palk wrote to the Nawab of Yusuf Khan's reported intention to escape as an attempt “in which I think it can only be the interest of a few of his followers to assist him, especially as their families and effects must remain in the Fort.” *Country Correspondence*. The Abbé Dubois tells us (*Customs, Manners and Ceremonies*, III. 9) that Muhammadan chiefs of high rank “never cry for quarter, and even when the day is going against them they will not retreat a step as long as they have the support of a few of their followers. Flight or retreat under such circumstances is considered by them even more ignominious than it is by their European opponents.”

⁴ A Tanjore Brahman. Kirmani, *Hydur Naik*, p. 162. Apparently he was Yusuf Khan's diwan or chief adviser and not a soldier. The *Tamil Ballad* says he was deprived of his eyesight by order of the Nawab. On the other hand, Mr. Rangasami Naidu tells me that Srinavas Rao's Muhammadan confederate was rewarded by the gift of the village of Perungudi. The *Tamil Ballad* says that Yusuf Khan was warned of this conspiracy in a dream by the goddess Minakshi, but took no notice of the warning.

The conspirators fixed the 13th October for the attempt. The time chosen was 10 a.m. when most of the soldiers would be off duty, but Yusuf Khan that morning did not make his appearance in public. This apparently frightened some of the native leaders, who must have thought that he had stayed in his quarters owing to suspicion of their intentions, but the bulk of them had now gone too far to recede. At 5 o'clock in the evening, Marchand with the leaders of the conspiracy entered a private room,¹ where they found Yusuf Khan engaged in his prayers, and there one of the subadars taxed him with his intention to desert those who had so long and so faithfully served him. Furious at the insult, Yusuf Khan drew his sword and cut down his traducer, but was overpowered by the rest of the conspirators, bound, it is said,² with his own turban, and, though he begged them to kill him there and then rather than deliver him to the Nawab, he was carried under guard to Marchand's quarters, apparently close by, where he was kept under strict surveillance by some of his troopers.³

Everything so far had been done quietly, for it was the hope of the mutineers to obtain the full advantage of their action by treating with the Nawab for the surrender of Yusuf Khan. Marchand had posted the artillerymen at their guns with strict injunctions to be ready to fire at a moment's notice, and the guards were all going their rounds as if nothing were happening, whilst the gathering darkness of night, deepened by an approaching storm, prevented the general public from knowing what was going on. Only one of Yusuf Khan's men, a brave young fellow named Mudali, was aware of his master's plight. Hurrying to the women's quarters he sent word to Yusuf Khan's wife, despatched a message to the artillerymen, which, apparently coming from Marchand, made them all abandon their posts, and having collected five or six hundred men he went to

¹ Marchand says he was seized in his Darbar. The Dutch account says he was seized in a private room. Bishop Caldwell (*Tinnevely*, p. 130) says the native account was that he was seized when at his prayers by "Moossoo Marsan and his Hindu diwan Srinavas Rao."

² Peixoto, *Anecdotes relative to the Rise of Hyder Ali*, p. 82. See Appendix V., p. 292, below.

³ Letter from Captain Matthew Horne to R. Smith, 20th Oct., 1764. *Orme MSS.*, 27, p. 143. See Appendix V., p. 286.

Yusuf Khan's rescue. But the attempt to create confusion by the order sent to the artillerymen only resulted in their coming to Marchand's quarters, where they joined him and the other conspirators. Mudali was shot or cut down at once—he was the only man killed in the affair—and the men whom he had brought with him, having no one to lead them and afraid to attack Marchand, who had brought up and posted a couple of field-pieces in front of his door, quickly dispersed. A last effort was made by Yusuf Khan's wife, who sent Marchand a letter, offering him the fort and all the treasure in it if he would release her husband, but he refused, saying it was the native officers and not he who held him prisoner.

It was now necessary for the conspirators to communicate with the camp, where no one yet knew what had happened within, though they had been surprised at the sudden cessation of the fire from the walls, which had hitherto never been wholly interrupted.¹ The native officers chose as their envoys Yusuf Khan's physician, Badruddin Darwesh, and two other men whose names are unknown, whilst Marchand selected M. Perigny-Beaumarchais, formerly engineer at Fort St. David, who had for some time been under Yusuf Khan's displeasure, and who appears to have been a non-combatant. M. Perigny and his fellow envoys left the town at 8 o'clock. He took with him the following letter ²:—

“A Monsieur Campbell, Majeur et Commandant de l'armée Anglaise devant le Maduré. Au camp.

“MONSIEUR,

“J'ay l'honneur de vous donner avis que je viens d'arrester le Sr. Kan-saeb avec le consentement de tous ses chefs.

“Je vous envoie Mr Perigny porteur de la presente pour vous faire par de notre position.

“Je vous demande une grace général (que je vous prie de lui remettre) pour tous ceux qui sont dans le cas de la requirire.

“Demain matin je m'expliray plus emplement pour cette place

¹ So unexpected was this sudden collapse of the defence that on this very day Major Call had written to R. Smith a letter in which he says, “If this con-founded place were taken I should, etc., etc.” *Orme MSS.*, 27, p. 129.

² This letter still exists in the Orme Collection, 281, p. 25. I have copied it *verbatim et literatim*.

et celle de Palliancotte, en attendant que je puisse conférer avec vous demain ou ce soir (si vous pouvez envoyer avec Mr Perigny deux commissaires) des forces supérieures à celles que j'ay pour estre l'aigle sur le glaïs de la grande porte de l'ouest, au premier moment que le cas le requerrera où les troubles et conspirations qui peuvent survénir d'juy a demain. Le porteur vous fera plus emplement le detail des choses.

“ J'ay l'honneur d'estre,

“ Parfaitement,

“ Monsieur, votre tres humble et très obeissant serviteur,

le 13 8^{bre} 1764,

“ MARCHAND.”

a 8^h du soir.

This somewhat incoherent letter reached Major Campbell about 11 o'clock at night. At first he thought it was a fresh trick of Yusuf Khan, probably intended to cover his evasion ; but being somewhat reassured by M. Perigny, he sent him back with Captain Meyers, the latter being entrusted with a message, in which Campbell promised M. Marchand and the Europeans (deserters excepted) their lives, and asked that the west gate should be given into his possession and Yusuf Khan delivered into his hands. To guard against any trickery the whole army was kept under arms, and Campbell himself went to the trenches. A company of grenadiers and five companies of sepoys went with Captain Meyers, and were posted by him near the south gate ¹ so as to be ready at a moment's notice. He and M. Perigny entered the town by this gate at 5 a.m. on the 14th. They went immediately to Marchand, who told Captain Meyers the reasons for what he had done and the measures he proposed to take in regard to the surrender of the place. Having satisfied himself that Marchand's offer was genuine, and three guns being fired as a signal for his return to camp, Captain Meyers departed, Marchand begging him to obtain the despatch of two commissaries as requested in his first letter, for he had an enemy within the fort as well as one without to deal with. He said

¹ Marchand had asked for troops to be sent to the west gate ; but that faced the camp, so possibly the envoys thought it safer to keep it closed. On the other hand, the south gate, being closer to Marchand's quarters where apparently Yusuf Khan was confined, was more convenient for the party intended to support Marchand.

he left the treatment of himself and his men to the generosity of the Nawab and the Council.

About 10 o'clock, Badruddin and his comrades having finished their business with the Nawab, Captain Meyers returned to the fort with a paper from Major Campbell, demanding the fort and Yusuf Khan at discretion, and granting the Europeans and topasses (deserters excepted) their lives, apparel, and other effects, but reserving to a later decision the manner in which the prisoners should be disposed of. Captain Meyers took with him Ensign Desvoeux, the Nawab's *diwan*, and some other of his officers, and also five palanquins and four companies of sepoy, for whom he asked admission. The palanquins of course were for the conveyance of Yusuf Khan and his family to the camp, but Badruddin and his companions urged that the sepoy should not be admitted until the terms that had been obtained from the Nawab had been discussed by the native officers. This caused another delay until 1 o'clock, when Marchand drew up four articles of capitulation which he asked Captain Meyers to take out. These were ¹ :—

“(1) M. Marchand shall march out with the troops both black and white with their arms and baggage, colours flying, drums beating and loaded muskets, to the foot of the glacis, where they shall lay down their arms except the officers and volunteers.

“(2) No person in M. Marchand's troop shall be molested under pretence of desertion or on any other account.

“(3) M. Marchand's troops as well as the topasses of the Malabar and Coromandel Coasts the day before they set out for Tranquebar shall be advanced one month's pay, agreeable to what they had in this place, to enable them to proceed there.

“(4) M. Marchand shall be permitted to go to Tranquebar with his troops, where shall be allowed to them a subsistence agreeable to the allowances stipulated in the Cartel made in the last war between our sovereigns, until the re-establishment of the French nation in India or until the arrival of the Commissaries.”

In other words, M. Marchand, whose only alternative to surrender was to release Yusuf Khan, and thus to give the signal for the immediate massacre of himself and all his countrymen,

¹ *Mil. Cons.*, 27th Oct., 1764, p. 877.

asked Major Campbell, who was forbidden by his superiors to grant any terms whatever, to allow him the honours of war. Naturally enough, Campbell was not so foolish as to sign such a document. He proceeded to the south gate himself, and with difficulty persuaded the guard to admit Ensign Smith¹ (Campbell's aide-de-camp) and some sepoy with orders to proceed towards the west gate, opposite to the English camp, which he particularly wished to get into his possession. On their way they were stopped by a hundred topasses with fixed bayonets, who told Smith that M. Marchand had forbidden any gate to be opened until something certain had been signed for the garrison. Smith asked to be taken to M. Marchand, and, as he pretended to have something particular to say to him, he was conducted to the house where Yusuf Khan was a prisoner, and there found Marchand with his two field-pieces and about four hundred French and topasses, deserters included, drawn up under arms, three deep with lighted matches. Marchand was in fact little better than a prisoner himself. Captain Meyers had made no secret that he doubted whether Campbell would grant the capitulation which Marchand had proposed, whereas Marchand's men thought he had been too moderate. They had threatened to kill him and his chief officers, and were furious when they found that sepoy were being admitted to the town; and now, when Smith coolly urged the absolute necessity of opening the west gate before anything had even been settled which would secure the lives of the deserters, of whom there were a great number in their ranks, they were convinced that they had been betrayed. It was of little use for Smith to promise vaguely that their good conduct would be favourably remembered; they were determined to have something definite or to release Yusuf Khan. Fortunately for Marchand, they agreed to await another reference to Campbell, and Ensign Desvoeux, who seems to have stayed with Marchand, hurried off to inform Campbell that unless a pardon were immediately granted to the deserters the whole affair would be upset. Campbell, meanwhile, had been steadily introducing his men in small

¹ John Smith, brother of General Richard Smith, was at this time Campbell's aide-de-camp. Campbell does not mention his name, but it is given in Horne's letter of the 20th Oct., 1764, already referred to.

bodies, but neither of the gates had yet been secured, and, especially as the night was coming on, anything might have happened in the event of a counter-revolution taking place; so he took a piece of paper and with a pencil wrote "something relative to a general pardon, but not clear enough to protect them." As this paper has disappeared, it is difficult to know exactly what Campbell pledged himself to do, but the Council held that he had promised the deserters their lives, and as a general pardon it was interpreted by Marchand to his men, who thereupon declared they would lay down their arms.

Word was carried to Campbell, who now rode in with the cavalry. When he reached Marchand's quarters the latter offered to surrender his sword, which Campbell immediately returned to him, whereupon the men threw down their weapons. Yusuf Khan was handed over to the Nawab's servants, who, though the looks of the people showed they were glad the siege was over,¹ evidently thought an attempt at rescue or escape was possible, and therefore bound him² down in one of the palanquins before they carried him out to the camp, where he was confined for the night in a pagoda. His wife and family, who were made prisoners at the same time, were despatched at once to Trichinopoly.³

"Thus ended this long, bloody and tedious siege and blockade, much to the satisfaction of the Nawab and Governor and Council."⁴

¹ "Yesterday we marched in our troops and took possession of the Fort with joy in the countenance of the resigners both black and white. Yusuf Khan was sent out and delivered to the Nawab, who ordered him to camp, and to-day he was hanged in the front of the lines—so much for French faith!" Letter dated Camp before Madura, 15th Oct., 1764. *Gazetteer and Daily Advertiser*, 30th March, 1765.

² Letter from Bassora, 12th Feb., 1765. *Scots Magazine*, 1765, p. 267.

³ Major Wood to Council, 4th Nov. *Mil. Cons.*, 12th Nov., 1764, p. 936. Practically nothing is known of what became of Yusuf Khan's family. The *Tamil Ballad* says however that his wife and son retired to Travancore. The Dutch account of Yusuf Khan's treaty with the King states, it will be remembered, that the King promised them his protection. As regards Yusuf Khan's son, see below, p. 233 (n.).

⁴ Campbell's Journal. *Orme MSS.*, 74, p. 100.

CHAPTER XV

CONCLUSION

ON the 15th October the Nawab wrote to Madras :—

“To-day, being Monday, the Rebel was hung at five o’clock in the evening, which struck a terror into the hearts of our enemies.”¹

Little is known for certain of what happened in the brief period between the arrival of Yusuf Khan in camp and his execution. Marchand² says that he was at first in the hands of the English and was well treated, it being the intention of the Council to retain him as a prisoner, whose release they might hold *in terrorem* over the Nawab if the latter should at any time display an inconvenient independence, but that Campbell was persuaded by a heavy bribe to surrender him to the Nawab, who ordered him to be hanged immediately in order to anticipate any contrary instructions in his favour. The Council, he adds, were extremely annoyed, and the Nawab had to pay a large sum of money to appease their anger, but thought this a cheap price for the destruction of so dangerous an enemy. This malicious statement is demonstrably false, for not only had the Council decided even before the beginning of the war³ that Yusuf Khan should be punished by death if he did not submit, but immediately on receipt of the news of his capture, Mr. Palk wrote to the Nawab :—

“It is a satisfaction I scarce expected to get the Rebel himself in your possession. The measure of his iniquities was full ;”⁴

and again on hearing of his death,

“I have received your Excellency’s letter and am well pleased

¹ *Country Correspondence*, 1764, No. 205. ² *Précis Historique*, pp. 48, 49.

³ See p. 143 above.

⁴ *Country Correspondence*, 1764, No. 201.

at the manner of your executing the Rebel, which will, no doubt, deter others from being guilty of his crimes.”¹

Similarly, the Council wrote ² to the Court of Directors :—

“The next evening an example was made of the Rebel which we hope will have a good effect and deter others from the many crimes he has been guilty of to support his power.”

It is clear, therefore, that the Council were in full agreement with the Nawab as to the necessity of the execution of Yusuf Khan, as an example to any of their servants who might rise to high position of the penalty attaching to treason. The infliction of the sentence was naturally left to the Nawab, the Governor of Madura and Tinnevely being rightfully the vassal of the Nawab and not of the Company.

All accounts, except that of Marchand, agree that Yusuf Khan was immediately handed over to the Nawab's officers, who had arrived in the fort with or before Campbell, and by them taken to the camp, where it appears he was questioned as to the whereabouts of the treasure which he was supposed to have amassed. To this inquiry his only reply was to refer them to his secretary. Beside three months' provisions and plenty of ammunition, the captors had found four lakhs of pagodas in the fort,³ but this did not satisfy the Nawab, and the Dutch Accounts ⁴ add significantly that the secretary died soon after. Marchand says that Yusuf Khan gave way to undignified lamentation over his fate, but this also is untrue, and it appears from the testimony of English officers that he accepted his lot with manly equanimity, and made no appeal whatever to either Campbell or the Nawab to spare his life.

On the evening of the 15th he was led through the camp, which lay upon the road to Dindigul, to the side facing the

¹ *Country Correspondence*, 1764, No. 206.

² Letter to Court, 24th Oct., 1764.

³ Letter from Captain Horne to R. Smith, 20th Oct., 1764. *Orme MSS.*, 27, p. 143. See Appendix V., p. 286.

⁴ Sweep's *Short Account* for 1764. Sweep gives as his authority a Portuguese priest, Constantino vas Concella [?], who was in the camp. Whether by Yusuf Khan's secretary is meant Rowling or his Diwan Srinavas Rao is uncertain.

town, and there hanged on a large mango tree. His body, according to the cruel custom of the age in *Europe as well as Asia*, was dismembered.¹ His head, like that of Chanda Sahib, was sent to Trichinopoly, his limbs to such places as Tanjore, Palamcotta, and Travancore, after they had been exposed for some time over the principal gateways of the city. The trunk apparently was buried in the village of Sammattipuram,² where Yusuf Khan is said to have usually lived whilst he ruled over Madura, and over it was built a small square mosque, which still exists and is known by the half Hindu name of the Khan Sahib's *pallivásal*. Inscriptions in Tamil and Persian on the tablet to the left of the doorway state that the tomb was erected in the year 1222 A.H. (1808 A.D.) by Shaikh Imam, son of Shaikh Kathal. The local tradition is that only his head was buried here.

It is generally believed that the circumstances of his execution partook of the extraordinary if not of the supernatural. The following is an account by a native writer³ :—

“It may not be screened from the reader that the account of the execution of this rebel which is current among the people at large is to the effect that the above mutineer was imprisoned at Madura and attempts were made to hang him three times, and at every trial the rope invariably broke, and he could not be despatched to his ever-resting place till at last he moved his sealed tongue to solve this unimaginable mystery, which was kept out of sight of the people, by revealing ‘that there was a magic ball deposited in my thigh which had been granted to me by one of the most eminent magicians and leading divine of the ascetics, and it is owing to the effects of this ball that the treasure of my life is secured, and if it is removed from me it will obviate the trouble taken to deprive me

¹ See p. 231 below. The Dutch Account and local tradition agree with Marchand on this point. Kirmani (*History of Hydur Naik*, p. 162) says he was impaled, but there is no authority for this statement. The *Tamil Ballad* says the reason why the Nawab ordered Yusuf Khan's body to be dismembered was that, three nights after his execution, Yusuf Khan appeared to his sepoys in their dreams and told them that if they performed certain ceremonies over his corpse it would come to life.

² Francis says (*Madura*, p. 67) the mosque is on the left of the Dindigul road. Mr. Rangasami Naidu informs me that it is really on a road running parallel to the Dindigul road and a little to the south.

³ *Life of the Walajah*. Wilson's *Madras Army*, I. 386.

of my soul.' Measures were accordingly adopted to do the needful, and his thigh was opened, the spell was taken and cast out, when the treasure of his soul was conveyed by the angel of death and the bier of his body was taken up by the earth. God has the best knowledge of facts."

There is no doubt that the attempt to hang him failed once, or even twice, by the breaking of the rope, but the charm by which he was protected is by some said to have been a golden ball, by others the fabulous horn of the jackal,¹ and its location is stated variously to have been his neck, his arm and his thigh. It seems to me most probable that this reputed charm was only the medal given him by the Council in 1755 with instructions to wear it always,² and that it was still round his neck when he was led out to execution. It would have been in accordance with the grim character of Yusuf Khan, when the first attempts to hang him failed, to have bidden the Nawab's executioners take away the last symbol of the Company's favour and protection, if they wished to achieve their object.

In regard to the character of Yusuf Khan, sufficient has been said as to his military capacity and as to his ability and uprightness as a civil governor.³ The reports of his cruelty (judging by the standards of his age) are not based upon any certain authority—Peixoto in fact justifies any severity he exercised during the siege by the necessities of the occasion⁴—and that he was capable of chivalry and free from any blind hatred for the English is shown by his kindly behaviour to Donald Campbell when he found him lying wounded on the field of battle.⁵ Private letters also show that, however those in authority were compelled by State policy to act with the utmost severity, his past services were remembered

¹ Or of the tiger. As regards the magical powers of the jackal horn and the clavicle of the tiger, see Jerdon, *Mammalia of India*, pp. 92 and 144.

² See pp. 21, 22 above, and 293 below.

³ As to his military capacity see the opinion of Sir John Malcolm, afterwards Governor of Bombay (Appendix V., p. 307), and as to his administrative ability that of Mr. S. R. Lushington, afterwards Governor of Madras (Appendix V., p. 304).

⁴ See Appendix V., p. 292.

⁵ See p. 150, above.

and his fate lamented by Europeans as well as natives, by civilians as well as soldiers.¹ As the servant of the Company he had been loyal when times were darkest and when rebellion would have been both easy and safe; when he did rebel the Company had no other enemy in the field, and he had been bidden to consider himself the servant no longer of the Company, but of his ancient enemy the Nawab. The change of the Company's policy was one which he had no right to criticize and much less to oppose, but it left him only the choice of resigning his high office or of a humiliating submission to a man whom he despised. To a soldier of his character and past this was intolerable, and hence Mill's assertion that he rebelled in self-defence² can hardly be questioned. It must also be remembered in his favour that, in his time, Indian opinion looked with a very lenient eye on rebellion against any one but the Great Mughal himself, for the authority of his so-called officers was only nominally based upon his grants.³ A rebel, therefore, was considered simply as a man who was prepared to play for his life, success bringing him a throne and failure bringing death. Such a man was Yusuf Khan. He may have

¹ "He [Yusuf Khan], poor wretch! was endeavouring to make his escape when his garrison seized him and delivered him over to the Nawab, who after leading him with a halter about his neck round the camp, hung him upon a tree in an avenue leading to the Fort." Letter from Edward Raddon to James Leigh, 24th Oct., 1764. *Madras High Court Records, Draft Letter Books*. "There fell Yusuf Khan, the greatest black man India could ever boast of." Letter from Lieut. George Nixon, 17th March, 1765. *Universal Magazine*, Oct., 1765, p. 220. In the *War of the Khan Sahib* it is stated that the Nawab consulted the English officers as to the disposal of Yusuf Khan, and that they unanimously recommended that he should be pardoned, but the Nawab declared that it was a question of his own life or that of Yusuf Khan, and ordered his execution. There seems, however, to be no documentary proof of this story, though it probably represents truly the wishes of the officers.

² "He resolved to give himself the chance of a struggle in his own defence." Appendix V., p. 305. Also "Among these soldiers of fortune a man highly distinguished becomes the rival of his master, and regard to his own safety is a frequent cause of rebellion." G. Rous, *Restoration of the King of Tanjore considered*, p. 45. See Appendix V., p. 295

³ See p. 12 above. If (see p. 132, above) he really received *parwanas* for Madura and Tinnevely from the Subah of the Deccan, it is not clear that Yusuf Khan could be correctly called a Rebel, for Muhammad Ali himself was the subordinate of the Subah.

hoped that the Company would have left him to fight it out with the Nawab, but this is hardly likely, for he knew as well as any man by what close links the interests of the Nawab and the Company were connected,¹ and hence he must have been prepared for the consequences of failure. His long service and previous fidelity could not serve him any more than they had availed in the case of his enemy Punniyappan.² He himself had given but a short and deadly reply to the rebel Muzaffar Beg's cry for quarter.³ He threw away the scabbard of his sword when he allied himself with the French and allowed the English flag to be burned in his camp by the hands of Frenchmen,⁴ and he was believed to have insulted the whole corps of his old comrades the British officers when he told the Maravan poligars that he could divert them from their duty by bribes.⁵ To Yusuf Khan death was probably welcome. He, the son of a humble peasant, had made a fight such as could hardly be surpassed by the feats of any of his countrymen, and when beaten it was by the treachery of his own men and not by the force of his enemies. The manner of his death was to him of no importance, but it was not, as some writers⁶ seem to imagine, a degrading form of death; for though nowadays we associate the gallows only with the crime of murder, it was then and up to the year 1814, the punishment prescribed by English law for rebellion,⁷ and that which, together with "the barbarous ceremony of unbowelling, mangling and casting the hearts into the fire,"⁸ had been inflicted in 1746 upon a number of gallant Scotch and English gentlemen who had fought for the Young Pretender.

Before leaving Yusuf Khan it is of some interest to refer to

¹ "Whatever motives instigated Yusuf Khan to revolt, the English in support of the Nawab's government were obliged to reduce him." Rous' *Restoration of the King of Tanjore considered*, p. 45. See Appendix V., p. 295.

² See p. 17 above.

³ See p. 91 above.

⁴ See p. 131 above.

⁵ See p. 143 above.

⁶ "his enemies, who . . . with a want of mercy which at this time seems all but inexcusable, hung him like a dog." Nelson, *The Madura Country*, p. 282. See Appendix V., p. 310.

⁷ See *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Art. *Treason*.

⁸ Lord Mahon, *History of England*, III. 475.

his connection with Haidar Ali. It was not to the advantage of the latter to assist Yusuf Khan, except so far as to damage the Nawab and the English without creating a possible rival for himself. Haidar Ali must have watched his career with keen attention and learned much from it, especially in regard to the adaptation of European methods of warfare to Indian armies. The necessity of European discipline and European instructors, the preparation of his own military supplies, such as muskets, guns, cannon-balls and powder, the supply of his own horses to his cavalry, possibly the advantages of attacks by night,¹ were all matters in which Haidar Ali followed if he did not actually imitate Yusuf Khan, and the fate of the latter taught him that, if he valued his independence, not to mention his personal security, he must employ only in very subordinate capacities Europeans of the class which alone would, at that time, enter the service of an Indian prince. Fortunately for the English the fact of Marchand being a Frenchman, and the failure of M. de Maudave to fulfil his promises (for Haidar naturally could not understand the dependence of French policy in India upon the state of affairs in Europe) only served to increase his distrust, and so prevented him, and his son after him, from forming a really effective alliance with the French nation.²

To return to Madura. The revolution had been almost bloodless, the only life actually lost being that of the faithful but unfortunate Mudali, and after the surrender, if we except his secretary, apparently Yusuf Khan was the only person who owed his death to the conquerors.³ The Nawab wished to enlist 21 companies of sepoys and about 200 topasses⁴ who had been in Yusuf Khan's service, but to this the Madras Council objected on the ground that, whilst the Nawab spent much money on his Indian forces, their discipline was so wretched that they were found utterly useless when required to assist the Company's troops.⁵ This can easily be understood when

¹ Attacks by night were not considered to be an honourable form of warfare by Indian soldiers. See Broome, *Bengal Army*, p. 387.

² See Law de Lauriston, *Etat de l'Inde en 1777*, p. 81, where he shows how impossible it was for Haidar Ali to trust the French.

³ See Appendix III. (a), p. 256.

⁴ Major Wood to Council, 4th Nov. *Mil. Cons.*, 12th Nov., 1764, p. 938.

⁵ *Mil. Cons.*, 29th Oct., 1764.

we reflect that the chief occupation of the Nawab's sepoys was to collect rent from recalcitrant tenants. What became of these men is not stated, but there was a warm welcome from Haidar Ali waiting for any good fighting man who was in need of service, and it is not at all unlikely that many of Yusuf Khan's old soldiers went to him, since in 1780 Yusuf Khan's son was in Mysore.¹

As regards the European prisoners there were only 16 officers and 94 privates,² and considering that at one time and another at least 400 Europeans had come into Madura since the beginning of the war, even when we allow for the losses by desertion and disease, this scanty number shows that Marchand's men had fought gallantly and done credit to the flag under which they had served. Of the privates, 34 Europeans and 12 Coffrees³ were deserters from the English army. Of the 16 officers only 10 were, according to Major Wood, Europeans, and of these 10 Marchand was the only one who could claim to be a gentleman, though perhaps Major Wood ought to have included Messieurs Perigny and d'Haumartin in this category. In reference to these men the Council decided as follows⁴ :—

“ We are concerned that Major Campbell should have granted M. Marchand and the other European prisoners, particularly the deserters, any terms, as it was never our intention that they should be allowed any. But as he has promised the deserters their lives, they are to be confined and subsisted by the Paymaster either at Madura or Trichinopoly. With respect to M. Marchand and the other Frenchmen, though Major Campbell did not sign the capitulation sent out by M. Marchand, yet we think from his promise in writing that no difficulty would be made regarding this, they have a right to expect our compliance, at least with such part thereof as may with prudence be granted them. It is therefore resolved

¹ “ It is said that *Yusuf Khan's* son at the head of 10,000 men is ready at Dindigul to enter the Madura and Tinnevely Districts, where he expects to meet with many friends on his father's account.” Letter dated Palamcottah, 1st Aug., 1780, from Captain James Edington to Council. *Mil. Cons.*

² Letter from Campbell and Call, 16th Oct. *Mil. Cons.*, 27th Oct., 1764, p. 110.

³ Major Wood to Council, 4th Nov., 1764.

⁴ *Mil. Cons.*, 27th Oct., 1764, p. 877.

that they be kept either at Madura or Trichinopoly, and that the private men be subsisted by the Paymaster till we can dispose of them in some other manner."

To relieve the Company as quickly as possible of the expense of keeping these men, Major Wood was ordered to try to enlist them in the Company's service, but in this he had little success. He writes ¹ :—

"I could enlist only two Dutchmen out of the French prisoners before they were sent away, and one has desired to stay with the Nawab, as he is said to be a fine Limner. There was one man more would have entertained in our artillery, but they all say our pay is too small to entertain them, as being accustomed to such large pay among the country powers. Besides 33 of these men had served with Yusuf Khan as officers,² and, in short, near the whole of these prisoners had been wounded and maimed, therefore could not be fit for our service ; indeed will not reconcile themselves to stay with their own nation after being so long with the black powers."

As regards the pay which they had received from Yusuf Khan, we find from an intercepted letter ³ that he paid the cavalry 33, the grenadiers 24, the artillery 22, and the infantry 20–22 rupees a month. What, then, can we think of the English pay which these plutocrats refused ? ⁴ Probably, however, the chief attraction to the native service for this class of Europeans was the freedom from unnecessary discipline and from all class distinction, which they enjoyed when away from their own flag.⁵ All the deserters, save seven, later on asked permission to re-enlist in the English service, and were permitted to do so on an engagement for five years.

We have seen that Campbell returned his sword to M.

¹ Wood to Council, 25th May. *Mil. Cons.*, 30th May, 1765, p. 510.

² Major Wood probably means officers in sepoy companies.

³ Yusuf Khan to M. Haussé, 20th March, 1764. *Orme MSS.*, 281, p. 22. Salabat Jang gave Bussy's Europeans 30 rupees a month besides food : see Journal of Bussy in the Deccan, *Bib. Nat. MSS. Nouv. Acq., Fr.* No. 9358.

⁴ Wilson (*Madras Army*, I, 114) gives the pay of the European privates in 1755 as 2½ pagodas, i.e. about 9 rupees, *per mensem*.

⁵ Speaking of Lally's troops in Haidarabad, Law says (*Etat de l'Inde en 1777*, p. 146), "Except as regards actual military duties, there prevails a freedom, a kind of equality which would not be tolerated amongst our troops."

Marchand. The latter says he surrendered himself to the Nawab, who received him with many compliments, but would listen to no representations in favour of Yusuf Khan.¹ He further tells us that Major Wood, who had been left in command whilst Campbell marched south to receive the surrender of Palam-cotta, complimented him with a sepoy guard. Major Wood wrote to the Council in November² :—

“I have always honoured M. Marchand’s person with a trusty *Jemadar’s* guard, partly to keep him from any insult which may be offered him from his [own] people and partly to have an eye over him. The allowance you have been pleased to make to him, his officers and men, will not be agreeable to him, I am sure, as he expects a large reward himself for the piece of service he has done for putting you in possession of the garrison and *Yusuf Khan*, and his people subsisted the same as when in that service. I assure you he claims no small merit, and does not stick to say he ought to have three *lakhs* from you or the *Nawab* and received in the Service ; asks the command of a troop of a hundred horse and three hundred infantry. It will be equal, he says, whether he be in the Company’s or *Nawab’s* service. I told him I would do myself the pleasure to acquaint you with his good intentions, and that he might expect to be thanked, but that was all I thought he could have.”

Campbell and Call had already reported³ that a counter-revolution in favour of Yusuf Khan had been prevented only by the good conduct and firmness of M. Marchand, but the Council thought, no doubt, that he had acted as much in his own interest as in theirs, and neither the Council nor the Nawab took any notice of his claim to a reward or of his later request to allow him to raise a corps of five or six hundred Europeans for the Nawab’s service,⁴ except to warn Major Wood that they did not trust M. Marchand, and that he must therefore carry out the orders he had received concerning his safe custody. At first it appears that they intended⁵ to send him to Europe to stand his

¹ *Précis Historique*, p. 48.

² Wood to Council, 19th Nov. *Mil. Cons.*, 28th Nov., 1764, p. 979.

³ See Appendix III. (a), p. 257.

⁴ Marchand to Council, 21st Nov. *Mil. Cons.*, 4th Dec., 1764, p. 1002.

⁵ *Mil. Cons.*, 13th Feb., 1765, p. 118.

trial, presumably for breaking his parole and for waging war against a friendly nation, though he protested that he had never been informed authoritatively of the ratification of the treaty until his interview with Campbell on the 17th September, and indeed never by his own superiors.¹ Though not in irons,² as he tells us, he was kept prisoner for some time at Trichinopoly, until at the request of M. Jean Law, who arrived in January, 1765, in India as Commissary, to receive back the French factories taken by the English, and who reminded the Council "that a soldier learns in his profession to obey only the voice of his officer,"³ the Council decided to set all the prisoners from Madura free. On the 24th and 25th May, 1765, Messieurs Marchand, d'Haumartin, and Perigny with 75 privates, all that remained of the European defenders of the town, were sent from Trichinopoly to Karical, whence they went to Pondicherry.

It is a matter of regret that there exists no authoritative account of the mutiny against Yusuf Khan. In his *Précis* Marchand says that Yusuf Khan was made prisoner by the native officers, and that he was made prisoner himself and ran a great risk of losing his life in his effort to defend him,⁴ but his letter to Campbell which I have quoted *in extenso*⁵ and the copies of his letters⁶ in the Madras Records show that he was one of the leaders, if not the chief of the conspiracy, whilst all independent accounts ascribe the actual seizure of Yusuf Khan's person to Marchand and one or more of the native officers. His well-known courage forbids one to believe that it was care for his own safety that actuated him, and his past record in the Deccan makes it unlikely that he was moved by any motive so sordid as a bribe, but he had shown as early as September that he was extremely anxious about the safety of his men, all or most of whom had enlisted at his suggestion and in reliance on his promises, though many of them, being deserters, were

¹ See Appendix III. (a), p. 252.

² "Je languis longtems dans les fers des Anglais." *Précis Historique*, p. 50.

³ Law to Council, 4th March. *Sep. Mil. Cons.*, 12th March, 1765.

⁴ See Appendix III. (b), pp. 264, 265.

⁵ See pp. 221, 222 above.

⁶ See especially his letter of the 17th Oct., 1764. Appendix III. (a), p. 252.

running the risk of death if captured by the English. On the other hand, it is pretty certain that bribes were offered to him,¹ and though he did not accept them before the surrender, when the Nawab and the English had profited so greatly by what had been done, it is possible that he saw no great harm in asking for some pecuniary reward for his share in it. The public, however, naturally supposed he was only demanding the fulfilment of promises made antecedent to the mutiny, and we are told by Peixoto² that he was so badly received by his countrymen that, until the recollection of the affair had grown dim, he could find no place where he could live. He had, however, a friend in the Governor, M. Law, who was at this time suffering much distress on account of the shameful accusations³ which M. Dupleix had made against his brother Jacques, and who was therefore the last person in the world to believe evil of a man whose fidelity to that brother in 1752 had saved him from unmerited disgrace. M. Law, after consideration of his story and after hearing the various accounts which were given of the affair, evidently came to a favourable decision, for, when Marchand went home to France, he was on M. Law's recommendation granted the Cross of St. Louis.⁴ In Paris he published a plan to illustrate the attacks in the two sieges of Madura, which he dedicated to the Prince de Condé, so apparently he enjoyed the patronage of that nobleman, and in 1771 he printed a little book entitled *Précis Historique des deux sièges de la ville de Maduré dans l'Inde*, to which I have often referred. He is stated by M. Bruno to have died in 1773 at Rueil near Paris, but there is no reference to his death in the official registers of the

¹ The Dutch Account says Yusuf Khan always suspected Marchand and watched him closely, but he managed to communicate with the besiegers, who offered him a bribe of a lakh of rupees. So also Marchand says (*Précis Historique*, p. 34) that Captain Bonjour on the 24th Feb. had offered him "des recompenses immenses," and further, Campbell himself in his letter to Council of the 17th Sept., says that his only object in continuing the conference with Marchand so long was to find out on what terms he stood with Yusuf Khan and to "sow jealousys," which shows that he was quite ready to offer money if he thought it would be accepted.

² See Appendix V., p. 292.

³ See p. 125 above.

⁴ M. Bruno's Journal. See Appendix V., p. 296 (n.).

town.¹ The cemetery employed in that year has long been disused and devoted to other purposes. If his body lies there, there is nothing to mark the spot. M. Bruno tells us he never wholly succeeded in clearing his reputation.

As had been expected, Palamcottah surrendered without firing a shot. The Dutch accounts say that the garrison refused at first to surrender, but when they were shown the gruesome remains of their late Governor, they were convinced that their wives and families had fallen into the power of the Nawab, and so made no further resistance.² The papers found in Madura by the captors provided ample evidence of the connivance of Haidar Ali and of the Kings of Travancore and Tanjore in Yusuf Khan's rebellion, and the Nawab, who was grievously disappointed at the amount of spoil taken in Madura, was eager to attack and punish them, but the Council decided that Haidar Ali and the King of Travancore had committed no overt act hostile to the Company, and that the Nawab's treatment of Tanjore was so bad as to completely explain the King's hostility,³ and therefore that it was wiser to take no notice of their conduct than

“to enter into disputes with them which may involve the Company's affairs in troubles without end;”⁴

in other words, that it was not worth while to throw good money after bad.

¹ I personally made inquiries at Rueil, but could obtain no information about Marchand at that place, nor is there any mention of his death in the *Gazette de France* or the *Mercure de France* for 1773 or any adjacent year.

² Palamcottah surrendered on the 23rd October. It was found “in excellent condition and in the works in all respects as good as Madura and well supplied with cannon and all sorts of stores.” Campbell to Council, 23rd Oct. On the 27th Oct. Council resolved, “The Board are entirely of the President's opinion that the sending so considerable a force against Palamcottah was quite unnecessary, as Yusuf Khan is now no more and the families of the principal people in that place are in the Nawab's hands.” *Mil. Cons.*, 27th Oct., 1764, p. 866.

³ In August Campbell reported that the Tanjore troops would do no duty and paid no respect either to the Nawab or himself. On this the Council remarked, “As to the behaviour of the King of Tanjore's troops we are not at all surprised at it, when we consider what pains the Nawab takes to make him his enemy.” *Mil. Cons.*, 13th Aug., 1764, p. 594.

⁴ *Mil. Cons.*, 27th Oct., p. 880.

One naturally asks oneself what advantage accrued to the Company from this war. Sir John Lindsay¹ says frankly "None," and indeed, beyond the indirect benefit derived from the discredit of French promises in the eyes of the Indian princes, and the fact that it had shown itself strong enough to subdue the most powerful and able of the Nawab's vassals, it is difficult to see that the Company derived any advantage. On the other hand, the Nawab was more heavily in debt than ever;² provinces which had paid a small but certain revenue under Yusuf Khan had been restored to the feeble rule of a Prince who could do nothing with them, and this restoration had been effected at a cost of no less than two crores of rupees, and the loss of a very large number of European officers and soldiers.³ The military prestige of the Company had also suffered, not merely by Yusuf Khan's prolonged resistance, but by the fact that Madura had fallen, not to an assault, but by the treachery of a portion of the garrison, whilst the stores of money, provisions and ammunition found in it showed that the defence could have been prolonged for months, during which anything might have happened in favour of Yusuf Khan.⁴ The English had also exposed themselves to the charge of ingratitude⁵ to an old and formerly loyal servant, for public opinion at that time in India could hardly be expected to understand Western ideas on the absolute submission required from the military by the civil power.⁶ To the Indian mind it would have seemed more

¹ Letter of 21st Jan. to Viscount Weymouth. *I. O. Records, Home Misc.*, 104.

² "In the years 1763 and 1764 I was forced to increase my debts to enable me to defray the immense expenses of the expedition against *Yusuf Khan* that strong enemy." Nawab to Council, 12th Dec., 1766. *Rous' Appendix*, III. 3.

³ Mill says, "a million sterling and no ordinary quantity of English blood." See p. 116 (n.) above, *Appendix II.* 248, and *Appendix III.* (b), p. 267, and V., pp. 282, 284, 289, 290, 291, 294, 297, and 305.

⁴ Call wrote, 10th Oct., 1764, "We have taught the country people almost to beat us." *Gazetteer and Daily Advertiser*, 2nd April, 1765. General Joseph Smith wrote to Council 13th March, 1768 (*Orme MSS.*, 64, p. 15), "Were it not for the treachery of his soldiers it's not impossible that he might still have maintained his pretensions to those countries." *Appendix V.*, p. 291.

⁵ See opinion of Sunku Rama (p. 161 above) and of Mr. Beveridge, *Appendix V.*, p. 308 below.

⁶ Many years passed and much friction took place between the civil and

natural for the Council to have insisted upon the retention of Madura and Tinnevely in their own hands with Yusuf Khan as their, and not the Nawab's, governor. This could certainly have been arranged with ease, for the Nawab had, many years earlier, offered to make over these provinces to the Company in return for a fixed allowance,¹ and it is quite possible that Yusuf Khan, contented and loyal, would have been a most useful ally in the long and troublesome wars with Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan. To Mr. Palk, however, and to his fellow-Councillors it appeared that the only possible policy for the Company was to place the Nawab in complete control of all the country which nominally belonged to him.² They had probably no great knowledge as to his incapacity, for Arcot and the districts within easy reach of Madras appear to have been not badly managed,³ and they had, no doubt, very exaggerated ideas of the sums of money which the rich provinces of the south would pour into the Nawab's treasury when once placed under a civil government. Under the circumstances it was in their eyes intolerable that a man whom they considered to be only a creature of their own should dare to dispute their orders. They considered that a great mistake had been made in placing the Provinces under a military

military before the people of India could be made to understand this. Col. Fullarton says (*A View of the English Interests in India*, p. 211): "As the natives of India have little respect for any but the military character, the civil servants, in order to acquire consequence, have usually assumed a superiority over the military."

¹ In a letter received 29th July, 1751, the Nawab offered to mortgage any districts the Council chose in return for a supply of money, adding, "If you don't like this proposal, I am ready to deliver up the countries of Trichinopoly, Madura and Tinnevely entirely to the English, provided they allow me two lakhs of Madras Pagodas yearly for my own expenses, defraying all the charges of the army themselves, and I will bind myself and my heirs to keep this agreement for ever if the English should chuse it." *Country Correspondence*, 1751, No. 103.

² "When the fate of War and the success of the English army subdued all opposition or contest for the Nabobship in the year 1761 and he [*i.e.* Muhammad Ali] was acknowledged *Nawab* of Arcot, it was natural for him to desire and his allies the English to assist him in calling to an account the most refractory and independent *Faujdars*, *Kiladars*, and *Zamindars* who were in possession of strong places or had been his greatest enemies during the trouble." Call to Court of Directors, 1775. *I. O. Records, Home Misc.*, No. 287.

³ See p. 116, above.

man,¹ and, when the Court of Directors remarked on the Council's lack of foresight and ignorance of character, not merely in appointing such a man as Yusuf Khan, but in subsequently leaving him wholly unsupervised,² they replied :—

“ You may be assured we shall be careful never to appoint *subadars* of sepoys to be renters of countries. It was troublesome times and a country to be reduced that made it appear expedient to put that confidence in Yusuf Khan of which he gave us sufficient cause to repent.”³

Thus the rebellion of Yusuf Khan closed for many years all opportunity of a high career to the natives of Madras who entered into the military service of the Company.⁴

Of Yusuf Khan there now remains only a little white mosque, a street in Madura known to the people by his name though officially it bears another designation,⁵ and a fast fading memory of one who, though he died a rebel, had been a gallant and skilful soldier and an able and upright governor.⁶

¹ “ The transactions of Yusuf Khan ought to have this effect on our administration—never to place independent power in the hands of a Mussulman, for most assuredly, sooner or later, will he throw off his allegiance and become a competitor for dominion even against your authority.” Note by R. Smith. *Orme MSS.*, 88, p. 183.

² Letter from Court, 30th Dec., 1763, para. 23. See Appendix V., p. 283.

³ Letter to Court, 22nd Jan., 1767, para. 34.

⁴ “ Among the inconveniences of that singular and generally beneficial government established by the British nation in India is the practice of committing the higher offices of the Army and State and almost all situations of trust and emolument to Europeans, and thereby excluding the natives of the country from every object of honourable ambition.” Wilks' *Mysoor*, III. 471.

⁵ *i.e.* Jadamuni Street, running from the Edward Park to South Masi Street. It was probably in this street that his house (marked in Marchand's plan) was situated. It is said that the quarter named Khansa Palayam near Mina Teppakulam, north-east of Tirumala's palace, was the spot where Yusuf Khan's army was located. The walls which Yusuf Khan defended so gallantly were pulled down about 1841. Letter dated 14th August, 1841, from the Père Garnier. *Lettres des Nouvelles Missions du Maduré*, III. p. 317.

⁶ See Colonel Fullarton's encomium of Yusuf Khan. Appendix V., p. 298.

APPENDIX I

YUSUF KHAN'S ACCOUNT OF HIS SERVICES TO THE ENGLISH ¹

*Letter, dated Madura, 20th September, 1762, to the Honourable George Pigot, Esq., President and Governor of Fort Saint George.*²

“ HONBLE. SIR,

“ I had the honour to receive your kind favor dated 7th instant, which with all due veneration have embraced in my heart, and will follow your Honor's good advice and orders, which your Honor was so beneficent to write me. About my coming down there [*i.e.* to Madras] nothing will hinder me, or will cause me any prejudice so long I am under your Honor's favor and protection, as I have received all this time a heap of favor from your Honor. I am sorry to understand now my proceedings have given grounds for many people to think that my intentions are to rebel and to think myself independent of [? in] the countreys, which I never thought nor shall do, but the people that have been talking these things must be some of my bad-wishers and no others; but your Honor will find me always, in the same manner I was before, ready to give my life in the Honble. Company's service and to obtain your Honor's good will and commands [? commendation], for to avoid the murmuring I shall endeavour myself to come to Madras before your Honor's departure to Europe in hopes to settle all my affairs with the *Nawab* in a regular manner, in consideration of all my troubles that I have taken for settling these countreys; and it is very hard after my taking so many troubles in this country, paying the [rent] into the bargain, borrowing money for the credit for to get more honour [from you] and in the time when I expect to have the advantage of it I shall lose my character. I beg your Honor for to grant me leave to

¹ For the Nawab's charges against Yusuf Khan, see pp. 278-279 below.

² *Country Correspondence*, Vol. X. No. 118, pp. 227-231. I have made some, though very slight, alterations in this letter where the text of the original was defective, or, for other reasons, unintelligible.

manifest my sentiments. When I came to these countreys first, the Honble. Company gave me one thousand sepoy, two three-pounder guns and some ammunition, in order to march to these countreys, without giving me any money for the payment of those sepoy. Accordingly I did so, but I was taken in considerable troubles, fighting with the *poligars* to get the tribute from them and to collect the rents and revenues of these countreys for the payment of the said sepoy, and also for the troops that were obliged to be raised here, and, not only this, I was obliged to fight with the *Nawab's* brother¹ too for the space of seven months time. I borrowed money from sundry people and merchants for the subsistence of the said troops. Besides this I was bound for and paid for the troops of the *Nawab's* brother *Mahfuz Khan* the sum of forty thousand rupees that he was indebted to his troops, and I also paid one hundred and ten thousand rupees for the agreement² of the Madura Fort and a great many other charges. It is true that your Honor will say, all this money I have got out of these countreys and paid, but your Honor will be so good as to consider the many troubles I have had to collect this money from the *poligars* and from this country that was quite ruined. All this I have done with interest [? intent] to obtain the Honble. Company's benefit, or else the Honble. Company would have been to the expense of all these charges. The same sepoy that I have had here assisted at the Trichinopoly and Madras sieges,³ but the sepoy I had with me for about three years time were paid by me out of this country's money, which has saved the expenses of the Honble. Company's cash for all this time, and they were always in readiness too for their service. By your Honor's order I sent forces to *Haidar Naik's* country to beat his troops which I did accordingly,⁴ and that broke off a great deal of his forces to not give any help and assist the French at Pondicherry, which expenses I have not got yet from the *Nawab*.⁵ When our army besieged Pondicherry I sent from hence to the *Nawab* about two *lakhs* of Pagodas, the rent of these countreys, as the *Nawab* said he wanted them for the use of the

¹ i.e. Mahfuz Khan, mentioned below.

² i.e. for its surrender to Caillaud in 1757.

³ i.e. the siege of Trichinopoly in 1751-4, and the siege of Madras by Lally in 1758-59.

⁴ i.e. in 1760, when Haidar Ali sent his brother-in-law Makhdum Sahib to Pondicherry, but was forced to recall him before the town was attacked by Eyre Coote. See p. 103 above.

⁵ The Nawab agreed to repay the Company the expenses of the capture of Pondicherry in 1761.

army, and also out of this country with many troubles sent to Cuddalore cattle and sheep for the use of his Majesty's Squadron, under the care of Mr. Bodle who paid me for the same.¹ On my arrival from Madras to Trichinopoly, after its siege by the French the *Nawab* have not showed me any good willing of his generosity. Instead of doing this he took off the allowances which I have got, one sepoy to each company, which was given me by the Honble. Company, which vexed me very much.² When the Anjengo gentlemen were in want of cash for the Honble. Company's trade, I lent them eighty-four thousand rupees without interest for about six months' time, myself was bound and gave security to the merchants for the said sum.³ This only I mention to your Honor to show that I am always in obligation for to do anything for the Honble. Company's service for their advantages. When I have took all these troubles and render services to the Honble. Company, which will be the reason to give means for to lose your Honor's favor that I have gained, therefore I will not give means for to alter your Honor's intentions.⁴ I will keep your Honor's letter as a firm Cowl⁵ of safety and shall come down to your Honor as soon as I can give part satisfaction of the arrears due to the troops, to whom I am indebted four months' pay. The reason of not paying them is a great quantity of Paddy⁶ remains in the country that have no price at present, and a great deal of money stands [unpaid by] the inhabitants, etc., that I cannot get at present for the payment of the troops, and also twenty thousand Pagodas lays upon the cloth⁷ that I had ordered to be made, thinking that your Honor will take

¹ See p. 97 above.

² Possibly he refers to the interview, or the effects of the interview, in which, according to the *Nawab*, Yusuf Khan drew his sword upon him. See p. 93 above.

³ I do not find any record of this loan, but in 1759 Mr. Pigot wrote to the Council of Anjengo saying that Yusuf Khan had concluded an alliance with the King of Travancore, and that if they required any trade indulgences from that Prince they should make their application through Yusuf Khan (*Mil. Cons.*, 23 November, 1759), which shows the connection between Yusuf Khan and Anjengo.

⁴ I suppose this means: "When I have taken all this trouble and rendered such services to the Company, why should I give any cause for losing the favour I had obtained with your Honour? I will give no cause for your Honour to alter your opinion of me."

⁵ i.e. assurance or guarantee.

⁶ i.e. unhusked rice.

⁷ Madura was at this time famous for its manufacture of cloth, and Yusuf Khan, like other dependants of the Company, used to order large quantities in the expectation that the Company would require it later.

it. The first money I get shall be paid to the troops [on account of] their arrears and I shall proceed my way to Madras. If I do not so, perhaps my troops may put some stop to my departure,¹ which will be very disagreeable to myself. I most humbly beg your Honor the favor to take all these causes into your Honor's serious consideration, and I conclude with a profound respect and submission,

“Honourable Sir,

“Your most obedient and most obliged humble servant to command,

“*Muhammad Yusuf Khan.*”

¹ As was done in 1756 by the troops of Mahfuz Khan. See p. 54 above.

APPENDIX II

M. DE MAUDAVE'S DEFENCE OF HIS CONDUCT IN ASSISTING YUSUF KHAN

*Letter from M. de Maudave to the Duc de Choiseul, dated Île de France, 20th April, 1764.*¹

“MONSEIGNEUR,

“I have had the honour to inform you as regularly as I could of the steps I have taken to revive the French party on the Coast of India and to excite against the English Company the jealousy and hatred of the Princes of the Peninsula, with the two-fold object of damaging their establishments² and of preventing them at the same time from making any attempt to carry outside [of India] what forces remained to them on the Coromandel Coast.

“A part of the year 1762 and the commencement of 1763 have been spent in binding our party together and making the necessary preliminary arrangements, in such a fashion that in March 1763 the bomb exploded, at a time when the English troops were, for the most part, in the island of Luçon.³

“A bold and courageous man, named Muhammad Yusuf Khan Sahib, held, in the name of the English,⁴ the little kingdom of Madura and the Province of Tinnevely, that is to say the portion of the Peninsula of India which borders the Strait of Manaar and which extends as far as Cape Comorin. In consequence of the measures which we had taken together, I had sent to his country in January 1763 a small body of white and black troops which I had collected in Tanjore, and as soon as this detachment had joined his army he

¹ Louis Laurent de Federbe, Comte de Maudave, *Archives du Département des Affaires Étrangères, Paris. Mémoires et Documents. Fonds France et Fonds Divers. Asie.* No. 13, ff. 323–326.

² *i.e.* their trading establishments or factories; in other words, “their trade.”

³ *i.e.* in Manilla.

⁴ M. de Maudave would have had a stronger case if he had said, as was the fact, that Yusuf Khan held his government in the name of the Nawab and not in that of the English at the time of his rebellion. See pp. 110 above and 283 below.

had lowered the English flag and replaced it by that of the King [of France], making public both our alliance and his resolution to embrace the party of the French Nation and to put himself at the head of the side which it favoured.

“ From that time my whole attention was taken up with passing into Madura all whom I could collect of the French who were dispersed throughout the country. Muhammad Yusuf Khan, on his side expelled from his new possessions all who adhered to the English, and even resolved to attack the possessions of the British Company. He was preparing to march to the Coleroon and to lay siege to Trichinopoly when I received the news of the Suspension of Arms and that of the conclusion of the Definitive Treaty, which followed each other very rapidly to India.

“ It is useless to weary you, Monseigneur, with all the reasons of which I made use to prevent Muhammad Yusuf Khan from taking the offensive against the English. Finally he gave way to my representations and confined himself to preparations for a simple but vigorous defence.

“ The English ships, which arrived in India during the months of May and June, had disembarked some troops at Madras, from which a Corps-d’armée was formed. Muhammad Yusuf Khan was threatened with extermination if he would not return to his duty, and, at last, Colonel Monson appeared on the frontiers of Madura in the month of August 1763 with a large force of white and black troops.

“ Under these circumstances I wrote to the Council of Madras to represent that their preparations against Madura appeared opposed to the spirit of the Peace happily concluded in Europe, that I did not know whether the engagements which I had made with Muhammad Yusuf Khan had given the French Company rights compatible with the Treaty of Paris, that the examination [of this question] was not my business, but that it appeared to me safer and better to leave matters as they were until the arrival of those who were charged with the execution of that part of the Treaty which concerned India.

“ On this subject I and the Council of Madras entered into a most detailed discussion, but in the replies which I received I could find nothing but a summons, supported by threats, to restore Madura to them, or at least to cause the French force to leave it, and to cease from favouring Muhammad Yusuf Khan either directly or in secret.

“ Both these demands were equally impossible for me to comply

with. (1) Had I been capable of such an act of perfidy I was not sufficiently master of the place to hand it over to the English. (2) It was at least equally difficult for the French detachment to leave Madura contrary to the wish of Muhammad Yusuf Khan, and the least sign of any desire on their part to do so would have been the signal for a dreadful massacre. (3) The measures which I had for a long time concerted with the leading Powers of Southern India, at a date when the then existing state of war between our nations made all such engagements legitimate for me, were now producing consequences which it was not in my power to arrest.

“These reasons did not satisfy the Council of Madras. They were enraged at seeing the power and wealth of the *Nawab* reduced by one half; so the English resolved to push the matter to the last extremity and to carry Madura by sheer force. Major Lawrence declared that the English name should perish under this place or they would carry it by assault. At the same time he declared that he would hang all the French who might fall into his hands.

“His second declaration was as vile as his first was fruitless. In the petty combats which took place, and later on during the course of the siege, prisoners have been exchanged and the wounded sent back to their own party. This has been the case all through.

“The English commenced a furious bombardment at the end of the month of August, and, after having made a breach of one hundred and fifty fathoms and carried their batteries right up to the counter-scarp, they retired in disgrace about the 7th of November.

“They had brought to this siege all the troops of the Carnatic, Tanjore, the two Maravans and the Tondaiman, which formed a multitude of more than a hundred and twenty thousand combatants. They fired forty thousand cannon shots and eighteen thousand shells, besides the expenditure of innumerable cartridges. Their loss in killed and by desertion exceeded seven hundred whites. The prodigious expenditure of these operations cost the English more than twenty-four millions of our money, and a check, so considerable in the consequences which must result from it, will cost the French Company absolutely nothing, for the small expenses which I have been forced to incur have all been met from sources which I discovered in the country.

“It is true that the English resumed the siege of Madura at the end of last January, though with smaller forces than they had at first, and on the 6th March, which was the date of my departure, I saw no signs of their meeting with any different success.

“I have thought it my duty, Monseigneur, to inform you briefly

of the particular details of my conduct in order to justify myself against the complaints ¹ which the Council of Madras has transmitted to England, and which will certainly be sent on to France. It is true that I have made war on the English after the announcement of the Peace, but it was only in the strict observance of a legitimate defence and after having exhausted all means of persuading them to make use of the path of gentleness and conciliation.

“I flatter myself that when you shall have considered this matter with your superior wisdom and knowledge, you will recognize that it was impossible for me to act otherwise, and that you will kindly protect and justify me effectively if there arrive from London at the Court any complaint against my proceedings, as the Council of Madras have expressed themselves more than once on this subject with as much hauteur and anger as injustice.”

Note on the letter from M. de Maudave by M. Henneberg.

“The person named Muhammad Yusuf Khan cannot be regarded by Great Britain otherwise than as a Rebel, since he held the little kingdom of Madura in the name of the English Company against which he rebelled.

“M. de Maudave was entitled to assist his rebellion as long as he was unaware of the signature of the preliminaries of the Definitive Peace, but the Treaty of Peace put an end to all the engagements into which M. de Maudave had entered with Muhammad Yusuf Khan, and after the French officer ² had been informed of the signature [of the Treaty] he ought no longer, under the terms of Article I. and even of Article XI. to have favoured the enterprises of this Rebel, or to have given him any kind of assistance.

“The preparations of the English against the Fort of Madura were in no way opposed to the spirit of the Treaty, and they were not bound to await the arrival of the Commissaries of the two Crowns to reduce Muhammad Yusuf Khan to his duty.

“In regard to the demand made by the English that M. de Maudave should deliver to them the town of Madura, or at least cause the detachment of French troops to leave the place, in order to judge whether it was possible to comply with this request it would be necessary to know whether this body of troops was sufficiently strong to impose its will upon Muhammad Yusuf Khan or whether it was compelled to submit to his wishes : in the latter case his [*i.e.*

¹ I cannot find that any serious complaints of Maudave's conduct were sent to England.

² *i.e.* the French commander in Madura.

M. de Maudave's] defence is quite legitimate, but M. de Maudave ought not to have continued to make war openly upon the English, and there is a strong likelihood that Muhammad Yusuf Khan would have given up the Fort if the French officer had informed him that he ought not to and could not give him any help.

"However, as great advantages have resulted from the behaviour of M. de Maudave, he may be justified upon the grounds which he puts forward."

*Extracts from a "Relation de ce qui s'est passé à la Côte de Coromandel depuis le 4 Avril 1762 jusques au mois de Janvier 1764, en conséquence de la mission donnée à M. de Maudave par le Comité de l'Île de France."*¹

"There was in the service of the English a man bold and courageous, named Muhammad Yusuf Khan Sahib. This chief, during the blockade of Pondicherry, raised, by order of the Council of Madras, a small body of troops with which he attacked Madura and conquered it and its dependencies. He remained in his new acquisitions, where he established order and regularity and collected the revenues. Muhammad Ali Khan, or rather the English, seeing that the man was daily becoming more powerful, wished him to give an account of his administration, but the knowledge which they had of his courage and conduct, the friendship which he affected, and other more pressing operations, were their reasons for leaving him in perfect tranquillity.

"Muhammad Yusuf was not unaware of the jealousy and secret dispositions in respect to himself of the Council of Madras and the Darbar of Muhammad Ali. He was particularly bound to the Raja of Tanjore, who took all the more interest in his preservation because he trusted to find in him a buckler against the eternal pretensions and ever renewed demands of the Nawab of Arcot and the Madras Council. . . .

"Khan Sahib prepared to defend himself, but being himself of a nature quick and fiery, he could not get on for any length of time with Marchand. After twenty quarrels of no importance, he became so angry with him that, without consulting me, he had him arrested and imprisoned and gave the command of the force to a rascally German officer named Riquet. . . .

"The trenches were opened on the night of the 16-17th September and the breach was judged practicable on the 23rd. Khan Sahib

¹ *Ministère des Colonies, Paris. Inde. Correspondance Générale, 1763-5, 98 C². Summary in the Bibliothèque Nationale Nouv. Acq. Françaises, No. 9365.*

was shut up in his capital and, as soon as the enemy were within reach of him, he got disgusted with Riquet and confided the command of the French troops to M. Flamicourt, who was in every respect more worthy of it. . . .

“Finally after more than sixty days of obstinate siege the English saw themselves forced to abandon the game and to retire three leagues from the town, in spite of a breach of one hundred and fifty fathoms made by their artillery and of their having effected a lodgement on the covered way. They had fired against the place more than thirty thousand cannon shot and more than twelve thousand shells.

“M. de Flamicourt was killed two days before their retreat. M. Marchand, recalled some time before from his exile and placed by Khan Sahib at the head of a body of Indian troops, had drawn near Madura, where he gave a great deal of trouble to the English; but, though he had no share in the vigour of the defence, which Khan Sahib owed solely to M. de Flamicourt, he has thought proper to declare since that it was he who did everything.”

APPENDIX III (a)

THE SURRENDER OF MADURA

*Letter dated 17th October, 1764, from M. Marchand to the Council of Madras.*¹

“GENTLEMEN,

“I flattered myself, as is usual in such cases, that before you stormed the place we should have been summoned in form, by which I should have been enabled to have caused the two places² to be delivered you, and the effusion of blood also on both sides would by this means have been spared, but you was determined to run all risques. *Khan Sahib*’s success therein made him imperious and haughty. Nevertheless, Gentlemen, having well considered everything I determined within myself to take such measures with you as to put an end to a war become burthensome to both, and therefore with *Yusuf Khan*’s consent immediately wrote to Major Campbell, Commandant of the army, desiring an interview with him, which he agreed should be the 16th September.

“After having informed him of *Khan Sahib*’s intentions, I then learnt from you, Gentlemen, that a peace was concluded between our two Crowns, and as I had received no news of it nor orders from my superiors, and seeing no appearance of any, I had then no other desire but to come to an agreement to retire with my troops to the Coast, which induced me to propose the capitulation sent you the 18th of the same month with a letter from *Khan Sahib*. Eleven days after, we received Major Campbell’s answer, by which we learnt your final resolution, which so exasperated *Khan Sahib* that he became furious and immediately formed the cruel resolution of privately getting away, unknown to his Chiefs and me, and thereby to abandon us and the place to the fury of his enemies.

“As soon as I had notice of his scheme I endeavoured to get at the bottom of it, and when I was certain that he intended to make his escape and that, according to the public report, he was causing his

¹ *Mil. Cons.*, 27 Oct., 1764, p. 871.

² *i.e.* Madura and Palamcotta.

money to be privately carried away, I did my utmost to sound the inclinations of the Chiefs, who I found, as well as the troops in general, had all reason to be discontented. I took advantage of this to engage the other Chiefs to take some violent measures against him by representing to them the embarrassment that this man was going to plunge us into and the risques we were going to run. The day agreed upon was the 13th instant. The Chiefs were, according to their promise, to have seized him at 10 o'clock in the morning, and they had besides promised me four or five hundred men of the troops to keep *Khan Sahib's* guards in order, in which I with my troop was to sustain and support them. This scheme was not put into execution till 5 o'clock in the evening, when, instead of having the black forces, I was obliged to make use of my own men to disarm him, and, in short, to do everything with them that ought to have been done by those of the Chiefs. As soon as we were masters of his person—not without trouble—I caused him to be confined in a room with eight or ten of his horsemen to keep sight of him, and with my own troops surrounded the apartment. During the first commotions one of *Khan Sahib's* young men, named *Mudali*, took shelter in the women's apartment and raised five or six hundred men who joined him. I had ordered all the artillery to lie upon the ramparts, every one to his post to take care of his gun and to be ready upon the first notice, but this young dog sent one of his people to them, who made them all abandon their posts, after which they came and joined my black and white troops who were drawn up in order of battle before the door to keep the revolvers in order. In the mean time people came in from all parts. Night was coming on apace and a storm was ready to burst upon us. This made me determine to send M. Perigny to the camp with a note ¹ to Major Campbell to demand of him a party of men to hold themselves in readiness at a convenient distance from the west gate, to second us in case of necessity. This gentleman went away at 8 o'clock at night with two Moorish officers to consult [*? concert*] measures with the *Nawab* and to inform him of the news. During their absence I caused two field-pieces with a proper quantity of ammunition to be placed before the door to keep every one in order. By this time the minds of the people were a little calmed, the crowd disappeared, everything was quiet, and we passed the night under arms.

“Major Campbell, in consequence of my request, drew up his troops and sent a body of men to the place I marked out, and Major

¹ This note still exists and is given *verbatim* in the text. See pp. 221, 222 above.

Wood gave Captain Meyers a company of grenadiers and five [companies of] sepoys who were conducted by M. Perigny to the southern gate to be ready at the first call. Captain Meyers and M. Perigny entered the town at 5 o'clock in the morning. I told this officer the reasons that had obliged me to act in this manner, and I communicated to him my intentions and the measures that I proposed taking with Major Campbell. Three guns being fired as a signal for his return, I desired him to come back again, since I had requested by my note two commissarys that I might settle matters for my own satisfaction, as I had an enemy both within and without to deal with.

"At 10 o'clock I heard that five palanquins, some horses and four companies of sepoys were at the southern gate. I sent M. Perigny with an officer to go and meet these gentlemen, who were going when the two Moor Chiefs, who went out the night before, desired that their admittance might be deferred till they had communicated to the other Chiefs the conditions they had made with the *Nawab*, on which account Mr. Meyers and another officer,¹ as well as the *Nawab's diwan* and some other Chiefs, were obliged to wait. The Chiefs returned about 1 o'clock and I then began to treat with Mr. Meyers in presence of the other officers, when many difficulties were started as well by the blacks as [by the] whites. Four articles that I had drawn up by way of capitulation were objected to² by my troop, from whose presence I could not withdraw, not having them well under my command. My life as well as that of the Town-Majors were often threatened by them; lastly almost a general revolt ensued on account of the articles of the capitulation, the granting of which Mr. Meyers seemed to doubt. Finally, Gentlemen, Mr. Meyers can witness to you the dangers that I went through, dangers so great the most expressive writing cannot represent.

"During these commotions Mr. Meyers went with the articles of capitulation to Major Campbell to sign. The Moor Chiefs were of opinion with me that two companies of sepoys should be permitted to enter, and that the opportunity of the gates being opened for Mr. Meyers should be taken hold of to effect it. My troop on their entering made some movements, the *Nawab's diwan* as well as myself were obliged to go out of the *Darbar*, he to make the sepoys retire, I to appease my troop, in the doing of which we both ran great risques. *Khan Sahib's* wife being advised of what was doing,

¹ Ensign Desvoeux.

² This is apparently a mistranslation, as the context shows that for "objected to" we should read "insisted on."

desired that I would immediately release her husband, and gave me to understand that I should be entirely master of the place and treasure, but I was deaf to such proposals and gave her to understand that it was not me but the Chiefs who detained her husband. In the mean time your troops by the assistance of the Moorish Chiefs entered the place, and I did everything that lay in my power to pacify my troop who, seeing I had not obtained of Major Campbell the favour I desired for all deserters (although Mr. Meyers had promised it me, referring it to the pleasure of his commander) were much exasperated, and I dare assure you, Gentlemen, that, had they not credited what your officer¹ and I told them, I cannot say what would have happened. An aide-de-camp however arrived with a paper signed by Major Campbell, which granted their pardon and which entirely appeased them, although the articles of capitulation were not signed or delivered to me. I hope then, Gentlemen, that all my demands, my disinterestedness and the risques that I ran, will incline you without hesitation to consent to and confirm the articles of capitulation that I sent Major Campbell by Mr. Meyers, of which, Gentlemen, I send you a copy.

“ I have &c. &c. MARCHAND.”

N.B.—The above letter was forwarded by Major Campbell with his own letter of the 18th,² in which he says: “ The enclosed letter has since been sent me by M. Marchand to forward to you. I have only to observe thereon that the circumstances of the late revolution are pretty fairly stated, as far as I could learn from those who went in with messages from me.”

Campbell's own account of the surrender is contained in a letter from himself and Major Call, dated the 16th October.³ It is as follows:—

“ The destination of M. Marchand and the Frenchmen is not yet decided, for though they did demand a capitulation and Major Campbell would have given one, yet no particular articles were signed, and, that your Honours may be the better enabled to judge concerning them, we will relate what passed on that subject.

“ On the morning of the 14th, when Captain Meyers returned out of the Fort he brought a paper to the *Nawab* containing some requests from the Chiefs who had seized the Rebel, the sepoy and the horse-men, but M. Marchand said he should depend on our generosity for the treatment of himself and the rest of the French. He only asked a general pardon for the deserters.

¹ i.e. Desvoeux.

² *Mil. Cons.*, 27 Oct., 1764, p. 870.

³ *Mil. Cons.*, 27 Oct., 1764.

“About 10 o'clock, when the blacks had finished their business with the *Nawab*, Captain Meyers went again to the Fort with them, and carried a paper from Major Campbell, demanding the Fort and *Yusuf Khan* at discretion, and that he would grant the Europeans and Topasses their lives, apparel and other effects (deserters excepted), but reserved to a further decision the manner in which they should be disposed of. In answer to this about 4 o'clock Captain Meyers returned with a paper containing the demand of a capitulation for the Europeans and Topasses in four articles, the two principal of which were that all in general should be pardoned, and that the Topasses with one month's pay should be permitted to go to the Malabar Coast and the Europeans be sent with M. Marchand to Tranquebar with one month's pay in advance and subsistence in future according to the Cartel.¹ Major Campbell did not sign this paper but proceeded towards the Fort and sent some sepoy with an officer and aide-de-camp in at the south gate, where with difficulty they were admitted. He gave orders for more to follow and some cavalry and for several small parties to get in under various pretences, because advice came that the people began to murmur and that there were great appearances of a second revolution. It was now near sunset, and we could not get the west gate open nor secure the south gate so as to be certain of the Fort, and repeated messages came which made us every moment apprehensive that the Rebel would regain his liberty. At last M. Marchand sent word by Mr. Desvoeux (who confirmed it) that in ten minutes the whole scheme would be upset from the apprehensions of the deserters and other Europeans concerning their treatment, that he should be massacred and *Yusuf Khan* released unless a general pardon was granted and something certain signed in favour of the whole. Major Campbell therefore sent a paper wrote with a pencil, promising the deserters their lives and that no difficulty would be made as to the disposition of the rest. This pacified them, and the troops of horse with Major Campbell gaining admittance just after, the whole body of Europeans and Topasses, who guarded *Yusuf Khan* and Marchand with two pieces of cannon, resigned their charge and grounded their arms, and *Yusuf* was immediately sent out to camp. Thus was concluded a revolution which gave possession of the Fort and the Rebel's person and all his effects without the least article being plundered or the least disorder taking place and without spilling the blood of a man except an officer of the Rebel's sepoy, who attempted to collect a party

¹ i.e. the arrangement agreed upon between France and England during the late war in respect to the treatment of prisoners.

in his favour.¹ The conduct and firmness of M. Marchand at the commotion brought this event to so fortunate a conclusion, and would have happened sooner had not a servant of his sent out with a note by some accident miscarried. He pleads strongly for a general pardon from all punishment for the deserters, and says that, though many of them deserve rigorous treatment, yet they were the most forward and their behaviour in the revolt was the most steady. He therefore hopes, and more particularly as the *Nawab* has pardoned all the blacks, that you will be pleased to pardon the Europeans and order the rest to be disposed of at some place in such a manner that they may be subsisted till the French re-establish [themselves] in India, or at least till the month of July next. The *Nawab* also interests himself in behalf of the deserters and prisoners in general. We shall however await your orders."

*Extract from Major Campbell's Journal.*²

"The aide-de-camp remonstrated in the strongest terms to Monsieur Marchand my desire of having the west gate open before it was dark as the evening was far advanced, and further that Monsieur Marchand might depend upon his good intentions being represented to all parties, and pressed him to have the gate opened. In the interim the rabble began to murmur and one or two of Marchand's confidants told him they were thinking of setting *Yusuf Khan* at liberty if a general pardon was not signed them. This being reported to me and knowing the disposition of those reprobates, I took my pencil and wrote Monsieur Marchand something relative to a general pardon but not clear enough to protect them. This Monsieur Marchand read to his people publicly, upon which they all to a man were for laying down their arms and a guard was ordered with my aide-de-camp to open the west gate, before which our troops were ready to enter. In the mean time I rode round to the south gate with the European cavalry and numbers of black horse, which assembled on this occasion. I rode through the town and was met by Marchand, who delivered me his sword, which I returned him, and immediately the whole threw down their arms and *Yusuf Khan* was delivered to the *Nawab's* people, who conducted him to camp. The prisoners were escorted to a pagoda for the night and Major Wood was left in possession of the garrison. Thus ended this long, bloody and tedious siege and blockade, much to the satisfaction of the *Nawab* and Governor and Council.

"Affairs being settled and *Yusuf Khan* executed, a detachment was ordered to march to Palamcotta."

¹ i.e. Mudali. See p. 253 above.

² Orme MSS., 74, p. 99.

APPENDIX III (b)

EXTRACTS FROM MONSIEUR MARCHAND'S "PRÉCIS HISTORIQUE
DES DEUX SIÈGES DE LA VILLE DE MADURÉ" (PARIS, 1771). *

Page 7. "Muhammad Ali, not being able to go personally against the rebels,¹ cast his eye upon Khan Sahib to take the place of Mahfuz Khan and to re-establish order and obedience in this province [*i.e.* Madura].

"Khan Sahib owed this distinction to the proofs which he had given on more than one occasion of his genius and military talent. A simple sailor at Pondicherry, a released convict—he had had an ear cut off for some crime²—this active and turbulent genius was tired of an obscure occupation, and resolved to take a part in the wars, in which he hoped to find a more rapid path [to distinction]. He served at first in the army of Muhammad Ali as a sepoy, and quickly signalized his courage and won distinction from his Prince and from the English. He was promoted from one military rank to another, and at last obtained the command of a body of two thousand³ men in the same force in which he had first served as a private soldier. It was under these circumstances that the orders of the Nawab sent him to replace Mahfuz Khan in 1757.

"The new Governor justified his selection by the prompt remedies which he applied to the evil."

Page 10. "Madras being delivered, Khan Sahib returned to Madura. He then undertook to reduce the Pulidevar, a great Poligar and the most powerful of those who had shaken off the yoke of Mahfuz Khan. It took him three years to reduce him. It was

¹ *i.e.* his brother Mahfuz Khan and the poligars.

² "This is the way in which theft is punished in India." *Note by Marchand.*

³ Marchand refers apparently to a native title of "Do-hazari," said to have been bestowed on Yusuf Khan by Muhammad Ali after the siege of Madras in 1758-9. In the life of the Walajah (see p. 282 below) the writer says the Nawab "made him the chief of 5000 horse and 10,000 foot and granted him 'Manseb Jaghir' and title for his services during the siege of Madras."

his courage which enabled him to triumph over this enemy, whose defeat brought as its consequence that of all the others. The whole country submitted and returned to its obedience to the Nawab, its legitimate sovereign.

“The Raja of Travancore alone seemed unintimidated by this success. He even dared to attack Khan Sahib at a moment when the latter thought he had nothing more to fear from his restless neighbours. Soon he was so hard pressed that he grew alarmed and trembled at the prospect of losing the fruits of his glory and his toil, but my arrival in his army and the victories which I won over the Travancorean¹ forced the latter to beg for peace from the Khan Sahib and to surrender to him the guns, carts and troops which he had captured.

“It was now that, intoxicated by his success and devoured by the thirst of dominion, this ambitious Moor, tired of administrating, of pacifying and of guarding for another a country which owed its happiness and tranquillity to the force of his arms and the resources of his genius, resolved to declare himself its absolute master and to restore it to its ancient footing by proclaiming himself King of Madura.

“From the moment when he came to Madura he had formed this project, and had worked quietly towards its accomplishment, collecting together every means for rendering himself independent, concealing his ambitious views under the pretence of the interest of the province and the necessity of assuring its tranquillity by placing it in a condition too strong to allow of its being insulted by its neighbours. He had collected from all sides workmen of all nations, carpenters, blacksmiths and foundry-men, who had worked without ceasing and supplied him with all kinds of implements and munitions of war.

“His coffers were full, and though he had been almost continuously engaged in war and the revenues of Madura amounted to only twenty-six lakhs of rupees, he had managed by economy to amass sums large enough to provide for the expense of a new war and to purchase both assistance and allies. . . .

“The occasion was favourable. His success had gained him the respect of his neighbours and of his new subjects. His restless and suspicious nature, the hardness of his character, his cruel severity, had in truth alienated every heart, but he was admired and feared :

¹ Marchand says he arrived in Yusuf Khan's camp on the 9th Jan., 1763. The submission of the King of Travancore (enclosed in the Nawab's letter to Council dated 18th Oct., 1763) was dated 16th Feb., 1763. See p. 131 above.

such feelings are sufficient for Usurpers. Having little desire to reign in men's hearts, they seek only to enslave men's spirits and to prevent rebellion by enchaining their courage by the terror they inspire.

"Khan Sahib however felt that he was not strong enough single-handed to oppose Muhammad Ali and the English, whom he expected to see falling upon him at the first news of his rebellion. . . . He tried therefore to draw the French to his side by convincing them that it was the sole method by which they could re-establish themselves in the Peninsula."

Page 15. "The new King of Madura had already addressed himself to M. de Maudave, who represented the Company on the Coast of Coromandel, to ask for the alliance and protection of the French. . . . M. de Maudave, who had his own private objects and who had already often begged of me to arouse our nation from the state of stupor in which it lay in India, lent himself to the Khan Sahib's projects. Accordingly he wrote to me to betake myself as soon as possible with my troop to the Khan Sahib, and sent me instructions regarding the new rôle which I was to play. It was not an easy one, and the least difficult part of it was that of fighting against the English and the troops of Muhammad Ali. I was also instructed to sound this new ally, to study the secret plans which he might have in his mind, to watch over all his actions, to obtain money from him for the fresh reinforcements which we must only promise, in short to make use of him merely for the purpose of collecting in Madura our forces which were now scattered throughout India, of increasing their number at his expense and of employing them thereafter as our interest might require, to the prejudice of all other interests whatsoever. I realized to the full the importance of such a commission. I foresaw its difficulties. I knew I had to deal with a man, tricky, suspicious, avaricious and intriguing. My zeal for my country however carried the day. I resolved to sacrifice myself for her and I set out for Madura. . . . I was received by our new ally with the most lively demonstrations of friendship and gratitude. He at once gave me the command of his troops, cavalry, artillery, topasses and sepoy, and declared me his Lieutenant-General and Second-in-Command throughout his Kingdom. At the same time he announced his alliance with our nation, allowing me to lower the English flag and that of Muhammad Ali and even to burn them in the middle of the camp, and to hoist the French flag there with all the pomp and solemnity proper to such an occasion.

"I took advantage of these first moments to extract from Khan Sahib some fresh pecuniary contributions, and, beside the expense which he had incurred on account of my troop, I obtained ten thousand rupees and two hundred Pagodas, which I caused to be sent to M. de Maudave."

Page 20. "A ship from the Isles¹ had arrived at Tranquebar. M. de Maudave had sent me word of this and ordered me to inform Khan Sahib that he had received letters from the Company, by which the latter approved of our treating with him, and promised all sorts of assistance, and especially to equip a fleet which would appear at once and would attack Muhammad Ali and the English. M. de Maudave particularly recommended me to profit by these fortunate openings to solicit the completion of the fifty thousand rupees;² he charged me to demand at the same time that Khan Sahib should do homage for the kingdom of Madura to the French, who would be its actual sovereigns and of whom he would be the Viceroy, explaining to him that it was under this aegis only that he could be sheltered from the blows which Muhammad Ali and the English would not fail to deal him."³

"I should have liked to make some objections to M. de Maudave on this last proposal, which I foresaw would be a very difficult—not to say dangerous—one, but having been ordered to go ahead, I seized the first opportunity, and used the utmost tact possible in explaining these demands. It would be difficult for me to depict the anger and rage of the Moor when he had heard them; he poured forth a thousand imprecations upon me and upon all my nation; he reproached me with the uselessness of the twenty thousand rupees given to M. Mallet, who had stopped at Salem instead of going to M. Hugel; he said he knew I was a traitor and in concert with M. de Maudave (? M. Mallet), and that I should bitterly repent having deceived him so cruelly. . . . These insults and suspicions were only the preliminaries to a more violent storm. Some days after, being encamped at Vellalapatti (three leagues from the town), Khan Sahib summoned me to his tent, which was at the other end of the camp. I went alone and on foot, when I was suddenly surrounded by some fifty Moors, who fell upon me, disarmed me and carried me prisoner to the Fort of Tirumbur, where I was imprisoned. My tent was pillaged, my property and papers were seized, and I

¹ Mauritius, or the Île de France.

² This sum had been promised conditionally by Yusuf Khan.

³ Had this been done openly, possibly Yusuf Khan would have been secure under the articles of the Treaty of 1763.

remained totally abandoned and destitute of even the barest necessities of life."

Page 27. "On the night between the 6th and 7th November the English raised the siege and retired to avoid the Rains, which are very heavy at that season. One can easily conceive the joy of Yusuf Khan to see himself delivered from a dangerous enemy. He came himself to wish me joy and to thank me for a result, all the glory of which he attributed to me. He promised me in writing fifty thousand rupees and distributed money to my troop."

Page 28. "It was now that Khan Sahib sought the alliance of Haidar Ali, to whom he sent a Vakil. The similarity of their adventures seemed to him a reason for their union. Haidar, like him, had revolted against his legitimate sovereign and had seized his kingdom. He had made war on the English.¹ Their cause seemed to him a common cause. But Haidar, whether he did not trust the offers of the King of Madura or whether he foresaw his speedy fall, refused to take any part in his quarrel or to join him.

"If we compare these two rebels, the superiority remains with the usurper of Mysore. Haidar has shown in his behaviour more resource in his genius, more activity in his courage, more firmness in misfortune than did Khan Sahib. The latter showed rather the qualities of a tyrant, but the former those of a King. Liberal to his soldiers, he knew how to attach them to himself by the punctuality with which he paid them; faithful to his word, he showed himself more scrupulous in keeping it than did the conqueror of Madura, who almost always broke it for the sake of petty immediate advantages. His conquests have been more rapid and have shown a greater breadth of view. Khan Sahib seemed to confine his views to reigning over the little province he had seized, but Haidar, with his vast projects, seemed, in his seizure of Mysore, to have made but a beginning, for he aimed at the monarchy of all India. Lastly he was more successful, and if, in human estimation, success justifies the prudence of an enterprise, the man who dethroned the Raja of Mysore and still keeps him a captive in his chains, who has given his daughter in marriage to Raza Sahib, son of Chanda Sahib that unlucky *protégé* of our nation, who for twenty-five years ² has been

¹ i.e. in 1757, when he was defeated by Yusuf Khan in person, and in 1760 when his officers were defeated by one of Yusuf Khan's Subadars.

² As Marchand wrote in 1771, this would take us back to 1746 when Haidar was a very insignificant person (some accounts say that Haidar was at one time a private soldier in the French employ!), but Haidar certainly distinguished himself against the English as early as 1752, during the Trichinopoly campaign.

the scourge of the English in India, that man shows that he had formed a better concerted project and a bolder and better sustained plan than did the sepoy of Muhammad Ali, who reigned no more than three years and succumbed at once to the efforts of his master who came to punish his rebellion."

Page 41. "The Council [of Madras] had written to Colonel Campbell that he must not consent to any other accommodation than the surrender at discretion of Khan Sahib and the town. The Commandant informed me of this reply and that it was useless for me to write to him unless it were to ask him to come and take possession of the town. This dreadful news deprived Khan Sahib of the little energy which remained to him. Broken by the weight of his misfortunes, he fell into a kind of lethargy from which he roused himself only to fall into inconceivable paroxysms of fury. Incapable of forming any plans, he seemed to wait upon events, not that he had sufficient firmness to realize that he must yield to necessity and endure his lot with courage, but because he was too much overwhelmed to stand up against it. I vainly suggested various methods, dangerous but honourable, by which we might extricate ourselves from our terrible embarrassment, but he had not sufficient strength of mind to adopt any of them, whilst he blamed everybody for the sad extremity into which he had fallen, and breathed rage against his own subjects instead of turning it upon the enemy, and thus concluded by making himself both hated and despised. A conspiracy was formed against him.

"Two Moor chiefs, Srinivasa Rao and Baba Sahib were the leading authors of the conspiracy. The latter had private causes of complaint against Khan Sahib, by whom he had often been ill-treated, and burned to revenge himself. To these motives of hatred were joined [those produced by] the reflections of every one upon the existing state of affairs and upon the course which ought to be followed. They felt that it would be very dangerous for them to be captured, arms in hand, defending this rebel, whilst to deliver Khan Sahib to the Nawab would be a mode of making their peace, and they resolved to sacrifice him to their safety and vengeance.

"The plot was conducted with much secrecy. The meetings [of the conspirators] were held in the hovels adjoining the Darbar.¹ The 13th October was fixed by the conspirators for carrying out their enterprise. I had noticed certain movements which alarmed me and had heard certain seditious remarks which showed only too clearly the secret disposition of the soldiers. I tried in vain to pacify

¹ "That is the place where the Council is held." *Note by Marchand.*

and soften their minds. I went to Khan Sahib to tell him my suspicions and fears. I represented in the most moving way the necessity of resolving upon some plan, and I begged him to make use of the precious moments which remained to us.

"These loyal counsels, far from having any good effect, only threw him into a passion. Fixing a haggard eye upon me, and quite losing control over himself, he said I could do nothing but prophesy misfortune, that I had better sleep and eat in quiet without troubling about anything, and leave him in peace. This reply filled me with grief. I felt tempted to abandon this fierce and obstinate person to his unlucky fate, but at last, overcoming my first impulse of anger, I determined to do my duty, if possible, in spite of him. With this object I ordered my troop to keep under arms, and determined to find out what were the intentions of the Moors. I passed the night of the 12th-13th in a cruel anxiety, which was, without doubt, a presentiment of the dreadful catastrophe with which we were threatened.

"In the morning I sent an intelligent and trusty soldier of mine to make enquiries. He returned saying he had seen a large number of the Moors under arms, and much movement in the direction of the Darbar. I sent to enquire if Khan Sahib had gone there and learned that he was still shut up in his Harem, so I gave orders to inform me as soon as he was visible.

"The conspirators, having been unable to execute their project in the morning, as Khan Sahib had remained in his Harem, a place sacred to all Muhammadans, postponed its execution until the afternoon.

"As soon as I heard that Khan Sahib had entered the Darbar, I started at the head of my men to get close to him, so as to be in a position to defend him if he should be attacked. On the way I saw nothing seriously to augment my anxiety, for the Moors, observing the weakness of my troop, which consisted of only 35 officers and soldiers, allowed me to pass without saying anything, promising themselves, no doubt, to overwhelm us by their number, and conceiving that so feeble a reinforcement would be no hindrance to the blow they intended. I arrived at the Darbar, and, leaving my troop at the gate, I went in to speak to Khan Sahib and to tell him again of all that I had observed.

"Hardly had I saluted him, when I heard a great noise outside, the enclosure of the Darbar was surrounded on three sides and an immense number of sepoys and Kallans fell upon us, sword in hand. We attempted to resist, but, overpowered by numbers, Khan Sahib

and I were surrounded in an instant and made prisoners. I was immediately taken out of the Darbar with threats of having my head split open if I made the least resistance. My troop, which had been attacked and which had likewise succumbed to numbers, had been disarmed. It was sent back to barracks with me and we were closely guarded.

“The chiefs of the conspiracy, quickly giving orders, had two field-pieces brought up, one of which was trained upon the door of the Harem and the other on that of the Darbar. At the same time they seized the chief Powder Magazine and the Armoury, took possession of the Fort gates, and having placed guards at all the posts on the Bazar Square and in all parts of the town, they made the rounds, taking charge of the besieged town as if everything were in perfect order. At 9 p.m. the conspirators sent a Fakir¹ and two of their comrades to the Camp, to inform Muhammad Ali that they were ready to surrender the town and Khan Sahib the next day, if he would send a deputy to treat with them. I took advantage of this circumstance to ask the Moors if I might send an officer of my troop with a capitulation for myself and my men. My request was granted, and I sent M. de Parigny (*sic*) with a letter to M. Campbell, containing four articles to which I demanded his signature. . . . However, whether the Moors, to consummate their treason, had promised to surrender me with the few Frenchmen I had left, or whether they were themselves surprised by an enemy more alert than themselves, the English took advantage of the moment when their envoys entered the town to introduce some companies of their troops, who immediately spread through the town, seized the chief positions and made my troops prisoners of war. I was, myself, guarded by an escort of thirty sepoys. I took advantage of the slight amount of liberty allowed me to go to the Camp and surrender my sword to Muhammad Ali, declaring myself his prisoner. This prince received me with much distinction, and complained of the harm done him by that same sword which I was then surrendering. I thought this a good opportunity to say a word in favour of his prisoner, but he pretended not to hear me, and I understood from his silence what I must fear on his behalf. He had been taken to the Camp on the 14th under a strong escort, commanded by Colonel Campbell himself. He was carefully guarded in a tent, and at first very kindly treated. He was still in the hands of the English. The Council at Madras, which respected his courage and which was well satisfied to have, in his person, a rival of whom it could make use to oppose Muhammad

¹ Marchand means Yusuf Khan's chief Surgeon, Badr-ud-din Darwesh.

Ali, in case the latter should wish to shake off the yoke which they had imposed upon him, had ordered that he should be well treated if he surrendered at discretion.

"Muhammad Ali, who felt that all the fruits of this conquest would be lost to him if this rebel were to escape from his vengeance, resolved to make any sacrifice in order to secure the immolation to his own security of a redoubtable competitor who had caused him so much alarm. He addressed himself to M. Campbell, representing that Khan Sahib had rendered himself unworthy of the clemency, promised him by the Madras Council, by refusing to surrender at discretion. He pressed him to hand over the culprit that he might inflict an exemplary punishment, and supported his request by two lakhs of rupees, which last decided the Colonel. The unfortunate Moor was placed in the hands of his sovereign. The revengeful Nawab, fearing the arrival of some order from Madras in favour of the prisoner, made haste to hang him on a tree between the Fort and the Camp, and having cut his body into four pieces, exposed his severed limbs upon the principal roads from Madura, whilst his head was sent to Trichinopoly.

"Khan Sahib, whose courage had suffered eclipse in the last days of the siege, ended his life with the same weakness. The Madras Council learned with indignation that he had been disposed of without their knowledge. They expressed great discontent with M. Campbell and with Muhammad Ali, and the latter was forced to spend much money in appeasing the Council; but, in paying so dearly for the death of the rebel, he did not think he had made a bad bargain.

"Such was the sad ending of this war and of the bold chief who had excited it: fortunate if he had been able to join to the military talents, with which he was endowed, more equanimity and gentleness of character together with a soul stronger in adversity. The ferocity of his manners and his invincible obstinacy precipitated the fall of Madura and were the cause of the catastrophe which terminated his days."

"NOTE HISTORIQUE" ATTACHED TO MARCHAND'S "PLAN DES
ATTAQUES DE LA VILLE DE MADURÉ."¹

"The kingdom of Madura is situated at the extremity of the Indian Peninsula to the south-west of Pondicherry. Formerly it had its own kings. It is now only a province of the kingdom of the Carnatic under the rule of Muhammad Ali Khan.

¹ Orme MSS., 332, p. 24.

“The government of this province having been granted in 1758 to Khan Sahib in recognition of various services, ambition impelled this chief to throw off the yoke and to declare himself king of Madura. Muhammad Ali Khan, aided by the English, invaded the kingdom the same year to punish this rebel. The usurper defended his country.

“The Sieur Marchand, Captain of Cavalry in the French service in India, received orders at the end of 1762 to join him with two hundred Frenchmen who had escaped from the ruins of Pondicherry.

“The English, with Moor sepoys and cavalry, came to lay siege to the town on the 15th September 1763, to the number of 30,000 Indians and 2500 Europeans. Khan Sahib had no more than 5200 men, including the troop commanded by M. Marchand, which consisted of 200 Europeans. The first siege was raised after 52 days of open trenches on the night of the 6-7th November 1763. The English withdrew into winter quarters two leagues away. They brought from Bombay and Bengal, in 1764, 1500 Europeans.¹ They returned on the 1st January and constructed a number of redoubts to protect their encampments. Several fights occurred during the next six months in the open plain. The trenches were opened on the night of the 1-2nd May 1764. On the 26th June the English delivered an assault. The Sieur Marchand, at the head of his men, repulsed them twice. Major Preston, second-in-command in the hostile army, was mortally wounded in this assault.

“The English, having failed to succeed by force, resorted to craft. They seduced a number of Moor officers in the garrison, whom Khan Sahib had disgusted by his severity. These men handed over both him and the town to the enemy on the 14th October, 1764.

“Khan Sahib was hanged the day after the surrender of the place by order of Muhammad Ali Khan. Captain Marchand was forced to leave the town and with difficulty was granted his life, so irritated were the English by a defence which had lasted for eighteen months, in which they knew he had taken the leading part, and which had cost them more than 2000 European soldiers, 130 officers, 7000 sepoys and Moor horse, immense labour and more than two hundred thousand 12, 18 and 24 pound cannon-shot, as well as a quantity of 12 and 8-inch shells and countless stones, and involved the expenditure of 60 millions of French money, as they and Muhammad Ali Khan themselves confessed.”

¹ In his *Précis*, p. 31, Marchand says the English renewed the siege with 3000 Europeans, so here he must refer only to supposed reinforcements.

APPENDIX IV

EXTRACTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE CHARACTER OF THE NAWAB MUHAMMAD ALI KHAN

(1) *Letter from the Nawab to Mr. Saunders. Received 29th
July, 1751.*¹

“It is impossible for me to express the undaunted valour and bravery of Mr. Gingins and the other officers of the English army, for in all our battles with the enemy they have behaved with Rustum like resolution and conduct and frustrated their designs. I am therefore surprised to find them retreat from their posts. . . . I cannot conceive the reason of their retreating in this manner.² Perhaps they will say my troops wont fight as they ought to do. Let me inform you they were never expected to fight; they were only to stay with yours for a show; but the battle entirely depends upon your army, and wherever that is my troops will continue. It is your men’s business to fight. For instance I beg leave to say that when the French waged war against Nasir Jang they had not a horseman with them; their whole force was some soldiers and sepoy, and with them they raised disturbances and defeated my army of ten or twelve thousand horse at Tiruvadi. They afterwards attacked Nasir Jang, who had fifty thousand horse, in the plains of Gingee, and killed him, and in reality gained the whole Deccan country to themselves. Thus you see the horsemen are of no service in the present war. . . . I must tell you that my whole dependance is upon your troops. I undertook the government of the Deccan country by the advice of the English, and engaged in the present expedition by their assistance. I and my family remain in the fort of Trichinopoly and it is talked all over Indostan, Deccan and Bengal, that I am protected and assisted by the English, who for their own honour should exert themselves to the utmost to support my reputation. . . . Don’t let the French and *Chanda Sahib* seize me. I

¹ *Country Correspondence*, 1751, No. 102.

² The reason given by Capt. De Gingins was that the Nawab had utterly failed to furnish them with provisions.

depend upon God and you. Do whatever may be conducive to your honour and reputation regarding my affair."

(2) *Letter dated Wassinnellore 26th May, 1767, from Colonel Donald Campbell to (?) Colonel John Call.*¹

"I have already informed you that my motive for not offering terms to these people was my having never been empowered by the Board or the *Nawab* to grant them any. To this last I have paid the compliment of communicating an account of my transactions regularly as they happened, and he has never had the civility to return me one syllable of an answer. Now was I to follow the dictates of my own judgement of matters on the spot, and to admit the submission of the *Kallans* upon conditions which should appear to me reasonable and just, what security have I that this step of mine would be approved of? The recollection of what other officers have experienced in the like circumstances leaves little reason to expect that the *Nawab* would stand to any agreement not made by himself—and, if these people can be believed in a story which bears strongly the marks of probability, a failure even in that has been the source of all these troubles. How far men of his rank in life may consider themselves at liberty to dispense with the performance of their promises I will not pretend to determine, but my word shall never be passed with an intention to deceive.

"In all my letters to the Board, to the Governor, to the *Nawab* and to you, I have ever given it as my opinion that, to accept the submission of the Rebels upon such terms as would deprive them of the power to be troublesome hereafter, is the most eligible method of treating them. This opinion is founded entirely on the nature of the country, for in other parts of the *Nawab's* dominions it would argue the utmost weakness to adopt a plan of the kind. In the districts of Arcot, for example, should the inhabitants rebel and abscond from the dread of punishment, they can be for ever excluded and their places supplied—but no man in his senses will settle in *Sivagiri*, while the natives of it can rush out of their lurking places, destroy him with the fruit of his labours, and be back again in the space of a few hours. Their present situation is, in their own opinion, barely preferable to surrendering at discretion—yet, while they have no better prospect than chains or death, they will certainly spin out their days, miserable as they are, in the imaginary possession of their liberty, and use every means in their power to distress the government and to evince that treating them with some degree of humanity will be most lastingly conducive to its interest."

¹ *Orme MSS.*, 308, p. 27.

APPENDIX V

REFERENCES TO YUSUF KHAN IN VARIOUS PRINTED BOOKS AND UNPUBLISHED PAPERS

MAJOR-GENERAL STRINGER LAWRENCE.

*Military Journal.*¹

“ They [the enemy] never could get right intelligence which way we went or sent out partys. And they often had detachments out waiting on one road while we were marching in with a convoy another. We were greatly assisted in this by a Moorman, who for his deserved merit was made commander of our sepoys. This man, commonly called the Nellore Subahdar (from the place whence he came), had first a company of sepoys in our service which were raised by himself. He is an excellent partizan, knows the country well, is brave and resolute but cool and sensible in action. In short he is born a soldier, and better of his colour I never saw in the country. He never spares himself but is out on all parties, and by his good intelligence brought in provisions to keep us in a moderate plenty.”

ROBERT ORME.

History of the War in Indostan, I. 347.

(1754). “ In this service [*i.e.* the provisioning of the army] they were much assisted by the activity and vigilance of *Muhammad Yusuf*, an excellent partisan, whose merit had raised him from a captain of a company to be Commander in chief of all the sepoys in the English service, into which he first enlisted under Captain Clive a little before the battle of *Kaveripak*: he was a brave and resolute man but cool and wary in action and capable of stratagem: he constantly procured intelligence of the enemy’s motions, and, having a perfect knowledge of the country, planned the marches of the convoys so well, that by constantly changing the roads and the times

¹ *Orme MSS.*, 13, p. 78.

of bringing the provisions out of the woods, not one of them was intercepted for three months."

*Letter dated 4th July, 1757, from Orme to Mr. Payne.*¹

"Madura will, I make no doubt, be taken if Caillaud is not as before suddenly recalled from his operations in reducing it. As soon as in our possession the value of all the districts dependant on it must be ascertained and these must be farmed to a man who can give the security of the Shroffs² for the fulfilling of his contract. This contract must leave nothing undetermined concerning the support which the Company are to give the Renter in case of disturbances. To which end it is necessary to stipulate that he maintain a number of English soldiers, say forty, and an officer in the Fort at his own expence, but this expence to be regulated to him. He may likewise have delivered over to him such a number of sepoy as may be necessary to maintain his Fort and Districts. Their pay and allowances must likewise be adjusted and ascertained, and they must be acquainted that the Renter is not only their Master but Paymaster, the Company no longer so after they once engage in his service, into which it follows they must enter without compulsion. These adjustments and ascertainments will cut off all extravagant demands on the Renter from his soldiery and all complaints from him to us. After a just calculation is made of the deductions to which the maintenance of this Force will subject the real incomes of the Country, the Price [*i.e.* the Tribute] must be fixed, and better with moderation to a capable and trusty man than for a greater to an uncertain character. I know no man in the country so proper for this employ as *Muhammad Yusuf Khan* the Commander of your sepoy, the reputation of whose military genius will avail him greatly in preserving the Country in tranquillity, and, though a soldier, by being a Renter it becomes his interest not to fight. I cannot refrain from giving you, though improperly in this place, an instance of his gallantry, which I have but just now heard. Four hundred of the best sepoy in Madura, horsemen dismounted, sallied on *Muhammad Yusuf Khan's* quarter, where were only three companies of sepoy. These instantly deserted him [almost] to a man. He retreated to a Choultry near at hand. Mr. Rumbold advanced from his Quarter which lay at a considerable distance, with what troops he could get together, and found *Yusuf Khan* defending himself with only ten men against the whole body of the enemy, who

¹ *Orme MSS.*, 28, p. 170.

² *i.e.* the Native Bankers.

could neither take, destroy or put to flight this invincible spirit. His attachment to the Company is, I think, inviolable. . . . For my part I should be willing to accept of any sum that I can see assured to the Company without incurring the advance of expenses on our part or the furnishing of troops, neither of which, you plainly see, Sir, we are able to do. It will only remain with me to be certified in the character of the man that he is such as to subject us to no risque of his revolting against us or betraying us."

GEORGE LORD PIGOT.

*Letter, dated 14th March, 1756, from Mr. Pigot to Yusuf Khan.*¹

"As I have a great dependance on your good conduct, bravery and fidelity to the Company, I have thought proper to entrust you with the command of a reinforcement to be sent to *Mahfuz Khan* in order to quell the disturbances which the *poligars* have raised in the Tinnevely countries. You are to carry with you one thousand sepoy, some Coffries and six gunners with two guns. You may take your own company of sepoy from Arcot, and Captain Caillaud will supply you with the rest at Trichinopoly and the proper stores. With these you are to proceed with all expedition to join *Mahfuz Khan*, consult with him concerning the proper measures to be taken to reduce the *poligars* to good order and settle the country and act accordingly. I entrust you not only with military affairs but also with the management of the Company's other concerns in the Madura and Tinnevely countries, which are as follows:—*Mahfuz Khan* is indebted to the Company on account of the rent of Tinnevely, according to his agreement with Colonel Heron, 121,000 Rupees, which I desire you will demand and receive. Besides this the *Nawab* agreed with the Company that they should have half of all the revenues of Madura and Tinnevely and also half of whatever sums the *poligars* might pay. Colonel Heron let the countries only for three months beginning in April 1755. You will therefore enquire what the countries have been let for since, and what the *poligars* have paid since, and receive half the amount for the Company, and also settle a method for the future payment of the share due to the Company in a regular manner. Whatever money you receive must be remitted to Captain Caillaud, to whom you will communicate the occurrences that may happen and follow his orders and advice on all occasions. Thus I have entrusted you with a

¹ *Mil. Cons.*, 16th March, 1756.

business of great importance, not doubting but you will act therein so as to gain an advantage to the Company and the *Nawab* and to yourself a good name, reputation and future favour."

*Letter dated 17th November, 1761, from Mr. Pigot to the Nawab.*¹

"I have received your letter relating to the Madura and Tinnevely affairs, wherein you wrote to me that you had offered to let *Yusuf Khan* those countries for twelve lakhs of rupees for the present year, but his *Vakil* would not agree to it. You then offered to deduct twenty thousand rupees from the above-mentioned sum, at last you told him that you would let him have them for eleven lakhs of rupees, but he would not agree to any of those terms, and likewise you wrote to me that *Tittarappa Mudali* had offered you thirteen lakhs and another person still more. Notwithstanding this you have agreed to take only eleven lakhs from the said Khan. But I acquaint you as a remembrance that we have not got any benefit from them before we delivered the management of those countrys to the said *Khan*, but on the contrary we have been obliged to keep a large force there to keep those countrys in peace and quiet, as they are very large, and we have been obliged to spend money in the room of getting it. I beg you will remember that I have represented to you all these [facts] when you was at Madras. Then you thought proper and said you would let *Yusuf Khan* continue in the management for the present year. I think it is proper to keep your promise and favour him with those countrys if his *Vakil* will propose reasonably. I have wrote to *Yusuf Khan* about it and enclosed the copy in my letters to you, and hope it will be settled between you."

COLONEL JOHN CAILLAUD.

*Letter to Council, dated 8th December, 1756.*²

"I have also wrote to *Mudali* desiring him to inform me if with the troops which he will require to be left by *Yusuf Khan* he can now pretend to manage the country himself, for I am pretty well convinced that if it is left to the other's [*i.e. Yusuf Khan's*] discretion to come away when the troubles are finished, they may not be finished for these many months, the country is so happily disposed for a person's turn who has rather the art of making disturbances than

¹ Appended to Sir John Lindsay's letter 21st Jan., 1771, to Lord Weymouth. *I.O. Records, Home Misc.*, 104.

² *Orme MSS.*, XII. p. 3364.

quieting of them. Believe me, Gentlemen, I do not speak this out of disrespect against the man whom you have thought proper to employ. I am convinced he is a faithful and good servant, but I am also convinced that his only talent lies in the military way, and that he is fond of opportunities to show it, and rather than to avoid them seeks them, and, in short, he will do best when not too much left to himself."

Letter to Council, dated 18th March, 1757.¹

"I found *Yusuf Khan* here with his army in very good condition. As to himself the same faithful, honest servant to the Company I ever knew him. The little differences which have happened between him and the *Mudali* I am almost sure have proceeded in the former from a good principle—the good, welfare and interest of his masters, but as he had proceeded sometimes with more warmth than discretion, it hath made the latter, who is naturally a timorous man, easily mistake the other's intentions, and in that point of view to represent them, and not, as they mostly were, the effect of an honest, but perhaps not well tempered zeal."

Letter to Council, dated 4th August, 1757.²

"As to *Madura* I will venture to assure you, *Yusuf Khan* is the proper man to command in that place and rent the country round it. The neighbours he has will require a brisk, active man amongst them to keep them to their duty and obedience: it is a large trust, but if there is faith in men, he is as honest and true a servant to the Honourable Company as ever eat their bread."

Letter to Council, dated 8th February, 1759.³

"One thing more, the Man ⁴ who is the Soul of all these black people thinks badly of the scheme [*i.e.* to force an entry into *Madras*] and that it is throwing away the people to no purpose who otherwise will be usefully employed. He himself will follow and some of his people, but the majority—if he can't answer for them, who can?"

¹ *Orme MSS.*, XII. p. 3391.

² *Orme MSS.*, XIII. p. 3430.

³ *Madras Records. Public Department, Sundry Book, No. 13.* "Transactions during the siege of Fort St. George," Appendix.

⁴ *i.e.* *Yusuf Khan*.

HENRY VANSITTART.¹*Letter to Clive, dated 2nd March, 1759.*²

"I should not forget to mention that your old friend, the Nellore Subadar, was of great service during the siege. He brought a large body of country horse and sepoys from Tanjore and Trichinopoly; and being joined by Captain Preston and about fifty Europeans from Chingleput, and afterwards by Major Caillaud, they occasioned a powerful diversion. The French were obliged four times to send out considerable detachments, but our people always kept their post, till a scarcity of provisions forced them to move further off. The enemy however lost many men in these different actions, beside the hindrance it gave to their work."

SIR EYRE COOTE.

*Letter to Council, dated 1st July, 1760.*³

"I am sorry to find that there is likelihood of disturbance in the Tinnevely country. I hope that *Yusuf Khan* is not endeavouring to deceive you, for my part I cannot conceive the Dutch have such a number of Europeans to bring, however it's right to ward off in time any schemes that may be forming against us."

MUHAMMAD ALI KHAN, NAWAB OF THE CARNATIC.

*Letter to Mr. George Pigot, Governor of Fort Saint George, dated March, 1759.*⁴

"Lately *Yusuf Khan* wrote a letter to Mr. Smith,⁵ from which I understand you have confirmed the Governorship of Madura and Tinnevely to *Yusuf Khan*. I cannot believe this, as I have your promise to the contrary in writing, but the hearing such news has made me ill. It astonishes me greatly. Perhaps you remember the terms upon which the Company rented the Tinnevely countries for

¹ Afterwards Governor of Bengal.² Malcolm's *Life of Clive*, II. pp. 48-50, note.³ *Mil. Cons.*, 3rd July, 1760, p. 596.⁴ *I.O. Records, Home Misc.*, 104. Appended to Sir John Lindsay's letter of Dec. 1770/21st Jan. 1771. The translation is so bad that I have been forced to re-word it in parts.⁵ Captain Joseph Smith, at this time commandant of the garrison at Trichinopoly.

three years, the Company to have the profit as well as I. It is now more than three years, and I understood from what you said that there was no profit from those countries, the charges being greater than the income, through things being in a state of disorder and confusion, and that you had returned them to me. You sent these orders to the Commandant of Trichinopoly and *Yusuf Khan*, and I appointed an *Amaldar*.¹ I suppose that as soon as this was made public *Yusuf Khan* informed you that the charges exceeded the Income, and so you intend to advance him money on behalf of the Company to meet them. I went to the Fort and said that such statements of his were false, and that he made them so as to be kept in the post. You wrote to me that you would be content with any *Amaldar* whom I should appoint. *Yusuf Khan* may pay what is due now or when he has made out his balance, as you may prefer. I have allowed him to extend his term by nine months. It has often been stated, and proved, that *Yusuf Khan* has collected more money than he is entitled to, and has transmitted it to Trichinopoly. The Commandant knows this, yet I have paid two *lakhs* of rupees to Mr. Smith through the Bankers in case there should be any deficit, and when I gave him your order to return the country to me, I told him if there were ten or even twenty thousand rupees owing I would pay it. Everybody knows this. Accordingly I have been collecting troops from all sides at great expense and am still increasing their number, but—which may God forbid—if you have determined as stated in *Yusuf Khan's* letter to Mr. Smith, it will be quite contrary to the English custom [of keeping good faith] and I will not agree to it. I cannot endure such a burden. You may be assured of the fact that the mere hearing of such a thing made me ill. Consider how mean I shall appear under such circumstances and what will be my loss. Worldly affairs are but for a few days and even for these one cannot always be the same. Only a good name is eternal. Accordingly I ask you, in conformity with your promise and agreement, to let me have possession of Madura and Tinnevely, so that I may send my servants there. Please God, of whatever remains over the charges of these countries, one half shall be paid towards my debt to the Company and I will have the other. . . . In my father's time I was in charge of Trichinopoly, Madura and Tinnevely. I also collected the tribute and *peshkash* ² of Tanjore, the *kiladars*, *Zamindars* and *Poligars* of the Carnatic, and I was

¹ *i.e.* Revenue Collector and Civil Governor.

² The customary present made on special occasions, as *e.g.* the time of paying tribute, to a superior. Sometimes used of the tribute itself.

appointed to punish the *Marathas*. So long as *Anwaruddin Khan* ¹ was the friend of the English I was rich, and as long as I had any money I spent freely and I borrowed from nobody. Now I am poor, but I ask only for your assistance, which you must grant me if I am to preserve my honour and credit. But I cannot accept any such order as the present, though you who give it are my father,² and I will never agree to his keeping those countries. As you have often told me, you are very careful about the Company's and military affairs, and the English are so strict in their accounts that no one can spend a single rupee without good reason. It astonishes me therefore that such an illiterate man as *Yusuf Khan* should be appointed without a capable person in the Company's employ to assist him, and that you should approve whatever accounts he presents to you. I don't know that he keeps any accounts. I write all this because you and I are friends, and I hope to receive a favourable answer from you soon."

*Letter to Council, dated 12th February, 1763.*³

"Tinnevely country was worth double the sum it was let for, notwithstanding it was let out to him in the manner it was. Your Honour is sensible of the offers made by other people concerning that country. Nevertheless I was necessitated to let it out to *Yusuf Khan* for nine lakhs ⁴ of rupees of the Company's coin on condition of his paying them at Madras. Even in this he detained a balance of upwards of three lakhs of rupees.⁵ . . . It is the custom in this world that if there is a necessity for any Renter to have an extraordinary Sibbendy, to apply to his Master for assistance, which, if he thinks proper to grant, he will either allot a force or sum of money to enlist the same, according to which a discount is made out of the *Sarkar* rents.⁶ As for instance if the Commander of Vellore enlists any troops unjustly without orders from the Council Board ⁷ and the *Sarkar*, can the Board allow him the expence thereof? If *Yusuf Khan* hath enlisted an extraordinary Sibbendy on just occasion by my and your orders, it may be admitted; if not, by what authority

¹ The father of Muhammad Ali.

² An Indian expression meaning that the person so addressed is one's sole protector.

³ *Country Correspondence*, 1763.

⁴ In the year 1762.

⁵ I have shown (see pp. 110 and 167) that, up to the time of the final order to pay his rent to the Nawab, Yusuf Khan had paid all that was due from him. Apparently the Nawab received only 6 lakhs for the year 1761-2, and this only because it had already been paid to Mr. Newton.

⁶ i.e. State Revenue.

⁷ Madras Council or Select Committee of the Council.

and by whose orders does he presume to demand the expences of the Sibbendy, repairs of forts, guns, firelocks, &c. ? As this is a time of peace no expedition hath happened, but he put out all the *poligars* and possessed himself of a large sum of money out of their countrys in lieu of the expense of the Sibbendy ¹ &c. He broke out in war with the *Zamindar* of the Maleavar ² upon a certain cause, who has wrote both to me and you several times and sent his *vakil* to me when in Madras. In short the Khan behaved disobediently in so many respects as it cannot be numbered. Although you forbade him to make war with the Maleavar, yet he acted contrary to it and entertained a large force under that pretence. Nine years ago he served *Muhammad Kamal* at Vellore [*i.e.* Nellore] as a physician at 15 rupees per month. He had not any of his father's estate by him, nor has he acquired anything by serving any others. All that he has at present is got out of my country by roguery. If he had defrayed the charges of the Sibbendy, repairs of the forts &c. of his own accord or without my or your orders it is no matter, because we may conclude what money he has got out of the country during his stay there was spent for the service of the said country. . . . It is well known to the world ³ :—

(a) that Yusuf Khan has been busy in repairing the fort of Madura &c. for this long time without my or your orders :

(b) that he maintained an union and correspondence of letters with the King of Tanjore &c. :

(c) that he sent an advance of 60,000 rupees and sent for ⁴ the French, Dutch and Danes from Negapatam, Wacamnad (?) and *Tuticorin* to join him :

(d) that he sent money and sent for lead, gunpowder, guns &c. :

(e) that he built a new house ⁵ :

(f) that he began a war with the Maleavars contrary to your orders :

(g) that he sent one *Zainaluddin vakil* two years ago to Nizam

¹ The tenure of the Poligars or petty chiefs was feudal, they being bound to supply troops when required. But they also paid Peshkash or presents of money. This passage supports the statement made by Mr. Landon (29th July, 1793, to the Board of Revenue) that Yusuf Khan disarmed the poligars.

² *i.e.* the King of Travancore. It has been shown (see p. 131 above) that there is good reason for supposing that the King of Travancore and not Yusuf Khan was the aggressor.

³ The charges which follow are run together in the original. For convenience's sake each has been given a separate paragraph and numbered.

⁴ *i.e.* enlisted Frenchmen, Dutch, and Danes.

⁵ Possibly the Nawab means a palace. In Marchand's plan Yusuf Khan's dwelling is marked.

Ali to persuade him and to demand a *sanad* for the Carnatic Country ¹ with an offer of a large sum of money and to desire him to negotiate the affairs of his Court with the English through his means, and further to request him to disturb and lay waste the country in some measure, promising that he would in some measure then undertake to make it up with the English :

(h) that he moreover entered into a union with Haidar Naik and sent one *Ghulam Hussain* ² to him :

(i) that he placed tappies ³ from Tinnevely as far as Mysore :

(j) that he sent messages with offers of alliance to Basalat Jang :

(k) that he sent to different parts to invite troops into his service, and

(l) that he shed innocent blood of men of distinction as well as the poor.

“As the gentlemen of the Council are very sensible and well acquainted with these proceedings I need not urge much to them on that subject. . . . The English entered into agreement with *Mansur ul Mulk*,⁴ Subadar of Bengal, but he behaved amiss only in one point, that is he gave protection to French deserters,⁵ for which reason the English were displeased with him. *Yusuf Khan* is a servant to the Company. How is it that he entertains the French ? ⁶ He mentions also in the letter that you was provoked against him by my persuasion. Let me inform you that I have represented to you concerning him from the beginning and wrote to you several letters about him, which you'll find in the Company's office, but the gentlemen of Council did not believe me. It is the custom of great people not to believe anything before it is proved. At present several of his bad proceedings [have] induced you and the gentlemen of Council to be enraged against him whose crimes are proved. . . . I am in friendship with the English nation and never wrote to the French

¹ M. de Maudave asserts that Nizam Ali, Subah of the Deccan, actually gave Yusuf Khan a *sanad* for Madura and Tinnevely, and that he was thinking of giving him one for the *nawabi* of Arcot in place of Muhammad Ali. See pp. 132 and 160 above.

² Kirmani (*History of Hydur Naik*, p. 285) says Yusuf Khan's agent with Haidar was Ali Zaman Khan.

³ i.e. posts for the despatch of letters.

⁴ i.e. Siraj-ud-daula, who was defeated by Clive at Plassey and soon after murdered by his cousin Miran.

⁵ The Nawab means “to Frenchmen and to deserters.” See Hill's *Bengal in 1756-57*, p. cxlix.

⁶ In 1759 Council permitted 30 Frenchmen to enlist with Yusuf Khan. Orme, *History*, III. 534. See p. 121 above.

without their knowledge. . . . As to *Yusuf Khan*, he entered into union with mine and your enemies. People of distinction,¹ who might have had the management of affairs from the time of their fathers and grandfathers will never do bad things and behave deceptfully to their Masters. *Haidar Naik* was weak till the management of Dindigul was given him, but when that was given him he grew strong and took the whole Mysore country under his power. This is the case with *Yusuf Khan*. As the *Zamindar* of Mysore was weak, he could not be revenged on *Haidar Naik*. By the blessing of God, *Yusuf Khan's* Masters, who are the English, are powerful, good soldiers, resolute and skilfull. I am therefore confident they will revenge themselves of his proceedings in such a manner that it may strike great terror in other betrayers.

"*Yusuf Khan* mentions further that you was perswaded by certain persons that he [has] acquired a large treasure. By the blessing of God and the friendship of the English I am creditable² Subadar of all the countries beginning from Nellore to Tinnevely. A number of proper and substantial *sahukars*³ resides in my country, who know and believe that I am honest in my dealings and in payment of money. Notwithstanding this if I apply to them for any moderate sum I cannot get it. As to *Yusuf Khan*, who in comparison was a common fellow, the other day, and that yesterday, [he] obtained a *sanad* for the *Faujdari*⁴ of the Tinnevely country for one year through my favour and yours. If so, can it be supposed [*i.e.* believed] that any one would lend him *lakhs* of money without proper security obtained from him out of the revenues of the country under him, for he advances several *lakhs* and sends for armies, forts (*sic*) and gathers provisions, &c. As your Honour is very wise you'll consider from whence he was able to defray all these expences. . . . By the blessing of God this is a proper time to detach [?] despatch] the Company's troops in order to settle the Tinnevely &c. countries, in which case *Yusuf Khan* cannot possess himself of the whole crop of the present year. If otherwise, his long stories and discourses can be with no other end than to possess himself of the produce for the present year, to collect armies and fortify forts and delay time. . . . If *Yusuf Khan* delivers up the country and forts with all stores to the *Sarkar* without fight, we may quite [*i.e.* remit] the *Sarkar's*

¹ The Nawab's own claim to high descent was somewhat shaky (Orme, *History*, I. 52). It was certainly not better than, if so good as, that of Haidar Ali. See p. 5 (n.) above.

² *i.e.* "fully acknowledged as."

³ *i.e.* bankers.

⁴ *i.e.* military governorship.

demand on him, which is above ten *lakhs* of rupees. Can I show him any more civility? Agreeable to your desire I have acquainted you with my opinion. You'll also inform me of your sentiments. You have nobody with *Yusuf Khan* to write to you the news on that side,¹ but he has a *vakil* in Madras who writes to him all the occurrences. If it is your inclination to let his *vakil* remain in your place, you'll send one on your part that he may continually write to you of *Yusuf Khan's* proceedings. If not, it is necessary that you should send him away."

*Letter to Council, dated [30] January, 1770.*²

"They ³ persuaded me to give the said countries to *Yusuf Khan*, who was Subadar of sepoys in the Company's service, illiterate, void of understanding and roguish. His ears were cut off at Pondicherry by Monsieur Law for his roguery, which was seen by every person when he was hanged. You ⁴ remember how positive the Governor and Council were in this matter when the army was near Vellore. You and Mr. Dupré were field deputies and wrote me ⁵ pressingly by order of the Governor and Council to appoint *Yusuf Khan* to those countries. The Governor then wrote me a letter with his own hand, wherein he was bound security for him. An instance of his bad behaviour was this, that he was appointed by means of the Company to command all my sepoys and was my deputy in my Countries. When I was [taken] ill at Trichinopoly and General Smith was with me, I was sitting sick upon my cot and but one servant stood by me. He came with a great many people to visit me and drew his sword, but I was saved by the General's being near me. Among all the nations in the world it is not allowed to draw a sword in a *Darbar* without any reason, and in return the person who draws his sword is killed—among the English specially this is much attended to, but I found no redress for *Yusuf Khan's* behaviour. On the contrary by giving him guns, firelocks, ammunition, stores &c.

¹ It was the common practice for Princes and Governors to entertain news-writers, stationed at the headquarters of subordinate officers, to report privately on everything that happened. In the same way a subordinate would entertain, if he were able, a private agent at headquarters, ostensibly to transact his business, but really to warn him of any intrigues likely to injure him. The English alone neglected what the Nawab thought a very necessary precaution.

² *I.O. Records, Home Misc.*, 103. *Corrected copy in* 104.

³ *i.e.* the Madras Council.

⁴ *i.e.* Charles Bouchier, governor of Madras, 25 Jan. 1767–31 Jan. 1770.

⁵ Letter from Messrs. Bouchier and Dupré to the Nawab, 10th Oct., 1761. *I.O. Records, Home Misc.*, 103.

they made him so strong that, besides neglecting to pay the money,¹ he was ready to fight against the Company. I have lost a great deal of money in turning him out of and retaking the countries from him."

LIFE OF THE WALAJAH.²

"It is observed that Muhammad Yusuf Khan was quite an illiterate and uneducated man. He was first enlisted in the infantry branch of the service and gradually rose from the ranks and [was] promoted to *Subadar*, which gave him the command of a company of one hundred men, and in the actions fought with M. Lally he attained the dignity of *Risaldar*,³ and when his Highness was engaged in the neighbourhood of Pondicherry in war-like operations he distinguished himself remarkably and evinced great valour. His Highness, who was a patron of the men of [the] sword, having in view his future fidelity, made him the chief of five thousand horse and ten thousand foot and granted him *Mansab Jagir* and title."

THE MADRAS COUNCIL AND THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

*Journal of the Siege of Madras.*⁴

5th February, 1759. "Captain Vasserot carried with him a gold watch and a large amethyst ring set round with diamonds as presents from the Company to *Abdul Wahab Khan* and *Yusuf Khan*."

*Letter from Messrs. Bouchier and Dupré to Council, dated 1st October, 1761.*⁵

"The day before yesterday the *Nawab* desired our presence in the *Darbar*. We accordingly attended him there, and he acquainted us that, in consequence of the President's recommendations of *Yusuf Khan* for the preference of renting the Tinnevely and Madura countries for the present year, he had offered it to him for twelve *lakhs* of rupees but he declined accepting it at that rent. The *Nawab* then sent for the *Vakil* ⁶ and in our presence made him the same offer free of all demands of *Nazr*,⁷ *Darbar* charges &c., and upon the

¹ The rent or revenue of the Provinces.

² "Walajah," one of the titles of Muhammad Ali. Wilson's *Madras Army*, vol. I., Appendix E, p. 386.

³ i.e. commander of a troop of horse.

⁴ *Madras Records, Public Department Sundry Book*, No. 13, p. 131.

⁵ *Mil. Cons.*, 8th Oct., 1761.

⁶ Yusuf Khan's agent.

⁷ *Nazr*, i.e. a complimentary present to a superior. The *Darbar* charges were the perquisites of the Treasury and other officials.

Vakil's declining to accept it he offered to abate twenty thousand rupees of that sum, but still the *Vakil* persisted that his master would not take the farm¹ on those terms. We acquainted the *Nawab* that we had not any instructions from your Honor &c. &c. on this head; he desired however that we would acquaint you with what had passed and that he should be under the necessity of letting the country to some other person if *Yusuf Khan* did not accept his offer."

*Letter from Court to the Council at Madras, dated 30th December, 1763, para. 23.*²

"It is with extreme concern we learn from your letter of the 30th of May that *Muhammad Yusuf Khan*, the Renter of the Madura and Tinnevely countries, has thrown off his allegiance from the *Nawab* and has collected such a force together as there is too much reason to apprehend will occasion much trouble before he is brought to reason. We observe you are taking vigorous measures to suppress this rebellion, and we trust they will be prosecuted with that prudence that they may be attended with the wished for success. We shall only make this remark that, as you well knew the genius, ambition and abilities of this man, we could wish he had not met with so much indulgence from you, and that a more watchful eye had been kept upon all his actions, as this event might probably have been foreseen and expected from such a character."

*Letter to Court, dated 24th October, 1764. Supplement.*³

"We have the agreeable satisfaction of advising your Honors that the Rebel *Yusuf Khan* is at last reduced. M. Marchand, who since the departure of M. Maudave commanded the French troops in Madura, made him a prisoner on the 13th instant and wrote to Major Campbell to send in two Commissaries and to have a body of troops on the glacis ready to march into the Fort. Major Campbell therefore sent in an officer who returned the next morning with proposals from M. Marchand of delivering up the Rebel with the Fort, on conditions that the lives of the garrison should be saved, which were in part agreed to, and Major Campbell took possession of the Fort the same day. The next evening an example was made of

¹ i.e. the Rentership.

² *British Museum, Addl. MS. No. 34,687, f. 35 B.*

³ *I.O. Records. Fort St. George Letters Received, Vol. II.*

the Rebel, which we hope will have a good effect and deter others from the many crimes he has been guilty of to support his power."

Letter from Court, dated 26th April, 1765.¹

Para. 2. "At length we are happy in being informed of the surrender of Madura and the death of *Yusuf Khan*, events that we hope will be attended with that wished for tranquillity on the Coast which will give you leisure and opportunities for turning your thoughts without interruption upon mercantile concerns and the reduction of your military expences, objects so frequently recommended to your care and which you have given us the strongest assurances shall be duly attended to. We shall therefore expect to find your utmost endeavours are exerted in serving the Company in these essential points.

Para. 3. "However agreeable and beneficial to the Company the fall of Madura will in its consequences prove, yet the loss of such a number of officers and men as have perished in the expedition fills us with the deepest concern, and in particular we are greatly affected at the death of so good and gallant an officer as Major Preston, who in the whole course of his service has behaved with that uniform zeal and attachment to the Company as always to have merited their esteem."

Letter from Court, dated 24th December, 1765, para. 7.²

"It is incident to all feudal governments that one insurrection begets another, but more especially so in the Asiatic States, where custom seems to have established as a rule that no tribute is to be paid without compulsion. This the Nawab has often experienced. The Madura and Tinnevely countries have cost him more in one expedition than the revenues of many years will repay, and often have the poligars in other places, taking advantage of their position, withheld their tribute and encouraged rebellion. The most effectual remedy to which seems to be the cutting practicable roads into the hearts of their countries. Had their been any such to Madura, Colonel Heron would not have been exposed to the defeat he suffered in the Nattam woods in the year 1755, and latterly *Yusuf Khan* would not, in all probability, have dared to attempt, as he did, an independancy in those Provinces."

¹ *Brit. Mus., Addl. MS. 34,687, f. 43.*

² *I.O. Records, Madras Despatches, Vol. III.*

THOMAS PELLING, MERCHANT AT MADRAS.

*Letter to Orme, dated 4th June, 1763.*¹

“*Yusuf Khan* has at last thrown off the mask and declared for himself. All warlike preparations are going forward, and as soon as the Coleroon is passable our troops are intended to march against his territories. This is an artfull and experienced soldier, and I could wish that matters were otherwise accommodated with him.”

*Letter to Orme, dated 9th November, 1763.*²

“I acquainted in my last of *Yusuf Khan's* having declared for himself and that our troops would soon make him a visit, at the same time giving for my humble opinion that 'twould be more for the publick advantage to accommodate matters than come to an open rupture with him. As I foresaw, so has been the event. This man, finding what we were determined upon, took every precaution of fortifying himself, entertained in his pay a large number of Europeans (mostly French, under whose banner he fights) and, before our forces could reach his territories, was ready for their reception, and though it is now several months that our forces have been employed against him, in which time a good deal of blood has been spilt and money exhausted, it is doubtfull whether we shall be able to accomplish the siege this season now the monsoons are set in.”

SUNKU RAMA, FORMERLY AGENT FOR ROBERT ORME.

*Letter to Robert Orme, dated 24th October, 1764.*³

“The Madura Fort is taken the 13th of this month from the Commandant *Khan Sahib* after sixteen months' siege. The French officer who was under his service sent a message to our army if the *Nawab* should save his life and with his troops, he will taken *Khan Sahib* prison (*sic*) and deliver the Fort, which proposal *Nawab* consented and got the Fort the same the 13th of this month, and the *Khan Sahib* is hanged the 15th.”

CAPTAIN MATTHEW HORNE.

*Letter to Colonel Richard Smith, dated the 20th October, 1764.*⁴

“I shall only observe that, from the hints I can gather from the officers I have seen that have been at Madura, that (*sic*) the attack ⁵

¹ *Orme MSS.*, 30, p. 35.

² *Ibid.*, 30, p. 49.

³ *Ibid.*, 30, p. 57.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 27, p. 141.

⁵ i.e. the assault of the 26th June, 1764.

was not conducted with that judgement that might have been expected from Call's long experience. Poor Major Preston (whose capacity was undoubtedly superior to any officer's in India with regard to affairs of that kind) very much disapproved of storming the place. By all accounts it was ill-timed, after some days' rain that almost filled the ditch. If your advice had been followed when first you suspected *Yusuf Khan*, this long and bloody affair in all probability would never have happened.

"Your brother is aide-de-camp to Major Campbell. . . .

"P.S.—*Oct. 24th.* Advice arrived here the 21st of Madura's being in our possession. The accounts of its fall [are] as follows. It was supposed by *Yusuf Khan's* behaviour that he was preparing to make his escape privately. This alarmed some of his principle men, and one of his *Subadars* upbraided him with it, asking him how he could think of leaving them a sacrifice who had so faithfully stood by him. This interrogation put *Yusuf Khan* in such a passion that he drew upon and wounded the *Subadar*. His people, seeing this, fell upon and seized *Yusuf Khan*, and the *Subadar* ordered him to Monsieur Marchong's quarters who commanded the Europeans. He immediately sent out to Major Campbell and delivered up the place, stipulating for the lives of his countrymen. *Yusuf Khan*, when he was seized, requested them to kill him, which they declined ; but never apply'd to Major Campbell or the *Nawab* to spare his life. After leading him through the Camp, he was hanged, and there was found three months' provision, plenty of ammunition and about four *lakhs* of Pagodas in the place."¹

LETTER FROM A GENTLEMAN IN THE EAST INDIES TO A FRIEND IN SCOTLAND, DATED CAMP BEFORE PALAMCOTTAH, 22ND OCTOBER, 1764.²

"In my last dated September 1763, I informed you of my resolution of staying on the Coast of Coromandel with my reasons for so doing. I at the same time made you acquainted with our army's having taken the field under the command of Colonel Monson, in order to reduce the Rebel, commonly known as *Khan Sahib*. *Khan [Sahib]* is by birth a Moor, and is descended from the ancient seed of that nation. His first appearance in the Company's service was as a

¹ "A considerable booty in gold was found in the fortress, with a large quantity of rice and ammunition in general." News from Constantinople, 1st April. *Scots Magazine*, 1765, p. 267.

² *Scots Magazine*, 1765, p. 264

Subadar or Captain of a Company of sepoy. While he remained in this character he often gave proofs of his abilities as a soldier. About six years ago he was recommended by the Governor to the *Nawab* as a very fit person to govern the kingdom of Madura and the country of *Tinnevelly*. These countries are a part of the *Nawab's* dominions, but being distant from Trichinopoly, the *Nawab's* capital, the inhabitants of the above countries often refused to pay the *Nawab* his revenues. For these reasons the *Nawab* appointed *Khan Sahib kiladar* or Governor of Madura and the countries depending on it, and furnished him with twelve companies of sepoy and a small train of European artillery. With this force he took possession of Madura, the capital city. He in a short time obliged the people to acknowledge the *Nawab* as their prince.

"Having settled the affairs of the country, he began to repair the fortifications of Madura, which at that time were much out of order. As he did not pay above one fifth ¹ part of the revenue that he collected, he soon was in a capacity of raising troops, both foot and horse, and of buying large quantities of all kinds of military stores. He was plentifully supplied with this last article by our cordial neighbours the Dutch. After the reduction of the French settlements, numbers of their soldiers took refuge at the Dutch and Danish garrisons. *Khan [Sahib]* prevailed upon them to come into his service, promising them that he would acknowledge the French King as his master. The Company and [the] *Nawab* were not ignorant of his making these preparations, but their affairs at that time would not admit of their taking notice of it. When Colonel Monson with the army arrived before Madura the beginning of August, 1763, he demanded that *Yusuf Khan* should deliver the garrison to its rightful owner the *Nawab*, which he refused. . . . The garrison at this time consisted of three thousand sepoy, one thousand horse, one troop European Hussars, two hundred French commanded by a French Captain and a large body of *Kallans*,

¹ This is not an exaggeration, if the calculations given by Mr. Lushington (see p. 303 below) are correct. From these it is clear that the total revenue of *Tinnevelly* for the seven years 1757-1763 amounted to 6,488,000 chakrams or 162,20,000 rupees, which gives an annual average of 927,000 chakrams or 23,17,100 rupees or, say, 23 lakhs, to which about 2 lakhs may be added for Madura, i.e. 25 lakhs of rupees in all as the gross revenue of the Provinces: (Marchand, see p. 259 above, gives the revenue as 26 lakhs.) On the other hand, in Madura the ordinary expenses exceeded the revenue, the deficit being met from the *Tinnevelly* revenue, which was also burdened with the expenditure of that province. Still, if Capt. Horne (see p. 286 above) is correct in saying that only 4 lakhs of pagodas (14 lakhs of rupees) were found in Madura on its capture, it is evident that *Yusuf Khan* spent his money royally.

inhabitants of the woods. They use large pikes and match-lock pieces.

“Our army consisted of about sixteen hundred Europeans, including two troops of dragoons, one of German Hussars, four thousand sepoys, two thousand Black Horse and many thousands of *Kallans*. The siege commenced about the middle of September and continued until the 12th of November, when it was found necessary to raise it on account of the rainy season, which at that time had begun. Our loss during the siege was very considerable. The army retired to *Tirumbur*, a small fort distant from Madura five miles. Here we incamped till the Monsoons were over, which were the severest I have felt. The Rains being over, in the beginning of January we again took the field under the command of Major Preston, an officer of great abilities. During the Monsoons *Yusuf Khan* was not idle, he having in that time repaired the damage his works had sustained in the siege : he also formed large magazines of grain, made powder and cast some pieces of cannon ; in short he was every way better provided than when we first came before the place. Major Preston opened the campaign with erecting posts on all sides of the garrison in order to prevent his getting in any supplies from the country round him. In February Major Charles Campbell took the command of the army, he being a senior officer to Preston. He continued to follow Major Preston’s plan in establishing redoubts round the Fort. By the latter end of May the heavy cannon and stores arrived from Madras, and our army was considerably augmented by recruits from the regiments that were ordered home, as also by recruits sent by the Company from England. The trenches were opened the 30th of May, and by the 12th of June we had twenty-five pieces of heavy cannon besides mortars playing on the Fort. The 26th of June the breach was declared practicable. The storming party consisted of the two troops of dragoons, who were dismounted for that service, two companies of grenadiers and three hundred battalion men ;¹ the attack was commanded by Major Preston. Our people descended into the ditch with great cheerfulness, in the middle of which they found an obstacle they were not aware of, a deep and narrow ditch into which our men fell up to the very neck. Nevertheless they pushed forward through a heavy fire of grape and musketry. When they had reached the foot of the breach and were forming to attack they found that, in crossing the ditch, they had wet all their ammunition, not a single cartridge being dry. The dragoons and grenadiers attempted to force the breach sword in

¹ This would make the assaulting force to consist of about 600 men only.

hand, but were repulsed with loss by the enemy's horsemen, who defended the gap with long pikes, and behind them were the sepoys. The commanding officer, seeing they could not succeed, ordered a retreat, in performing which we suffered much from the enemy's grape, small arms, arrows and stones. Our loss on this occasion was so considerable that it was not thought safe to hazard a second attack: at the same time we were assured that the garrison had not provisions sufficient to serve them for more than two months. For these reasons a blockade was resolved on and lines of circumvallation drawn round the Fort.

"We lost in this siege thirty-two officers killed and wounded and private men in proportion. Among the slain was the gallant Major Achilles Preston at the age of thirty. He died justly lamented by all who knew him; he was the darling of the army and an ornament to the Service: in him I lost one of my best friends. It is now three months since the assault, during which time we have daily expected the place to fall, the garrison being in the utmost distress for want of provisions. Their only food is two-year old rice with a little salt. They have had no vegetables for these many months, which are the principal part of a black man's diet, but what distresses them most is the want of 'beetle,' an aromatic plant which the natives of India constantly chew and which they feel the want of as much as an Englishman would that of beer and roast beef.¹ You'll easily form an idea of *Yusuf Khan's* abilities from his being able to keep together a body of men of different nations, who with cheerfulness undergo the greatest miseries on his account; wretches who have stood two severe sieges, one assault and a blockade of many months. The reduction of the French garrisons did not cost the Company half the blood *Yusuf Khan* has spilt them in these two sieges, nor is it certain how much more blood will be spent. Conquer or reduce him we must, otherwise lose our credit amongst the Country Powers. In March a detachment was ordered from the main army into the *Tinnevely* country in order to reduce some small forts belonging to *Khan Sahib* as well as to prevent any succours being sent to Madura. I was ordered to attend this detachment. We soon destroyed the little mud forts and obliged the inhabitants of the country to join us. In April we reached *Palamcotta*, a strong fort belonging to *Yusuf Khan*. . . . Its garrison consists of two thousand sepoys, two hundred horse and a few European gunners. On their bastions are planted eighteen and twenty-four pounders. This fort is commanded

¹ Later on in this letter the writer says that owing to the prejudices of the Hindus the force besieging *Palamcotta* was unable to procure any beef.

by four of *Yusuf Khan's* trusty chiefs, for whose fidelity he has taken a pledge, their wives and families, whom he keeps with himself in Madura. This is an instance of his policy."

LETTER DATED FORT SAINT GEORGE, THE 17TH MARCH, 1765, FROM MR. GEORGE NIXON, AN OFFICER IN THE SERVICE OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, TO A GENTLEMAN IN THE MIDDLE TEMPLE ¹ :—

"Since my arrival in this country, which was in July last, I have been constantly in the field. My first service was against the ancient, magnificent and strong city of Madura, which for a whole year obstinately resisted our strongest efforts : and was, in the month of October last, betrayed by a Frenchman, and delivered into our hands with the usurper who defended it, who was the day following hanged by order of the *Nawab* of the Carnatic. There fell *Yusuf Khan*, the greatest black man India could ever boast of ! Our loss before Madura was very considerable, as we had killed during the siege thirty-seven officers, upwards of four hundred Europeans and black troops almost innumerable. Soon after this great conquest the army was ordered against another very strong garrison called *Palamcott*, which place surrendered without much trouble. . . .

"We have . . . profited very considerably by our late acquisition, and [I] make no doubt of getting money if this climate agrees with my constitution. My pay in the field is upwards of eleven shillings a day, out of which little can be saved, as an officer is obliged to keep a great number of servants, which is very expensive. However, in a successful campaign there are several wind-falls, which sometimes turn out to considerable advantage. My late campaign, though a very trifling one to what sometimes happens, has enabled me to remit a cool hundred ² to Europe. The country, generally speaking, is agreeable enough, rather hot than otherwise but not in so great a degree as to prevent some Europeans from wearing cloth coats with heavy lace or embroidery.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOSEPH SMITH.

*Letter to Council, dated 13th March, 1768.*³

"I do not forget that when our whole force on this Coast was collected to chastise the usurper *Yusuf Khan*, notwithstanding they had no bodys of horse or other enemy to encounter in the field, yet

¹ *Universal Magazine* for October, 1765, p. 220.

² i.e. £100 sterling.

³ *Orme MSS.*, 64, p. 15.

what difficulties were they not drove to both for provisions and stores! The want of the latter occasioned great delays in their operations, and were it not for the treachery of his soldiers, it's not impossible but he might still have maintained his pretensions to those countries. The Man [*i.e.* *Haidar Ali*] you are acting against is by no means inferior either in courage, abilities or treasure."

*Letter to the Court of Directors, dated 1768.*¹

"Such is *Haidar Ali*, by far the most powerful and the most troublesome enemy we have ever met with in this country. Let me also mention another military genius, *Yusuf Khan*, a servant of the Honble. Company's. He seized the Madura and Tinnevely Countries, and it is well known that, when there was no enemy in the field to oppose our operations, that (*sic*) our collected force on the Coast, assisted by the *Nawab's* utmost efforts, could not reduce Madura, drive the Rebel out, or get possession of it—but on the contrary we found great difficulties in carrying on the war, in the course of which the Company lost many of their best officers and men, and their expense in money, ammunition and stores was very great. Yet, after all, had it not been for the treachery of the French officers, who gave us admittance into the place, it is hard to say how long he might have found means to keep his footing in that Country, but they opened their gates to us, admitted our troops, delivered him into our hands, and thereby put an end to the war which had lasted near two years. We are obliged to French treachery in this instance, and perhaps to them also for our present disappointments."

DOM ELOY JOZE CORREA PEIXOTO, CAPTAIN OF INFANTRY OF HIS
MOST FAITHFUL MAJESTY'S TROOPS OF THE STATE OF GOA.

*Anecdotes relative to the Rise of Hyder Ally.*²

"Cana Saib,³ Lord of Madura, was by fame and in truth a Chief and a Soldier, whom those of that Profession ought not only to imitate but to envy. He was a great Lover of the Europeans, full of Generosity and liberal to all in general. He mostly followed the European Customs, from whom he had learned to be valiant, for

¹ *Orme MSS.*, 10, p. 67. Apparently draft of a letter dated 9th Oct., 1768, in which this paragraph, after the first sentence, is omitted. See *Orme MSS.*, 64, p. 33.

² *British Museum, Additional MSS.* No. 19,287, f. 81 (b).

³ *i.e.* Khan Sahib or Yusuf Khan.

having served the English from an inferior chief to the greatest power, of which through his Merit he made himself deserving, he increased so much in Forces and Spirit that he afterwards made a terrible War against *Muhammad Ali*, whom the English assisted with the Forces they then were able. The War lasted long and *Muhammad Ali* would not have obtained such a happy End of the same if Monsieur Marchal,¹ who was Cana Saib's General and was charged with the Care and Defence of Madura, had not delivered him up to *Muhammad Ali* for a sum of money promised him, by which Action Marchal got so little Applause as he afterwards experienced as well from *Muhammad Ali* as from the English, for the former failed him in his promise of Money, and the English, knowing the Valour of Cana Saib and the Qualities for which he ought to be esteemed, could not bear to see Marchal, nor did they permit him to assist in their Camp, as it would have been necessary to treat him as a French officer—he was Captain of Cavalry—and it was plain how little Cana Saib deserved from Marchal to have his Hands tied by him with his own Turband and delivered to *Muhammad Ali*, who ordered him instantly to be hanged, leaving a perpetual Remembrance on the Coast of Coromandel. Marchal had nothing else to say in Excuse of such a vile Action than that Cana Saib began to be cruel, but it is not said in what his Cruelties consisted, for it might have been an exemplary Punishment for Carelessness in the Defense of Madura, which is as excusable as just. This Excuse availed him nothing, for the French would not consent to his assisting at Pondicherry, and as long as this Affair was fresh in Memory Marchal could get no Place to inhabit, but Time consumes all, and he came at last to assist in Pondicherry, and from thence he went to Europe, which the English obliged him to, agreeable to the Conditions of the said War at Madura. By this Marchal plainly saw in what esteem Treachery was held as well as the Authors of it, how long the Connection lasted of those concerned, and how little the Money got by it served them, which served only to buy a Vizard, a thing very necessary for all those who commit such like actions."

SIR JOHN LINDSAY, KNIGHT OF THE BATH, HIS MAJESTY'S PLENI-
POTENTIARY AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF HIS MAJESTY'S
SHIPS IN INDIA.

*Narrative of the principal transactions between the Nawab of Arcot
and the Carnatic and the Governor of Fort Saint George and the*

¹ i.e. Marchand.

*other Powers on the Coromandel Coast since the year 1759 to this date, and also a short account of the late war carried on by the Company against Hyder Ali.*¹

“Madura and the Tinnevelly country have been dependent on Trichinopoly from the earliest times, not as tributarys but they have always been under the proper government of the Country. . . . The French being defeated they returned again to the *Nawab*, who appointed his brother *Muhammad Mahfuz Khan* to be his Deputy for those districts. After this, about the year 1758, the Governor and Council pressed him to appoint *Mudali*, very much against his inclination, as he did not choose to take it from his brother. However he was obliged to acquiesce. This man behaved ill, neither did he pay the revenues, as the *Nawab* had always foretold, and the Governor and Council insisted that the *Nawab* should appoint *Yusuf Khan* to that government, and that he should have it at a small rent. The *Nawab* represented against it that he was deceitfull and a very improper man and that he never would pay the revenues. However the Governor became bound for him and made a point of his having it. This was in June, 1760.

“This *Yusuf Khan* was at first a low mean fellow, but by degrees became a *Subadar* of the Company’s sepoys. The first thing that made him be taken notice of was his wearing the Company’s Arms cut on a gold plate around his neck, on the back of which the Governor and Council ordered an inscription in Persian characters that it was the gift of the Honourable the Governor and Council of Madras to *Muhammad Yusuf Khan Bahadur*, Commandant of sepoys of the said Honourable Company for his good conduct and gallant behaviour, and that he was to wear it himself and also to go to his posterity for the good services he had done.

“When the *Nawab* let out the country of Tinnevelly to the Company for three years, they sent *Yusuf Khan* there to command a detachment of troops, and the bad conduct of their *Mudali* becoming more evident, they then obliged the *Nawab* to appoint him [*Yusuf Khan*] in his place. They gave him the forts of Madura and *Palam-cotta*, a great number of guns and firelocks and an immense quantity of ammunition.

¹ Appendix 46 to Sir John Lindsay’s letter, dated Fort St. George, the 13th October, 1770 to the Right Honourable Lord Viscount Weymouth, one of His Majesty’s principal Secretaries of State, *I.O. Records, Home Misc.*, No. 103. Sir John Lindsay’s account has been followed pretty closely in Macpherson’s *History and Management of the East India Company from its origin in 1600 to the present times*, p. 143.

"The *Nawab* was well informed that *Yusuf Khan* never meant to pay anything to him, nay he told it to several himself, and, from the time he found himself vested with authority he became master of the country. The Company's people knew well upon what conditions he rented Madura, but none of the *Nawab's mutasaddis* ¹ knew anything of the matter. He was to pay a very small annual sum to the *Nawab*, yet he did not pay the whole of that. He had once drawn his sword upon the *Nawab*, when he was confined by a fit of sickness in his own house at Trichinopoly, and he supposes he owed his safety to General Smith's presence, who luckily happened to be there at the time. He withdrew his hand from paying the rent, which was the first cause of the war. He then joined the French and carried them into Madura Fort. And to show that he was perfectly estranged from the English he fixed their colours to the mouth of a cannon and fired it off ² (which is a common punishment for criminals), and immediately hoisted French colours. He disobeyed the English, by whom he had arrived at such honours. He made it his business to execute the orders of their enemies the French. He began to dismember the country by assigning [Kalakadu] to the Zemindar of Travancore Malywar.³ He showed the utmost inclination to expel the English, and had already begun to correspond with *Haidar Naik*. It was then the Company's servants began to repent of their friendship to such a man and it was resolved to reduce him. A force was sent against him, in which the *Nawab* was employed. The expense of this war cost him very near a crore of rupees, and the loss on account of the deficiency of unpaid revenues near as much more. . . .

"The *Nawab* was at the whole expense of the Madura expedition except the European soldiers, which were paid out of the revenues of the *Jagir*." ⁴

GEORGE ROUS.

The Restoration of the King of Tanjore Considered, p. 45.⁵

"*Yusuf Khan* was, without exception, the most gallant and enterprising soldier who appeared among the *Muhammadans* while

¹ Clerks or accountants.

² Godfried Sweepe in his Short Account for 1763 confirms this statement.

³ i.e. the King of Travancore.

⁴ The Chingleput District, which the Nawab gave to the English but rented from them.

⁵ This paper is appended to Vol. I. of one copy of *Rous' Appendix*, in the India Office Library. N.B. Apparently the Appendix is composed only of the original documents appended to *The Restoration of the King of Tanjore Considered*,

the French and English were contending for superiority in India. During the wars of Trichinopoly he was frequently employed by Major Lawrence on the most important and dangerous service. His activity under Major Preston in distressing the enemy before Madras greatly conduced to the safety of the place and established his reputation. The mutual jealousy which afterwards arose between him and the *Nawab* was a natural effect of merit under a Moorish Government. 'The field of fortune,' says Mr. Orme,¹ 'is open to every man who has courage enough to make use of his sword or to whom Nature has given talents of mind.' Among these soldiers of fortune a man highly distinguished becomes the rival of his master, and regard to his own safety is a frequent cause of rebellion."

"Whatever motives instigated *Yusuf Khan* to revolt, the English, in support of the *Nawab's* Government, were obliged to reduce him."

MONSIEUR LOUIS BRUNO.

*Journal d'un voyage fait aux Indes Orientales en 1764 par Monsieur Bruno, Introduceur des Ambassadeurs près Monsieur. 1773.*²

"26 September, 1765. I dined today at Cuddalore with M. Marchand,³ a Swiss officer in the English service and Commandant of the garrison of that town. He had his leg taken off by a cannon ball during the siege of Madura,⁴ and as I have met several persons who were wounded in that siege, I will say something about what caused it.

"*Khan Sahib* was a Moor who, whilst he pursued the occupation of a tailor⁵ at Pondicherry, had an ear cut off⁶ by sentence of the which was the reply prepared for the Court of Directors in 1777 to two pamphlets entitled (1) *State of Facts relative to Tanjore*, and (2) *Original Papers relative to Tanjore*, published in London in the same year.

¹ *History*, I. 53.

² *Archives du Ministère des Colonies*, C² 98, p. 84. M. Louis de Bruno married Marie Joséphe, daughter of the Chevalier Jacques François Law.

³ Captain Rudolph Marchand.

⁴ Captain Rudolph Marchand lost a leg at Vellore, not, it seems, at Madura.

⁵ "tailleur." Dupleix, in his reply to Mr. Godeheu's letter of the 25th Oct., 1759, says (page 93), the only inhabitants of Pondicherry fit for military service were the Muhammadans, and these were tailors.

⁶ "It was for theft that *Khan Sahib* was condemned. When I wrote this part of my Journal I was not fully informed of the facts, but having since then passed eight years in India I had opportunities of learning everything about this affair. I have re-written this part and added the details which I did not then know. The facts are as I have given them." *Note by M. Bruno*. M. Bruno left France in 1764 and arrived in India in 1765. His Journal was retouched and brought up to date in 1773.

Chaudry [*Ang.* Choultry], a tribunal which disposes in the first instance of civil and criminal cases for the Moors and Malabars, and from which there is an appeal to the Sovereign Council.¹ But *Khan Sahib*, not wishing to remain in a place which had witnessed his disgrace, took service as a sepoy under the King of Tanjore, was promoted to the rank of Captain and left the service of Tanjore for that of the *Nawab* of Arcot, *Muhammad Ali*. He soon distinguished himself and acquired the confidence of his new master, who sent him to Madura in the capacity of Receiver-General² of the Revenue of that Province. His position gave him great authority, for as Receiver-General he was also Governor. This is contrary to our custom, but it is the basis of the hierarchy of power throughout India. Having ambition, talent for war and a courage which he pushed to rashness, he could not resist the temptation of making himself master of the Province. The money in his Treasury enabled him to raise troops, but, to maintain himself in greater security, he determined to obtain the assistance of the French officers who had escaped from the English after the siege of Pondicherry.

“He first addressed himself to Marchand,³ to whom he sent money to buy guns, bullets and powder and to raise sepoys. This Marchand was a French officer, a partisan. He accepted the offers of the *Khan Sahib* and soon joined him at Madura with some good sepoys, well armed, and with some remnants of our forces, but the most valuable thing he brought to the *Khan Sahib* was his own person. Marchand was a man of courage. He had been Captain of M. Bussy’s body-guard in the Deccan, where he had distinguished himself by twenty instances of extraordinary valour. He brought back from a country, so rich that every one but himself had made a fortune in it, nothing but a number of wounds, amongst which was a musket shot in the chest, which had passed right through his body. This wound, of which he has never been completely cured, still often causes him to vomit blood—sometimes to the amount of a pint.⁴ It is clear such

¹ I presume this means the “Superior Council” of Pondicherry.

² *i.e.* Amaldar or Renter.

³ “This is not the Marchand I mentioned a few lines above and who commands at Cuddalore. He was a Frenchman and had been a servant (*domestique*) of the Chevalier Law, who seeing his talents had made him a partisan [*i.e.* officer of irregular troops]. He died this year, 1773, at Ruel [*i.e.* Rueil, near Paris], having been made Chevalier de St. Louis on the recommendation of M. Law, Baron de Lauriston, Governor-General of India, notwithstanding his affair at Madura, of which he never quite cleared his reputation.” *Note by M. Bruno.*

⁴ “une pinte.”

a man must have a body of iron, to have held out, in such a state of health, through a siege of three months of open trenches, during which for twenty-eight days the breach was exposed to assault and always defended by himself in person. The *Nawab*, or rather the English to whom the *Nawab* is only a *prête-nom*, soon sent an army to reduce the Rebel. *Khan Sahib* was not strong enough to hold the open country, so, as he had strengthened the fortifications of Madura, the capital of the Province, he shut himself up in it with Marchand and the brave men who had followed him. The English at once besieged Madura. The town was well provided with food and munitions of war and the garrison was numerous, but the fortifications, which had been repaired in a hurry, were not equally good. Nevertheless the town, even in this condition, was able to hold out against the English army for a long time. The Governor of the Isle of France, from time to time, sent word of the arrival of a French squadron or of fresh troops. The expectation of these succours encouraged the garrison and made the English redouble their activity. It was important for the latter not to have such a business on their hands if the French should return to India.

“Never did a siege cost the lives of so many brave officers and soldiers. Major Preston, a young officer of great merit and the brightest promise, commanded the English army. Piqued by the resistance of *Khan Sahib* and chagrined at the reproaches he received from Madras, he resolved on a general assault in which he sought for and obtained death.¹ *Khan Sahib* was saved. Marchand, and the French officers and soldiers, who had come with him and defended the place so bravely, proved clearly that Pondicherry had fallen only by the treason or the folly of those in command. In short the English did not know how to reduce the place or to recover the honour of their arms. *Khan Sahib* was the author of his own ruin. In the course of a quarrel which he had with Marchand, he so far forgot himself as to strike him with his whip. He was the stronger, and Marchand, deprived of his weapons, was unable to take his revenge for an outrage, no example of which had ever occurred up to that time in India. He resolved to make terms with the English, to whom he delivered *Khan Sahib* and Madura. The English had the Rebel hanged on the breach, and left Marchand absolutely unrewarded for an act of treachery, which he should under no circumstances have allowed himself to commit.

“In the defence of Madura against the English he served our nation as much as he served *Khan Sahib*. Who knows what might

¹ “Se fit tuer.”

have been the result of this affair? *Haidar Naik* was not far off. Hugel¹ was with him at the head of two hundred determined horse-men."

COLONEL WILLIAM FULLARTON.

A View of the English Interests in India, pp. 137-140.²

"Your Lordship and the Board are not unacquainted with the unworthy practices by which the fertile province of Tinnevely has suffered since the disreputable expedition thither under Mahfuz Khan and Colonel Heron. Their defeat by the *Nad Kallans* near Madura was not more disgraceful than the principles upon which that and subsequent armaments against the *Poligars* had been conducted. Though clear statements and specific charges, leaving no retrospect of exaction, together with simplicity of arrangement and despatch in execution are the great barriers against malversation, the opposite of such conduct constantly prevailed; until your Lordship and the Board assumed the management of those territories, nothing was definite—nothing was concluded: partial payments were received; past claims were left for future settlement; many months were wasted in fitting out an expedition, and still more in performing slight services. During the whole period of protraction the Renter, the *Amaldar*, the *Faujdar* and the European Commander were reaping the harvest of corruption and sowing for an after-growth of peculation. The *Poligars* are subtle and acute: they took advantage of so corrupt a system; and notwithstanding their internal feuds, they united against a common invader. They administered to the avarice of their opponent by bribes, and to his passion for command by procrastination. Thus the province was impaired—its cultivation failed—its manufactures diminished—every new collector and commander entailed new evils and taught the *Poligars* to consider their *Peshkash* (the sum paid by those who hold of a superior) not as a just tribute to their sovereign but as a price to purchase the forbearance of oppressors.

"The conduct of *Muhammad Yusuf Khan* deserves to be exempted from this general accusation. While he ruled those provinces, his whole administration denoted vigour and effect: his justice was unquestioned—his word unalterable—his measures were happily

¹ "M. Hugel belonged to the 'troupe Allemande.' He died of wounds received on the 14th May, 1771, when Hyder was defeated by the Marathas." Note by *M. Bruno*.

² See also *I.O. Records, Home Misc.*, No. 331, pp. 169-331. Letter dated 7th Jan., 1785, from W. Fullarton to Lord Macartney and Council, p. 212.

combined and firmly executed; the guilty had no refuge from punishment: his maxim was that the labourer and the manufacturer should be the favourite children of the *Sarkar*, because they afford strength and comfort to the public parent, and that the *Poligar* and the *Kallan*, though equally entitled to truth and justice, have no pretension to indulgence, because they are the worthless prodigals who waste their own means and ravage those of others. 'Let them become *Zamindars*,' said he, 'and cultivate their own lands instead of plundering their industrious neighbours; then they shall be cherished, but, while their habit is idleness and their business devastation, I will treat every one as a public enemy who wields a pike or wears the turban of a *Poligar*.' On comparing the state of that country with his conduct and remarks, I found that wisdom, vigour and integrity were never more conspicuous in any person of whatever climate or complexion."¹

ANQUETIL DU PERRON.

Des recherches historiques et géographiques sur l'Inde, p. 127. Berlin, 1786.

"Prataup Sing et Toullasou avoient permis ou plutot ordonné à un corps de François, qui étoient au service de Tanjaour de joindre Kam Saheb.² 'Malheureusement pour ce chef,' observe l'Auteur du Management,³ 'M. Marchand etoit du nombre. *Cet homme se saisit de sa personne et le livra d ses ennemis.* Cela arriva au mois d'Octobre 1764.' Ce trait que je voudrois effacer avec mon sang des Annales de l'Inde, est confirmé par les *relations Danoises*.⁴ En parlant du siège de Madurei, de la prise de la place par les Anglois unis a Mahmet aali, de la mort du Commandant, Kam Saheb Vassal du Nabab, lequel fut pendu le jour même de la reddition, 14 Octobre 1764, elles ajoutent que 'les François, dont le Capitaine livra le Fort et le rebelle Isophkhan, furent faits prisonniers de guerre.'"

JOHN SULLIVAN.⁵

Tracts upon India, written in the years 1779, 1780 and 1788. London, 1795. Page 142.

"A divided authority can never be adequate to the arduous and difficult task of effectuating a reform in the long established

¹ "are of no climate and complexion." Original letter of 7th Jan., 1785.

² "*Précis des deux sièges de Madur*, pp. 16, 45, 49."

³ i.e. J. Macpherson.

⁴ "*Relation des Miss. Dan.*, T. IX. 100, 101; cont. pp. 480, 570, 577, 594, 596."

⁵ John Sullivan or Sulivan went to India as a Writer in 1765, and was a

habits and manners of the *Poligars* and *Kallans*, neither can we expect to see any material improvement in the conduct and condition of those people, while their attention is called off on one side by the civil administration of the *Nawab* and on the other by the coercive power of the English.

“The only remedy, from which a radical cure of this great political evil can be hoped for, would be the adoption of a systematic arrangement, which should resolve all the powers of government into one controlling authority, to which, and to which alone, all classes and descriptions of persons should be made to direct both their hopes and their fears.”¹

“Such was the system which *Yusuf Khan* introduced when he assumed the government of those provinces; and, although he held them for some time under all the disadvantages of an usurped authority, yet so great was the vigour of his administration, and so forcible was the example which he set of a rigid adherence to the letter of the engagements he entered into, that the tribute from the *Poligars* was regularly collected, the property of individuals was secured from the depredations of the *Kallans*, and the public revenue was considerably augmented.”²

“The two short periods of English administration at the time of the assumed revenue [*i.e.* when the Revenues were collected by the Madras Council] from 1782 to 1785 and from 1790 to 1793 were distinguished by consequences not less favourable to the interest of the State and to the general tranquillity of the country, without having been accompanied by that rigorous and, in some instances, too severe an exercise of authority, which characterized the government of *Yusuf Khan*.”

EDWARD COTSFORD.

*Letter dated Bruton Street, 5th Oct., 1784, to the Court of Directors.*³

“After the reduction of Manilla, I took the first opportunity to return to Madras, where, shortly after my arrival, I was appointed to go with the army under Colonel Monson to the siege of

Senior Merchant and fourth in Council at Masulipatam in 1776. Apparently he retired about 1782.

¹ This is the same advice as was given by Orme in 1757: see p. 271, above.

² This paragraph closely resembles para. 18 of Mr. Lushington's Letter of the 28th May, 1802, to the Madras Board of Revenue. See p. 304 below.

³ I.O. Library, Tract No. 59. Cotsford was an Engineer officer, who was afterwards transferred to the civil line and rose to be Chief of Masulipatam.

Madura; a variety of circumstances contributing to render the operations of the army then unsuccessful, the siege was raised. I continued with the army during the next siege, under the command of Colonel Charles Campbell. *Yusuf Khan* defended the place most gallantly, and in a general assault made upon his works we miscarried with a very heavy loss; but by the treachery of the French troops within, *Yusuf Khan* and the garrison were betrayed into our hands."

PHILIP DORMER STANHOPE.¹

Genuine Memoirs of Asiaticus, 2 Edit., 1785, p. 160.

"From Trichinopoly we travelled through the plains of Mellore [? Melur] and arrived at the Fort of Madura, famous for having held out two obstinate sieges, against the combined forces of the *Nawab* and [the] Company, in the second of which it was taken by the treachery of a French officer, and the Governor, a Mahometan of royal extraction,² whose gallant defence against a superior army deserved a milder fate, was sacrificed to the resentment of the *Nawab*. From a more generous enemy he would have experienced that mercy which his grey hairs,³ his high descent, and above all his heroic bravery so justly claimed. But such is the savage policy of the East, that death and captivity go hand in hand, and the most solemn promises of life and forgiveness to the conquered are no longer deemed sacred by the conqueror than while the life of the unfortunate prisoner may be conducive to the interests of the victorious tyrant."

GENERAL SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF THE SOUTHERN DIVISIONS OF
THE PENINSULA FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE CALLEYOO-
GUM OR THE PRESENT AGE.⁴

"REGARDING MELLOOR NAUD.—During the administration of the Rebel *Yusuf Khan*, he considered it political (*sic*) to offer no trouble to the *Kallans* of this *Nad*, and thereby to preserve the tranquillity of

¹ For three years Stanhope was in the service of the Nawab Muhammad Ali.

² This is a good instance of the rapid growth of tradition, but see p. 286 above.

³ If *Yusuf Khan* was a youth when Jacques Law arrived in India in 1744, he can hardly have been grey headed at the time of his death in 1764.

⁴ "Collected at Pawur, a village in the Tenkasi Tallook in Tirunelveli, from the traditionary information of Auhobala Saustry and Yaman Acharii, 1801." *I.O. Records, Map Department, MS. B. 27.*

Madura District. To keep them however in awe of him, he caused a fort in *Vellalapatti* and another at *Melur* to be built and garrisoned by some of his troops. Recognizing the *Melur Nad* under three distinct *Nads*, viz. *Vellalur Nad*, *Serugudi Nad* and *Melur Nad*, he would occasionally, by his partial conduct towards one of the *Nads*, create a jealousy in the others, and secretly stimulate them to an insurrection with one another, and when the parties referred to him for a decision of their dispute, he would levy a sum of money from the weakest party. During the period of his rebellion with the *Nawab*, he demanded nothing from these *Nattars*,¹ with the view of attaching them to his person and of engaging their services towards opposing the march of the *Nawab's* detachment through any part of the *Melur Nad*. In short, to the downfall of *Yusuf Khan*, the *Kallans* maintained their original independency, and by their constant depredations and frequent murders proved the terror of the neighbouring countries. After the execution of the Rebel, the Madura District was thoroughly placed under the *Nawab's* government."

"REGARDING TIRUMBOOR.—During the warfare carried on by the *Nawab* against *Yusuf Khan*, the country was so agitated that the ryots² finding themselves considerably troubled and plundered by the *Nawab's* people of their property, they were under the necessity of abandoning their villages and to repair to foreign countries for their subsistence. After the restoration of the *Nawab's* authority, a *Muhammad Abiral Khan*³ was appointed Manager of this country, which encouraged the greatest part of the emigrants to return to their villages and re-establish themselves in the hope of protection in future. But as from that time the Managers of Madura adopted the system of renting the *Taluks* to individuals at a very high rate without any consideration to the welfare of the Ryots, the demand of the Renters bore so oppressively on them that, in order to avoid the punishments with which they were threatened and to satisfy the Renters, they were reduced to the grievous necessity of selling even their ploughing cattle."

¹ ? Kallans of these Nads or Districts.

² i.e. the small cultivators.

³ Abiral Khan was the *Bakhshi* or Commandant of the *Nawab's* army, and accompanied him to the siege of Madura. On its fall he was appointed *Kiladar* or Governor, but soon died, being succeeded, in turn, by his son and grandson, their total tenure of office lasting until the English took over the provinces. See *Petition of "Rymiah Khan," Kiladar of Madura, Mil. Cons.*, 3rd April, 1804, p. 1135.

STEPHEN RUMBOLD LUSHINGTON, COLLECTOR OF TINNEVELLY.

*Letter dated 28th May, 1802, to the Board of Revenue, Madras.*¹

Para. 14 (Summary).—The accounts commence with the administration of Anwar Cawn appointed Faujdar and Amil of Tinnevelly by Anwaruddin Khan.² His *Jamabandi*³ was 8½ lakhs of Chakrams⁴ for Tinnevelly. Next came Ghulam Husain Khan and Husain Muhammad Khan jointly; their *Jamabandi* varying from 7 to 12 lakhs. In 1749 Husain Muhammad Khan alone had a *Jamabandi* of only 7 lakhs.

Para. 15 (Summary).—“When Anwaruddin Khan was slain in battle Chanda Sahib deputed an *Amil* named Alam Khan. He managed for two years 1750 and 1751 with *Jamabandis* of 8 and 7 lakhs respectively. To him succeeded *Tittarappa Mudali* and *Mundi Meyah*, the agent of Chanda Sahib, who was killed in battle by [Mahfuz Khan].” *Tittarappa's Jamabandi* was 6½ lakhs, that of *Mundi Meyah* about 6 lakhs.

Para. 16 (Summary).—“Upon Mundi Meyah's death the authority of *Mahfuz Khan* was established in the country. He formed the design of becoming independent in the possession of it, and his *Jamabandi* for the two years of his administration was—1754, 609,669-9-2, and 1755, 725,080. But Yusuf Khan by the vigour of his mind frustrated this ambitious design of *Mahfuz Khan*, and re-establishing the power of *Muhammed Ali Khan* delivered the management for a year to *Alagapah Mudali*. The *Mudali's Jamabandi* for 1756” was Chakrams 635,000.

Para. 17.—“The distracted state of the country, owing to the depredations of the Poligars, required a greater energy for their reduction than *Alagapah Mudali* brought to this arduous undertaking, and Yusuf Khan was appointed to the sole charge from the year 1757 to 1763. He accordingly continued to rule in the country, and during this period the annual *Jamabandi* was” 1757, 583,000; 1758, 663,000; 1759, 774,000; 1760, 1030,000; 1761, 1244,000; 1762, 1141,000; 1763, 1053,000.

¹ *I.O. Records, Madras Board of Revenue Proceedings*, 16th August, 1802, p. 9027. Lushington was appointed Collector of Tinnevelly in 1801. He was Governor of Madras from 18th Oct., 1827, to 25th Oct., 1832.

² Father of Muhammad Ali.

³ *Jamabandi*, i.e. the land revenue or rent payable to the State.

⁴ I presume this means the gold chakram. According to the accounts appended to this letter it appears that 16½ chakrams were equal to 10 pagodas, the pagoda being equal to 3½ rupees; thus the chakram would be equal to a little more than two rupees.

Para. 18.—“ During the first three years of *Yusuf Khan's* management he was engaged in constant struggles with the Poligars with very various success. The necessities of the Company during this anxious period in the Carnatic demanded the employment of his force and of his extraordinary military talents in more central parts of it. Tinnevely was therefore left in his absence a prey to the depredations of the Poligars and the perfidious machinations of *Mahfuz Khan* aided by the adherents of Travancore. The latter indeed wholly assumed during this period the most fertile Taluk of the Province, *Kalakadu*, but, when *Yusuf Khan* could be spared from the siege of Madras to return to Tinnevely, he had the address not only to detach the Raja of Travancore from the League¹ but to acquire his assistance in punishing the Poligars. Notwithstanding the disadvantages under which he laboured of an usurped authority, he accomplished by the vigour of his mind and military talent the complete subjugation of the Province. In his time the tribute of the Poligars was regularly collected, private property was in no danger from their depredations, and the Revenue of the *Sarkar* Lands was very largely increased.² The effect of the subordination he established may be seen in his *Jamabandis* from the year 1761 to 1764 when they never fell below 1030,489 and were in one year so high as 1244,530.

Para. 19.—“ The vigour of *Yusuf Khan's* measures was indeed felt for some little time after he suffered the death of a rebel, but the Poligars soon forgot the terror of his name and relapsed into their former habits.”

JAMES MILL.

*History of British India, 1817-1818, Vol. III. pages 388-389.*³

“ It was not till the summer of 1763 that the *Nawab* and Presidency were enabled to turn their attention to Madura and Tinnevely. Though *Muhammad Yusuf* had been previously employed from the raising of the siege of Madras till the fall of Pondicherry in reducing the refractory *Poligars* and other local commanders, obedience and

¹ *i.e.* the League of the Poligars against Muhammad Ali.

² This paragraph closely resembles the third paragraph of the extract quoted above from Mr. John Sullivan's *Tracts upon India*. See p. 300 above.

³ M. Barchou de Penhoen in his *Histoire de l'Empire Anglais dans l'Inde* 1840 (Vol. II. p. 376) follows Mill in his account of Yusuf Khan almost *verbatim*. He concludes, “ He,” *i.e.* Yusuf Khan, “ was the bravest and ablest of all the native warriors who had ever fought during the Indian wars in the ranks of the English,” a passage which closely resembles the concluding passage in the extract given below from Sir John Malcolm's *Life of Clive* (see p. 307 below).

tranquillity were by no means established : and when that active and useful partizan proposed to take the country as Renter and to become responsible, though for a small revenue, from a region which hitherto had cost much and yielded nothing, the offer was not unwillingly embraced. *Muhammad Yusuf*, like other Renters of India, had no doubt an inclination to withhold, if possible, the sum which he had engaged to pay out of the taxes which he was empowered to collect : and, like other Governors, contemplated, it is probable, from the very beginning, the chance of independence. It cannot however be denied, that the enemies with whom he had as yet been obliged to struggle, and who had heretofore rendered the country not only unproductive but burdensome, left him no revenue to pay. It appears, accordingly, that none had ever been received.¹ For this failure the *Nawab* and the Company now proceeded to inflict chastisement, and in the month of August 1763 a combined army of natives and English marched to Madura. *Muhammad Yusuf* endeavoured, by negotiation and the influence of those among the English whom he had rendered his friends, to ward off the blow. But when he found these efforts unavailing, he resolved to give himself the chance of a struggle in his own defence.² He was not a man of whom the subjugation was to be expected at an easy price. He baffled all the efforts of the *Nawab* and the Company till the month of October 1764 ; when he had already forced them to expend a million sterling, and no ordinary quantity of English blood ; and, without a deed of treachery which placed his person in their hands, it is uncertain how far he might have prolonged his resistance. Among a body of French troops whom he had received from the Raja of Tanjore was a person of the name of Marchand, by whom he was seized and delivered to his enemies.”

SIR JOHN MALCOLM.

Quarterly Review, Vol. XVIII., No. XXXVI., May, 1818, Article VI., page 391.³

“ The general history of the native army of Fort Saint George is short. Sepoys were first disciplined, as has been stated, on that

¹ I have shown that this statement is incorrect. He paid the revenue agreed upon into the English Treasury, up to the date when he was finally ordered to pay it to the Nawab. This, too, is implied in Council's letter of the 12th Jan., 1764, in which an account is required only from July, 1761 (see p. 167 above).

² See Rous' explanation of Indian rebellions, p. 295 above.

³ Review of Captain Williams' *Historical Account of the Rise and Progress*

Establishment in 1748; they were at that period, and for some time afterwards, in independent companies under *subadars* or native captains. *Muhammad Yusuf*, one of the most distinguished of those officers, rose by his talents and courage to the general command of the whole; and the name of this hero, for such he was, occurs almost as often in the page of the English historian of India as that of Lawrence and Clive."

Life of Robert Lord Clive, Vol. II. page 295.

"The gallant *Muhammad Yusuf*, who had so greatly distinguished himself in the early campaigns of Lawrence and Clive, had been continued in the management of Madura and Tinnevely, which he had been the chief instrument of reducing to order. He was, in this situation, subject to the *Nawab*, to whom and those around him he was not long in becoming an object of jealousy and hatred. The defalcation of revenue from exhausted countries and the haughty replies¹ made by a proud soldier to reproaches, added to the preparations he made to guard against the designs of those he justly deemed his enemies, furnished ample pretexts² for accusing him of malversation and rebellion. The Company's troops were combined with those of the *Nawab* for his reduction, which was not however effected without great waste of blood and treasure, and at last accomplished by an act of treachery. A Frenchman in his service, of the name of Marchand, betrayed him, and he was put to death by the *Nawab, Muhammad Ali*. This gallant soldier, no doubt, became a rebel to the Prince he served; but he may be deemed, in some respects, the victim of those disputes for power which ran so high at this period between the English and the *Nawab*. Mr. Pigot, according to *Muhammad Ali*, forced *Muhammad Yusuf* upon him

of the Bengal Native Infantry from its formation in 1757 to 1796. This article is not signed by Sir John Malcolm, but there is no doubt that it was written by him. See his letter dated Bombay, 27th Nov. 1830, *Mil. Records, Spec. Collections*, 171. Malcolm was Governor of Bombay from the 1st Nov., 1827, to the 1st Dec., 1830.

¹ Mr. Rangasami Naidu informs me that the tradition at Madura is that when the Nawab threatened Yusuf Khan for not remitting the revenue, Yusuf Khan replied that if he were really a Nawab he might come and seize him, but as he was not a real Nawab he would find it impossible to subdue him. It is quite possible that some such angry communications passed between the two in the years 1762 and 1763, though I have not traced them in the Records, and from what is said (p. 294 above) by Sir John Lindsay, who derived his information direct from the Nawab, there is little doubt that Yusuf Khan treated the Nawab with the very scantiest respect.

² See the Nawab's charges against Yusuf Khan, pp. 278, 279 above.

as the Manager of the countries of Madura and Tinnevely ; and by his support and countenance encouraged him in acts of contumacy and disobedience. Educated as the Vellore [*i.e.* Nellore] *Subadar* had been, and knowing that the real power was vested in the English, he appears to have looked exclusively to them and to have paid little attention to one he considered as having no more than a nominal authority. But the departure for England of his friend Mr. Pigot and the succession of Mr. Palk, whose policy conceded to the *Nawab* the real dominion of his country, left *Muhammad Yusuf* without hope, and in the desperate struggle he made for his life, the former faithful soldier of the English not only corresponded with their enemies, the French, against whom he had so often and so gallantly fought, but declared himself the subject, and displayed in his fort and country the banners, of that nation. This last act of his life has not deprived his memory of the honours that belong to it as the bravest and ablest of all the native soldiers that ever served the English in India."

GENERAL JAMES GEORGE SMITH NEILL.

Historical Record of the Honourable East India Company's First Madras European Regiment, by a Staff Officer, 1843, page 218.

"The Carnatic and Southern India had enjoyed a season of tranquillity until August 1763, when a force, of which the Madras Europeans formed the principal part, marched to Madura against *Muhammad Yusuf*, who had brought into subjugation the southern *Poligar* States round Madura and Tinnevely, which he had rented from the *Nawab* ; but, being backward in paying the Revenue, was accused by the *Nawab* of defalcation and rebellion. Until October 1764 that gallant soldier made a desperate struggle against his enemies, and his capture was not effected (and that by the treachery of a Frenchman in his service) until much blood and treasure had been expended."

REV. G. R. GLEIG.

India and its Army. Reprinted from the Edinburgh Review, No. 197, for January, 1853. India Office Library, Tract No. 532.

Page 23.—"The names of Muhammad Yusuf, Jamal Sahib and others fill a page in history scarcely less memorable than that which sets forth the exploits of our own Forde, Caillaud and Coote."

Page 36.—"Why should we hesitate to place more *Muhammad*

Yusufs or *Bhavany Singhs* at the head of our battalions if we can find them—subject, of course, to the control of European officers, carefully selected ? ”

HENRY BEVERIDGE.

A Comprehensive History of India, Civil, Military and Social, 1862.

Vol. II. p. 210.—“ After the question of the Jaghire was settled the Presidency, as much for their own sakes as that of the *Nawab*, were not indisposed to assist him in collecting the revenue which had fallen into arrear in almost every district. . . . Not satisfied with reducing the refractory chiefs belonging to the *Nawabship* properly so called, *Muhammad Ali* turned his eyes southward where he expected to reap a more abundant harvest. Tanjore, governed by its Raja, and Tinnevely and Madura, of which *Muhammad Yusuf* had been appointed Renter, were the localities in which the next grand effort for the recovery of revenue was to be made. . . . ”

Page 212.—“ The expedition to Tinnevely was both of a painful and of a formidable description—painful, because directed against a man who had formerly deserved well of the Company, and was therefore entitled to some degree of indulgence—and formidable because there was good ground to apprehend that on finding himself treated as an enemy he would make a vigorous and protracted, perhaps even a successful defence against any force that could be mustered to attack him. *Muhammad Yusuf* was a soldier of Clive’s training, and a ‘ worthy disciple,’ says Colonel Wilks,¹ ‘ of the school in which he was reared. His perfect fidelity, intelligence, and military talents had deservedly obtained the confidence of Major Lawrence, and he was promoted to the rank of commandant of all the English sepoy, and continued to perform the service of the convoys with admirable vigilance and address.’ Indeed, it may be affirmed without exaggeration that the successes which ultimately terminated in the relief of Trichinopoly, and the capitulation of the French in the island of *Srirangam* could scarcely have been possible but for the dexterity displayed by *Muhammad Yusuf* in furnishing supplies, often in the face of a very superior force. . . . Under such circumstances the collection of revenue was a very difficult task, the expenses seldom falling short of the gross sum obtained. *Muhammad Yusuf*, however was confident of better times and in the hope of profiting by them, offered to take the burden of collection upon himself and to pay a fixed sum in the name of rent. The *Nawab*, who had no liking for *Muhammad*

¹ *Historical Sketches of the South of India, I. 324.*

Yusuf, would at once have rejected the offer, but the Presidency approved of it and it was accepted. It is not improbable that *Muhammad Yusuf* in making the offer was not sincere. His success in life had been great, and having from a very subordinate station raised himself to an important command, he perhaps only became the Renter of Madura and Tinnevely in the belief that he thus took the most effective method of acquiring an independent sovereignty. Such at least was the suspicion of the *Nawab*, and circumstances seemed to justify it, for the rent, moderate as it was, was not paid. The excuse was that no revenue could be levied.¹ The Presidency, whose pecuniary difficulties had been constantly increasing, were not satisfied, and after remonstrance had failed, determined to proceed against *Muhammad Yusuf*, as if he had now himself become the most refractory and formidable of the *Poligars*. Before this determination was declared he had endeavoured to prevent it by the intercession of influential friends, who, knowing how faithfully he had served the Company, could not believe that he now meant to turn traitor. When influence failed, and it was plain that nothing but force would avail him, he began to prepare for the worst, and when the *Nawab* and his allies appeared met them with defiance. The struggle was severe, and its issue was by no means decided, when an act of treachery made the *Nawab* triumphant."

J. H. NELSON, M.A.

The Madura Country: A Manual compiled by order of the Madras Government, 1868.

Part II., page 46.—"During the period of *Muhammad Yusuf Khan's* administration a temporizing policy was adopted by that able ruler of men in his dealings with the Melur Kallans, and though he built a fort at Melur and another at Vellalapatti, he did not attempt to extract tribute from them; but contented himself with fomenting jealousies amongst the principal men of the caste, and teaching them to habitually refer their disputes to him as the common mediator and supreme arbitrator. By this means he succeeded in keeping them in tolerably good order, and no doubt attached them to his cause, when at last he found it necessary to rebel against the *Nawab Muhammad Ali*." ²

¹ I have shown in the text that this is incorrect. See pp. 110 and 167 above.

² This paragraph seems to have been suggested by the "General Sketch" from which I have quoted on pp. 301, 302 above.

Part III., page 281.—“*Muhammad Yusuf* continued to govern the Madura country for some time longer, and appears to have made himself exceedingly powerful. The memoirs furnished to me by Ponnusami Tevan and another furnished by a *Muhammadan* gentleman¹ agree in stating that he conquered all the Poligars without exception, and exacted tribute from the King of Travancore, and he overran the Sivagangei and Ramnad countries. But these successes brought no profit to the Honourable Company's government. Either the expenses of *Muhammad Yusuf's* administration were too great to admit of him acting up to his pecuniary engagements, or he thought he might render himself sufficiently strong to maintain himself in independence, and acting in accordance with the long established and almost unvarying custom of India, delayed remitting tribute to his Lord until his Lord came with an overpowering army to enforce obedience and collect arrears.

“This event happened towards the end of 1762.² A considerable force was sent against him and he was regularly besieged in his capital by an army of Englishmen, *Muhammadans* and Maravans. The Sethupati, the *Tondaiman* and the Raja of Sivagangei combined against him together with many of the Poligars; and the unfortunate man found himself without a friend. Unappalled by this formidable array against him, *Muhammad Yusuf* defended himself with the greatest energy and skill; and at the end of eight or nine months the besiegers found that they had made but little progress. But treachery effected what force could not effect: and the gallant soldier, who had served in so many campaigns, always with marked distinction, was seized by a confidential servant and given over to his enemies; who in May 1763, with a want of mercy which at this time seems all but inexcusable, hung him like a dog.³

“The history of the career of this remarkable man as preserved by tradition is very peculiar and interesting. According to one of Ponnusami Tevan's memoirs, which as observed before are generally very fairly accurate, *Muhammad Yusuf Khan*, better known in Madura by the name of Gaun Sah Kummanthan (Khan Saheb, Commandant) was a Hindu of the Vellala caste born at Paniyur in the Ramnad country. In his youth he was wild and disobedient to his parents, and eventually ran away to Pondicherry

¹ I have made all possible inquiries as to these Memoirs, but no one, at Madura, appears to know what has become of them.

² Nelson is very confused in his dates. This should be 1763, and the capture of Yusuf Khan not May, 1763, but October, 1764.

³ I have pointed out in the text (see p. 231 above) that “hanging” was the English punishment for treason or rebellion.

and served under a European for three years and a half, at the end of which period he committed some great fault which led to his immediate dismissal. After this he served under a Mr. Brunton, who took great pains with his education, and had him instructed in several languages. Next he entered the service of the *Nawab*, and being a man of great ability rapidly rose from being a Tandalgar, and then a toll-collector, and next a Sepoy, to the posts of *Naik*, *Havildar* and *Subadar*. In the course of time he greatly distinguished himself against Bada Saheb¹ at Saint Thomas' Mount, and was promised the government of the southern countries. At Arcot he married a Parangi woman.² Subsequently he came to Madura, chastised the Kallans and poligars and subdued the whole of the south to submission with the exception of the Marava Rajas. He began to plot the conquest of these countries also, and it was in consequence of the representations made to the *Nawab* and the English at Trichinopoly by the ministers of Ramnad and Sivagangei³ that the *Nawab* resolved to bring a large army against his vassal, and finally hung him. It is also stated that *Muhammad Yusuf* carried a magical ball of gold in the flesh of his right arm and was thus rendered safe from all bodily harm: consequently when he was dropped from the gallows the rope broke, and when he was dropped a second time the rope broke a second time. Finally he removed the golden ball, and then the rope did its duty.

“*Muhammad Yusuf's* high character and eminent administrative ability are forcibly contrasted with the incapacity and tyrannical conduct of his successors in the following passage, which occurs at page 21 of the report of Colonel Fullarton, dated Pondicherry, 7th March,⁴ 1785, which has lately been printed by order of Government . . .”⁵

¹ Bada Sahib was the brother of Chanda Sahib and had been killed in battle in the year 1740 (*vide* Part III., p. 262), long before Yusuf Khan's time. The tradition probably refers to Chanda Sahib's son, Raza Sahib, who was the protégé of the French. The fighting at St. Thomas' Mount refers to Lally's siege of Madras in 1758-9.

² If the order of events is correctly stated, then Yusuf Khan's marriage in 1759 agrees with the birth of a son in 1762-3.

³ As far as I can ascertain, it was the Nawab who bribed the Maravans to give up the cause of Yusuf Khan. The complaint of the Maravans to General Lawrence is mentioned on p. 143 above.

⁴ In the *I. O. Records, Home Misc.*, No. 331, the letter is headed “Pondicherry, 7th Jan., 1785,” but at the end the address is given as Fort St. George.

⁵ For this passage see extracts above (pp. 298, 299) from Colonel William Fullarton's *View of the English Interests in India*, p. 139.

Part III., page 289.—“ In 1757 . . . *Haidar Ali* made a descent from Dindigul upon the Madura country, and took Solavandan; but was beaten off by *Muhammad Yusuf*. . . . In 1760 occurred the collision between the Mysorean force and the expedition sent by *Muhammad Yusuf* from Tinnevely. . . . It is said that in the action near Vattila-gundu the Mysorean *Faujdar* and many of his subordinates were killed, and Shir Khan the commander of the troops sent by *Muhammad Yusuf* then took possession of the Utthama-paleiyam, Periyakulam, Kambam and other districts; and that he held them up to the time of the execution of *Muhammad Yusuf*, when he found it necessary to relinquish his conquests.”

MAJOR H. M. VIBART.

The Military History of the Madras Engineers and Pioneers, 1881,
Vol. I.

Page 74.—“ In 1759 the *Nawab's* Government, finding that the districts of Madura and Tinnevely were in great disorder, and that they were unable to get any revenue from them, sent *Muhammad Yusuf* with a strong force to take charge of the districts. He agreed to rent the districts for an annual sum of seven lakhs of rupees. He had some considerable trouble in restoring order, but being a good soldier, he eventually succeeded and introduced a good government. He was however unable or unwilling to pay the rent required of him. He probably contemplated independence; whether he was unfaithful or not does not seem to be quite clear. At any rate the *Nawab* and the English government resolved to coerce him and, in 1763, an army was sent against him. He tried by negotiations and by his influence with some of the English to clear himself, but finding this of no avail, determined to fight.

“ His lengthy and gallant defence show that he had much money at his disposal: hence it would seem that he really did intend to found an independent kingdom.”

Page 89.—“ Madura was accordingly taken possession of at 6 p.m. on 14th October. *Yusuf Khan* and his family were taken prisoners, and the next day *Yusuf Khan* was hanged. Although, being a rebel, he had rendered himself liable to this fate, still, considering the gallantry displayed by him, his life might well have been spared. The incident was, it is thought, by no means creditable to us.”

AUTHORITIES REFERRED TO IN THE TEXT AND NOTES.

- Anquetil du Perron, M. Abraham Hyacinthe.* Des Recherches historiques et géographiques sur l'Inde. Berlin. 1786.
- Barchou de Penhoen, Auguste Théodore Hilaire, Baron.* Histoire de la conquête et de la fondation de l'Empire Anglais dans l'Inde. 1840-41.
- Beale, T. W.* Oriental Biographical Dictionary. New edition by H. G. Keene. 1894.
- Beveridge, Henry.* A comprehensive History of India, Civil, Military and Social. 1862.
- Broome, Captain Arthur.* History of the Rise and Progress of the Bengal Army. 1850.
- Bruno, Monsieur Louis.* Journal d'un voyage fait aux Indes Orientales en 1764. (Completed in 1773, but not published.) *Archives du Ministère des Colonies. Paris.*
- Buckland, C. E.* Dictionary of Indian Biography. 1906.
- Bussy, Comte de.* See *Patissier*.
- Caldwell, Bishop R.* A Political and General History of the District of Tinnevely. 1881.
- Cambridge, R. O.* An account of the war in India between the English and French on the coast of Coromandel from the year 1750 to the year 1760. London. 1761.
- Campbell, Col. Charles.* Journal of the second siege of Madura. *Orme MSS. 74.* Unpublished.
- Caraccioli, Charles.* The Life of Robert Lord Clive, Baron Plassey. 1775-1777.
- Chalmers, George.* A Collection of Treaties between Great Britain and other Powers. 1790.
- Chatham Papers and Colonial Office Records* in the Public Record Office, Chancery Lane.
- Compagnie des Indes.* Mémoire pour la Compagnie contre le Sieur Dupleix. 1763.
- Cotsford, Edward.* Letters to the Honble. the Court of Directors. 1784.

- Danish Missions.* Geschichte der Missions anstalten in Ost-Indien. 1763-1764.
- Dubois, Monsieur l'Abbé, J. A.* Hindu Manners, Customs and Ceremonies. Ed. 1906. (Edited by H. K. Beauchamp.)
- Dupleix, Joseph François, Marquis.* Mémoire pour le Sieur Dupleix contre la Compagnie des Indes. 1759.
- Dutch Records.* (Rijksarchief, 's Gravenhage). (1) Letter from the Governor and Council of Ceylon to Batavia, 24 January, 1764. (Unpublished.) (2) Short accounts of events in Madura, the Maravas and Travancore during the years 1763 and 1764, by Godfried Sweepe, the Dutch Chief of Madura. (Unpublished.)
- Edinburgh Advertiser, The.* 1765.
- Encyclopædia Britannica, The.*
- Francis, W.* Madura. 1906.
- French Foreign and Colonial Office Records.*
- Fullarton, Colonel W.* A view of the English Interests in India. 2nd Edition. 1788.
- Fumel, Vicomte Jean Georges.* Expédition de, ou Mémoires de la guerre de Lally. (Orme MSS. 73 and xiv. Unpublished.)
- Gazette de France.* Recueil des Gazettes de France. 1770-83.
- Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser, The.* 1765.
- General History of the Kings of the Ramanad.* Mackenzie MSS. IV. 21.
- General Sketch of the History of the Southern Divisions of the Peninsula.* India Office, Map Dept. MS. B. 27.
- Geschichte der Missions anstalten in Ost-Indien.* 1763-64.
- Gleig, Rev. G. Robert.* Life of Robert, first Lord Clive. 1848. India and its Army (reprinted from the *Quarterly Review*, January, 1853).
- Hamilton, Walter.* A geographical, statistical, and historical description of Hindustan and the adjacent countries. 1820.
- Hill, S. C.* Bengal in 1756-57. 1905. The Old Sepoy Officer. 1913.
- Imperial Gazetteer of India.*
- India Office Records* concerned with Madras.
- Kirmanî, Hussein Ali Khan.* History of Hydur Naik (translated by Col. W. Miles. 1842).
- Lally de Tolendal, Trophime Gérard, Comte de.* Plaidoyer du comte de Lally-Tolendal. . . . contre M. Duval d'Eprémèsnil. Rouen. 1780.
- Lauriston, Jean Law de.* État politique de l'Inde en 1777. Paris. 1913.
- Law, Jacques.* Plainte du Chevalier Law contre le Sieur Dupleix. 1763.
- Leighton, David.* Vicissitudes of Fort St. George. (1902.)

- Letter from Mahommed Ali Chan, Nabob of Arcot, to the Court of Directors.* 1777.
- Letters to and from the East India Company's Servants from 1756 to 1766.* London. 1772.
- Lettres des Nouvelles Missions de Maduré.* 1839.
- London Chronicle, The.* 1761.
- Love, Col. H. D.* Vestiges of Old Madras. 1913.
- Lushington, Stephen Rumbold.* Letter dated 28th May, 1802 to the Board of Revenue, Madras. (Unpublished.)
- Mackenzie, Lt.-Gen. Colin.* General History of the Kings of the Ramanad. Collection of Manuscripts, I.O. Library. Statistical and Geographical Memoir, Marawar and Ramnad, the Isle of Ramiseram and Tondiman's Country, surveyed in 1814. 1817. (I.O. Map Dept., MS. B. 22. Unpublished.)
- Macpherson, J.* The History and Management of the East India Company from its origin in 1600 to the present time. New Edition. Vol. I. 1782.
- Mahon, Lord (Philip Henry Stanhope).* History of England, 1836-1854.
- Malcolm, Sir John.* Review of Captain Williams' Bengal Native Infantry. (*Quarterly Review*, 1818.) Life of Robert Lord Clive. 1836.
- Marchand, Le Chevalier.* Précis historique des deux sièges de la ville de Maduré. Paris. 1771.
- Maudave, Comte Louis Laurent de Federbe.* Letter dated 20th April, 1764, to the Duc de Choiseul. (Archives du Département des Affaires Etrangères. Paris. Unpublished.) Relation de ce qui s'est passé à la Côte de Coromandel depuis le 4 Avril 1762 jusques au mois de Janvier, 1764, en conséquence de la mission donnée à M. de Maudave par le Comité de l'Île de France (Archives du Ministère des Colonies. Paris. Unpublished.)
- Mercure de France.* 1770-83.
- Miles, Col. W.* See *Kirmani*.
- Mill, James.* The History of British India. (4th Ed. by H. H. Wilson. 1840-48.)
- Neill, Brig.-General J. G.* Historical Record of the Honble. East India Company's First Madras European Regiment. 1843.
- Nelson, J. H.* The Madura Country. A manual compiled by order of the Madras Government. 1868.
- Nicolas, Major-Partisan.* Mémoires de Lally. (Orme MSS. 2. Unpublished.)

- Orme, Robert.* Collection of Manuscripts in the India Office. A History of the military transactions of the British Nation in Indostan from the year 1745. New Edition. Madras. 1861.
- Pandion Chronicle, The.* (Taylor's Oriental Historical Manuscripts.)
- Patissier, Comte de Bussy-Castelnau, Charles Joseph.* Mémoire pour le Sieur de Bussy. Paris. 1764.
- Peixoto, Captain Eloy Jozé Correa.* Anecdotes relative to the rise of Hyder Ally. Brit. Museum. Addl. MS., 19287. (Unpublished.)
- Pennant, Thomas.* View of Hindoostan, 1798-1800.
- Pouget de St. André, Monsieur H.* La Colonisation de Madagascar sous Louis XV. 1886.
- Quarterly Review, The.* See *Gleig* and *Malcolm*.
- Rous, George.* The Restoration of the King of Tanjore considered, with an Appendix. 1777.
- Scots Magazine, The.* 1765.
- S.P.C.K.* Reports for 1759 and 1765.
- Spring, Col. F. W. M.* The Bombay Artillery. 1902.
- Stanhope, Philip Dormer.* Genuine Memoirs of Asiaticus. 2nd Edition. 1785.
- Stewart, Major C.* Memoirs of Hyder Aly Khan and Tippoo Sultan. 1809.
- Stuart, A. J.* Manual of the Tinnevely District. 1879.
- Sullivan, John.* Tracts upon India, written in 1779, 1780, and 1788. 1795.
- Sweepe, Godfried.* Short Accounts of Madura, etc., for 1763 and 1764. (In Dutch. Unpublished.)
- Tamil Ballad entitled The War of the Khan Sahib.*
- Taylor, Rev. W.* Oriental Historical Manuscripts. 1835.
- Universal Magazine, The.* 1765.
- Vibart, Major H. M.* Military History of the Madras Engineers and Pioneers. 1881.
- Welsh, Col. James.* Military Reminiscences. 1830.
- Wilks, Col. Mark.* Historical Sketches of the South of India in an attempt to trace the History of Mysoor. 1810-1817.
- Wilson, Col. W. J.* History of the Madras Army. 1882

INDEX

ABDUL KADIR, 145 (n.)
 Abdul Rahim, 26-30
 Abdul Wahab, 27, 83, 84
 Abestie, Monsieur, 155-158
 Abiral Khan, 302
 Adair, Thomas, 166 (n.), 193 (n.), 204
 Airey, George, 91
 Aix-la-Chapelle, Treaty of, 153 (n.)
 Alagappa Mudali, 65
 Alam Khan, 8, 26-30
 Ali Sahib, 66
 Ali Zaman Khan, 119 (n.), 279 (n.)
Ambition, Indian ideas of, 12, 230, 284, 295
 Anquetil du Perron, 299
 Anwaruddin Khan, 5, 26, 61 (n.), 277
 Arcot, 8, 9, 116, 240
Arrack, 184
 Aryanatha, 4, 5
 Asserah (? Asir) Beg, 186, 187
 Auteuil, Combault d', 10-12

BABA SAHIB, 219, 263
 Badruddin Darwesh, 221, 223, 265
 Baillie, William Annesley, 182
 Barchou de Penhoen, Baron, 304 (n.)
 Barkatullah, 40 (n.), 53, 55-60, 72, 75, 112
 Barnard, Nicholas, 159
 Basopanaik, 58, 62, 65, 66
 Bawdwin, Thomas, 193, 196
 Beaver, George, 42, 43 (n.)
 Beck, John Francis de, 139
Betel, 192, 214, 289
 Beveridge, Henry, 239 (n.), 308-9
 Bhadra Kali (Durga), 75
 Black, Richard, 164 (n.)
 Blake, David, 195, 201
Blue Lights, 64
 Boistel, Adjutant, 201
 Bonjour, Abraham, 159 (n.), 176-178, 237 (n.)
 Bouchier, Charles F., 22, 106, 107, 144, 281 (n.)
 Brahmans, The, 16, 17, 33, 34, 59, 75
 Brereton, Cholmondely, 90-93
 Bridger, John, 190
 Brower, Christian, 175, 213
 Brown, Sergeant, 29
 Bruce, Thomas, 205
 Bruno, Louis, 2 (n.), 124, 126, 160, 237, 238, 295-298
 Brunton, Mr., 2, 3, 311
 Buchanan, Surgeon Duncan, 201
 Buck, George, 190

Bullock, Josiah, 205
 Bussy. *See* Patissier

CAILLAUD, JOHN, 16-18, 44-46, 50, 51, 53, 56-65, 67-70, 72, 76, 78, 84-87, 90, 91, 116, 271-275, 307
 Caldwell, Bishop R., xi, 37 (n.)
 Call, Sir John, 148, 150 (n.)-152, 155, 156, 159, 160, 168, 169, 172, 176, 181, 188, 191, 196, 201, 205, 216, 221 (n.), 235, 239 (n.), 240 (n.), 255-257, 286
 Callender, Alexander, 43 (n.)
 Campbell, Charles, 11 (n.), 131, 168-170, 176-198, 201-203, 205, 206, 210-227, 233-235, 252-257, 263, 265, 266
 Campbell, Donald, 101, 115 116 150, 159, 201, 214, 229, 269
 Caraccioli, Charles, 10 (n.)
 Carere, Surgeon Jean, 179
 Casemore, Thomas, 159 (n.)
Cavalry, Indian, 81, 84, 85, 187, 189
 Champion, An Indian, 29
 Chanda Sahib, 7, 8, 10, 12, 23, 26, 228
 Chapman, Major, 152, 159
 Chingleput, 77, 83, 87
 Choultry in the Vaigai River, 67
Chronogram of Yusuf Khan's death, xii
 Clive, Robert, ix, 7, 9-11, 14, 15, 25, 55, 86, 88 (n.), 270, 306, 308
 Colombe, Lieut., 194, 196, 201
Company's Flag, The, 106 (n.)
 Conjeeveram, Storm of, 91
 Constantino Vas Concella (?) 227, (n.)
 Coop Sahib (? Khub Sahib), 31
 Coote, Eyre, 88, 102, 103, 105, 275, 307
 Cope, James, 9, 10, 26-30, 31 (n.)
 Cotsford, Edward, 159 (n.), 193, 300, 301
 Council, The Madras, *passim*
 Croley (or Crowley), John, 201

DALAWAI MANDAP, The, 12 (n.)
 Dalton, John, 10-12, 38
 Damois, Anthony, 123 (n.)
 Danes, The, 96, 119, 126, 127, 134, 157
 Danish Mand Khan. *See* Barkatullah
 Daud Khan, 184-187
 Davis, Henry, 181
 Dawson, Samuel, 182, 183
 Desvoeux, Charles, 223, 224, 256
Din Muhammad, 77
 Dubois, l'Abbé, J. A., 54, 192, 219 (n.)
 Dumont, Jean, 123
 Dupetitval, Monsieur, 175


- Dupleix, Joseph François, 10 (n.), 11 (n.), 13, 14, 18, 19, 47, 125, 237
 Dupré, Josias, 106, 107, 281
 Dutch, The, 96, 119, 126, 127, 134, 287
 ELEY, JOHN, 201
 Ettaiyapuram Poligar, The, 52, 66, 98
 Exagon Redoubt, The, 175
Expédition Frigate, The, 161, 169, 176
 FAULKNER, ARMOURER, 53
Fidèle, The, 122
 Fitzgerald, James, 197
 Fitzgerald, Robert Villiers, 168, 176
 Fitzgerald, Thomas, 188, 189, 195 (n.), 205
 Flacourt, Charles, 123, 156, 161, 169
 Flamicourt, Claude Thérèse Eléonor, 124, 127, 149-151, 153, 156-159, 161, 171, 251
 Forde, Francis, 87, 88, 307
 Fort Defiance, 172, 179
 Fowkes, Lieutenant, 179
 Frischman, Daniel, 192
 Fullarton, William, 113, 239 (n.), 298, 299, 311
 Fumel, Vicomte Jean Georges, 79 (n.), 87 (n.)
 GANGAIKONDAN, 59
 Gingins, John Rodolph, 9, 10, 268
 Gleig, Rev. R., 111, 307, 308
 Godeheu, Charles Robert, 18, 19, 31
 Grant, Alexander, 159 (n.)
 HAIDAR ALI, x, xii, 3, 9, 62, 72, 74, 75, 89 (n.), 119, 122 (n.), 123, 128, 145-147, 165, 169, 170, 176, 183, 213, 232, 233, 238, 240, 243, 262, 263, 280, 291, 298, 312
 Hamilton, James, 175, 201
 Hamilton, Walter, 185
 Harper, Humphrey, 183
 Harris, Thomas, 51 (n.)
 Hart, Simon, 136, 182, 186, 188, 214
 Haumartin, Monsieur d', 233, 236
 Haussé, Monsieur, 123 (n.), 161, 176
 Henneberg, Monsieur, 249, 250
 Heron, Alexander, 21, 23, 33-44, 272, 284, 298
 Heyne, Mr., 186, 187
 Hooker, Williamson Legard, 193
 Horne, Matthew, 105, 285, 286
 Hugel, Monsieur, 122, 127, 169, 170, 176, 192, 213, 261, 298
 Hunterman, Arnold, 189
 Hurts, Quartermaster, 139, 180 (n.)
 ÎLE DE FRANCE, Council of, 122, 124
 Innis, John, 27
 Innis, Khan, 186, 187
 Ishwant Rao, 166, 167
 JAMAL SAHIB, 40, 53, 56, 58-60, 196, 307
 Jeffrys, Richard, 51 (n.)
 Johnson, Captain, 163
 Johnson, Joseph, 51 (n.)
 Johnston, Samuel, 25
 KALLANS, The, 25, 26, 37, 41-43, 57, 60, 113, 163, 174, 198, 269, 302
Kamandán bāghi, xii
 Kattabomanaik, 37, 52, 58, 66, 98
 Kaveripak, Battle of, 7, 9, 270
 Kelly, Robert, 212
 Kerjean, Jacques Desnos, 11 (n.), 125 (n.)
Khan Sahib's pallivāsāl, 4, 228
 Killpatrick, James, 16, 47-50
 Kirkpatrick, James, 195, 205
 Knox, William, 205
 Kovilkudi, Storm of, 35-37, 42 (n.)
 Krishna Rao, 78, 79, 92
 LACKENAIG (? Lakshmi Naik), 34, 35
 Lally, Michael, 84
 Lally, Thomas Arthur, Comte de, 76-88, 99
 Lambert, Monsieur, 125
 Landeman, Johannes, 123 (n.)
 Lannoy, Eustace Benedict de, 131 (n.)
 Law, Jacques François, 1, 2, 8, 10, 124, 125, 237, 281
 Law de Lauriston, Jean, 146, 155 (n.), 171, 175, 178, 179, 236, 237
 Lawrence, Stringer, ix, 10, 14-16, 19-22, 25, 34, 44, 85 (n.), 90, 130, 134, 138, 140-144, 148 (n.), 149 (n.), 151, 152, 158, 160, 161, 164, 166, 168, 200 (n.), 210, 248, 270, 306, 308
 Lee, William, 43 (n.)
 Leyrit, George Duval de, 19, 125
 Lin, William, 41, 43 (n.)
 Lindsay, Sir John, 19, 134, 239, 292-294
 Lisle, Hospital Assistant, 53
 Lucas, Colley Lyon, 170, 209 (n.)
 Lushington, Stephen Rumbold, 114, 303, 304
 Lysaght, Arthur, 163
 MACDONALD, WILLIAM, 205
 Mackain, John, 51 (n.)
 Maclean, John, 159 (n.)
 Macpherson, J., 19, 131 (n.), 293 (n.)
 Madras, Siege of, 77-88
 Madura, 23-32, 63-69, 120, 145-225
Magic ball, 228, 311
 Mahfuz Khan, 14, 26, 33-35, 37-39, 44, 50-59, 61 (n.), 62, 66, 72, 90, 99, 102, 116, 243, 258, 272, 293, 298, 304
 Maissin, Monsieur, 125
 Maitland, Richard, 201
 Malcolm, Sir John, ix., 110, 305-7
 Mallet, Monsieur, 123, 124, 169, 170, 176, 261

- Manilla Expedition, The, 118, 124
 Mankoji, 12, 165 (n.)
 Marathas, The, 11, 12, 26, 112, 146, 200 (n.)
 Maravan Poligars, The, 31, 35, 36 (n.), 98, 104, 118, 136, 139, 141, 143, 145, 231, 248, 311
 Marchand, Monsieur, 2, 97, 104, 117, 123 (n.), 124-127, 131, 135, 149 (n.), 150, 156, 159, 161, 162, 171, 174, 176-178, 180, 181, 204, 205, 208, 210, 212, 215-227, 232-238, 250-267, 283, 286, 292, 296, 297, 299, 305, 306
 Marchand, Rodolph, 160, 295
 Martanda Varma (Travancore), 50, 52, 53, 57, 74, 100, 304
 Maruthanayagam Pillai, 1
 Maudave, Comte Louis Laurent de Federbe, 80, 122-124, 127, 128, 132, 136, 137, 139, 140, 142, 145-147, 150, 151, 153-161, 169, 171, 232, 246-251, 260, 261
 Maunsell, Thomas, 38, 44
 Mayana, 31, 35, 36, 50, 56, 69
 Maza (Yusuf Khan's wife), 3, 5, 6, 221, 254, 255
 Medeler, D. E., 103
 Merriman, Lawrence, 27
 Meyers, John Henry, 222-224, 254-256
 Mill, James, x, 230, 304-5
 Minakshi Rani, 12 (n.), 26
 Minakshi Goddess and Temple, 4 (n.), 75, 112, 117 (n.), 208 (n.), 219 (n.)
 Mir Jafar, 54, 56
 Mir Mansur, 22
 Mir Sahib, 185 (n.), 204
 Mollitore, John Wolfgang, 42, 43
 Monson, George, 109, 131 (n.), 140, 144, 148-153, 155, 156, 159, 164 (n.), 190, 247, 286, 287
 Montrose, *Heart of the Great*, 25
 Moodemiah, 31, 35, 50, 52
 Morse, Mrs. Jane, 86 (n.)
 Morse, Nicholas, 15, 86 (n.)
 Mount, Battles of The, 81, 84, 85
 Mudali (Sepoy officer), 220, 221, 232, 253, 256
 Mudali, Tittarappa (Renter), 50-52, 54, 56-62, 64-66, 70, 107, 273, 274, 293
 Mughal, The Great, 12, 230
 Muhammad Ali, *See* The Nawab
 Muhammad Kamal, 3, 7, 278
 Muhammad Yakub, 186, 187
 Muhammad Yusuf. *See* Yusuf Khan
 Muhiuddin Sahib, 185, 186, 193
 Murtaza Ali, 47-50, 109, 129
 Mutiny in Indian Armies, 54
 Muzaffar Beg, 91, 231
 Mysoreans, The, 12-14, 31
- NABI KHAN KATTAK, 31, 35, 50, 57-60
 Nadiyunni Anicut, The, 113 (n.)
 Nad Kallans, The, 96-98, 104, 172, 302, 309
 Nandaraj, 13, 15, 65 (n.)
 Narayan Dubash, 57
 Nattam Pass, The, 40-43, 72, 145, 159, 284
 Nawab, The (Muhammad Ali), *passim*
 Neill, J. G. S., 307
 Nelkattamseval, 39, 104 (n.)
 Nellikotah, Storm of, 37
 Nellore Subadar, The, 3 (n.), 11, 20, 34, 87, 270, 307
 Nelson, J. H., 309-312
 Newton, Andrew, 110, 277 (n.)
 Ninety-sixth Regiment, The, 140, 141 (n.)
 Nixon, Eccles, 218 (n.)
 Nixon, George, 200 (n.), 230 (n.), 290
 Nizam Ali, 132, 160, 171, 278, 279
 Nizam-ul-mulk, 26
- ORME, ROBERT, ix, x, 3, 5, 7, 10 (n.), 12, 18, 44, 48-50, 70, 91, 92 (n.), 96, 98, 160 (n.), 270-272
 Orton, Robert, 195
 Owen, Thomas Colby, 205
- PAINTER, GILBERT, 205
 Palamcotta, 23, 116, 120, 197, 198, 211, 212, 238, 289
 Palk, Robert, 20, 110, 111, 129, 161, 189, 190, 207, 219 (n.), 226, 240, 307
 Pandion Chronicle, The, 75
 Paniyur, 1, 104 (n.), 310
 Parced Sahib, 186, 187, 193
 Paris, Treaty of, 7 (n.), 140, 146, 151, 153, 154
 Patissier, Comte de Bussy Castelnau, Charles Joseph, 39, 83, 125, 126, 296
 Peixoto, Eloy Jozé Correa, 229, 237, 291, 292
 Pelling, Thomas, 130, 285
 Perigny-Beaumarchais, Monsieur, 162, 221, 222, 233, 236, 253, 254, 265
 Perumal, Temple of, 117
 Phillips, Robert, 189
 Picot de la Motte, Bernard, 208
 Piers, William, 152, 159
 Pigot, George, 19, 22, 51, 55, 59, 71, 75, 79, 80, 82, 83, 87, 104, 106-108, 110, 128, 129, 144, 161, 272, 273, 306, 307
 Pillai, The, 3
 Pitt, The, 168, 176
 Pocock, Sir George, 78, 87 (n.), 122 (n.)
 Polier de Bottens, Paul, 41, 42, 43 (n.)
 Pratab Singh (Tanjore), 2, 8, 35,


- 76, 78, 92, 98 (n.), 106, 119, 123,
124, 129, 137, 141, 165, 250
Preston, Achilles, 78-84, 127, 128,
134-137, 139, 141, 143, 145, 147,
148, 152, 157, 159, 163, 164-166,
168-170, 175, 179, 181, 182, 185-
189, 193-198, 201-207, 211, 267,
275, 284, 286, 288, 289, 295, 297
Prize Money, 200 (n.)
Pulidevar, The, 35, 39, 50, 58, 60, 98-
101, 104, 258
Punniyappan, 15, 16, 18, 20, 33 (n.), 231
- RAILLARD, JOHN FRANCIS, 42, 43
Ramalinga, 183, 184, 191-193
Ramanaik, 65, 66, 74, 76, 77, 98 (n.)
Rama Varma (Travancore), 99-101,
128, 130-132, 138, 171, 188, 238,
259, 304
Rawlinson, Captain, 215, 216
Raza Sahib, Ali, 9, 262
Rebellion, Indian ideas of. See *Ambition*
Reddi of Turaiyur, The, 76, 77
Rennell, James, 69
Riquet, Monsieur, 139, 156, 170, 176,
178-180, 250, 251
Robinson, Sergeant-Major, 51 (n.)
Roman Catholic Missionaries, The,
25, 26
Rous, George, 294, 295
Rowling, Bartholomew, 191, 196,
215, 217, 227 (n.)
Rumbold, William, 59, 60, 64-67
Rumley, Charles, 37
- SADRAS, English ladies at, 80, 85-87
Saint-Denis, Captain, 126
Salabat Jang, 132 (n.), 153 (n.), 154
Sammattipuram, 117, 228
Sampati Rao, 100, 223, 254
Saunders, Thomas, 9, 10, 18, 19, 30,
31, 142 (n.)
Schwartz, Rev. C. F., 56 (n.), 112, 137,
204, 206, 207, 209
Sculthorpe, Richard, 51 (n.)
Sepoys, European officers of, 134,
164 (n.)
Shir Khan, 103, 312
Sikandarmalai, 56 (n.), 181
Smith, Alexander William, 201
Smith, John, 224, 257, 286
Smith, Joseph, 35, 40-43, 76, 77, 93,
94, 97, 102, 104, 239 (n.), 275, 276,
281, 290, 291, 294
Smith, Richard, 92 (n.), 102, 103,
105, 126, 129 (n.), 178
Soupire, Monsieur de, 69, 72, 81
- Srinavas Rao, 219, 227 (n.), 263
Srivilliputtur Pagoda, 59
Stanhope, Philip Dormer, 301
Stevenson, Samuel, 150, 159
Stevenson, William, 159 (n.)
Subrahmanya, Temple of, 59 (n.)
Sullivan, John, 299, 300
Sunku Rama, 161, 239 (n.), 285
Sweep, Godfried, 133, 149 (n.), 227
(n.)
- TAMAKAM, The, 172
Tandava Raya Pillai, 4 (n.), 112
Tanjore Cavalry, 189, 238 (n.)
Tanjore, King of. See Pratab Singh
and Tulsaji
Tiruvamiyur, Fight at, 81, 82
Tondaiman, The, 14, 35, 78, 92, 98,
133, 136, 248
Tondria Jemadar, 204 (n.)
Travancore, King of. See Martanda
Varma and Rama Varma
Treason, Penalty of, 231
Trusler, James, 28, 29
Tulsaji (Tanjore), 165, 189, 208, 238
- UNDERWOOD, SAMUEL, 51 (n.)
- VADAGARAI, 99, 100, 212
Van Eek, Heer, 122 (n.)
Vansittart, Mrs. Emelia, 85, 86
Vansittart, Henry, 86, 275
Van Teylingen, Heer, 122, 127, 132
Vashon, Thomas, 205
Vasserot, Baron David, 34, 41, 84, 282
Vasudevanallur, 101, 104 (n.)
Vattilagundu, 103, 312
Vellalans, The, 3-5
Vellore, 47, 109, 118
Vencatchellum, 21
Verdapu, 77
Vibart, M. H., 312
Volkonda, 11, 12
- WARD, FRANCIS SWAIN, 189
Ware (Wear or Weir), Daniel, 205
West, Mr., 145
Whithear, Robert, 201
Wood, John, 148, 201-203, 205, 212,
216, 233-235
Woodiataver, The, 112
Woomady Singh, 74
- Yellow Flag, The*, 200
Yusuf Khan, *passim*
Yusuf Khan's son, 6, 225 (n.), 233.
311 (n.)
Yusuf Khan's wife. See Maza
- ZEIGLER, CONRAD, 43

EXPLICATION DES RENVOIS.

- A. Palais du Roi
- B. Grandes Pagodes ou Temple de Gentils
- C. Eglise Romaine
- D. Petite Pagodes
- E. Logement de Camsaëb
- F. Etang Revêtu de Pierres
- G. Logement du Nabad Mahamet Alikan
- H. Camps des Anglois et Indiens au 1^{er} Siège
- I. Attaque du premier Siège
- K. Différents Campemens des Anglois et Indiens autour
de la ville au 2^e Siège
- L. Principale attaque du 2^e Siège
- M. Ligne de Contrevallation
- N. Redoute des Anglois sur leur ligne de Contrevallations
- O. Etang qui étoit à sec pendant le 2^e Siège
- P. Lac ou Grand Etang
- Q. Pagode fortifiée et endroit des Signaux pour les Anglois
- R. Château de plaisance des Roys
- S. Pagode fortifiée
- T. Aldée fortifiée par les Anglois
- U. Aldée non fortifiée
- V. Batteries Angloise pour battre les Redoutes Y
- X. Fortins des Anglois pour retirer leur grosse Artillerie
pendant l'hiver
- Y. Redoutes construites par le S^r Marchand et prises par
les Anglois pendant le 2^e Siège
- Z. Mosquée batti en honneur d'Alexandre
- & Endroit ou se sont donné les differens combats
- a. Redoutes qui ont tenu jusqu'à la livraison de la Place



Gravé par Croisey.



Yusuf Khan

169269

HI n.B

Y 957

.Yh

Author

Hill, S.G.

Title

Yusuf Khan, the rebel commandant.

DATE.

NAME OF BORROWER.

University of Toronto Library

DO NOT
REMOVE
THE
CARD
FROM
THIS
POCKET

Acme Library Card Pocket
Under Pat. "Ref. Index File"
Made by LIBRARY BUREAU

UTL AT DOWNSVIEW



D RANGE BAY SHLF POS ITEM C
39 14 01 12 13 011 6